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ABSTRACT 
Israel has witnessed both the judicialization of politics and growing criticism that the 
judiciary does not reflect the diversity of Israeli society. However, no comprehensive 
analysis of judicial diversity in Israel has existed. In addition, despite substantial changes 
in legal education and the legal profession in Israel in the past two decades, there has been 
no research into the demographics of Israeli lawyers and law students who make up the 
“pool” for future judicial appointments. These factors, along with recent proposals to 
reform the judicial selection procedure, form the background to this research, the aims of 
which are: 
 
(1) To provide the first comprehensive analysis of judicial diversity in Israel; 
(2) To provide the first study of diversity amongst Israeli lawyers and law students; 
(3) To explore perceptions of Israeli lawyers and law students regarding judicial 
diversity in Israel. 
 
To achieve this, three large-scale quantitative empirical studies were carried out. The first 
study draws on publicly available information to profile the diversity of all judges in the 
general court system in Israel (covering over 700 judges). The other two studies surveyed 
lawyers and law students in Israel, profiling the diversity of each group and examining 
their views about the Israeli judiciary, judicial diversity in general and in Israel, as well 
as their interest in a judicial career. 
 
The three studies therefore provide a unique insight into judicial diversity in Israel as it 
currently stands as well as the where it may be heading in the immediate and longer-term 
future. The thesis also places its findings within the continuing debate about judicial 
diversity in Israel, and it explores how judicial diversity in Israeli fits within the wider 
scholarship on judicial diversity worldwide. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
JUDICIALIZATION AND JUDICIAL DIVERSITY IN THE ISRAELI 
CONTEXT 
"So long as the [court system] duplicates its judges, it will keep losing 
its legitimacy amongst the public...I think that the members of this 
house...should act together to change the judicial nominations system, 
to break the wall that denies access from Sephardic Jews and Arabs, to 
enable adequate representation and thus create a consensus of support 
in the courts. Until then, I will keep asking: where is justice?"1 
"The Supreme Court does not represent the diversity of Israel's 
population. If it does not accept judges of different sectors...it will lose 
its legitimacy.... Arabs, Orthodox Jews and Olim [new Jewish 
immigrants] will always think the Supreme Court rules against them so 
long as they are not represented in it"2 
 
This thesis investigates the state of judicial diversity in Israel. The composition of the 
judiciary is a critical issue of major significance in Israel.  It has been such since the 
establishment of the state and is even more so since the late 1980s, following changes in 
the dynamics between the courts and the other branches of government. As the quotes 
above demonstrate, the Israeli courts system (and the Supreme Court in particular) is 
perceived as failing to represent the diverse composition of Israeli society. The politicians 
who made these statements have long retired, but their concerns continue to resonate in 
the political and public debate of Israel today. 
 
In an age of significant change in the role of courts in society worldwide, the public debate 
about the demographics of judges is not unique to Israel. Numerous democracies have 
investigated the composition of their judiciaries, the leading in terms of scope and variety 
of research is the United States3, but examinations of the state of judicial diversity have 
                                                 
1 Remarks by Knesset member (MK) David Azulai, an Orthodox Sephardic Jew, during a discussion in 
the Knesset on 3 February 1998 (quoted in: Menachem Mautner, ‘Appointment of Judges to the Supreme 
Court in a Multicultural Society’ (2003) 19 Legal Research 423, 429. 
2 Statement by Yuli Tamir, Minister of Education (then), in 29.6.2000, quoted by Mautner (n.1), 431-2. 
3 The National Centre for State Courts routinely publishes statistics on judicial diversity in the 50 states 
(“Diversity of the Bench”). http://www.judicialselection.us/ accessed 3 December 2016. 
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also been carried out in England and Wales4 and other common law jurisdictions5. 
Although there are obvious differences between jurisdictions in terms of their legal 
system, the structure of courts, the judicial nomination system and the composition of 
society, there are commonalities that characterise the study of judicial diversity: for 
instance, the composition of the judiciary and identification of sectors that may be under-
represented in it (e.g. women, ethnic minorities); the factors that are likely to affect 
judicial diversity (e.g. the judicial selection process); and the possible links between the 
state of judicial diversity and way the judiciary is perceived.  In that sense, Israel does not 
differ from other jurisdictions. However, several factors highlight the importance and 
uniqueness of judicial diversity in Israel. 
 
Over the years and particularly in the past two decades, numerous concerns have been 
expressed about the composition of courts and under-representation of specific groups in 
the judiciary6. These concerns were accompanied in many cases by attempts to revise or 
reform the judicial appointments system, mainly by parliamentary bills that for various 
reasons have not resulted in any significant change in the selection system7. So while 
public debate makes an abundance of claims about the composition of the judiciary and 
flaws in the judicial selection procedure as well as proposals for change, the nominations 
procedure has not changed significantly since its establishment in 1953. This gap can be 
partially explained by the dominance of those who object to calls to reform the 
nomination system, mainly the judiciary and several political players. But another 
obstacle hindering change in judicial appointments has been the lack of solid, empirical 
research on judicial diversity in Israel. Israel has quite unique population dynamics, with 
a highly diverse (and divided) society consisting of a range of ethnic, religious and 
national groups that differ in numerous aspects, including their attitudes toward the courts 
and political institutions of Israel8. These are the critical factors that shape the discussion 
about judicial diversity in Israel and that underlie this study. 
                                                 
4 The Judicial Appointments Commission publishes a diversity strategy and monitors its performance on 
its website (in a specified statistical bulletin): https://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/diversity-strategy. 
5 Cheryl Thomas, Judicial Diversity in the United Kingdom and Other Jurisdictions (The Commission for 
Judicial Appointments, 2005); Alan Paterson, Chris Paterson, Guarding the Guardians? Towards an 
Independent, Accountable and Diverse Senior Judiciary (Centre Forum and CPLS 2012) 52-63 
6 Shimon Shetreet, On Adjudication: Justice On Trial (Miskal – Yedioth Ahronoth Books 2004), ch 9. 
7 Mautner (n1); for a detailed review see chapter 2. 
8 Menachem Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel (OUP 2011). 
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This chapter outlines the theoretical and scholarly foundations of this thesis. It starts by 
explaining the circumstances in which the judicial diversity debate has gained recognition 
and importance in Israel. It focuses on the judicialization of politics in Israel, which 
changed the role of courts in society, making the judiciary a significant political player 
and prompting queries about its composition and selection methods. As part of the 
discussion of judicialization, specific focus is given to political and social processes that 
occurred in Israel and changed the role of courts as well as the perception and public 
interest in the composition of courts. The chapter also places these developments in Israel 
within the wider international development of the study of judges (Judicial Studies and 
Judicial Behaviouralism) and judicial diversity. Reasons why such scholarly research has 
not developed in Israel despite the continuing strong general interest in judges there are 
also explored. Finally, this chapter presents the aims and objectives of this thesis, as well 
as its organisation. 
1.1 Judicialization of politics  
In most democracies, courts are important agencies of the government and like other 
governmental institutions they interact with the political culture9. However, this was not 
always the case, at least not in its current intense form. The traditional view suggested 
that courts were isolated from the political process and impervious to external (including 
political) influences. Nevertheless, in the early twentieth century scholars (most notably 
in the US) began to argue that this view was naïve; courts are situated within the political 
process and judicial functioning carries inherent political elements10: 
“The political jurist begins with what any fool could plainly see if his 
eyes were not beclouded by centuries of legal writing, that judges and 
courts are an integral part of government and politics ... and are, 
therefore, first and foremost political actors and agencies” 11. 
This view has become more acceptable and common as the field of judicial studies gained 
greater influence and support, and the traditional prototype role of judges as rule-
applicators has gradually faded away. Today, judicial intervention exists in almost every 
aspect of modern life. The number and types of decisions that democracies entrust to 
courts has increased substantially, to the point that “there is virtually no area of social life 
                                                 
9 Martin Edelman, Courts, Politics and Culture in Israel (University Press of Virginia 1994); Ran 
Hirschl, ‘The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts’ (2008) 11 Annual Rev. of 
Political Science 93. 
10 Carlo Guarnieri and Patrizia Pederzoli, The Power of Judges- a Comparative Study of Courts and 
Democracy (Cheryl Thomas ed, OUP 2002) 5.  
11 Martin Shapiro, ‘Political Jurisprudence’ (1964) 52 Kentucky Law Journal 294, 296. 
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immune from public regulation, and thus no area can be excluded from judicial 
intervention”12. Judges are now called upon to decide such a rich spectrum of issues this 
has created expectations that have inevitably changed the perception of their role13. This 
has led to the rise of the “political judge model”14, which sees the judge as an active 
figure, no longer merely “an executor of law” but rather the guardian of individual 
freedoms and protector against state coercion. 
 
A large volume of scholarship exists on the changing role of courts in society, specifically 
the evolution of the judiciary from a dispute-resolution authority to a central institution 
in society, an equally powerful constitutional branch of the government15. This has been 
described in various terms, such as the increasing ‘judicialization of society’16, the global 
expansion of judicial power17 or juristocracy18. The increasing judicialization of society 
globally is believed to be a result of various factors (legal, social, cultural and political). 
Firstly, it is claimed, law is perceived in the western world as reflecting dominant social 
and political values. This contributed to the formation of law as a preferred method for 
dispute resolution, including the growing use of litigation to challenge governmental 
actions on the one hand, and as a resort for personal remedies on the other hand.19  In that 
respect, increased legislation regulating the rights of individuals (that correspondingly led 
to an increase in litigation against government services)20, serves as another manifestation 
of the ability of law to empower people in disputes among themselves or with state 
agencies. Similarly, various social developments may be linked to the increasing 
judicialization of society, ranging from industrialization to the expansion of the welfare 
state and the development of “social rights”21. Judicialization of society was also enabled 
and promoted by the weakening of other branches of government. Increasingly courts 
                                                 
12 Rachel A. Cichowski, ‘Introduction: Courts, Democracy and Governance’ (2006) 39 Comparative 
Political Studies 3. 
13 Guarnieri & Pederzoli (n10) 8-10. 
14 Ibid 4-13. 
15 Shimon Shetreet, ‘Judging in Society: The Changing Role of Courts’ in Shimon Shetreet (ed), The Role 
of Courts in Society (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1988) ch 33, 467-487 
16 In this field, different terms are often used to describe similar or related phenomena, thus judicialization 
may sometimes be discussed along ‘legalisation’, ‘juridicalisation’, etc. Shimon Shetreet, Justice in 
Israel: A Study of the Israeli Judiciary (Dordrecht 1994). 
17 C. Neal Tate, Torbjörn Vallinder (eds) The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (NYUP 1995); 
18 Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 
(Harvard UP 2004.); James Grant, ‘The Rise of Juristocracy’ (2010) 34 The Wilson Quarterly (1976-) 16. 
19 Herbert Jacob and others, Courts, Law, and Politics in Comparative Perspective (Yale UP 1996) 5-6. 
Litigation had not only become more widespread, but also more complex, as collective procedures (e.g. 
class actions) created a “massification” of the law, Shetreet, Justice in Israel (n16) 176. 
20 Shetreet, ibid. 
21 Guarnieri & Pederzoli (n10) 187 
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may be called upon to adjudicate on a variety of issues when other governmental branches 
have been unable or unwilling to act22.  Alternatively other branches may intentionally 
shift the burden of decision to the courts to avoid the risk of paying a political price for 
unpopular decisions23. However, it was not just the amount and variety of issues that were 
shifted to the courts to decide, but also their complexity and uncertainty (for instance in 
relation to terrorism)24. 
 
The judicialization of politics is a broad concept, but it usually refers to one of the 
following dimensions. First, it can be the expansion of the province of courts to determine 
public policy outcomes that previously had been set by the legislature or the executive 
branch25. This is primarily through judicial review26. Judicial review can take two forms.  
One focuses on the distribution of authority between the different branches of government 
and is relatively uncontroversial, being a legitimate exercise of the courts’ prerogative to 
monitor the boundaries between institutions and authorities. The second form, substantive 
judicial review (or constitutional review), enables courts to overturn the actions of other 
branches of government if they conflict with the constitution and is inherently more 
controversial.  
In addition to judicial review, judicialization can also mean “the infusion of judicial 
decision-making and of court-like procedures into political arenas where they did not 
previously reside”27. This includes the spread of legal discourse, jargon, rules, and 
procedures into the political sphere and policy-making procedures28. This form of 
judicialization is not straightforward, as it deals with the impact of courts on processes 
taking place outside the courts. Namely, it has to do with political actors and interest 
                                                 
22 Guarnieri & Pederzoli (ibid 160-161) explain that the scope for judicial intervention is somewhat 
limited in majoritarian regimes with a strong executive branch, and conversely more powerful in 
democracies where political power is not centralized. For the Israeli example of inefficient decision-
making resulting in growing judicial intervention see: Itzhak Galnoor and Dana Blander The Political 
System Of Israel, vol 1 (Am Oved publishers 2013) 301-302 
23 Shetreet, On Adjudication (n6) 461-462; Assaf Meydani, The Israeli Supreme Court and the Human 
Rights Revolution: Courts as Agenda Setters (CUP 2011) 58-62. Meydani claims, that the less efficient 
the political system is in making policy decisions, the more likely the Supreme Court is to adopt an 
activist approach. 
24 In Israel, terrorism and security crises expanded the type of issues brought to the High Court of Justice 
and its practices of judicial review. Yigal Mersel, ‘Judicial Review Of Counter-Terrorism Measures: The 
Israeli Model For The Role Of The Judiciary During The Terror Era, (2006) 38 International Law and 
Politics 67 
25 Tate and Vallinder (n17); Thomas, Judicial diversity in the United Kingdom (n.5) 21. 
26 John Ferejohn, ‘Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law’ (2002) 65 Law & Contemporary Problems 41. 
27 Tate & Vallinder (n17) 13 
28 Ran Hirschl, ‘The Judicialization of Politics’ in Robert E. Goodin (ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
political Science  (OUP 2011) 254-5 
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groups taking the possibility of judicial review (or the occurrence of past review) into 
account when considering political action. Similarly, judicialization may also mean the 
incorporation of judicial practices and conduct into non-judicial institutions29. One 
example is reform in the administrative tribunals in Britain, where legislation in the late 
1950s led to “more adjudication, less administration” (e.g., the duty to give reasons; and 
making the hearings open to the public)30.  The third aspect of judicialization is the 
reliance on courts to decide "mega politics", i.e. core political controversies that “define 
(and often divide) whole polities”31. This has been claimed to be "arguably the most 
problematic type of judicialization from a constitutional theory standpoint"32, because it 
often meant that the courts were taking an active part- and sometimes leading- 
constitutional reforms33. Finally, it is possible to describe the judicialization of politics as 
an example of a wider phenomenon, which was referred to by some as “the global 
expansion of judicial power” 34. To that, one can add the role of judges in extra-judicial 
activities, broadly divided into two types: first is the appointment of judges by the 
legislature or executive to run formal inquiries into major political issues35. The second 
is the participation of judges in private activities (e.g. lectures, conferences). Both types 
may raise concerns about judges’ involvement in politics, the separation of powers and 
judicial independence.36. 
1.2 Judicialization of politics in Israel 
“It is doubtful whether there is another political community in the world that its 
customs are subject to and affected from decisions of a judicial forum as much as 
the political community in Israel is affected by the court. And it is doubtful that any 
other legal forum in the world has such an intense involvement in the political, 
economic, social and media arenas in which it operates as the Supreme Court of 
Israel”37. 
                                                 
29 Tate and Vallinder (n.17) 16 
30ibid 93 
31Hirschl, ‘The Judicialization of Politics’ (n.28) 255-257 
32 Hirschl, ibid. 
33 Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy (n.18), says Israel's constitutional revolution is an example of this trend. 
34Tate and Vallinder (n.17) 5 
35 In the UK, judges are appointed to chair commissions to investigate highly controversial affairs. 
Shimon Shetreet, Judges on Trial: The Independence and Accountability of the English Judiciary (2nd 
edn, CUP 2013) 243-271. In Israel this is usually done in the form of Commissions of Inquiry (e.g. to 
investigate wars) initiated either by the Knesset or the government. Galnoor and Blander (n.22) 320-343.  
36 Jonathan Lippman, ‘The Judge and Extrajudicial Conduct: Challenges, Lessons Learned, and a 
Proposed Framework for Assessing the Propriety of Pursuing Activities Beyond the Bench’ (2012) 33 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1341. 
37 Yoav Dotan, ‘Preliminary Procedures And Constitutional Dilemmas Relating to The Role Of The State 
Advocacy In High Court Of Justice Litigation’ (2004) 7 Law And Governance 159, 161 
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The above quote reflects the growing power of Israeli courts in the past three decades. In 
the US, the correlation between law, courts and politics has been direct and profound by 
virtue of the Supreme Court’s policymaking role and judicial review38, but that has not 
always been the case in Israel. Legal historians define the early years of the Israeli courts 
system, and specifically 1948-1953, as the years in which the “Supreme Court brethren 
was formed”39. Strong political considerations shaped the composition of the first 
Supreme Court panel, which was supposed to represent a variety of political parties and 
views40 but at the same time be associated with the establishment41. Scholars claim that 
the government and Knesset were reluctant to accept a court decision that rendered an 
executive act void or exceeding authority42. The Supreme Court, in response, had to 
strengthen its status as an equally strong and authoritative branch of governance. Yet the 
Supreme Court’s conduct in its first three decades is described as “the formalistic era”, 
when the court, operating in a highly collectivist society under constant security threats, 
was relatively self-restrained especially in matters of security43. However, in the absence 
of a constitution, the Supreme Court has inevitably become a central forum for public 
debate on matters of the state’s identity44 as well as political and public controversy45. 
This judicial role was strengthened especially after the enactment of the Judges’ Law, 
1953, which regulated the status of judges and enshrined the principle of judicial 
                                                 
38 Martin Shapiro, ‘Juridicalization of Politics in the United States’ (1994) 15 International Political 
Science Review 101. In contrast, UK courts have traditionally played a marginal role in political life, and 
law was perceived as clearly distinct from politics; Herbert M. Kritzer, ‘Courts, Justice, and Politics in 
England’ in Courts, Law, and Politics in Comparative Perspective (n.19) 81-177. 
39 Ron Harris and others, ‘Israeli Legal History: Past and present’ in Ron Harris and others (eds), The 
History of Law in a Multi-Cultural Society (Israel 1917-1967) (Ashgate Dartmouth Publishing 2002) 17; 
Daniel Friedman, The Purse and the Sword: The Trials of the Israeli Legal Revolution (Miskal – Yedioth 
Ahronoth Books 2013) 21-29. 
40 Nir Kedar, ‘Ben-Gurion And The Struggle To Appoint A Sephardic Jew To The Israeli Supreme Court’ 
(2003) 19 Legal Research 515; Natan Brun, ‘A Judge In Distress: The Story Behind The Appointment Of 
Shneor Zalman Cheshin To The Supreme Court In 1948’ (2006) 93 Zmanim – History Quarterly 82. 
41 Pnina Lahav, ‘Courage and Office: The Supreme Court in the First Decade of Its Existence’ (1989) 14 
Tel-Aviv University Law Review 479-501. Lahav claims that although the judges of the first panel were 
diverse in some ways (religious, secular, private lawyers, experienced judges, etc.) overall, their 
worldviews did not differ considerably. For a review of the court as part of the Zionist state, see: Pnina 
Lahav, ‘The Supreme Court of Israel: Formative years, 1948–1955’ (1990) 11 Studies in Zionism 45-66 
42 Lahav, ‘Courage and Office’ (ibid) 486. 
43 Ibid 490-497. 
44 Elyakim Rubinstein, Judges of the Land (Schocken Publishing 1980); Eli Salzberger, Fania Oz-
Salzberger, ‘The German Tradition of the Israeli Supreme Court’ (1998) 21 Iyunei Mishpat 259. 
45 Daphne Barak-Erez, Milestone Judgments of the Israeli Supreme Court (Ministry of Defence 
Publishing 2003) mentions landmark cases dealing with terror and warfare, gender equality, constitutional 
review, the definition of ‘who is a Jew’?, etc. 
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independence. Gradually, the court laid the liberal foundations of Israeli law and 
developed a legal discourse of individual rights, constitutionalism and the rule of law46. 
 
From the late 1970s, several socio-political, legal and cultural changes occurred in Israel, 
which contributed to the growing judicialization of politics. Along with the political 
upheaval of 1977 (when the Labour Party lost the national elections after almost 30 years 
of consecutive rule), growing social struggles47 and the transformation of Israeli society 
from hegemony to multiculturalism, the Supreme Court also changed its doctrines. After 
many decades of legal formalism, during the 1980s a new jurisprudential era began, 
described as the “decline of formalism and the rise of values in Israeli law”48. In essence, 
this refers not only to the court’s growing involvement in issues that had been traditionally 
considered non-justiciable, but also the changes in its reasoning49 and self-perception: 
from a dispute-resolution institution, to a political institution that determines “the values 
that prevail in the country and the distribution of its material resources”50. Several factors 
and doctrines, both inside the court and externally, have expedited the judicialization 
process during the 1980s and 1990s to the point that “[t]he judicialization of politics has 
probably proceeded further in Israel than in any other democratic country”51. 
Internal factors  
The Supreme Court of Israel52 in the first decades of its existence used both the standing 
and justiciability doctrines53  to bar individuals and organizations from appealing political 
                                                 
46 Lahav, (n41) 500-501 and other scholars view the Kol Ha’am case (HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha’am v. Minister 
of Interior, 7PD 871) as a defining moment in the formation of the court's liberal approach. For a different 
view: David Kretzmer, ‘Fifty Years of Public Law in the Supreme Court - Human Rights’ (2000) 5 Law 
and Governance 297, 305. 
47 Inter alia, the secular-Orthodox debate, the Ashkenazi-Sephardic tension and of course the Israeli-Arab 
conflict.  
48 Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel, (n.8) 75-99. For a dissenting view: Assaf Likhovski, ‘Some 
Remarks on Menachem Mautner’s Law and Culture in Israel at the Beginning of the 21th Century)” [A 
Book Review] (2011) 14 Ha-Mishpat 715. 
49 Mainly shifting from focusing on the language of legal norms to the purposive interpretation approach; 
Mautner, ibid 93 
50 Ibid 75 
51 Martin Edelman, ‘Israel’ in Tate and Vallinder (eds.) The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (n.17) 
403.  
52Yoram Shachar, ‘On the Structure of the Supreme Court of Israel (“Mishkan Ke’Mishpato”) (2003) 19 
Bar-ilan Law Studies 397; Yair Sagy, ‘The Missing Link: Legal Historical Institutionalism and the Israeli 
High Court of Justice’ (2014) 31 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. Law 703.  
53 Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton UP 2006). During Barak’s tenure as Chief 
Justice, the court accepted a liberal approach to examine standing (190-197) and justiciability (177-189). 
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or publically sensitive matters54. However, over the years, and especially during the 
1980s, the court adopted a liberal approach, narrowing the limitation on standing and 
expanded the issues it was willing to adjudicate55. 
Judicial review is perhaps the most prominent expression of judicialization of politics in 
Israel. Today, it is obvious that the courts are authorized to review the constitutionality 
of legislative acts of the Knesset and administrative decisions of the executive branch56. 
However, this was not always the case. This authorization has not been officially granted 
by the parliament57, but gradually the Supreme Court created a judicial bill of rights and 
developed a legal discourse of human rights58, protecting rights it perceived as essential 
to maintain a substantive democracy (e.g. equality, freedom of speech). 
A turning point in Israel’s constitutional law came in 199259, when the Knesset enacted 
two basic laws dealing with human rights; Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty60, and 
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation61. These basic laws differed from their predecessors 
because they had special provisions protecting them from future changes62. In the 1995 
Mizrahi case, the Supreme Court declared it had the power to invalidate Knesset 
legislation that does not meet the formal conditions or values incorporated in the Basic 
Laws63. These developments were called the “constitutional revolution”, and 
significantly strengthened the Supreme Court’s status and political significance64. It has 
been argued that the “revolution” was actually an infringement of the separation of 
                                                 
54 Shetreet on Adjudication (n.6) 464-473. Dotan (n.37) 163-164 claims that the low fees to file petitions 
increase the accessibility of the court. 
55 Dotan, ibid 163-164; Ze’ev Segal, Standing in the High Court of Justice (Papyrus 1994); Ruth Gavison, 
Mordechai Kremnitzer and Yoav Dotan, Judicial Activism – For And Against: The Place of the High 
Court of Justice in Israeli Society (Magnes 2000) 11-15.  
56 Barak (n.53) 229. 
57 Lahav, ‘Courage and Office’ (n.41).  
58 Kretzmer (n.46). 
59 Gideon Sapir, ‘The Israeli Constitutional Revolution – How did it Happen?’ (2008) Bar-Ilan University 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 08-02, 3. This article provided a thorough review of the 
preliminary parliamentary consultations that led to the enactment of the Basic Laws as a political 
compromise.  
60 S.H. 150 (1992). For an English translation see: 
http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawLiberty.pdf  
61 [S.H.] 114 (1992). For an English translation see: 
http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawOccupation.pdf  
62 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, s.7 (‘rigidity’). Also see: The Israel Democracy Institute ‘The 
History Of The Constitutional Process In Israel’ (2000) 30 Parliament, here (accessed 1 January 2016). 
Gideon Sapir, ‘The Supreme Court – Structure and Institutional Practices’ (2003) 2 Bar-Ilan Law Studies 
387. 
63 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Collective Vill., 49 (4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.); Meydani 
(n.23) 103. 
64 Sapir (n 62) 387. The 1992 Basic Laws did not explicitly vest judicial review authority in the courts. 
However, since the Mizrahi case, the court has exercised this authority and dismissed various sections of 
legislation (most recent example would be HCJ 8665/14 Desta v. The Knesset (11.8.2015) in which the 
court disqualified Knesset legislation regarding the detention conditions of illegal immigrants). 
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powers and exceeded the authority of the court to a point that jeopardizes the court’s 
legitimacy65. Now whenever the court interprets the constitution it is perceived as taking 
sides in political controversies66. Judicial activism is not unique to Israel67 and is 
manifested in constitutional courts in other jurisdictions68. Nevertheless, many regard the 
Israeli Supreme Court, especially in the Barak era69, as “the most activist in the world”70. 
Many Israeli scholars tend to agree that the overall approach of the Israeli judiciary and 
the Supreme Court in particular is indeed activist71; that it is no longer a dispute resolution 
forum, but rather an institution committed to law making and defending human rights and 
democracy72. 
Scholars argue that the growing motivation of Israelis to turn to the court could be 
attributed to the rise of individualistic and liberal views amongst some sectors in the 
Israeli society, and especially elite groups (secular Jews, the press). Their goal was to 
make Israel a more secular, liberal and democratic state, and when this could not be 
achieved through political participation, they turned to the court. Furthermore, following 
the transition of Israel from hegemony to multiculturalism, the group of “former 
hegemons” reacted with anxiety to the entrance of new players into the policy-making 
domain. It is argued that this is the catalyst for the far-reaching changes that occurred in 
the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court73 and explains why the court’s growing political 
involvement caused outrage in various sectors of society that did not identify themselves 
with the “liberal elite”. 
 
                                                 
65 Ruth Gavison, ‘The Constitutional Revolution - A Description of Reality or Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?’ 
(1996) 28 Mishpatim Law Rev. 21, 99. Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard UP 2010) 368, 
strongly criticised Barak’s conduct. 
66 Gavison, ‘The Constitutional Revolution’ (n65) 99-104; Shetreet, On Adjudication (n6) 558; Barak 
Medina, ‘Four Myths about Judicial Review (In Response to Robert Bork’s And Richard Posner’s 
Criticism Of Aharon Barak’s Judicial Activism)’ (2007) 3 Haifa University Interdisciplinary Law Review, 
399 
67 Omri Yadlin, ‘Judicial Discretion and Judicial Activism as a Strategic Game’ (2003) 19 Bar-Ilan Law 
Studies 665. Instead of 'judicial activism', suggests Yadlin, it should be looked at as an inevitable realistic 
approach. 
68 Tate and Vallinder (n17). 
69 Barak himself rejected the use of this term and placed himself in the middle of the activism-restraint 
spectrum. Aharon Barak, ‘The Essence of Judicial Activism: On Worldviews about Law, Adjudication 
and Judicial Activism’ (1993) 17 Iyunei Mishpat 475, 498. 
70 Mautner Law and the culture of Israel (n8) 55; Edelman, ‘Israel’ (n51) 407. For dissenting views, see 
Yadlin (n67) and Medina (n66). 
71 Gavison, Kremnitzer and Dotan (n55). In this book, three different views regarding the desirability of 
judicial activism are presented, but it is widely accepted that the court is indeed activist.  
72 See Aharon Barak, ‘Forward: A Judge on Judging: The Role of A Supreme Court in A Democracy’ 
(2002) 116 Harvard Law Rev. 16.  
73 Mautner Law and the Culture of Israel (n8) 127. 
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External factors  
There are also external factors that strengthened the judicialization of politics. First, 
public and third-sector organizations (e.g. NGOs), disappointed with political and 
executive institutions, have found resort in the courts74, encouraged by the court’s 
approach to standing and justiciability. Second, Israeli has transformed into a litigious 
society, which prefers adjudication to any other form of dispute resolution75. This is 
partially the result of Israel having the highest number of lawyers per capita and one of 
the highest litigation rates per capita in the world76. A third factor has been the executive 
branch, intentionally shifting decision-making to the judiciary to avoid paying a political 
price for decision-making77. It is relatively accepted that Israeli society and its political 
institutions are almost incapable of handling disputes by conventional non-judicial 
tools78, and that the legislature and the executive branch avoid decisions on crucial 
matters (e.g. the constitution, relations between the religion and the state)79. Additionally, 
recurrent cases of corruption, improper conduct and scandals led to a sharp decline in the 
public’s trust in the Knesset and the government80. Under such a democratic deficit81, 
groups in Israel disappointed with the elected policy-makers now prefer to opt out from 
politics82 and appeal to the Supreme Court as an alternative policy-maker83. A fourth 
factor is the running of monitoring mechanisms (such as the State Comptroller) by current 
or retired judges84 because they demonstrate “the infusion of judicial decision-making 
and of court like procedures into political arenas where they did not previously reside”85. 
                                                 
74 Dotan (n.37). 
75 Galnoor and Blander (n.22) 265. 
76 Neta Ziv, Who Will Guard the Guardians of Law? Lawyers in Israel between the State, Market and 
Civil Society (Bar-Ilan UP 2015) 78 
77 Shetreet On Adjudication (n.6) 462 
78 ibid.  
79 Eli Salzberger, ‘Judicial Appointments and Promotions in Israel - Constitution, Law and Politics’ in 
Kate Malleson, Peter Russell (eds), Appointing Judges In The Age Of Judicial Power: Critical 
Perspectives from around the World (Toronto UP 2005) 252. 
80 The most recent data show that only 40% of the public trust the government and 38% trust the Knesset, 
ranking them the least trusted institutions in Israel. See "Selected Data from the 2015 Social Survey: 
Public Confidence in Various Institutions, Bodies and Organizations" CBS Press release (10.7.2016). 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201619207 accessed 1 December 
2016. 
81 Galnoor and blander (n.22) 303-304 
82 That is not to use common democratic forms of protest, such as demonstrations, petitions, and strikes.  
83Shlomo Mizrahi and Assaf Meydani, ‘Political Participation through the Judicial System: Exit, Voice 
and Quasi-exit in Israeli Society’ (2003) Israel Studies 8 (2). Indiana UP 118. 
84 Shetreet (n.6) 511 points out in this capacity judges are called to decide and investigate highly political 
and controversial matters, which might lead to a decline in public’s trust; Galnoor and Blander (n.22) 306 
85 Tate & Vallinder (n.17) 13 
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Similarly, Supreme Court justices have chaired numerous commissions of inquiry86 that 
have investigated defining events in the history of the state of Israel. 
1.3 Ramifications of judicialization in Israel  
Gradually, as the expansion of the political significance of Israeli courts, and the Supreme 
Court in particular, into the policy domains of other branches grew, it became common 
to argue that a court should be held accountable to the democratic values it enforces, such 
as equality, fairness, transparency and diversity. Consequently, questions about the 
composition of the Supreme Court, the backgrounds of its judges and the nomination 
procedures have become increasingly common87. 
Attempts to restrict the judiciary 
The transformation in the reciprocal relations between courts and the other branches of 
government in Israel naturally increased the tensions between them. In order to limit the 
court’s political significance, in recent years policy makers and Knesset members have 
raised several reform proposals (the vast majority of which have not been adopted)88. For 
example, several bills have proposed creating a Constitutional Court that would be 
separate from the main judicial system and exclusively authorized to review on 
constitutional matters89. Other proposals sought to restrict matters the Supreme Court 
could deal with90; to overturn the Court’s decisions through legislation91; and to either 
increase the number of justices on the Supreme Court or change its composition to reflect 
the ethno-cultural composition of Israeli society92. 
                                                 
86 Commissions are appointed either by the chief justice, based on the governments’ request, or by the 
government. Shetreet (n6) 508-512. 
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Effect on trust in courts  
Surveys conducted in Israel in the past 15 years clearly show a consistent decline in the 
public’s trust in courts, although there is no consensus on the reasons for this decline. 
Representatives of the judicial system are confident that recurrent attacks about the court 
system led to the decline in public’s trust. Some jurists suggest that this decline derives 
of the public’s refusal to accept the constitutional revolution and accept the court’s 
authority93. It has been claimed that the court’s growing involvement in public life and 
the judicialization of politics placed the judicial system in the eye of the storm, and 
damaged its professional and impartial image94. Others believe that declining levels of 
trust are due to the Supreme Court judicial review decisions not being congruent with the 
preferences of large groups in the population95. There is a perception that a Jewish-secular 
and liberal elite, well represented on the Court, has promoted a constitutional revolution 
that is detached from the values and preferences of the public.  A critical view by former 
Minister of Justice, Prof. Daniel Friedman, claims that the Supreme Court has harmed the 
public’s confidence in the entire judiciary, in this is part due to the Court’s involvement 
in the judicial nominations procedure, which has creates the impression that judges are 
appointed by a small, closed group96.  
However, further research needs to be carried to map the factors that affect public trust in 
the courts in Israel. Most of the polls are partial, in the sense that they only ask the 
respondents to quantify their level of trust, and do not ask why they have little faith in 
courts. Therefore, the available data cannot do more than prompt speculation about what 
factors led to this large fall in the Israeli public’s confidence in courts and whether it is 
indeed related to the composition of courts and the perception of judicial diversity97. 
Despite growing interest in it in the media and among policy makers in the question of 
the composition of the courts, for reasons presented in detail below, the issue of judicial 
diversity has not been the subject of detailed academic study in Israel. Any attempt to 
investigate the composition of the courts and its effects on its decision-making was 
                                                 
93 Ze’ev Segal, ‘A 15-year-old Constitutional Revolution’ Haaretz (22.11.2010) 
http://www.haaretz.com/a-15-year-old-constitutional-revolution-1.326009. 
94 Yael Hadar, ‘Israeli Public Confidence In Government Institutions In The Last Decade’ (2009) 63 
Parliament (The Israel Democracy Institute) (here). 
95 Yoav Dotan, “Judicial Review and Political Accountability: The Case of the High Court of Justice in 
Israel” (1998) 32 Israel Law Rev 448, 450 
96 Friedman (n.39) 344-348 
97 A steady and sharp decline indicates a problem as the ramifications of low level of trust in state 
institutions vary from a decline in voter turnout, disobedience with the law, etc. Hadar (n94).  
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immediately categorized as dangerous to the judiciary. The link between judicialization 
and judicial diversity seemed problematic, as it was usually made by politicians and 
jurists who rejected the Court’s jurisprudential approach. Nevertheless, the growing 
power of courts in Israel has made the examination of their composition and the factors 
affecting it not only inevitable but also essential. 
 
1.4 Study of judicial diversity 
The interest in judicial diversity and its possible implications for judicial selection and 
case outcomes (judicial decision-making) is not new. The premise that judges are 
objective, impartial and impervious to external influences was critically explored during 
the second half of the 20th century, focusing on the factors that influence the adjudication 
process98. Parallel to the growing political significance of courts (judicialization), the 
traditional view of the judiciary was undermined99 and more specific models and 
approaches to judicial behaviour have emerged.  In search of “true factors” that affect 
judicial behaviour, scholars have focused on judges themselves and their characteristics 
and attitudes as possible factors in the process of decision-making. Thus, the desirability 
of a diverse judiciary, and the implications diversity may have on case outcomes, were 
examined100. However, the available literature is long on theory and shorter on evidence. 
While it is generally accepted that diversity matters, exactly what diversity is and how 
much of it is required are complex questions that have only partially been answered. 
Diversity is a broad concept covered in a number of academic and policy-making 
disciplines101, including education, medicine, employment and policing102.  Despite the 
increase in the number and scope of research, characterising judicial diversity is not an 
easy task, as the definition is both place-based and culture-based. According to Waldi, 
“[u]nderstanding diversity requires appreciation of and attention to context: to different 
practice settings and to different groups”103.  The nature of the judicial system, its political 
                                                 
98 Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences- A Perspective on Judicial Behavior (Princeton UP 
2006) 8; Thomas Judicial Diversity in the UK (n5) 20. 
99 For a review of the differences between the US and European perception of courts as political actors 
see: Britta Rehder, ‘What Is Political about Jurisprudence? Courts, Politics and Political Science in 
Europe and the United States’ (2007) Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 
http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp07-5.pdf accessed 1 January 2016. 
100 Especially in the US, less significantly in the UK (Thomas (n5) 21).  
101 Thomas, ibid 18-19, 29-30 
102 D.A.J Waddington, ‘Editorial’ (2015) 9 Policing- a Journal of Policing and practice 1.  
103 Eli Wald, ‘Primer on Diversity, Discrimination, and Equality in the Legal Profession or who is 
Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why’ (2011) 24 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 1079, 1083. 
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context and the makeup of the society it serves are invariably different in different 
jurisdictions104. Thus, the meaning and scope of ‘diversity’ varies according to the 
purpose of the investigation, the make-up of society and the presumptions regarding lack 
of diversity. For example, ethnic diversity is presumed to be more relevant in countries 
where ethnic minorities constitute a significant proportion of the population. In other 
countries, gender equality or professional background and expertise gain more focus.  
However, despite the differences between nations, most research into judicial diversity 
looks at several common variables that 'operationalize' “diversity”. The main ones are 
gender (usually meaning the extent to which women are represented in the judiciary), and 
ethnicity and race. The less common factors are educational background, professional 
experience, age, disability, religion and sexual orientation105. In the US, the political 
outlook of judges is highly relevant to the examination of judicial diversity, due to the 
political significance of the judiciary and the political nature of judicial appointments. In 
England and Wales the low numbers of women and ethnic minorities remained the focus 
of the judicial diversity debate from the 1990s to date106, but examination of judicial 
diversity also included unique characteristics such as the differences between barristers 
and solicitors, socio-economic background, etc.107. However, in Israel, as reviewed 
further in the following chapters, the judicial diversity debate focused mainly on 
nationality and religion, intra-Jewish ethnicity, level of religious observance and 
professional background of judges. Sexual orientation, political outlook and social class 
have not been the core of the claims about lack of diversity, either because they are less 
relevant (e.g. ‘class’) or because they are not known to the public (e.g. political views).  
It is important not to assume that all under-represented sectors in the judiciary are similar 
and can be treated similarly for research or policy-making purposes. Women and ethnic 
minorities may both be under-represented in the judiciary, but this may well be for 
different reasons and therefore cannot necessarily be examined in exactly the same 
way108. Similarly, viewing all ethnic minorities in one jurisdiction as a unified group may 
                                                 
104 Thomas (n5) 18-19 
105 Cheryl Thomas, Understanding Judicial Diversity: Research Report for the Advisory Panel on 
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create a misleading impression about the state of judicial diversity and any measures to 
address it109. Finally, it is important examine group representation in the judiciary in 
relation to other socio-demographic factors110. 
 
1.5 Factors that systematically affect judicial diversity 
Probably the most widely researched issue is the possible correlation between the judicial 
selection system and the state of judicial diversity, specifically whether the method of 
judicial appointments affect the relative success of women and minorities in attaining 
judicial posts111. The interest in the nominations procedure and the composition of 
nominating committees is strongly related to the expansion of judicial power. The 
growing political significance of the courts “has been mirrored by an increased focus on 
the process of judicial appointments which has given rise to substantive reforms in many 
countries”112. One area of interest has been the composition and diversity of nominating 
commissions. Some research has found that where the committee that nominates judges 
is ethnically or socially diverse, there is overall more diversity in the judiciary113. Another 
source of interest was the politics of the nominations procedure, for example, whether 
including non-politicians in those committees would necessarily mean that less political 
considerations are taken114. 
 
The second systematic factor that was linked to judicial diversity was the nature of the 
judicial office and the judicial profession. That is, the structure of the judicial profession 
and how influential the various courts are in the process of selecting judges; and the 
perception of the judicial profession as enabling equal chances of career progression and 
providing decent working conditions for judges. An additional research area in this 
context is the level of courts where under-represented sectors manage to be appointed. 
Two important theoretical assumptions have been examined in relation to this.  First is 
the “prestige theory”, which asserts that women and minorities are more likely to attain 
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judicial offices in less prestigious courts, and similarly, that there are fewer women and 
minorities in senior ranks and higher judicial positions115. The second is the “caring role 
effect”, in which women are most likely to attain judicial office in family and other “care” 
related posts that tend to be at lower levels of judiciary116. 
 
The third factor affecting judicial diversity is the ‘pool’ for judicial appointments, with 
specific focus on the profile of applicants for judicial positions117, as well as the 
composition of the legal profession as a whole and those in legal education118.  In many 
jurisdictions, this body of eligible jurists forms the pool from which judges are selected, 
and when lawyers are heterogeneous, it is more likely to expect that judges will be 
heterogeneous as well119. Therefore the extent to which the pool for judicial appointments 
is diverse is crucial to an understanding of judicial diversity120. Studies in other 
jurisdictions have examined the career progression chances of women121 and ethnic 
minorities in the legal profession122, as well as previous experiences of discrimination at 
work123, and their possible influences on the nature of the legal profession and barriers it 
may place. The interest in legal education in the context of judicial diversity involves 
several factors124. The obvious one is the educational background of judges and senior 
lawyers (i.e. the schools and later on universities they attended)125. Another aspect looks 
at the ethnic and gender composition of law schools, and the chances of students from 
these groups securing a training contract or other offers of employment, and the reasons 
for this (e.g. lack of contacts in the profession as a possible barrier)126. 
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1.6 Justifications for judicial diversity127 
The democratic argument 
One of the prominent justifications in favour of judicial diversity is what has been defined 
as the “democratic argument”. It suggests that “[d]iversity in the judiciary is ... part of the 
delivery of justice that is increasingly vital for the courts’ legitimacy in a diverse 
society’128. This argument somewhat parallels the claim that an independent judiciary is 
an essential element in a democracy, and a diverse judiciary thus represents the very 
definition of democracy129. In a democracy, adjudication is legitimised through a 
legitimate mechanism of selecting judges. Therefore, as Resnik points out, while the 
methodology of appointing judges may vary in different democracies, the process of 
appointing judges needs to be founded on democratic values130, some of which are 
transparency, accountability and diversity. For example, the democratic argument served 
as the impetus for calls for reform in the appointment of American judges, especially in 
regards to US federal court life-tenured positions and were made in the name of 
equality131. 
The ‘perception of fairness’ argument 
“…a diverse judiciary signals the public acknowledgement of 
historically excluded communities and sends an invaluable message of 
inclusion”132 
The second justification for diversity is commonly referred to as the ‘fairness’ argument. 
It contends that diversity increases people’s confidence in courts. A diverse court is 
perceived as impartial and fair, as heterogeneity reflects the diversity between different 
sectors133. Moreover, studies in the US demonstrated a link between diversity and the 
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perception of fairness of the legal system among minority or disadvantaged groups134. 
Similarly, a lack of judicial diversity can raise suspicion, especially in ethnic minority 
communities135. This can be explained by the fact that these groups have traditionally 
been excluded from the justice system. In common with other institutions (e.g. the police), 
a negative perception of the justice system decreases the legitimacy of court decisions. 
Consequently, these groups are arguably less likely to respect the decisions of the courts 
that in their view (or objectively) fail to represent them136. Indeed, some scholars assert 
that judicial diversity means giving all eligible individuals an equal chance to be selected 
to the judiciary137. Moreover, in other instances it has been argued that the legal status of 
an unrepresentative judiciary is questionable, and judicial appointment procedures have 
been claimed to be violating anti-discrimination legislation138.  
 
Initially in many jurisdictions, the justice-system tended to dissociate itself from the 
“diversity discourse”, to oppose calls to increase judicial diversity or to claim that no 
change was needed because diversity would “evolve” over time139.  Strong objections to 
amend the appointment system have been made on the grounds that this would inevitably 
impair the professional quality of the judiciary (often named the merit debate140). 
Paradoxically, the same arguments that are raised in favour of diversity (legitimacy, 
fairness and public confidence in courts) are used in attempt to counter proposals to 
introduce diversity to the bench. However, this view may be discounted. First, there is 
little evidence to support the claim that time heals social injustices and there may actually 
be a need for tipping points for such changes to occur141. Thus, it may be better to address 
claims about the lack of diversity proactively, as this could strengthen public trust in the 
nominations procedure and consequently in the judiciary142. Secondly, increasing the 
pool from which eligible judges are drawn does not necessarily conflict with the process 
of choosing the best individuals from within that pool143. Furthermore, in light of the use 
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of ‘merit’ as an exclusive criterion for judicial selection, one wonders what ‘merit’ 
actually means144. Is diversity necessarily a secondary consideration subject to ‘merit’? 
Some scholars assert that diversity is actually integral to merit because it increases the 
legitimacy of courts and promotes impartiality of the judiciary145. 
   
The judicial diversity effects argument 
The view of diversity as an inherent part of a democratic and fair appointment procedure, 
and integral to judiciaries in democracies, is becoming increasingly accepted. However, 
while the two arguments in favour of judicial diversity are theoretically grounded and 
logical, the possible effects and benefits of diversity are yet to be comprehensively 
clear146. Research into the potential effects of judicial diversity focused on two main 
policy issues147: the effect of judicial diversity on the perception of the fairness of courts 
and the possible effects on judicial decision-making148.  
 
The link between judicial diversity and the perception of fairness of courts was mainly 
investigated in the US, which prioritised it as a key policy-making issue149. These studies 
showed that judicial diversity could promote public confidence in the courts150, and that 
lack of diversity in courts compounds suspicion amongst ethnic minority communities. 
Similarly, ethnic minority defendants were found to be troubled by the lack of non-white 
judges and court staff151. One of the dangers to a judiciary that is perceived as not diverse 
is that its legitimacy may be undermined: “A judiciary exercising significant power in a 
democracy whose own composition reflects an apparent lack of fairness runs the serious 
risk of undermining its own authority”152. 
 
Many studies have empirically examined the influence of judicial diversity on judicial 
decision-making and case outcomes153. Most research has been carried out in the US and 
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has focused on race, ethnicity and gender154. Research in this field traditionally examined 
the extent to which judges' beliefs and attitudes affect their decision-making155. However, 
studies that are more recent extended this approach and explored how background 
characteristics of other judges influence voting behaviour of panel judges. For instance, 
Cameron and Cummings examined heterogeneity in the composition of three-judge 
panels of the US Courts of Appeal in affirmative action cases, and found that increasing 
racial diversity on the panels substantially changed the voting behaviour of other judges 
on the panel156. This diversity effect suggests that different judicial perspectives broaden 
judicial views and may change the final decision157. Cameron and Cummings see this 
effect as the ‘strongest argument in favour of diversity in the courts: social legitimacy’158. 
In more than one way, this taps into the “democratic argument”, which holds that 
democratic institutions in heterogeneous societies should reflect the make-up of society. 
Thus, not only does diversity have an intrinsic value, but it also has extrinsic implications 
that must be taken into account159.  
Similar research by Sunstein on the importance of dissent, and the tendency to conform, 
has shown how the political and ideological views held by judges affect court outcomes. 
In fact, when judges’ views are diverse case outcomes are more likely to follow what both 
statutory law and precedent require160.  Posner, on the other hand, asserted that increasing 
judicial diversity was likely to result in more dissent, less adherence to precedents and 
consequently less legal certainty161. But most commentators have stressed that the 
availability of a greater range of perspectives on the bench will improve the quality of 
judicial diversity by making a difference to what courts do162. “Judicial disagreement is 
not merely anticipated or tolerated but instead is positively facilitated in common law 
systems due to its having a recognised value”, hence emphasizes the importance of 
achieving diversity in the appointment of judges163. 
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In addition to the main arguments in favour of judicial diversity, other factors and effects 
have also been linked, empirically or theoretically, with greater diversity. Two arguments 
that share similar rationale are the “business case” for diversity and the argument that 
diversity is the realization of the idea of utilitarian exploitation of all existing talent. 
The business case for diversity focuses on the commercial advantages of diversity, and 
asserts that diversity has been linked to improved organisational performance164. Whilst 
the business case for diversity has been raised primarily with relation to greater diversity 
in the legal profession, it is also linked (albeit indirectly) to judicial diversity, because the 
legal profession forms the pool of potential applicants for judicial appointment165. 
Similarly, the utilitarian use of all available talent argument also focuses on the benefits 
that greater diversity carries to professions and organisations. Diversity, arguably, 
contributes to maximizing the ‘talent pool’, as a recent report by the SRA states: 
“Removing the barriers that some groups face to entering, and progressing within, the 
profession […] maximises the chances of getting and retaining the best people for each 
role”166. 
The provision of role models is another argument that links between the judiciary and 
the pool of potential applicants. It asserts that diversity on the bench, mainly the existence 
of women and ethnic minority judges, provides a role model for new entrants to the 
profession167. Similarly, lack of such role models might be perceived as a barrier that 
deters lawyers from considering a judicial career. 
1.7 Study of judicial diversity in Israel 
Israel serves as a strong candidate for a case study of judicial diversity for a number of 
reasons. The diverse character of Israeli society and the social and political changes it has 
undergone since its establishment, the central role of courts, and recent calls to reform the 
judicial selection procedures all elevate the significance of judicial diversity in Israel. The 
quotes that opened this thesis illustrate how unrepresentative the judiciary is perceived to 
be. However, detailed research into the make-up of the Israeli judiciary has not been 
carried out yet. There have also not been any empirical studies in Israel that examine the 
factors that systematically affect judicial diversity (nominations procedure, the 'pool' of 
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from which Israeli lawyers are selected). Therefore, at this stage most claims about 
judicial diversity are mostly anecdotal. 
 
The lack of hard evidence about judicial diversity in Israel stems from two factors: (1) 
the general refusal of the Israel judiciary to cooperate with research on judges, and (2) the 
traditional lack of interest amongst Israeli academics in the empirical study of the 
judiciary. Surprisingly, the liberal elite (including the senior judiciary) that supports and 
promotes liberal values such as equal representation has strongly objected to attempts to 
examine the composition of the judicial system or to assess the ability of the judicial 
selection method to promote diversity. For these reasons, the need for comprehensive 
empirical investigation of the composition of the Israeli judiciary is clear. This research 
therefore aims to be the first to comprehensively examine the state of judicial diversity in 
Israel using a wide range of variables and encompassing all judges in the general court 
system in Israel. This thesis also examines the 'pool' for future judicial appointments, that 
is the populations of Israeli lawyers and law students, in order to provide insights into the 
diversity of the pool, as well as perceptions and views of members of the pool on judicial 
diversity.  
1.8 Does judicial diversity in Israel present a liberal paradox? 
It is widely agreed that Israeli judiciary is indispensable in protecting Israeli democracy 
and defending liberal values. However, some scholars believe that this very characteristic 
of the Israeli judiciary means it should not be diversified in a way that might jeopardize 
its ethos. Mautner168 thinks that because Israel is a multi-cultural society the Supreme 
Court’s composition should include representatives of all main cultural groups, but only 
as long as they are committed to the continuation of the liberal tradition embodied in the 
court’s rulings.  This reflects the general high level of respect many have towards the 
judiciary as a key player in Israel’s democratic process, The Supreme Court in particular 
is seen as the watchdog of Israeli democracy: 
“Israel inherited the legal system of a colonial regime - the British 
Mandate. Most of its founders lacked democratic traditions in their 
countries of origin. It has been in a constant state of war since its 
establishment…The Supreme Court of Israel, together with other legal 
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institutions […] managed to construct important features of Israel’s 
democracy and to protect others”169 
Salzberger also claims that the composition of the Supreme Court (i.e. Jewish German 
jurists or those educated in the Anglo-American legal system) and the judicial selection 
procedure have jointly created an independent and liberal court, and a unique Israeli 
liberal tradition170. The fact that this Court does not reflect the composition of Israeli 
society and consists of justices with very similar characteristics and worldviews171, is not 
reviewed as problematic at all by some.  On the contrary, this lack of diversity is actually 
valued as one of the sources of the Israeli Supreme Court’s power and a crucial factor in 
creating the Court’s liberal tradition.  
 
Those views reveal a fascinating paradox in relation to judicial diversity in Israel that has 
perhaps not been seen in other jurisdictions: in order to defend the liberal ethos of the 
Israeli Supreme Court and strengthen or maintain its role as defender of democracy, it is 
necessary (according to some) to refrain from diversifying the judiciary. Amongst those 
who hold this view, recognition of the value of judicial diversity, generally a liberal 
concept based on principles of equality and fairness, in Israel might be detrimental to the 
liberal tradition of the Israeli judiciary. 
 
In Israel the reality is that the majority of reform proposals concerning the Supreme Court 
and the judicial nominations procedure which argue for greater diversity have been made 
by either right-wing or religious Knesset or government members. Although in the first 
years of statehood, some left wing representatives opposed the formation of a judicial 
nominations committee that gives advantage to professionals and judges over the 
Knesset172, in the last decades representatives of the opposite political spectrum almost 
exclusively raised these claims. This is the first component of the liberal paradox of 
judicial diversity in Israel: politicians of left parties, associated with liberalism in their 
worldview and actions, refrain from criticising the composition of courts173 because they 
                                                 
169 Salzberger, ‘Judicial Appointments and Promotions in Israel’ (n79) 241. 
170 Ibid, 243; Oz-Salzberger and Salzberger (n44) 15-79. 
171 Saltzberger (n79) 246 describes how the MoJ (then) admitted in an interview after his retirement “he 
preferred Yekkes [i.e. German-speaking Jews YLA] in the legal establishment because they were honest 
and law-abiding”. This is a disturbing view that shows Ashkenazi Jews of German origin were given 
preference in the appointments system.  
172 Kedar (n40). 
173 An exception to this trend is Prof. Yuli Tamir of the Labour Party (n1). 
38 
 
do not want to give ammunition to the non-liberal political camp. Respectively, right-
wing and/or religious MK’s174 try repeatedly to change the composition of the judicial 
nominations committee, in part to increase judicial diversity, which is generally thought 
to be a liberal concept175. In addition, some criticisms of the lack of judicial diversity have 
made by politicians who actually reject the supremacy of law over religion. 
 
Similarly, although the Israeli judiciary is recognised as more liberal than the other 
branches of government176 and is often associated with left-wing views on prominent and 
controversial public issues in Israel (i.e. the peace process, security, human rights and the 
relation between religion and the state)177, it has not embraced the diversity argument for 
itself.  The liberal approach of the Israeli Supreme Court led it to create a judicial bill of 
rights, to expand and develop concepts of equality and enforce standards of transparency 
and good governance on virtually all administrative and political institutions in Israel 
(elected and non-elected). Nevertheless, paradoxically, the concept of judicial diversity, 
which one could argue is a democratic, liberal concept in its essence, has been either 
ignored by the judiciary, discounted as an inappropriate attempt to weaken the 
judiciary178, or judges have simply claimed that the judiciary is already diverse and 
nothing needs to be done. The question arises, however, why would a court that is 
perceived by itself and by so many others as a progressive, independent and liberal 
institution, object to the idea of judicial diversity so strongly? 
 
In considering this paradox one has to confront the reality that diversifying the judiciary 
in Israel may well introduce judges of non-liberal backgrounds into the judiciary. The 
Supreme Court’s liberal approach to the interpretation of Israeli law has developed over 
                                                 
174 A prominent exception is Prof. Daniel Friedman, who was not affiliated with any political party when 
appointed MoJ in 2007, and tried to pass several reforms regarding the nominations procedure. Friedman 
is well known for his criticism of the judicial activism and constitutional revolution doctrine of the 
Supreme Court, and his reforms were labelled as attempts to diminish the power of courts and their 
independence by intervening with the nominations procedure.  
175 Yael Levy-Ariel, ‘It is time to Increase Judicial Diversity, Your Honor’ (2015) 29 The Lawyer- Israel 
Bar Association’s Review 90-95 http://www.dmag.co.il/pub/israelbar/israelbar.html accessed 1 November 
2016.  Not all proponents of reform to the nominations procedure were interested in a weak, powerless 
court. Some of them were actually supporters of the court and highly familiar with the legal system, 
driven by concerns about diversity and public trust.  
176 Saltzberger (n79) 250 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid, 255: “we witness a delegitimizing campaign against the legal establishment, one symptom of 
which is the mounting calls to change the selection process of judges”.  
39 
 
many years, and its leaders have closely guarded this character and reputation. In the early 
years, the liberal tradition of the courts stood in sharp contrast to the eastern-European 
political style that characterised the government and other political institutions in Israel, 
and which “had distinct anti-liberal elements”179. Today, other ‘non-liberal’ forces 
threaten the hegemony of the Court (e.g. Orthodox Jews). Thus, in order to maintain the 
Supreme Court’s liberalism, it has been argued that only judges who are committed to 
liberal values or conform to the judiciary’s liberal approach should be appointed. 
 
The objection of Israeli liberals to the idea of judicial diversity in an attempt to stop non-
liberal groups from endangering the Courts’ independence and liberal legacy is not 
entirely unique. It resembled some of the challenges liberals worldwide face given the 
rise of multiculturalism; one of them is “how should liberal states treat non-liberal cultural 
groups?”180 Thus, although liberal decision-makers are thought to be more likely to 
appoint under-represented groups to the judiciary because they are more aware of issues 
of fairness, equality and diversity181, in Israel this has not necessarily been the case.   
 
In these respects, judicial diversity in Israel presents a timely and challenging prospect 
for research.  In contrast to most other jurisdictions where judicial diversity has been seen 
as a liberal policy issue, in Israel liberal ideas have been used to reject calls for greater 
judicial diversity. At the same time, there has been little detailed study of diversity in the 
judiciary, legal profession and law students in Israel, and much of the public and scholarly 
debate about judicial diversity in Israel is based on little more than anecdotal and 
unsubstantiated claims about representation in the current judiciary and those who form 
the pool for future judicial appointments. 
 
1.9 Thesis aims and organisation 
The purpose of this research is to address the key issues arising in the context of judicial 
diversity in Israel that have not been investigated in previous research. The questions this 
study focuses on are:  
                                                 
179 Ibid, 247 
180 Menachem Mautner, ‘From "Honor" to "Dignity": How Should a Liberal State Treat Non-Liberal 
Cultural Groups?’ (2008) 9 Theoretical Inquiries L. 609  
181 Hurwitz and Lanier (n108). 
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• What is the current composition of the Israeli judiciary in terms of the background 
characteristics of judges?  
• To what extent does the judiciary represent Israeli society?  
• To what extent do Israeli lawyers and law students have the same demographic 
characteristics as judges?  
• How do lawyers and law students in Israel perceive judicial diversity?  
• What factors affect lawyers and law students when considering a future judicial 
career? 
The aims of this thesis are: 
(1) To provide the first comprehensive analysis of judicial diversity in Israel, 
encompassing all judges in all courts in the main courts system, examining their 
background characteristics based on a large number of variables; 
(2) To compare the state of judicial diversity in Israel to the pool for current and future 
judicial appointments (lawyers and law students in Israel), and in doing so: 
a) To provide the first analysis of diversity of lawyers and law students in Israel; 
b) To explore perceptions of Israeli lawyers and law students regarding judicial 
diversity in Israel.  
c) To examine the possible motivations and barriers to choosing the legal profession 
and considering a judicial career 
This chapter laid the foundations to understanding why judicial diversity matters, and 
how the interest in it is linked to the judicialization of politics, with specific focus on 
Israel. Chapter 2 presents the characteristics and structure of the Israeli judiciary, 
including the judicial nomination system, and also covers the legal profession and 
education in Israel. Chapter 3 reviews what was known about judicial diversity in Israel 
prior to this study and where this research fits within the existing study of the judiciary in 
Israel.  Chapter 4 provides a brief outline of the complex demographics of Israeli society, 
including the population dynamics and the main social and cultural conflicts that may be 
relevant to judicial diversity. Chapter 5 sets out the empirical research methods used in 
this study. Chapter 6 presents the results of the Judges Study, setting out the background 
characteristics of all judges in the main courts system in Israel. Chapters 7 and 8 presents 
the results of the Lawyer Survey and Law Student Survey, respectively, which together 
explore the diversity of the 'pool' for judicial appointments in Israel. Chapter 9 
summarizes the main findings of the previous chapters and discusses them in relation to 
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the main themes underlying this thesis: judicial diversity and its relationship to 
judicialization, liberalism and the justifications for diversity, the possible effects of 
diversity (or its lack thereof) and the factors that may affect judicial diversity (e.g. the 
'pool'). It ends with policy-making recommendations, as well as suggestions for future 
research on judicial diversity in Israel. 
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CHAPTER 2:  THE ISRAELI JUDICIARY, LEGAL PROFESSION 
AND LEGAL EDUCATION 
The previous chapter introduced the aims of this research and the reasons for conducting 
an empirical study on judicial diversity in Israel. The purpose of this chapter is to present 
the Israeli judicial system, covering the circumstances of its establishment, its structure 
and its position in Israel's political system. The chapter then outlines the system for 
judicial appointments, including reform proposals, as well as key aspects of the “pool” 
for judicial appointments: the Israeli legal profession and legal education. This provides 
the essential background to examining judicial diversity in Israel. 
2.1 Historic background 
Today Israeli law mostly consists of Knesset legislation182, however it is deeply rooted in 
an amalgam of legal systems from foreign rulers, and therefore comprises a mosaic of 
laws whose origins lie in English common law, Ottoman and religious legal systems183. 
Moreover, examining the years preceding the establishment of the state of Israel reveals 
invaluable insights into the formation of Israel’s political (including judicial) institutions. 
Political scientists and historians argue that the mechanisms used by Jewish communities 
in the diaspora184 to regulate their affairs generated the knowledge and political traditions 
that were required to establish the Zionist movement and later on the political institutions 
of Israel185. In addition, The British Mandate government in mandatory Palestine (1917-
1948) allowed the Arab and Jewish communities to have their own organizations 
regulating internal affairs186. Thus, the institutions of the Zionist movement and the 
Yishuv187 (the Jewish community during the 19th century and until the formation of the 
state of Israel in 1948) laid the foundations of the modern Israeli political system188. The 
"Assembly of Representatives of the Knesset, Israel's parliament" was established in 
                                                 
182 Mostly following the enactment of the Foundations of Law Act 5740—1980. Aaron Kirschenbaum, 
“The Foundations of Law statute: Reality and Expectations” (1986) 11 TAU Law Review 117; compare: 
Aharon Barak, ‘The Foundations of Law Act and the Heritage of Israel’ (1987) Yearbook of the Institute 
for Research in Jewish law 265-283. 
183 Assaf Likhovski, ‘Between Two Worlds: The Mandate Legal Tradition in the State of Israel’, in 
Yehoshua Ben-Arieh (ed), Jerusalem during the British Mandate (Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi 2003) 251-295. 
184 The term ‘Diaspora’ (or ‘exile’) describes the dispersion of Jews out of the land of Israel into various 
countries and continents. 
185 Shlomo Avineri, ‘The Historical Roots of Israeli Democracy’ (1987) 6 Shofar 6 1–6. 
186 Lev Luis Grinberg, ‘The Crisis of Statehood: A Weak State and Strong Political Institutions in Israel’ 
(1993) 5 Journal of Theoretical Politics 89-107. 
187 Na'ama Sheffi, ‘Yishuv Intellectuals and the Approaching Holocaust’ (1996) 20 Kesher 6e–10e 
188 Shlomo Avineri, “The Origins and Challenges of Israeli Democracy” Haaretz (23.9.2014) 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.2442073 accessed 1 September 2016; Galnoor and Blander 
(n22) 23-30, 25-26. 
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1920.189 The National Council was responsible for education, local government, welfare, 
and security of the Jewish community190, but not a legal system (covered under the British 
mandate191). Thus, when the state was declared in 1948, the transition to sovereignty was 
not very difficult192. 
The legacy of British rule in the region was a crucial factor in the emergence of the 
political system in Israel193 and the establishment of the judiciary in particular194. The 
state of Israel adopted the structure195 of the courts system that had been established by 
the British Mandate196 and several principles of the English legal system (e.g. the 
principle of the independence of the judiciary)197. The common law had a major influence 
on the development of the Israeli legal system198, mainly by virtue of the King’s Order in 
Council, 1922, which gave the courts in Mandatory Palestine the liberty to apply English 
law to resolve lacunas199. 
The other pre-state factor in the formation of Israel's political institutions is the Partition 
plan (“Resolution 181”)200, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 29 November 1947. 
The resolution recommended the creation of independent Arab and Jewish states and 
termination of the British Mandate. The Plan was accepted by most of the Jewish public 
and leadership, but the Arab Higher Committee in Mandatory Palestine and the Arab 
                                                 
189 ‘The Elected Assembly’, in The Knesset Lexicon 
(http://main.knesset.gov.il/About/Lexicon/Pages/asefat_niv.aspx)  
190 Avineri (n188). 
191 Justice Dr Elyakim Rubinstein, “Judges in Jerusalem’, 60 Years to the Supreme Court: What Was the 
Political and Personal Process That Led to the Establishment of the First Supreme Court?” (2008) lecture 
at the Israel Democracy Institute. 
192 Galnoor and Blander (n22) 23.  
193 An attempt to adopt the model of the British civil service was not successful; however, other 
independent bodies (e.g. the State Comptroller, Governor of the Bank of Israel and the Supervisor of 
Banks) as well as governmental units (the Central Bureau of Statistics, the Post Office etc.) owe their 
existence to the British Mandate. Ibid, 24 
194 Aharon Barak, ‘Some Reflections on the Israeli Legal System and Its Judiciary’ (2002) 6 Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law http://www.ejcl.org/61/art61-1.html accessed 1 January 2016. Natan Brun, 
Judges and Jurists in the Land of Israel: Between Kushta and Jerusalem, 1900-1930 (Magnes 2008). 
195 Salzberger, “Judicial Appointments and Promotions in Israel” (n79) 244; Shachar (n52). 
196 Harris and others, The History of Law in a Multi-Cultural Society (n 39) 6 
197 Shimon Shetreet and Sophie Turenne’ Judges on Trial: The Independence and Accountability of the 
English Judiciary (CUP 2013). For a review of the ‘Anglicization’ (the replacement of Ottoman law with 
the English legal system) of the law of Israel see Mautner Law and the Culture of Israel (n 8) 35-38  
198 E.g. the doctrine of estoppel, the doctrine of binding precedent. Aharon Barak, “Israeli Legal System – 
Tradition and Culture” (1992) 40 Hapraklit 197-209; Even in the 2000’s 43% of the citations that Israeli 
Supreme Court justices referred to in their rulings were to English law: Yoram Shachar, “The Supreme 
Court’s Scope of Reliable Sources, 1950-2004” (2008) 50 Ha’praklit 29. 
199 Section 46 of the King's order. Suzie Navot, The Constitution of Israel: A Contextual Analysis (Hart 
Publishing 2014) 1-5.  
200 “Resolution 181 (II) - Future Government of Palestine” 
(http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061d253); Ruth Gavizon (Ed.), 60 
Years to the November 29th 1947 Resolution: The Partition Resolution and the Controversy Around it - 
Sources and Reflections (Metzilah 2009). 
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League rejected it201. Consequently, the plan did not fully materialize, a violent conflict 
emerged and turned into the 1948 war. Nevertheless, the Mandate was terminated and the 
state of Israel was declared on 14 May 1948202. Resolution 181 set the foundation for a 
democratic form of governance in Israel203. The Declaration of Independence of Israel204 
was generally in line with resolution 181205 and committed Israel to establish transitional 
institutions, a government and a constitution206. The Provisional State Council’s first act 
of legislation in 1948, the Law and Administration Ordinance207, defined the separation 
of duties between the governmental branches. Importantly, the Ordinance determined that 
the law that governed Israel prior to the establishment of the state would remain in effect, 
subject to future laws and changes. This meant not only that the court system established 
by the British Mandate would continue to operate, but also that the legal concepts and 
underlying values of the British legal system were retained, to an extent. 
2.2 Israeli Judiciary and separation of powers 
The theory of the separation of powers is the defining principle of the governmental 
structure in Israel. As classically defined by Montesquieu, it demands total separation 
between the three branches of the government: the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary208. In contemporary times, this theory is viewed as founded on (a) a recognized 
distinction between the different branches and (b) the view that every branch must have 
some discretion in fulfilling its functions without being interfered with by another 
branch209. It is important to note the connections between the branches and the restrictions 
they impose on each other210. This separation guarantees the judiciary’s independence, 
but as is the case in other countries and governmental systems, absolute separation is 
impossible to achieve211. A more flexible approach is the ‘Doctrine of Checks and 
                                                 
201 For further details of the Palestinian standing on the partition plan, see: Nazir Majali, “The Position of 
the Arab mission to the Partition Plan: Crime and Punishment”, in: Ruth Gavizon (ed), 60 Years to the 
November 29th 1947 Resolution (ibid) 69-75; Mustafa Kahaba, “The Palestinians and the Partition Plan”, 
ibid 60-68 
202 Gavizon, ibid 14, 81 
203 Galnoor and Blander (n.22) 35 
204 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs “The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel” here 
(accessed 1 December 2016). 
205 i.e. committing to a democratic country and preserving fundamental rights of minorities, announcing 
the establishment of the constitution, etc. 
206 Galnoor (n 22) 38; Yoram Shachar, “Israel as a Two-parent State: The Hebrew Yishuv and the Zionist 
Movement in the Declaration of Independence” (2007) 98 Zmanim: A Historical Quarterly 32–45  
207 Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948, 1 L.S.I. 7 (1948) (Isr.). 
208 Shetreet, On Adjudication (n6) 337; Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (n.53) 35-51. 
209 Barak, ibid 37-40 
210 Ibid, 36 
211 Ibid, 37; Shetreet (n.6) 354 
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Balances’, which aims to allow an effective and proper functioning of the authorities by 
restricting and balancing their powers212.  
Israel is a parliamentary democracy, meaning the sovereignty of the people is expressed 
through the Knesset, which consists of 120 members and is elected by the public in 
general, national, direct, equal, confidential and proportional elections213. In the absence 
of a constitution, the Knesset is arguably omnipotent. However, in practice the Basic 
Laws, the courts and the separation of powers restrain its powers214. Particularly, the 
Knesset is subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court. In its first years, the Knesset 
was characterized by clear boundaries between political parties, however the Knesset has 
gradually changed and become much more critical in its approach towards the 
government215. Frequent political changes in the 1980s and 1990s weakened the 
Knesset216, and there has been a sharp decline in the public trust217. 
The Government218, headed by the Prime Minister, stands at the top of the executive 
branch and administers the state. It has broad jurisdiction and authorities, specifically the 
exclusive power to enforce the law, to determine and execute policy and to operate its 
binding mechanisms (e.g. the police, the armed forces etc.).219Similar to the UK, the 
executive branch in Israel is accountable to parliament. By virtue of its judicial review of 
government’s actions, ethical conduct of ministers and administrative measures, the 
courts set important standards for the operation of the executive branch.   But numerous 
court proceedings challenging government powers have at times been seen as infringing 
the separation of powers. 
2.3 Structure and powers of the Israeli judiciary 
Structurally, Israel has a hierarchical three-tier General Courts system, and a parallel 
system of Specialized Courts (Labour, Military and Religious courts) with unique 
                                                 
212 Amnon Rubinstein and Barak Medina, The Constitutional Law of the State of Israel (6th edn, 2005) 
127-129  
213 Basic Law: The Knesset (1958), article 4.  
214 Galnoor (n.22) 156 
215 Ibid 157-159. 
216 Shlomo Swirski, Ami Fraenkel, “The Role Of The Knesset In The Budget-Making Process: A Critical 
Analysis And Proposal For Reform” (2000) Adva Centre- Information On Equality And Social Justice In 
Israel, http://adva.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/The-Role-of-the-Knesset.pdf (accessed 1 September 
2016) 
217 In 2014, the Knesset was at the bottom of the scale of trusted institutions, with only 35.2% of Jews and 
36.3% of Arabs trusting it ‘very much’ or ‘quite a lot’ (Tamar Herman, The Israel Democracy Index 2014 
(abridged index in English): http://en.idi.org.il/media/3823043/democracy_index_2014_Eng.pdf  
accessed 1 September 2016, 38-39. 
218 Basic Law: The Government (5761-2001)  
219 Galnoor (n.22) 209. 
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jurisdictions. The General Courts system is divided to three instances220: the Supreme 
Court, the District Courts, and Magistrate’s Courts221. The Figure below shows the 
arrangement of courts, each court’s jurisdiction and number of judges.  
Figure 1. Structure of the courts system in Israel222 [following page]
                                                 
220 Basic Law: The Judiciary 5748-1984; The Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984. 
221 S.1.(a) Basic Law: The Judiciary. 
222 In this figure, the General Courts system is in black outline and Specialized Courts are in blue. Of the 
Specialized Courts, only Labour Courts are covered in this thesis. Data on the number of judges and 
registrars in each court relies on the Judicial System’s Annual Report, 2014. As explained in Chapter 5, 
these numbers vary slightly from the total number of judges covered in this thesis. 
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At the head of the Supreme Court and the entire judicial system stands the President of 
the Supreme Court (Chief Justice). The Supreme Court jurisdiction is divided in two: (1) 
as the final and highest court of appeal in the General Courts system; (2) as the authority 
to adjudicate administrative matters in its capacity as the High Court of Justice (HCJ)223. 
Immediately below the Supreme Court are the six District Courts, whose dual authority 
is as first instance trial courts224 and as an appellate court (on appeals from Magistrate’s 
Court). The Magistrate’s Courts are trial courts, authorised to adjudicate civil and 
criminal cases. Some Magistrate’s Courts have been empowered225 to sit as Family 
Courts226, Juvenile Courts227, Municipal Courts228 and Minor Claims Courts229, and to 
rule on traffic matters230. 
The Specialised Courts significantly differ from the General Courts (and from each other) 
in their composition, jurisdiction, procedures and appointments231. However, they do 
have some common characteristics: each of them comprises an independent judicial 
system with its own administration, judges, and two judicial instances (trial and appeal). 
Usually, there is no right of appeal to the Supreme Court, but a petition to the HCJ can 
challenge decisions of specialized appellate courts232. In addition, unlike the General 
Courts system that has no non-professional (lay) judges, in Specialized Courts laypeople 
either handle the entire procedure (religious courts) or sit alongside judges. 
The General Courts’ jurisdiction is geographically divided into six districts (see Figure 
1). Magistrate’s Courts and District Courts have jurisdiction over the geographical area 
they are situated in, whilst the Supreme Court's authority includes the entire area of 
Israel233. The courts are administratively subordinated to the Minister of Justice but 
professionally subject to the Chief Justice. For many years, the judicial system was 
                                                 
223Basic Law: The Judiciary, s.15(c), 15(d);  
224 For all matters beyond the jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court, and in administrative matters (by 
virtue of the Administrative Affairs Courts Law, 2000) in specified disputes between citizens and 
administrative authorities. 
225 S.1, Basic Law: The Judiciary; Shetreet (n.6)105-109 
226 The Family Courts Act, 1995; The Courts Law, s.51(5) 
227 The Juvenile Law (Trial, Punishment and Modes of Treatment), 1971 
228 The Courts Law, s.54 
229 Ibid, s.59 
230 Shetreet (n.6) 129 
231 For a detailed review see Appendix 1. 
232 Shetreet (n.6) 118.  
233 Ibid 109. Chapter 6 below presents a detailed review of the geographical distribution of all the General 
Courts. 
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immune to external criticism or monitoring234. However, alongside a general growing 
demand for transparency in Israel public life, it has become accepted that the judiciary 
should be monitored to an extent. In addition to parliamentary discussions about judges 
and judicial decision-making and a growing interest of Israeli media in courts235, the 
Ombudsman of the Israeli Judiciary was established in 2002, in order to improve the 
service supplied by the judiciary, and investigate complaints regarding judges’ 
conduct236. 
2.4 Inter-relations between the judiciary and the other branches237 
Although the courts are authorized to adjudicate disputes and issue orders that bind the 
executive branch, de facto the latter has the final say (by virtue of its authority to execute 
courts’ rulings)238. On several occasions, the executive branch used its authority to 
prevent the implementation or execution of court judgements239. In addition, several 
factors may generate tension between the judiciary and the Knesset. For example, by 
controlling the terms of office of judges (e.g. salary) and being involved in the Judicial 
Nominations Committee, the Knesset can potentially influence the judges’ independence 
and the composition of the judiciary240. However, the focus of most tension between the 
three branches is the “constitutional revolution”, which not only strengthened the courts 
but also developed and complicated relations between the judiciary and the Knesset241. 
Some scholars even perceived it as an attempt of the elite (represented by the court) to 
force values and morals on the public despite the explicit provisions of the legislature242. 
                                                 
234 Ibid 308-313; According to Friedman (n.39) 340-348, so long as the courts had limited political 
power, there was no interest in monitoring them. However, their growing political significance and the 
decline in public trust led to calls to monitor them.  
235 Shetreet (n.6) 314-319. 
236Ombudsman of the Israeli Judiciary (official English website) 
http://index.justice.gov.il/En/Units/OmbudsmanIsraeliJudiciary/Pages/Main.aspx 
237 Other institutions that are not part of the three branches but have important roles in Israel are the 
President of Israel, State Comptroller, Attorney General and National Inquiry Commissions. Over the 
years, and with the growing judicialization of politics, the importance and impact of the monitoring 
bodies have intensified significantly. See Galnoor (n22) Chapter 7. 
238 Shetreet (n.6) 355 
239 Ibid 362-374; A very recent example of an attempt to override the court was is the government’s 
conduct regarding the temporary detention facility of illegal residents. In this case, the HCJ decided to 
annul key clauses in the law and forced the government to close the detention facility. However, 
subsequent government decisions have not implemented the court’s ruling and two more petitions were 
submitted to the HCJ which heavily criticized the other branches for their conduct in this case (Desta 
(n64).  
240 Shetreet (n.6) 423-438.  
241 Dotan, ‘Does Israel need a Constitutional Court?’ (n.89) 191 shows that prior to the “constitutional 
revolution” the Knesset seemed more ‘obedient’ to court rulings; Sapir, ‘The Israeli constitutional 
revolution’ (n59) 4 
242 Sapir (ibid) 5; Gavison (n65). 
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Thus, in several cases, the Knesset's response to court rulings regarding the 
constitutionality of legislation was to amend the Basic Laws to 'bypass' the court243. The 
tension between the branches is also apparent from several legislative attempts to regulate 
the type of matters the Supreme Court can adjudicate244. Many of the speakers against 
the Supreme Court were religious or Orthodox Jews that felt the Court, which was 
predominantly secular, was using its powers to change the status quo contrary to the views 
of the public245. At the same time, a growing number of petitions in political matters were 
submitted to the Supreme Court by MK’s’, making the Court an arena to resolve 
disagreements that would normally be discussed in the Knesset246. 
2.5 Appointment of judges in Israel 
The procedure for selection and nomination of judges has frequently been called into 
question in Israel, usually coinciding with periods of tension between the judiciary and 
the other branches247. Nevertheless, in general the appointment procedure has not 
significantly changed since the 1950s. This section describes the nominations body and 
its procedures.  It then reviews common claims that have been raised against the judicial 
nominations system in Israel, which directly relate to judicial diversity. 
Applicants for judicial posts in the General Courts system must be Israeli citizens, 
registered (or eligible to be registered) as members of the Bar and have experience in the 
legal profession for varying periods in at least one of three specified manners: as a lawyer, 
in a recognized judicial or another legal position, or as a law teacher in a listed high 
education institution248. Thus, eligible candidates for the Magistrates’ Courts must have 
worked in the legal profession for at least five years (of which at least 2 years in Israel) 
in one of the positions mentioned (i.e. as a lawyer, in a judicial or legal position or a as 
law teacher)249. Eligible candidates for the District Courts must have been either 
Magistrates Court judges for at least four years or practiced the profession in the various 
                                                 
243 Meatrael (n.91); Rivka Weill, “Sui Generis? The Hybrid Israeli Constitutional Experience” (2009), 
Working Paper, 39 <http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/Weil_Experience.pdf>; Dotan (n.89)193 
244 Assaf Meydani, Shlomo Mizrahi, “The Relations between the Supreme Court and the Knesset In Light 
Of the Steps Theory (From Problem to Solution)” in Hani Zubida, David Mekelberg (eds), The Israeli 
Political System: Between Governance and Collapse (the Israeli Political Science Association 2008) 109-
163. 
245 Dotan (n.89)196 
246 Friedman (n39)110-115; Mautner goes further to say that petitions to the HCJ were mainly made by 
left-wing MKs who used the Supreme Court to influence public opinion (Law And The Culture Of Israel 
(n8) 143-144). 
247 Yael Cohen-Rimer, “The judicial Nominations Procedure in Israel: it Works, Do not touch it!” (2012) 
72 Parliament Israel Democracy institute (here). 
248 s.4 The Courts Law. 
249 The Courts Law, s.4. Shetreet (n6) 282, believes the required length of experience should be longer.  
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forms mentioned for no less than seven years (of which at least three years in Israel).250  
Eligible candidates for the Supreme Court are those who either served as District Court 
judges for five years, or have practiced the profession for ten years (of which at least five 
years in Israel)251. 
In practice, most Magistrates’ Court judges are selected from private and public legal 
practitioners252, District Court judges are likely to be Magistrates who have been 
promoted or senior prosecutors (or other senior lawyers in state legal offices). Supreme 
Court justices are either promoted District Court judges (often Presidents) or are very 
senior legal civil servants (e.g. the Attorney General) or, rarely, senior academics253. 
Thus, the Israeli judiciary is a “professional”254 judiciary where judges are experienced 
legal professional whose judicial position is a second or third career, not a “bureaucratic” 
judiciary found in most continental jurisdictions where judges enter a career judiciary at 
a very early age,255. 
Judicial Nominations/Selection Committee256 
For several years after the establishment of the state, the procedure for appointing judges 
was handled by politicians in the absence of legislation on the matter257. This changed in 
1953 with the enactment of the Judges Act, which set the mechanism for selection and 
promotion of judges in Israel and was subsequently affirmed in Basic Law: The Judiciary 
(1984)258. The appointment of most judges259 is done by the Judges’ Selection Committee 
(hereinafter: “the Committee”)260. The Law requires that the legislature, executive and 
judiciary are all represented in the Committee. The Committee consists of nine members: 
the Chief Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court; two other Supreme Court justices; the MoJ 
                                                 
250 The Courts Law, s3. 
251 The Courts Law, s.2. Also, for the Supreme Court only, a person that does not meet the criteria 
regarding the length of practice, can be appointed if they are “outstanding jurists”. 
252 Salzberger, “Judicial Appointments and Promotions in Israel” (n.79) 249 
253 Article 2(2)(c) and 2(3) in the Courts Law. An academic who was recently appointed to the Supreme 
Court is Daphne Barak-Erez, a law professor appointed in 2012. Friedman thought such appointments 
should be restricted to very rare cases (n 39) 187. 
254 Guarnieri & Pederzoli (n 10) 66-68. 
255 Saltzberger (n 79) 254. There is some resemblance to the continental system: for example, lack of 
juries, role of the MoJ as the top administrator of the judicial system and the selection process of judges 
led by professionals.  
256 The terms ‘Nominations Committee; and ‘Selection Committee’ are both commonly used in the legal 
and public discourse, therefore they are alternately used in this thesis. 
257Nir Kedar, “Democracy and Judicial Autonomy in Israel's Early Years” (2010) 15 Israel Studies 25–
46. However, no evidence was found to show that politicians ever interfered with judicial work.  
258 Also translates as Basic Law: The Judicature (38 L.S.I. 101) 
259 Including the Supreme Court, District, Magistrate’s, Labour and Traffic Courts. Different committees 
decide appointments to Religious and Military Courts.  
260 S.6 in the Courts Law.  
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and another minister; two Knesset members (usually one from the coalition and one from 
the opposition) and two representatives of the Israeli Bar Association261. The composition 
of the Committee, therefore, guarantees a majority of lawyers over politicians (five judges 
and Bar members, compared with four MK’s and government ministers): Kedar argues 
that the committee “is largely shielded from political-factional influences because jurists 
are ensured a structured majority within it”262, while Salzberger points out that the three 
Supreme Court justices have an advantage in the Committee as they constitute the largest 
single group263. The Committee is responsible for the appointment and promotion of all 
judges in the General Courts but not appointments to Specialised Courts264 or Presidents 
of courts265.  
The Judiciary Rules (Judges’ Nomination Committee Procedural Regulations), 1984 list 
the main characteristics required from each candidate. They include: knowledge and 
skills in several areas of law; being articulate generally and in writing; efficiency 
(including management skills and punctuality); authority; judicial character, integrity, 
wisdom and motivation.266. The rules do not include provisions on how the Committee 
should consider these characteristics, nor does it define a vision regarding the desired 
character or composition of the judiciary. This means there is no stipulation regarding 
diversity as a consideration in the appointment process. 
The selection procedure starts in applications submitted to the Courts Manager by 
interested candidates267. In the application they are required to provide personal details, 
refer to their professional legal experience and provide names of people with whom they 
have been in touch over the past years in various schemes (e.g. during the military service, 
in the academia) as well as names of judges and lawyers that can provide references for 
the applicant268. The application and the accompanying documents are then sent to 
                                                 
261 S.4, Basic Law: The Judiciary 
262 Kedar (n.257) 27 
263 Salzberger (n79) 248 
264 Appendix 1. 
265 The MoJ, subject to the approval of the Chief Justice, appoints Presidents of courts. Street believes this 
should be changed so that the Committee also appoints Presidents.  
266 S.11a 
267 Rule 2, Judiciary Rules (Procedures of the Judges’ Selection Committee), 1984. For the forms see: 
The Courts Administration “A Request to be appointed as a Judge”, 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/forms/bakasha_leminuy_shofet.pdf. 
268 The Courts Administration, Directive 5-09 “The procedure for handling applications for judicial 
positions” (6.7.2009), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/haba/menahel/doc/08435509.pdf ; Yasmin Gueta, 
Efrat Noiman “The Path to a Judicial Position”, TheMarker (15.2.2016) 
http://www.themarker.com/law/1.2851297. The exact number of recommendations required in support of 
the application is not clear, as it was not listed in the Regulations. The directive mentions that applicants 
are required to provide at least eight names of referees (section 1) but then notes that after receiving six 
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various checks, and the referees are requested at this stage to provide confidential 
references regarding the applicant. Provided they meet the eligibility criteria, pass the 
security and medical background checks (e.g. criminal record) and received at least six 
appropriate recommendations269, the Manager invites them to an interview by a sub-
committee (comprising three members of the Nominations Committee, i.e. a Supreme 
Court judge (as chair of the sub-committee), an MK and a Bar representative). If the sub-
committee decides to promote the candidate, the next step in the application process is a 
one-week evaluation course for judicial applicants, led by a three judges and two 
psychologists (as of 2016, a representative of the Bar joined the course’s evaluation 
team). The course is considered intense, and only a third of the participants successfully 
pass it270. The successful applicants then go back to the sub-committee for review and 
final decision regarding their inclusion in the official database of judicial applicants. 
Then, when a judicial position needs to be filled, the applicant’s name may be brought 
forward (according to the Courts Law, the MoJ, the Chief Justice or three Committee 
members may suggest an applicant)271. The Committee then chooses an eligible candidate 
for a judicial position by a majority decision272 and recommends him or her to the 
President of Israel, who in turn formally appoints the judge273. 
For comparison, for many years judicial appointments in England and Wales operated in 
an ‘old politics style’ which involved the Lord Chancellor advised by a small number of 
senior judges who hold secret consultations, and were characterised by ‘stability, secrecy 
and informality’274. However, in the early 21st century, in part due to growing complaints 
of lack of judicial diversity, it was decided to shift the judicial appointment model into 
one that is based on the recommendations of an independent committee, the Judicial 
Appointments Commission (JAC). The JAC is “responsible for identifying candidates for 
judicial office in courts and tribunals in England and Wales (…). It manages a long and 
highly formalised selection process involving advertising, short-listing, interviews, and 
                                                 
detailed references the candidate will be invited to an interview. However, the form itself notes 8-10 
references are needed. 
269 This may be viewed as a barrier to potential applicants who have no previous connections with judges. 
See similar discussion in the UK about requirements that judicial applicants are ‘known’ to the senior 
judiciary and how it disadvantages minorities and women who lack these networks (Thomas, Judicial 
diversity in the UK (n5) 65). 
270 Gueta and Noiman (n268). 
271 S.7 
272 Except for the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court, which requires a special majority of seven 
Committee members (s.7(c) of the Courts Law). 
273 De facto, the President serves as a “rubber stamp” in the appointment process, Saltzberger (n79) 248. 
274 Gee, Graham, Robert Hazell, Kate Malleson, and Patrick O'Brien. The Politics of Judicial 
Independence in the UK’s Changing Constitution. (CUP 2015), 159-160 
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… presentations”275. Unlike the Israeli nomination commission, which is chaired by the 
MoJ, the JAC operates at “arm’s length from, but within a strategic framework set by, the 
Ministry of Justice”276. It consists of 15 commissioners: the chairman (a lay member); 6 
judicial members; 2 professional members (holding legal qualifications); 5 lay members 
and one non-legally qualified judicial member277. The selection procedure has some 
similarities to the Israeli one: application stage, shortlisting (including qualifying tests 
and other assessments), selection day for shortlisted candidates (similarly to the course 
for candidates in Israel, this day involves interviews, role play and presentations), then 
statutory consultation and a decision followed by a recommendation to the appointing 
authority278.  
Confidentiality and lack of transparency 
Members of the Committee operate under a confidentiality rule279. Moreover, by law the 
Committee's deliberations (including any information about applicants) are privileged 
and not published for public review. Until recently, the lists of applicants were not 
published either280. However, following concerns about lack of transparency, in 2008 it 
was decided to keep protocol (minutes) of the Committee’s meetings and decisions281, 
but to publish the protocol only when a specific request is made and based on the 
exclusive discretion of the committee. Recently several protocols have been uploaded to 
the judiciary’s website282 and the Committee’s announcements (e.g. approved 
nominations) are uploaded more often. Examination of the protocols and the decisions 
reveals that they do not provide information regarding the dynamics in the Committee, or 
the considerations made in reviewing applications. The protocols focus instead on the 
technical aspects of the meetings (e.g. attendees, list of candidates, results of the voting). 
The privilege on applicants’ personal information dictates that the protocols do not refer 
to the qualities of candidates or reflect the discussion about them in the Committee283. 
Consequently, the protocols do not shed light on the extent to which diversity is taken 
                                                 
275 Ibid, p.163. The authors describe how despite initially being a recommending body, the changing 
dynamics between the heads of the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice on the one hand, and the JAC on 
the other, have significantly shaped judicial appointments in the past decade. 
276 Ibid, p.165; also see: “Framework Document: Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Appointment 
Commission” https://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/sites/default/files/sync/about_the_jac/jac-moj-framework-
2012.pdf  
277 https://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/commissioners 
278 https://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/overview-selection-process 
279 Rule 15. Shetreet (n6, 273-4) describes the attempts to challenge this duty at the HCJ.  
280 Rule 15 the Judiciary’s Rules 
281 Rule 12 the Judiciary's Rules. 
282 http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/judge/protocol.htm. The protocols are from 2013-2016. 
283 The minutes omit those discussions and leave only the technical aspects and the final decision. 
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into account in the nominations procedure. Knesset reform proposals, media publications 
and statements made by policy-makers remain the main source of information regarding 
the Committee’s deliberations and diversity. 
In addition, it has recently been published that a sub-committee, consisting of two retired 
judges, operates as a ‘preliminary screening’ panel that examines applications of judges 
who are candidates for promotion. The restricted panel’s activity or authority are not 
regulated by law, and its existence (let alone mode of operation) is not fully known to the 
public, or even to all members of the Nominations Committee284. The criteria upon which 
it reviews the applications is unclear, but it is known that the panel may interview 
candidates, read previous court decisions they wrote, interview others and gather 
additional information. Judges who are not approved by this small advisory panel are not 
brought by the Chief Justice before the Nominations Committee. This policy has been 
recently challenged in a petition to the District Court, but the petition was rejected285. 
However, recently (perhaps following the petition) the Chief Justice started to present the 
Nominations Committee with a brief summary of the information gathered by the 
advisory panel. 
 
Registrars and Specialized Court judges 
The Courts Act authorises the Supreme Court President, subject to the approval of the 
MoJ, to appoint judges or those eligible to be Magistrate’s Court judges, as registrars in 
the Supreme Court, district courts and magistrate’s courts286. The registrars' main duty is 
to review and screen claims, appeals and petitions at a preliminary stage. They have 
several judicial, procedural and technical powers287, and they form an important part of 
the court system288. Judges in the Specialized Courts (e.g. Labour, Military and Religious 
courts and tribunals) are appointed via a nominations committee consisting of 
professionals and politicians (see Appendix 1). Labour courts judges, for example, are 
appointed according to the same procedure289 and by an almost identical panel as General 
                                                 
284 Revital Hovel “A secret committee rules out the promotion of judges without legal authority” Haaretz 
(18.8.2015) https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/.premium-1.2709989.  
285 Administrative appeal 29791-03/17 Movement for Governance and Democracy v The supervisor on 
the implementation of the Freedom of Information Law in the Courts Administration (6.12.2017). An 
appeal was filed with the Supreme Court and is now pending discussion (here). 
286 S.84 the Courts Law. 
287 Shetreet (n6) 130-131 
288 For further details see chapter 5. 
289 And required to meet the eligibility criteria of District Judges. 
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Court judges, however the law determines that in addition to the MoJ, the Minister of 
Economy and Industry also serve on the Committee290. However, the composition of the 
nominating committee changes significantly when judges are appointed to Religious and 
Military Courts291. Moreover, the eligibility criteria are entirely different, as the judges 
in these courts usually have no legal education. These conditions substantially influence 
the composition of some courts (for example, religious courts are entirely dominated by 
men, most military courts judges are likely Jewish, etc.292), and therefore the fall outside 
the scope of this thesis (discussed further in Chapter 5). 
2.6 Calls for reform of judicial appointments 
Most Israeli scholars and senior judges have traditionally valued the appointment system 
as reliable and trustworthy and have even suggested it is one of the best methods in the 
world in securing judicial independence and freedom from political influences293. 
However, in the last two decades, the appointment system has come under increasing 
criticism294, with some scholars and politicians now openly calling for the role of the 
judiciary to be restrained in appointing judges295. The controversy over judicial diversity 
in Israel is directly related to these calls for reform. 
Israeli politicians have shown continuing interest in judicial diversity matters (e.g. the 
background characteristics of judges, and the composition and procedures of the 
Committee that selects judges). At times, criticism, concerns and actual bills were directly 
linked to the nominations procedure; on other occasions, the parliamentary attempts at 
reform were part of wider attempts to weaken the courts. The most important or 
controversial claims and bills are discussed briefly below296. 
                                                 
290 S.4 in the Labour Courts Act, 1969; 
291 The nominating committee for religious courts consists of two officials in the relevant courts system, 
two ‘judges’ of those courts, two MKs affiliated with the relevant religious group and two lawyers. 
Appendix 1 
292 Friedman (n.39) 441-2 elaborates on the significant differences between the regular Nominations 
Committee and that of the Specialized Courts (where the Committee as well as the applicants are strictly 
religious or Orthodox men). 
293 Rubinstein and Medina (n.212) 334. For a brief review of the unique Israeli model, see: Paterson and 
Paterson (n5) 58. 
294 The Knesset Research and Information Centre Judges’ Appointment – A Comparative Research (2001) 
4. 
295 Ibid, 4-5; Mautner (n.1) 427-431. 
296 Ibid, 424-427 
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Calls to change the Supreme Court 
The claim of politicians that the Supreme Court represents the Israeli elite (e.g. 
Ashkenazi, Liberal/left-wing, secular men) and that other groups (namely women, Arabs, 
Sephardic and religious Jews) are significantly underrepresented has been increasingly 
heard since the 1990s297. The rationale behind the interest in the composition of courts is 
that the growing involvement of the courts in controversial issues makes the backgrounds 
and views of judges, as well as their selection process, an important issue and a 
fundamental component in shaping the public’s trust in the judiciary. Of particular 
concern is the image of the Court as an institution that acts for the benefit of certain 
sectors of the population298, and the wider concern that the court system as a whole is an 
exclusive “members’-only club”. Both concerns have exacerbated the decline in public 
trust in courts in Israel299. While the Supreme Court is still one of the trusted institutions 
of the state, this trust is steadily declining300. Barak-Erez argues that the desire to preserve 
public confidence in the court system is important if the system wishes its decisions to be 
followed and viewed as accepted norms and codes of behaviour301. According to scholars, 
this decline in public trust in courts in Israel exists because of growing feelings of 
alienation amongst minority groups, who tend to assume that the justice-system and the 
Supreme Court in particular do not represent them302. 
Other criticisms focus on the political significance of judges and their excessive power in 
the nominations process. Israeli critics of the judiciary have claimed that, in most western 
democracies, the role of the judiciary in the appointment procedure is limited, with power 
to select judges vested in elected representatives. In Israel, however, not only are judges 
fully involved in the appointment procedure, but also they are extremely active in the 
types and scope of cases they are willing to adjudicate303. The current Israeli MoJ, Ayelet 
Shaked, argued only several weeks prior to being appointed that "Only in Israel, judges 
                                                 
297Ibid, 427-434 for several examples of criticism from MKs. Most of the criticism was in the form of 
public pronouncements in Knesset committees or plenary, but some matured into bills. 
298 M. Mautner, The Decline of Formalism and the Rise of Values in Israeli Law (1993) 
299 Friedman (n39) 345  
300 Ibid, 124; compare Gad Barzilai, Efraim Ya’ar-Tuchman and Ze’ev Segal, The Israeli Supreme Court 
in the View Of the Israeli Public (Papyrus 1994); Mark Schon “Survey: The Public Contentment Of The 
Judiciary In Israel – The Lowest In Recent Nine Years” Calcalist (19.11.2009) 
http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3368093,00.html 
301 Barak-Erez (n.45) 123. 
302 Ibid. 
303Yitzhak Klein and Moshe Koppel, ‘Towards Balance: The Powers of government authorities in Israel 
and the Judicial Appointment Method’ (2003) The Israel Policy Centre 16. The authors claim that in 
other countries, the degree of judicial involvement in the appointment process declines in inverse 
proportion to the level of judicial activism. 
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appoint themselves and the court invalidates laws"304. Although these claims may not be 
borne in the reality of judicial appointments in other democracies, they maintain a certain 
level of “truth” in Israel that governs the public debate over judicial selection. Former 
Israeli MoJ, Freidman, argued that a series of appointment rounds and debates damaged 
the public perception of courts: 
“…the entire affair, which gained vast media coverage, severely hurt 
the Supreme Court. It turned out, that the appointments struggles in the 
Supreme Court are political, in all the ugliness that characterizes such 
battles.... The impression was even worse following a series of 
statements [according to which] the Supreme Court justices are a 
‘family’, and therefore it is impossible to accept a new member without 
the consent of all other family members”305. 
In addition, the number of justices on the Israeli Supreme Court has not grown in 
accordance with the number of cases coming to the Court306. Shetreet claims that the 
existing Justices do not want to expand the Court despite the burden of work and concerns 
about possible damage to the services given to the public by the court. Traditionally, the 
Supreme Court has objected to attempts to increase the number of justices set by law 
(currently 15) because it did not want the Court to lose its unique character307. 
Calls for change to the judiciary’s composition 
It is often claimed that a selective hegemonic group of “nation builders” has the monopoly 
over key political and social power positions in Israel. This group consists primarily of 
Ashkenazi Jews from certain cultural and ideological backgrounds308. The first panel of 
the Supreme Court, for example, was comprised solely of Ashkenazi men309. It was 
almost 15 years before the first Sephardic Jew was nominated to the Supreme Court310, 
three decades for the first woman to join, and fifty-six years for the first Arab judge to do 
so311. 
                                                 
304 Naomie Levitzki, "Threatening the Supreme Court", Haaretz (27.4.2015) 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.2622170. 
305 Friedman (n39, 190-191) referring to the controversy regarding the failure to appoint Professor Nili 
Cohen to the Supreme Court in 2002. 
306 Shetreet (n6) 292.  
307 Moshe Gorali "Adding Justices To The Supreme Court: Small Politics, Big Change " Calcalist 
(9.11.2016) http://www.calcalist.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3701385,00.html 
308 Ran Hirschl, ‘The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons 
From Four Constitutional Revolutions’ (2000) 25 Law & Social Inquiry 91-149. 
309 Brun, ‘A Judge in Distress’ (n40). 
310 Kedar, ‘Ben-Gurion and the Struggle to Appoint a Sephardi Justice’ (n40). 
311 Salim Joubran, a Christian Arab, was appointed in 2004 (in 1999 an Arabic judge was serving as an 
acting judge but did not retain a permanent position). 
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In the 1950s senior politicians had already proposed moves to diversify the Supreme 
Court, aiming to enhance social cohesion and contribute to the legitimacy of the legal 
system312. In response, the judiciary opposed the idea of imposing diversity or assigning 
designated seats to judges from specific backgrounds. The then Chief Justice claimed that 
pre-assigning seats based on gender, ethnicity or religion would not only be contrary to 
the principle of equality, but also detrimental to the legitimacy of the judiciary. 
Nevertheless, a “silent practice” of “designated-seats”313 for Sephardic Jews, religious 
Jews, women and Arabs has developed, which is not formally endorsed by law and is 
confined to the Israeli Supreme Court314. The secrecy surrounding the appointment 
process impedes the identification of cases in which this practice was adopted. What is 
clear is that this practice has not ended claims about under-representation within the 
judiciary. 
In addition to concerns over the Supreme Court’s homogenous composition, claims have 
also been made about the Court’s western-liberal agenda, which promotes the interests of 
the elite and where distinct social groups appear to be excluded and unrepresented by the 
judiciary. The growing attention to the composition of courts may also be related to 
cultural and political changes315. In 1977, after 30 years in power, the centre-left Mapai 
party lost the election to the right-wing Likkud party. Over time other social and political 
groups (e.g. Sephardic Jews, religious Jews, etc.) also started to gain political power. It is 
claimed that, in response, the old Ashkenazi, liberal elite acted to transform the Supreme 
Court into a super-authority that is representative of its worldviews. 
Another frequently heard claim is of nepotism in the judiciary. Kinship ties between 
judges in Israel, as well as family ties or close friendships and professional partnerships 
between judges and interns, legal assistants and even state advocates, have been 
commonly seen in the judiciary and gave rise to criticism about the nominations 
procedure316. Today, information about direct family ties within the judiciary is published 
on the judiciary’s website317. However, in the past, the public has not been made aware 
                                                 
312 Kedar (n40) 521 
313 Michael Birnhack, David Gussarsky, “Designated Chairs, Minority Views and Judicial Pluralism” 
(1999) 22 Tel-Aviv University Law Review 499-542  
314 Ibid, 503  
315 Mautner (n1) 426 
316 Mautner, ibid; Bill: The Courts Law (Amendment – Restrictions on The Appointment of Family 
Relatives), 2016-5776; Hen Ma’anit “There Are Judges in Jerusalem (And Their Children Are State 
Advocates)” Globes (22.7.2016) http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001141247. The 
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criticism over a nepotistic appointment procedure was, in many cases, not substantive. 
317 http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/rashut/family.htm. 
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of these ties318, and the common perception remains that the appointment mechanism is 
based on social relations and acquaintances. These practices were strongly criticized319 
as detrimental to the concept of fairness320, and therefore the Judicial Selection committee 
recently decided it would not recommend appointing family members of sitting judges 
except in exceptional circumstances, and it imposed stricter rules, including that children 
of Supreme Court justices would not be appointed to a judicial position during their 
parent's' tenure321. 
Calls to change the Judicial Nominations Committee and its procedures  
Over the last decade, criticism has mainly focused on appointment procedures and the 
composition of the Judicial Nominations Committee322. Some asserted that the 
nomination procedure ought to be revised so that public representatives (e.g. academics) 
are added to the Committee323. This, they argue, would diversify the committee without 
undue political influence. Other politicians have sought to increase parliament’s influence 
within the Nominations Committee324. The most common argument is that appointing 
judges solely on professional considerations is inappropriate, given the involvement of 
courts in politics and judicial review325. This issue was particularly popular during the 
term of the eighteenth Knesset (2009-2013), when the Committee was `under attack` by 
bills designed to change its composition and mode of action326. Most notable of these 
were a bill suggesting public hearings for Supreme Court candidates in the Knesset327, 
and the proposal to change the composition of the Committee to ensure that the head of 
the Bar Association would be appointed as one of two representatives of the Bar 
                                                 
318 Dan Lahav, Limitations on Justiceships of Judges in Family Relationships (2001) Knesset Research 
and Information Centre. 
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(allegedly in order to influence the appointment of Supreme Court judges328).  A 
statement made by MK Gideon Saa'r indicates the rationale behind the proposal to have 
public hearings for SC appointments: 
“The hearing is one of the ways to achieve heterogeneity of world-
views, and transparency of the nominations to the Supreme Court. The 
concept that judgement is a merely objective profession is obsolete.... 
Therefore, it is important that diverse morals be reflected in the 
Supreme Court…. Conservatives, i.e. religious Jews, Olim and [Likkud 
voters] feel like their perceptions are not represented in the Supreme 
Court. A public hearing and greater transparency would decrease the 
hostility and alienation towards the Supreme Court and the rule of law 
amongst those groups”.329  
Eventually, none of the bills passed. Several leading researchers have warned that calls 
for a change in the composition of the Supreme Court stem from a desire to weaken the 
judiciary, and characterized the speakers in favour of diversity as political nationalist 
extremists330.  There have even been calls to alter the judicial appointments system by 
introducing quotas for under-represented sectors331. 
2.7  Instituted reforms 
Several important amendments to the Nominations Committee’s practices did eventually 
pass. The Courts Act was amended in 2008 to require a special majority of seven (out of 
9) Committee members in order to appoint Supreme Court justices332. This was done (as 
officially stated in the explanatory notes333) in light of the importance and unique status 
of the Supreme Court and its jurisdiction. However, it is clear that an additional 
motivation was the desire to mitigate the impact of Supreme Court justices in choosing 
their future colleagues. Additionally, it was decided to limit the period of tenure of 
Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Supreme Court, District Courts and Magistrates 
Courts, purportedly in order to prevent stagnation and infuse ‘new’ blood’ into the 
                                                 
328 A summary of the more recent proposals (2011-2012) –The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 
‘Monitoring Anti-democratic legislation’ http://www.acri.org.il/he/?p=1231. Additional bills proposed to 
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http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1104565.html?more=1. 
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333 Bill –The Courts Law (Amendment No. 51, special majority for the appointment of Supreme Court 
judges), 2008. 
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system334. Another important amendment passed in 2014 inserted (though not explicitly) 
an element of gender diversity into the Committee, when it was determined that each 
body in the Committee would have at least one woman amongst its representative groups 
(i.e. at least one woman of the three judges, at least one woman from the Bar etc.)335. 
Zamir committee 
In 2000, following mounting criticism of the courts, their composition and the 
nominations process, the Committee nominated a subcommittee (headed by then 
Supreme Court Vice-President, Yitzhak Zamir) to re-examine judicial appointment 
procedures336. Zamir Committee was composed of three members: a judge (Zamir), a law 
professor (Amnon Rubinstein) and the then President of the Bar (Yuri Guy-Ron)337. 
In its 2001 report, the Zamir Committee reviewed the various recommendations and calls 
for reform of the Israeli judiciary, including claims about under-representation of 
religious Jews, Sephardic Jews, Arabs, new immigrants and others338. It also reviewed 
various ideas about changing the composition of the Nominations Committee and 
embedding mechanisms to guarantee “democratic-values” and ensure representation of 
minority-groups339. Nonetheless, the Zamir Committee did not accept any of these, 
arguing that representativeness is compulsory in elected institutions but not in the 
judiciary whose role is to interpret the law as objectively and professionally as possible340. 
It expressed the view that the courts are strictly professional341, and it asserted that a 
litigant’s basic right is to have its case adjudicated by judges that are appointed on the 
merits of their qualifications and not because they represent a certain sector. Finally, it 
argued that it would be practically impossible for a small institution like the Supreme 
Court to be representative of all social sectors342.  
                                                 
334 S.8(b) and 9(b) to the Courts Law 
335 Ibid, Article 6(3a).  
336 The Report of the Committee for the Examination of Judicial Selection in Israel (March 2001) 
337 All were Jewish Ashkenazi men of the same background; a similar claim was raised in a journalistic 
review of the under-representation of Sephardic Jews in the judiciary (Arik Weiss, “White Lie”, Ma’ariv 
(2.11.2007). 
338 Zamir report (n336) 26. 
339 Ibid 13. 
340 Ibid 12-13 
341 Mautner (n1) 432 
342 Zamir report 13-14. The latter argument seems weak, as it does not explain why larger courts in Israel 
are under-representative. 
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Instead, the Zamir Committee embraced the concept of a “socially reflective” rather than 
representative judiciary343: 
“The idea that the composition of the judiciary in general, and the 
Supreme Court especially, should represent the composition of the 
population is not accepted... Representativeness is appropriate for 
elected bodies, whose role is to set policy in local or national affairs, 
like the Knesset […], but it does not suit a professional body like the 
court. The court’s main duty is to interpret and implement the law 
objectively… and not to represent a specific sector…. [H]owever, the 
principle of ‘mirroring’ the composition of the population is found in 
various countries and international organizations. According to this 
principle, the Court, although it should be first and foremost a 
professional body, should also reflect society, if possible…[in other 
words] the court should be ‘reflective’ rather than ‘representative’ “344 
Although it did not define what ‘reflection’ actually is and how it should be measured, 
the Zamir Committee claimed “social reflection” already existed in practice in the judicial 
appointment procedure and it was merely re-affirming it345. Not all agreed346. The Zamir 
Committee also went as far as concluding that the Israeli judiciary was more socially 
reflective than judiciaries in other jurisdictions. Despite not presenting any empirical 
evidence to support this347, it claimed that Sephardic and religious Jews are not under-
represented in the judiciary and that there had been continuous improvement over time 
as far as Arabs and immigrants are concerned348, that there was no “significant problem 
with regards to these issues.” Lacking neither the evidence nor a clear operationalization 
for the concept of “social-reflection,” Zamir Committee de facto ignored these 
problems349. What it did recommended was that the Nominations Committee officially 
                                                 
343 Ibid 15. Of course, the term ‘reflective’ in relation to the judiciary is not unique to the Zamir 
committee; compare: “A judiciary which is visibly more reflective of society will enhance public 
confidence” (The Advisory Panel report, 2010 (n107), p.4). 
344 Ibid 26.  
345 It stressed that reflectiveness should be given weight, only subject to the professional and personal 
level of the judicial applicant. Ibid 28.  
346 Shetreet (n6, 290-291) argues that the committee missed an important opportunity to adequately deal 
with the criticism on lack of diversity. While he agrees that the principle of representativeness is 
inappropriate in the judicial context, as it may create a politicization of the courts and endanger their 
independence, he argues that Zamir Committee should have expressed clear support for the “reflective 
judiciary” principle and its justifications, instead of determining that it had already existed.  
347 Unless there had been a systematic collection of data from all courts by the Committee, but its findings 
remained confidential and there was no indication of this in the official report.  
348 It asserted that data on Jewish ethnicity or religiosity could not be obtained from the Courts’ 
Administration, and that anyway it would be unworthy to categorize judges based on those parameters. 
(Zamir report (n336) para 29). 
349 It only mentioned representation of women and Arabs in the judiciary (43% and 4% respectively); Ibid 
14. 
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adopt the reflectiveness as a criteria for appointment, but it asserted at the same time that 
it had already been part of the nominations procedure350.   
It should be noted that the terms ‘socially reflective’ and ‘representative’ often overlap in 
the discussion about judicial diversity in Israel. As mentioned, it is unclear what their 
exact definition is and what are the differences between a ‘representative’ and a 
‘reflective’ judiciary in this context. It might be that acknowledging that the judiciary 
should be reflective imposes a less binding standard of diversity compared to determining 
the judiciary should be representative of society (as further discussed in section 2.8 
below).  
Outcomes of Zamir Committee: judicial training and transparency 
The Zamir Committee did make some important recommendations regarding judicial 
appointments, specifically about transparency and judicial training351. It recommended 
that while the Nominations Committee’s deliberations should remain confidential, it 
proposed that the names of the candidates on the Committee’s agenda be published 21 
days before its deliberations352. Similarly, it recommended that a sub-committee 
(comprising three members of the Nominations Committee) should hold interviews with 
the candidates prior to presenting their names to the Committee for decision353. As 
discussed earlier, this sub-committee operates today and is considered central to the 
appointment process. 
Another importantly change was the creation of a ‘Course for the Evaluation of Judicial 
Candidates’, which was established following the recommendation of the Zamir 
Committee and has been running for 15 years now. During this 7-day course, judicial 
applicants are observed and evaluated by a team of three judges and two psychologists, 
who then draft a recommendation for the Committee that forms an essential part in its 
decision whether to appoint the applicant354. The judiciary sees it as the best (and even 
unique in the world) evaluation tool for selecting judicial applicants. The course has not 
been without criticism, with some feeling that because it is not regulated by law and has 
                                                 
350 Mautner (n1) 433, wrote in this context that the Zamir Committee was “rocking between its 
professional approach towards the judiciary and widespread recognition that the Supreme Court plays a 
clear political role”. 
351 It also supported the idea of an Ombudsman to examine complaints about judges’ conduct, and this 
institution was established a year later. 
352 Salzberger (n79) 22. 
353 ibid.  
354 See the guidelines for applicants on the judiciary’s website: 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/forms/bakasha_leminuy_shofet.pdf). Note: the course is not aimed for 
District and Supreme Court applicants; (Shetreet (n6) 296; the Zamir report (n336) 52-54 
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developed as a practice run by the courts’ system, it therefore is not subject to any form 
of supervision. Additionally, judges play an exclusive role in the actual evaluation of 
applicants, while the other bodies that are represented in the Committee (but not in the 
evaluating team) are not in a position to question them355. Some lawyers who have taken 
the course have complained that two-thirds of the participants fail and that the evaluation 
team does not explain its decision. In addition, they claimed that preference is given to 
lawyers who have worked in the public sector, especially in the courts and the State 
Advocacy356.  Consequently, the Bar has been asked to participate in the course, and in 
January 2016 it was confirmed that a Bar representative would sit as an equal partner (not 
an observer) in the evaluation course for a pilot of two courses357. 
2.8 Resistance to change 
Many Israeli scholars are confident that the Israeli judicial selection system is one of the 
best in the world (or at the very least it operates well and does not require any 
modifications). Distinguished scholars who regularly criticise political institutions and 
their practices do not see flaws in a judicial appointment mechanism that for years has 
been operating under the cloak of secrecy, despite the great influence it holds over who 
becomes judges in almost all courts in Israel.  For some the fact that all three branches of 
government (and the Bar) are represented in the Nominations Committee means there is 
no need to examine it further: 
“Our experience shows that the independence of the committee is 
guaranteed by its unique composition. The committee’s decisions are 
always substantive and free of political considerations, thus leading to 
the appointment of highly professional judges, independent of political 
bodies. In fact only a few countries have such a satisfactory 
arrangement in a pivotal matter…”358  
Without information about how the Committee actually operates, one wonders how the 
authors could be so confident that the decisions of the committee were always 
                                                 
355 Tova Tzimuki “For The First Time: Not Just Judges To Screen Judicial Applicants” Ynet (23.8.2015) 
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4693630,00.html 
356 Anat Ro’ee “Graduates of the Judicial Training Course Claim: The Course Dynamics Contradicts 
Independent Thinking” Calcalist (16.8.2015) http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-
3666995,00.html. In addition, MK Koren, a member of the Nominations Committee, claimed that a 
psychologist from the team that manages the judicial selection course was discriminating against 
Sephardic Jewish applicants. Hen Ma'anit "A Psychologist in charge Of the Judicial Selection Course 
Discriminates Sephardic Applicants", Globes (9.5.2016) 
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001123257.  
357 This was stated in a letter from the Chief Justice, Miriam Naor, to the president of the Bar (21.1.2016), 
as published on the Bar’s website: http://www.israelbar.org.il/UpLoadFiles/judge_selection_letter.pdf  
358 Rubinstein and Medina (n.212) 131. 
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professional and devoid of political considerations. Other scholars, feeling that the 
judiciary was under attack because of its activism, see queries or reform proposals 
regarding its composition as attempts to restrain the courts and the rule of law, and to 
change the balance between the branches and promote narrow political interests.  Such 
reforms are therefore perceived as dangerous to the professional level of the courts and 
public trust in them359. This reflects a wider academic reluctance to criticize the 
“constitutional revolution” 360.  It is claimed that this is based on the fact that many Israeli 
senior academics are part of a group who promoted the enactment of the 1992 Basic Laws 
and their far-reaching interpretation by the courts, and whose cultural, political and legal 
hegemony has come under attack in recent decades.  This group may also have no interest 
in writing about judicial diversity, because its findings may better serve groups that 
oppose the growing power of courts (e.g. Orthodox Jews) or claim its composition should 
reflect Israeli society to a greater extent. 
 
Traditionally, the judiciary itself and the Supreme Court in particular, strongly objected 
to the idea of a representative or diverse judiciary361. In the earlier decades of the state, 
the judiciary enjoyed an unsullied reputation and soaring rates of public trust. 
Additionally, public awareness of concepts like accountability, legitimacy and 
transparency was not well developed, and therefore the judiciary was not criticised for its 
substantial influence in the appointment procedure, its homogenous composition or its 
objection to adding judges of various backgrounds to the bench. The views of senior 
judges were clear: diversity is not a legitimate consideration in the appointment 
procedure, and the interest in judges’ backgrounds is “a delicate matter that may amount 
to an invasion of privacy”362. Israel’s Supreme Court Chief Justice, Dorit Beinisch, 
expressed some of the most common arguments against diversity: 
“The Supreme Court is not a representative body. Unlike the Knesset 
and the government, the court is not an elected body. Indeed, what is 
called 'mirroring' of the public should be held in the composition of the 
Supreme Court, but the reflection does not imply representation. 
Representation is not suitable to a distinct professional body designed 
to objectively and independently express the values of society. Public 
                                                 
359 Cohen-Rimer (n247). 
360 Gideon Sapir, ‘Between Liberalism and Multiculturalism: Review of "law and Culture in Israel at the 
Beginning of the 21st Century" by Menachem Mautner’ (2010) 26 Bar-ilan Law Studies 311–40. 
361 Salzberger (n.79) 249 
362 Zaltzberger and Oz-Zaltzberger (n44). 
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Confidence in courts will not be achieved from it being a representative 
body and perhaps on the contrary”363. 
 
Nonetheless, the interest in the composition of the Israeli courts has continued to grow, 
and the stronger the Court has become, the more interest there has been to investigate its 
judges, their decision-making and their appointment mechanism.  
Interestingly, the concept of diversity is no stranger to the legal and public spheres in 
Israel. In 2000, when the legislature amended the Civil Service Law (Appointments) 
1959, it adopted a form of affirmative action policy, which requires that “proper 
expression” should be given to the representation of the following groups amongst 
employees in the civil service: both sexes; people with disabilities; members of the Arab 
population (including Druze and Circassian); and people who were born in Ethiopia. 
Moreover, Israeli courts have been expanding concepts of equality, adequate 
representation and constitutional rights to institutions across the public sector. One might 
ask why a similar acknowledgement should not be extended to the process for judicial 
nominations364.  Should a committee that is exclusively authorised to select, promote and 
dismiss judges, and therefore shapes the current and future judiciary of Israel, also have 
to take similar issues into consideration? Moreover, Beinish’s statement also echoes the 
distinction made by the Zamir committee between a ‘representative’ and a ’reflective’ 
judiciary, as reviewed in section 2.7 above. Thus, Beinish accepts the terms ‘social 
reflection’ or ‘mirroring’ in the judicial context, but rejects the assertion that the judiciary 
should be representative of society. Of course, the terminology of a ‘reflective’ judiciary 
is not unique to Israel, but the opposition to the term ‘representative’ may indicate that 
the judiciary is exempt from the binding meaning of the legal term ‘(adequate) 
representation’. Instead, it may reiterate the assumption that the term ‘a reflective 
judiciary’ sets a vague criteria for diversity that, according to Beinish, is more suitable 
for the judiciary. 
                                                 
363 Beinish’s speech in judges’ inauguration ceremony is quoted in: Tomer Zarhin, “Beinisch: The 
Supreme Court is not a Representative Body, It Is Only Meant to Reflect” Haaretz (2.1.2012) 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/1.1607342. 
364 In fact, the Civil Service Law as well as the Attorney General’s Directive which followed the 
amendment to the law, did not exclude the judicial system from the applicability of the law (see: The 
Attorney General Directive no. 1.1503 “Adequate Representation to Certain Sectors” (2003) 
http://www.justice.gov.il/Units/YoezMespati/HanchayotNew/Seven/1.1503.pdf [Hebrew]. In comparison, 
judicial nominations had already been brought within the scope of the Sex Discrimination Act and the 
Race Relations Act in some European Directives; see Thomas (n5) 63-66.  
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Another argument that is commonly used is that Israeli judiciary is actually diverse 
enough and can no longer be seen as homogenous. Former Chief Justice Asher Grunis, 
claimed in 2012 that the composition of the Supreme Court reflected Israeli society364F365. 
Unlike Grunis’s statement, which was confined to the Supreme Court, other scholars such 
as Salzberger have gone as far as to claim that the entire Israeli judiciary was diverse and 
proves that the appointments procedure operates well: 
 “in comparison to other countries, the composition of the courts in 
Israel, including the highest court, has always been more heterogeneous 
from the perspective of ethnic origins, gender, and religious beliefs”366. 
What is true is that the Israeli Supreme Court today is perhaps the most diverse it has ever 
been in several aspects (e.g. Jewish ethnicity, religiosity)367. However, this does not mean 
that it is diverse in all key respects, nor does it mean that the entire judiciary is diverse 
and reflects Israeli society. In his claim, Saltzberger does not rely on actual data regarding 
the entire judiciary, but rather on the round of appointments in 2004 in which two women, 
an Arab and an Orthodox Jew were appointed to the Supreme Court. As progressive as 
this may be, it cannot be inferred that the entire judiciary is diverse or that the nominations 
procedure is flawless. 
2.9 The “Pool” for judicial appointments 
In Israel, as in many jurisdictions, the legal profession and legal education provide the 
pool for judicial appointments, and therefore the composition and demographics of 
lawyers and law students are directly related to judicial diversity368. As with judicial 
diversity, the importance of and justifications for diversity in the legal profession and 
legal education369 have until recently been mainly studied in the US, with specific 
emphasis on women and people of colour370.  In addition, diversity in the legal profession 
and legal education can be important not just because of its potential contribution to a 
                                                 
365 Yuval Yoaz “Grunis: The Composition of the Supreme Court reflects Israeli society”, Globes 
(31.5.2012) http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000753266  
366 Salzberger (n79) 250 
367 Goor Megido “From Tunisian To Rehavia: Mazuz Was Sworn In As A Judge At The Supreme Court” 
Globes (10.11.2014) 
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000985271.  
368 Thomas, ‘Judicial Diversity in the UK’ (n5) 31. 
369 Gary Orfield and Dean Whitla, ‘Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences in Leading Law 
Schools’ (1999) UCLA: The Civil Rights Project. 
370 Wald (n103) differentiated between various domains of the legal profession and how diversity should 
be assessed in them. 
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diverse judiciary, but also for several other reasons371 (including the business argument 
for diversity) which may not be as relevant for the judiciary372. 
Legal profession in Israel  
Israeli lawyers play an important role in the legal system, the public debate and socio-
political activity373. Moreover, as seen earlier, one of the eligibility criteria for judicial 
appointments is that applicants be registered (or eligible to be registered) as members of 
the Israeli Bar and have experience in the profession for varying lengths of time. It is 
clear, therefore, that in Israel the existing population of registered lawyers serves as an 
important pool from which judges are appointed and should be examined when discussing 
issues of judicial diversity.  
The legal profession in Israel is a uniquely strong and centralized professional 
association374. As with the judicial system, the legal profession in Israel was also formed 
during the British Mandate and was influenced by the English legal tradition375. Although 
the distinction between solicitors and barristers was not adopted, other aspects of the 
emerging legal profession in Israel were regulated by Mandate ordinances376. In the first 
years of statehood, the main values of the young state were contradictory to the core 
values of the legal profession. The state relied on collectivist solidarity, which was 
especially expressed through agriculture, security and defence, and redemption of 
lands377. Lawyers (and judges, as reviewed before) did not easily blend with this ethos, 
and unlike today, when lawyers are found in key positions in the Civil Service, the 
Knesset and the government, in the past they were not involved in the political and public 
spheres378. 
Over the years, however, the status of the legal profession has changed substantially, in 
parallel with the strengthening of the courts and the enactment of the Israeli Bar 
Association Law in 1961379 ("the Bar Law"). According to the Bar Law, the purpose of 
                                                 
371 Eric H. Jr Holder, "The Importance of Diversity in the Legal Profession" (2002) 23 Cardozo Law 
Review 2241-2252, claims that diversity in the profession is part of the struggle for equality in America. 
372 Thomas (n.5) 52; Wald (n103). 
373 Gad Barzilay, "The Ambivalent Language of Lawyers in Israel: Liberal Politics, Economic Liberalism, 
Silence and Dissent" (2010) 15 HaMishpat 195. 
374 Ziv (n.76) 6; Eli Salzberger, "The Israeli Jurists Conspiracy – On the Israeli Bar and its Allies" (2001) 
32 Mishpatim 45-95. 
375 Ziv (n.76) 51 
376 ibid 53 
377 ibid 59; Lahav (n.41) 482 
378 Ziv (n.76) 60 
379 The Bar Association Law, 5721-1961 
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the Bar is to incorporate all lawyers in Israel and to assure the standard and integrity of 
the legal profession. Membership is mandatory and is a pre-requisite to practicing law in 
Israel380. The Bar has several statutory functions, the main ones being to register, 
supervise and hold examinations for legal interns; to license new lawyers; and to take 
disciplinary measures against lawyers and legal interns. The most senior position in the 
bar is that of the Bar President, who is elected every four years. The law also clearly states 
that only lawyers are authorised to represent clients in judicial bodies and to draft legal 
opinions and documents.381. Given the extensive power conferred on the Bar by The Bar 
Law, some scholars describe the Bar as a guild that strives to limit the number of its 
member, is almost impervious to external revision and is highly autonomous in a manner 
unprecedented in comparison to other professions in Israel (e.g. medicine) or to legal 
professional associations in other countries382. 
In order to qualify as a lawyer in Israel, one must take an undergraduate degree in Laws 
(LL.B.), which may be obtained either in universities (where candidates must meet high 
admission criteria) or colleges (with somewhat lower admission criteria but where tuition 
fees may be significantly higher). Upon successful completion of studies, a one-year 
compulsory internship period (‘staj’) is required. After completing the staj, candidates 
who wish to become lawyers must take the Bar examination, and are accepted as members 
of the Bar if they pass. In most cases, professional legal training usually lasts 4.5 years, 
of which 3.5 are dedicated to the LL.B., and the remainder is for the internship period.  
Since the mid-1990s, following the opening of several new law schools, the number of 
lawyers in Israel has grown dramatically. Data show that between 1968 and 2005, it 
accelerated by 1,552%, compared to a 246% growth rate in the general population383. The 
average annual number of law graduates that were admitted to the Bar between 1948 and 
1994 was 337, but this swelled into more than 2,500 newly qualified members each year 
between 1995 and 2011384.  Israel already has one of the highest rates of lawyers per 
capita in the world, with an estimated ratio of one lawyer per 146385-150 people386, and 
                                                 
380 Israel Bar Association – General Information  
(http://www.israelbar.org.il/english_inner.asp?pgId=103336&catId=372); Ziv (n76) 18  
381 Ziv (n76) 65 
382 Salzberger (n374) 47-62. 
383 Ziv (n76) claims that the acceleration in the number of lawyers is not unique to Israel (243).  
384 Limor Zer-Gutman, 'Effects of the acceleration in the number of lawyers in Israel' (2012) 19 
International Journal of the Legal Profession 247, 248-249 
385 Moshe Bar Niv, Ran Lachman and Revital Altberger, ‘The Increase in the Number of Israeli lawyers: 
Responses and Ramifications’ (2014) 20 HaMishpat 73.  
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Lawyers in Israel - One per 150 Persons” Calcalist (25.5.2014) 
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it is expected that by 2021 there will be some 80,000 lawyers in Israel. Recent studies 
linked the rise in the number of lawyers with a series of changes that occurred in the legal 
profession and education including the growing number of lawyers who take an LL.M.387 
and the increase in the number of lawyers who leave the legal profession. Opponents of 
the growth in the number of lawyers claim it has damaged the professional level and 
ethical conduct of the legal profession, with considerable fluctuation in the number of 
disciplinary inquiries opened by the Bar against its members; however a recent study did 
not find evidence to support these claims388.  
Legal education in Israel  
The first legal education institution was opened in Mandatory Palestine in 1920 by the 
British commission389. Following the establishment of the state of Israel, the law faculty 
at the Hebrew University was established in 1949390, and its law school has since been 
one of the most influential institutions in the legal culture in Israel391.  In subsequent 
years, Tel-Aviv University, Bar-Ilan and Haifa Universities opened law faculties. Yet 
until recently, the Hebrew and Tel-Aviv Universities were the main generators of senior 
judges and civil servants392. The relatively small number of law faculties and students, 
along with their homogenous composition (consisting mostly of Jewish Ashkenazi 
men)393, gave these institutions a rarefied image, and they were often referred to as ‘ivory 
towers’, symbolizing how law and legal professionals (including judges) are detached 
from the people394. However, the image of legal education in Israel changed dramatically 
in the 1990s as new law schools were opened in colleges, and the number of law students 
grew exponentially.  Today there are 65 higher-education institutions in Israel (8 
                                                 
(http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3631984,00.html); Ziv (n76) 78, claims that this ratio is 
the highest in the western world.  
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being either unable to find a job in the legal profession or under the impression that an advanced legal 
degree would enhance their career prospects. 
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389 Assaf Likhovski, ‘Colonialism, Nationalism and Legal Education: The Case of Mandatory Palestine’ 
in Ron Harris and others (eds) The History of Law in a Multicultural Society (n39) 75  
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universities and 55 budgeted and non-budgeted academic colleges)395, and there are law 
schools 14 of these (4 in universities and 10 in colleges396). Today, the vast majority of 
students and degree recipients in law are college students397. In 2011, 8.5% of all 
undergraduate students in Israel studied law398 (4% of university undergraduate students 
and 15% of undergraduate students in colleges). 
As the number of law colleges grew, and accordingly thousands of new lawyers joined 
the profession, the Bar intensified its actions and rhetoric against law colleges, and took 
various measures to try to influence legal education. The Bar’s actions included recurrent 
calls to extend the internship term399; several harsh statements against law schools in 
colleges400; and significantly increasing the degree of difficulty in the qualification 
exams401, when data show that college graduates are more likely to fail the Bar exams402.  
However, several scholars claim that the fear of saturating the profession is not new at all 
and goes back to the pre-state period403. Moreover, the significant increase in the numbers 
of law students and lawyers is not unique to Israel, but is rather a common phenomenon 
in many western countries404.  The diversity issue, perhaps surprisingly, has not drawn 
much attention within the general controversy over legal education and the legal 
profession, but the few exceptions to that are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
This chapter has outlined the structure or the Israeli judiciary, its judicial selection process 
and recent debates over reforming the judicial selection system.  It also outlined important 
information about the two key elements of the pool for future judicial appointment: the 
Israeli legal profession and legal education. These issues relate directly to the current state 
                                                 
395 Budgeted colleges are subsidized by the state, meaning their tuition fees are very similar to those of 
universities. 
396 Two colleges are located in the periphery of Israel: Zefat Academic College in the north and Sapir 
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400Hen Ma’anit, “The President of the Bar: Reduce College Tuition Fees" Globes (15.12.2015) 
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of and continuing debate in Israel over judicial diversity, which is discussed in more fully 
in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: JUDICIAL (AND LEGAL) DIVERSITY IN ISRAEL 
Israel serves as a strong candidate for a case study of judicial diversity for a number of 
reasons. The diverse character of Israeli society, the central role of courts in Israeli politics 
and society as well as recent calls to reform the judicial selection procedures, all elevate 
the significance of judicial diversity in Israel. Yet despite the fact that the issue is 
prominent on the public agenda in Israel, there is a significant lack of empirical research 
on the matter. The growing awareness of the importance of judicial studies in Israel has 
produced several empirical legal studies, which investigate links between judicial 
decision-making and background characteristics, external influences and judicial 
dynamics405. But detailed and robust research into the make-up of the entire Israeli 
judiciary has not been carried out yet. The lack of hard evidence stems from two factors: 
(1) the refusal of the judiciary to cooperate with research on judges and (2) the traditional 
lack of interest amongst Israeli academics in the empirical study of the judiciary. 
This chapter presents the main themes and characteristics of the current study of judicial 
diversity in Israel and the factors that led to its limited scope, despite great public interest 
in the composition of Israeli courts. It reviews the few empirical studies on the judiciary 
in Israel, which mainly focused on the possible links between background characteristics 
of judges and their decision-making or on individual aspects of judicial diversity such as 
the representation of the Arab sector in the judiciary. Therefore, this chapter reviews the 
existing research in order to ascertain what is already known about judicial diversity in 
Israel and what needs to be further examined.  It also reviews what is known about the 
diversity of the “pool” for judicial appointments in Israel amongst Israeli lawyers and law 
students. 
3.1 Existing research in Israel on the judiciary and judicial diversity 
Over the years, a substantial body of research has developed about the role the Supreme 
Court has played in Israel406. Yet despite the deep interest in courts in Israel, and their 
reciprocal relations with the other branches of government in Israel, very few scholars 
have investigated the make-up of the judiciary and the interactions between the judiciary 
and Israeli society. In a jurisdiction where, arguably, “everything is justiciable”407, one 
                                                 
405 As further discussed below in chapter 3.1 
406 Meydani, ‘The Israeli Supreme Court’ (n.23).  
407 This statement is attributed to former Supreme Court President, Aharon Barak: “…I regard the 
doctrine of non-justiciability or ‘political questions’ with considerable wariness […]”, The Judge in a 
Democracy (n.53) 177-8. 
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would expect that such an analysis would have been undertaken at some point. Yet for 
years legal academic research in Israel has refrained from critically examining the reality 
of the judicial decision-making process, the judicial appointments procedure and the 
background characteristics of Israeli judges. These have, until recently, remained the 
province of journalists408, social activists409 and politicians410. This now seems to be 
gradually changing, and recently some Israeli scholars have begun to publish research 
drawn from the field of judicial studies (also known as judicial behaviouralism411). The 
studies that are most relevant to this thesis are reviewed briefly below, focusing on their 
possible contribution to the understanding of judicial diversity in Israel. 
 
“Judicial diversity” in Hebrew? 
The fact that there is no comparable word in Hebrew to the English term ‘judicial 
diversity’ perhaps exemplifies the overall paucity of research in this area.  The few studies 
in Hebrew that have dealt with this topic used alternative concepts (e.g. ‘the reflective 
judiciary’412) that arguably do not capture the full meaning of the term. This may also 
indicate that the empirical study of the judiciary (judicial studies) has yet to really develop 
in Israel. The author of this thesis consulted the Academy of the Hebrew Language 
regarding the proper translation of the terms “judicial diversity” and “judicial studies”. 
The Academy approved the term that the author suggested for judicial diversity (‘ ןווגמ
יטופיש’), and suggested a new term for ‘judicial’ (‘תוּט ְפוֹשׁ’)412F413.  These terms have now 
been used in an article published in the Israeli Bar journal 413F414, but it is too early to tell 
whether they will be adopted in future academic discourse about judicial diversity. 
Research on judicial nominations and links to judicial diversity 
Several Israel scholars have examined the extent to which the government and the 
Knesset were involved in appointing Supreme Court judges in the early years of the state. 
Kedar claims that the political-factional considerations were ‘negligible’ in the 
appointments process and mainly concerned the extent to which appointers sought to 
                                                 
408 Nomi Levitski, The Supremes: Inside the Supreme Court (The New Library 2006).  
409 Sikkuy– The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality Adequate Representation of Arab 
Citizens in the Israeli Justice-System (2008).  
410 As seen in chapter 2. 
411 Nancy Maveety, The Pioneers of Judicial Behaviour (University of Michigan Press 2002), for the 
origins of judicial studies and judicial behaviouralism (in the US). 
412 Shetreet (n.6) 284 
413 Pers. Comm (email) with the Academy of the Hebrew Language (5.3.2015 and 8.3.2015).  
414 Levy Ariel (n.175) 
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achieve a politically balanced composition in the Supreme Court, representing most of 
the political parties at that time415: 
“[The] understanding, shared by the entire Israeli elite, stat[ed] a need for the 
highest government institutions to be staffed not only by honest professionals 
but also to somehow reflect the political centre of Israeli society. This system 
of appointments reflected a suitable balance between the principles of 
democracy and judicial autonomy”416. 
Politicians’ acknowledgement of the importance of diversity of political affiliations on 
the bench, in addition to professional qualifications and integrity, is evident elsewhere417. 
More important to this thesis is the first evidence of a struggle to attain ethnic diversity 
in the Supreme Court. As early as the 1950s, and prior to the establishment of the Judicial 
Nominations Committee, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was convinced that 
appointing a Sephardic judge to the Supreme Court (which was then entirely dominated 
by Jewish Ashkenazi men) would enhance social cohesion and contribute to the 
legitimacy of the legal system418: 
“Ben-Gurion was guided in this struggle by…primarily his desire to 
strengthen the feelings of solidarity, belongingness, and responsibility 
for Israeli society among non-Ashkenazi ethnic groups. ‘There must be 
a sentiment of a nation’, he claimed, ‘the [Israeli] people must feel that 
it is their [Supreme] court, I am surprised that the judges do not feel 
this’”419. 
Quite strikingly, at such an early stage of statehood, when judicial diversity was not even 
a conceptual notion in Israel, Ben-Gurion (who was not considered a liberal), was already 
rationalising diversity in a way that resembles current justifications for judicial diversity 
(e.g. perception of fairness)420. However, the judiciary rejected the idea that various 
ethnic groups in the Jewish sector should be represented in the Supreme Court, and 
specifically attempted to block the appointment of a Sephardic justice421. Eventually, the 
first Sephardic justice was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1962, 14 years after the 
establishment of Israel. Similarly, at the end of the 1970s, the right-wing PM, Menachem 
                                                 
415 Kedar (n.257) 30. 
416 Ibid 31 
417 Saltzberger (n.79) 246.  
418 Kedar, “Ben-Gurion and the Struggle to Appoint a Sephardi Justice (n40) 521 
419 Kedar (n.257) 35 
420 ibid, ibid; compare: Salzberger (n79) 249-50.  
421 Rubinstein, Judges of the Land (n.44) 150, presents the letter sent from the President of the Supreme 
Court to the MoJ. He also mentions that the Sephardic applicant himself refused to be appointed based on 
his ethnic affiliation and insisted it would be made based on his skills and experience (153).  
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Begin, wanted an Arab judge to be appointed to the Supreme Court422, but this did not 
happen until 2004. While this state of affairs was criticised by a small number of 
researchers423, others did not think that the dominance of Ashkenazi men in the judiciary, 
or the pivotal influence the judiciary had in the Nominations Committee, were 
problematic: 
“The judges in the Committee, who almost always voted en bloc after 
consultation with their fellow judges, were generous in appointing 
Sephardic, Orthodox and Arab judges to the lower courts, but insisted 
that appointment to the Supreme Court should be based solely on 
merit424”.  
This reveals two important aspects related to judicial diversity in Israel. First, it shows 
that, already in the early years of statehood, political leaders believed diversity of the 
bench was desirable and were concerned about the lack of diversity in the Supreme Court. 
Second, it demonstrates how policy-makers were more concerned about diversity than 
judges. Specifically, it shows how judges strongly objected to attempts to ‘diversify’ the 
judiciary, and were taking measures to directly influence the appointment procedure425. 
Research on diversity and judicial decision-making  
Israeli academics (mostly jurists, but also criminologists and scholars from other fields) 
have been interested in the possible links between nationality and ethnicity (of judges, 
lawyers and parties) on the judicial process. Of specific interest has been the effect that 
ethnicity and/or nationality may have on case outcomes, with special emphasis on 
comparisons between Jews and Arabs and the extent of judicial biases to the detriment of 
Arabs426.  A number of studies have found negative correlations between the ethnicity 
and nationality of defendants and the punishments received in the criminal justice 
                                                 
422 Ibid 157  
423 Shetreet (n6) 
424 Salzberger (n79) 250. One wonders why exactly it was “generous” of the judges in the Committee to 
appoint Arabs, Sephardic and orthodox Jews, and why (in the name of merit) they were only allowed in 
lower courts and not the Supreme Court. 
425 Brun’s articles show the attempts of judges to prevent the appointment of specific judges using 
intrigue, pressure on decision-makers and even gossip. See: Nathan Brun, “The Lost Honour of Supreme 
Court Justice Gad Frumkin” (2003) 101 Cathedra 151–90 (part 1); 102Cathedra 159–86 (part 2); Nathan 
Brun “The Secret Document on the Judges: Another Look at the Establishment of the Israeli Judicial 
System in 1948’ (2005) 115 Cathedra 195–216; “A Judge in Distress’ (n.40). 
426 Giora Rahav, Yoram Rabin
 
& Eppi Yuchtman-Yaar “Disparities between Jews and Arabs in the Israeli 
Criminal Justice System” (2015) 13 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 233. The focus on Arabs seems 
only natural, given the complex relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel, and the disproportionate 
number of Arab prisoners (40% of criminal prisoners are Arabs, while they only constitute 20% of the 
total population). 
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process427. Then from the 2000s, Israeli scholars began to look at the background of other 
participants in the judicial process, including judges428. An empirical-legal study found 
that judges may be influenced from stereotypical perceptions of Arabs, which may be 
exacerbated when judicial decision-making is done under time and data constraints (in 
initial remand proceedings)429. A recent study tests the ethnicity-based panel effects in 
criminal appeals in Israel430. Drawing from the existing literature and research (mainly in 
the US and Israel) about the extent to which judicial outcomes depend on judges’ 
identities431, and specifically the impact of racial composition of appellate courts432, the 
authors examine the impact of panels’ ethnic composition on the outcome of criminal 
mitigation appeals of defendants from different ethnic origins in Israel. They found that 
Arab defendants’ appeal chances are higher when the appeal panel that reviews their 
requests to mitigate punishment includes an Arab judge (compared with all-Jewish 
panels). 
                                                 
427 For example, a study in the 1980s examined differences in punishment policy in criminal cases 
between Arab and Jewish defendants in Magistrates’ Courts (Muhammad Salim Haj-Yichie, Giora Rahav 
and Meir Teichman, “Magistrate’s Courts and Their Functioning with Minorities In Israel” (1994) 4 
Israel Journal of Criminal Justice157). Rahav found that Jews of Sephardic origin were sentenced more 
severely than Ashkenazi new immigrants, and Israeli-born defendants (Giora Rahav, "Ethnic origin and 
disposition of delinquents in Israel" (1980) 4 Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 63-
74). In 2014, research conducted at the Israeli Bar’s request revealed that Arab defendants are not only 
significantly more likely to be convicted compared to Jews in identical offenses, but they are also 
sentenced to longer periods of imprisonment (Rahav, Rabin and Yaar (n 426). Other studies found 
somewhat conflicting results: for example, that juveniles of minority groups involved in anti-social 
behaviour were treated more severely (compared to Jews) by the police and the Probation Service, but 
more leniently in Juvenile Courts. Haj-Yichie and others (n 427).  
428 Amy Wolf The Effect Of Lawyer’s Ethnicity On Judicial Decision-Making, a seminar paper presented 
at Bar-Ilan University’s Advanced Legal Writing Workshop (2015); Gideon Fishman, Arye 
Rattner, and Hagit Turjeman, “Sentencing Outcomes in a Multinational Society: When Judges, 
Defendants and Victims Can Be either Arabs or Jews” (2006) 3 European Journal of Criminology 69-84. 
This research found that Arab defendants are more likely than Jews to be sentenced to prison in violence 
offences, by both Jewish and Arab judges. However, Arab judges tend to mitigate the penalty when the 
victim is Arab (78-81). Oren Gazal-Eyal, Nochi (Nechama) Politis, “Specialization or Generalization? 
The Effect of Judicial Specialization on Proceedings and Decisions” (2014) 44 Mishpatim 891-931. 
429 Oren Gazal-Eyal and others, “Arabs and Jews in Remand Procedures” (2008) 38 Mishpatim Law 
Review (vol. 3) 627; Oren Gazal-Ayal and Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, “Let My People Go: Ethnic In-
Group Bias in Judicial Decisions - Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment” (2010) 7 Journal 
of Empirical Legal Studies 403. For a similar recent study see: Chemi Ben Noon, “Cognitive Biases and 
Judicial Decisions – Intuition and Systematic Thinking In the Judicial Work” (2016) 5 Sha’arei Mishpat 
Review 177-242 
430 Guy Grossman and others, "Descriptive Representation and Judicial Outcomes in Multi-ethnic 
Societies" (2015) 60 American Journal of Political Science 44. 
431 Fishman, Rattner and Turjeman (n428); Theodor Eisenberg, Talia Fisher and Issi Rosen-Zvi, “Group 
Decision Making on Appellate Panels: Presiding Justice and Opinion Justice Influence in the Israel 
Supreme Court” (2013) 19 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 282–96. 
432 Lee Epstein and Jack Knight “Reconsidering Judicial Preferences” (2013) 16 Annual Review of 
Political Science 11–31. 
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An important study about gender and law by Bogush and Don-Yichyee examined the 
possible effects of gender on female judges, lawyers and complainants in Israeli courts433. 
This large-scale, multi-method study found that female judges in Magistrates’ and 
District Courts tend to be lenient with male sex offenders. The authors hypothesized that 
women in senior positions tend to adapt “manly” patterns in resolving issues that concern 
other women, or adopt stricter policies against female litigants. Similar conclusions were 
made in some of the research mentioned above, which tried to understand why Arab 
judges might be stricter with Arab than non-Arab defendants434. 
A further study of judicial decision-making focused on the designated seats in the 
Supreme Court (e.g. the Sephardic chair, the religious chair, etc.), and it examined 
whether the ‘seat’ of the judge influences their decision-making patterns and specifically 
their tendency to write a minority opinion435. The authors did not find any correlation 
between the position of the judge and unique judicial opinions (i.e., dissenting views). 
But they maintain that, given the importance of dissent, the ‘legal pluralism’ concept 
underlying judicial diversity is justified regardless of the judicial outcome436.  
Research about the make-up of the Israeli judiciary 
Even though no empirical investigation of the composition of the entire Israeli judiciary 
has been conducted to date, several studies provide important (albeit partial or out-of-
date) information on the composition of the judicial system in Israel. Rubinstein’s book, 
Judges of the Land, examined the establishment and the first decades of the Israeli 
Supreme Court437. Alongside the historical review of the formation of the legal system, 
Rubinstein provides a portfolio of all 25 Supreme Court justices serving in the years 1949-
1978, including essential background on the nominations procedure and the official and 
non-official considerations that governed the process. The justices’ background 
characteristics examined were: age, country of birth, legal education and previous 
positions. Another investigated aspect is ‘related considerations in the appointment of 
                                                 
433 Rina Bogush and Rachel Don-Yichyee, Gender and Law – Discrimination against Women in the 
Israeli Court System (Jerusalem Institute For Israeli Research 1999). The study focused on criminal and 
family law cases, and involved several methods, e.g. court rulings analysis, observations in courtrooms, 
off-the-record interviews with judges and critical textual analysis of rape cases. 
434 Fishman et al (n428). 
435 Birnhack & Gussarsky (n313). 
436 The research examined rulings between 1986-1994 and defined “unique opinions” as dissenting 
opinions. 
437 Rubinstein, Judges of the Land (n44). Rubinstein was appointed the Vice President of the Supreme 
Court in 2015. 
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judges’438. Professional experience was primary in the appointments procedure, but, 
Rubinstein claims that unlike the ethnic, national439 and gender considerations, which 
seemed controversial and infringed the professional ethos of the judiciary, there was 
general consent that there should be a religious judge in the Supreme Court in order to 
interpret Jewish and Hebrew law440. Salzberger’s article from 2000 provides a later 
review of biographies of Israeli Supreme Court justices, in which he investigates the 
personal and collective history of the Supreme Court over its first 50 years, focusing on 
country of birth, legal education, religiosity, gender, previous judicial experience and 
other characteristics of 25 justices.441 Shetreet looked at the broader picture of women 
and Arab representation in the judiciary in the 1990s. For example, he found that in 1992 
only 25% of all judges were women, but in 1998 this figure reached 40% (in lower courts 
their proportion was even higher)442. Additionally, Shetreet provided evidence that Arabs 
were under-represented in the judiciary, finding that in 1989 only seven judges were 
Arabs (2%) although Arabs formed 18% of the general population. More recent research 
has focused on Arabs in Israeli judiciary, and examined what the judicial system and the 
other branches have done to increase Arab representation on the bench443.  
In addition to the very few academic studies of judicial diversity in Israel, there have been 
several journalistic investigations of specific aspects of diversity. In 2007, Ma’ariv, a 
daily newspaper in Israel, published a report according to which only 10% of judges in 
District Courts and the Supreme Court were Sephardic444. The article interviewed 
academics and former senior judges (including Yitzhak Zamir, chair of the Zamir 
committee) and criticized the judicial system's ongoing refusal to investigate why 
Sephardic Jews are so overwhelmingly under-represented. A TV documentary 
broadcasted in 2013 reported similar figures about Sephardic Jews in the senior judiciary 
and again highlighted the system's reluctance to elaborate on judges' intra-ethnic 
origin445. More recently, Haaretz, another daily newspaper, published a report about the 
                                                 
438 Ibid 147 
439 Rubinstein (ibid, 157) describes how the first right-wing prime minister, Menachem Begin, had 
suggested to appoint an Arab to the Supreme Court in order to strengthen the sense of equality amongst 
the Arab sector, and how this suggestion was criticized. 
440 Ibid 155; Kedar (n257) 34. 
441 Eli M. Salzberger “the Israeli Supreme Court at 50 Years: Between Hedgehog and Fox” (2000) 
16 Bar-Ilan Law Studies 141-159 
442 Shetreet (n6) 285. 
443 Guy Luria, “Appointment of Arab Judges to the courts of Israel” (2015) 16 Law and Governance 306-
315 
444 Weiss (n337) 
445 Amnon Levi “The True Face of the Ethnic Demon”, Episode 3 (13.10.2013) 
(http://docu.nana10.co.il/Article/?ArticleID=998673) 
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background and homogeneity of interns in the Supreme Court446. The review, based on 
data obtained from the courts, found that the “typical” Supreme Court intern is a Jewish 
male who graduated from either the Hebrew University or Tel-Aviv University. Only five 
interns (out of some 220 examined) were Arabs447, and there were hardly any interns from 
peripheral areas.448. 
The relatively small number of studies on judicial diversity or on topics that may be 
related to judicial diversity has nonetheless contributed to the knowledge of the dynamics 
of the judicial appointment procedure and its development over the years, as well as the 
composition of the Supreme Court over time, and most notably, the possible links 
between certain judicial background features (e.g. gender) and case outcomes. However, 
despite this contribution, most studies have often been either very small-scaled or focused 
on a single background characteristic449, or specific types of cases and procedures450. 
Shetreet’s data, for example, refers only to Arabs and women, and is not up to date. 
Similarly, Rubinstein’s book is from 1980 and does not reflect the transformations in 
Israeli society and the judiciary. Also, the tendency of some studies to focus on the 
Supreme Court and skip the rest of the judiciary presents a very limited picture of judicial 
diversity in Israel; the Supreme Court is too small and too exceptional to extrapolate its 
diversity to all of the Israeli judiciary. The reality is that the majority of Israeli judges sit 
in lower courts.  Lower courts, it has been argued, better represent “everyday judging” 
and provide a broader perspective on judicial attitude451. Additionally, a significant 
proportion of these articles researched the Supreme Court historically, focusing on its 
composition in the early years of the state452 and the political considerations behind 
judicial appointments. Very little has been written on the actual make-up of the Supreme 
Court to date. Even less has been written on the composition of the entire judiciary. 
                                                 
446 Revital Hovel, “The Supreme Court’s Preferred Intern: a Jewish Male, Graduate of the Hebrew or Tel-
Aviv Universities”, Haaretz (29.6.2015) http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/.premium-1.2670988. 
447 There was no data regarding gender or Jewish ethnicity distribution. It also lacks any information 
regarding the number of Arabs amongst the general law student population, how many Arab applicants 
there were, etc. 
448 In addition to the figures, the report quotes a former senior official in the legal system, who claims that 
the findings illuminate the Supreme Court’s “double standard”. The official argued that, even if the 
Supreme Court is not obliged to consider affirmative action, the Court should be leading on this 
proactively and serve as an example to other institutions. 
449 Galit Goldman “Appointing Justices to the Supreme Court: Is there a preference for Ashkenazi over 
Sephardic applicants?” (2012) A seminar paper in the course “Politics and Governance in Israel”, Tel-
Aviv University. 
450 Gazal-Eyal and others, “Arabs and Jews in Remand Procedures” (n429); Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-
Kenan, “Let My People Go” (n429) 
451 Hazel Genn, Judging Civil Justice (CUP 2009) 131-137 
452 Lahav, ‘Courage and office’ (n41); Zaltzberger and Oz-Zaltzberger (n44) 
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3.2 Approaches to studying judicial diversity in Israel 
Furthermore, almost all the existing research about the composition of the Israeli judiciary 
is qualitative, and mainly based on interviews with retired judges, biographies of specific 
justices453, memoires, documents from the state’s archives, etc. Although these studies 
are insightful, the lack of large-scale quantitative or empirical research means there is no 
accepted database or baseline information on judicial diversity in Israel. Moreover, this 
lack of a robust quantitative approach seems to have contributed to a lack of fact-based 
academic and public debate about judicial diversity, a topic that has been traditionally too 
reliant on anecdotes rather than solid data. While the empirical work that has been 
conducted in recent years advanced the knowledge about possible links between 
background characteristics and case outcomes, it naturally focuses on only one 
background characteristic (mostly ethnicity), and does not aim to provide a broad picture 
of the state of judicial diversity in Israel (encompassing key factors such as educational 
background, professional experience, religious affiliation, etc.). 
Despite the dramatic decline in the level of public confidence in courts, there has also 
been no attempt to explore whether this decline may be associated with perceptions about 
judicial diversity. Public trust in the judiciary is often used in the debate about the make-
up of Israeli society but inevitably without supporting evidence. On the one hand, the 
judiciary uses it to claim that the diversity debate and the calls to change the nominations 
process would decrease public trust in courts. On the other hand, some sectors in Israeli 
society argue that their lack of representation in the judiciary contributes to the decline in 
public’s trust. If public trust is a solid justification for prompting diversity, research 
should presumably focus on sectors in which the confidence rates in the judicial system 
are significantly low454. Yet no data on how both sides reached their conclusions could 
be found455. 
Finally, there has not been an in-depth investigation of the pool from which judges are 
appointed and almost no reflection on how the significant changes legal education and 
                                                 
453 Nomi Levitzki Your Honor, Aharon Barak- Biography (Keter Publishing 2001); Pnina 
Lahav, Judgment in Jerusalem: Chief Justice Simon Agranat and the Zionist Century (University of 
California Press 1997) 
454 The recent CBS social survey found that in 2015, only 58% of the general public in Israel trust the 
court system to a large or some extent. The level of trust decreases however for Arabs (50%), orthodox 
Jews (22%) and new immigrants (53% for USSR and 43% for Ethiopian Jews). ‘Selected Data from the 
2015 Social Survey’ (n80). 
455 Although there are substantial studies about public trust in state’s institutions, including the judiciary. 
See previous chapters. 
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the legal profession may be related to judicial diversity. The massive growth in the 
number of lawyers, specifically the inclusion of thousands of lawyers from sectors that 
were not represented in the profession until recently, provide fertile ground for research 
about the make-up of the legal profession and how this is or may in future affect the 
composition of the judiciary. Instead, discourse about legal education and legal 
practitioners in Israel seems to be focused on all other aspects (e.g. measures taken by the 
Bar to limit the number of lawyers) instead of diversity. 
Overlooked groups 
Sephardic Jews, religious and Orthodox Jews, new immigrants- all seem to have been 
overlooked in previous research of judicial diversity in Israel. It could be because it is 
methodologically easier to examine Arabs and women (e.g., the variables are easy to 
operationalize, the data collection is more straightforward in comparison with Jewish 
ethnicity for instance). Israeli law acknowledges the principle of adequate representation, 
equality and affirmative action of women, Arabs, Ethiopian Jews and, in some cases, 
people with disabilities. Concerning Sephardic Jews, however, legal research requires 
“ingenuity and creativity”, because: 
“With regard to Mizrahim [i.e.- Sephardic Jews], Israeli law appears to have 
been blind…. [F]ormally they have been treated as equal; any discrimination 
was justified on the basis of merit.”456.  
Lahav and other scholars point to manner in which prejudice against Mizrahim influenced 
law. Such insights, although are not exclusively or directly related to judicial diversity, 
may provide an interesting explanation as to why research about background 
characteristics of judges may have ignored intra-Jewish ethnicity457. 
While research about Arabs and women in the judicial process, the judiciary and the legal 
profession is highly relevant, there are other important groups that should not be 
overlooked in understanding judicial diversity in Israel. This is a common issue in other 
jurisdictions as well:  “it is important to caution against thinking that ethnic diversity is a 
                                                 
456 Pnina Lahav, ‘A Jewish State ... to Be Known as the State of Israel: Notes on Israeli Legal 
Historiography’ (2001) 19 Law & Hist. Rev. 387, 414; Compare: Thomas (n5) 66, on how merit has been 
used in denying appointment as pretence for discrimination. 
457 There are several scholarly references to Sephardic Jews in the context of judicial studies, but they are 
very limited in scope (referring anecdotally to Supreme Court justices) and focus on the historical 
functioning of the “designated Sephardic justice” rather than on the current state of affairs. Lahav, ibid 
413-417; Kedar, “Ben Gurion and the struggle to appoint the first Sephardic justice” (n 40); Rubinstein, 
Judges Of The Land (n44) 148-154; Biton shows how generally Israeli law ignored the discrimination of 
Sephardic Jews even when it was willing to acknowledge discrimination of other sectors - Yifat Biton, 
“Mizrahim and the Law: ‘Nothing’ as ‘Something’” (2011) 41 Mishpatim Law Review 315-377. 
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unified concept…viewing all ethnic minorities as a single group can often create a very 
misleading picture…”458. Thus, in Israel, it would seem incorrect to examine “Arabs” 
without reference to the unique and different sub-groups within this sector. Similarly, a 
very distinct picture about gender may emerge when cross-referencing gender with 
ethnicity, professional background, career progression, etc. This thesis has the specific 
aim of understanding judicial diversity in Israel in this richer context.   
3.2 Israeli judges’ reluctance to take part in academic research 
An important factor underlying the lack of academic research on judicial diversity is the 
secrecy that is associated with the nominations procedure. However, additional practices 
in the judiciary have contributed to the lack of research into judicial diversity. Scholars 
have criticized the judiciary’s tendency to conceal its practices and work procedures from 
the public’s eye459. This policy means that, for example, the procedures for assigning 
judges to panels, the ethical and managerial norms of decision-making and ruling between 
panel members460, were never a matter for public debate or revision.  
Specifically, the judiciary’s disinclination to participate in academic research and 
particularly to provide background information about judges has made research on 
judicial diversity very difficult. Although there is no law in place to forbid Israeli judges 
from participating in interviews or completing questionnaires as part of academic 
research, in practice Israeli Judges have refrained from doing so461. The Courts 
Administration almost always denies such requests from researchers, based on the 
concern that participation of judges in research would jeopardize their unique 
professional status. The principles that shape judges’ work, it is claimed, are objectivity, 
independence and neutrality, and these are not consistent with exposing the personal 
views of judges to the public (even anonymously).  
                                                 
458 Thomas (n.5) 19, referring to studies in the US examining the differences between African-Americans 
and Hispanics in attaining judicial office. 
459 Shachar (n.52) 410. 
460 ibid. 
461 In principle, section 34 of the Judges’ Ethics Rules 2007 states, that: “subject to the approval of the 
President of the Supreme Court, a judge may reply, either orally or in writing, to questions or 
questionnaires addressed to him for research purposes relating to his judicial work”. In practice, however, 
it seems that very rarely such an approval is granted by the Chief Justice. Additionally, in 2009, the MoJ, 
Prof. Friedman, appointed a special committee to examine the accessibility of court decisions to academic 
research. However, shortly after the government had disbanded the initiative was shelved. 
(http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/veadot/academic.pdf).  
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This approach was challenged in the Supreme Court, but was not overturned462. The 
Supreme Court ruled that presenting judges’ personal views, in any form, might impair 
public trust in courts; everything judges have to say is found in their written decisions, 
which are available to the general public, so there is no need to interview or distribute 
questionnaires to judges463. Scholars argued that this decision reinforced two idealised 
models of judges: the “transparent judge”, who disconnects from his or her private and 
subjective “self” in reaching decisions and responds solely on the basis of jurisprudence; 
and the “professional judge” ethos, according to which judges are impartial and resistant 
to external influences464. As in many other jurisdictions, the Israeli legal system puts 
significant efforts into ‘hiding’ judges behind clear, objective legal conceptions465, and 
portraying them as nothing but servants of the law whose personal characteristics are 
irrelevant466. Consequently, any attempt to discuss the biography, gender, religion, 
nationality or world-view of judges is regarded as inappropriate. Scholars who criticise 
this policy of the judiciary say itis “puzzling” as it implies that in order to maintain the 
judiciary’s objectivity and the public’s trust in courts, it is essential to hide information 
from the public, when in fact public trust is derived from transparency and facts467. 
Despite the judiciary’s reluctance to participate in academic research, a number of 
journalists have managed to investigate the work of judges. Nomi Levitski, an Israeli 
journalist, wrote one of the most comprehensive non-academic reviews of the Supreme 
Court468; it examines the transformation in the Court’s status over the years and relies on 
extensive investigative journalistic research, including (mostly anonymous) interviews. 
The book focuses on biographies and life experiences of several justices, and suggests 
they are correlated with their decision-making. It also demonstrated a range of external 
                                                 
462 HJC 2491/02 Ben-Ari v. Judge Dan Arbel, the Director of the Courts (1.8.2002). 
http://www.psakdin.co.il/fileprint.asp?filename=/sada/private/ver_bolq.htm. In this petition, a research 
student asked the HCJ to issue an injunction to the director of the courts to explain his refusal to allow the 
petitioner to interview judges or send them questionnaires. The court rejected the petition, claiming that 
just as judges should not be expressing their personal views in their decision-making, so too it is 
unacceptable to present personal views of judges in interviews and the like. 
463 Similar rationalization was used in another decision, according to which a judge should not be 
summoned to testify in court because of the need to defend the standing of the judiciary and ensure the 
public’s trust prevails over the parties’ right to cross-examination (LCA 3202/03 The people v. Yossef, 58 
(3) PD 541 [2003]) 
464 Issachar (Issi) Rozen-Tzvi, “’Are Judges Human?’ – Establishing the Judge’s Figure in light of 
Disqualification Rules” (2005) 8 Law and Governance 49-118. 
465 Judges’ personalities are hidden in various ways (e.g. using plural form - “we”- or third person 
singular - “the court” - when writing decisions). Ibid 56 
466 “The hidden judge syndrome” – Ibid. 
467 Shetreet, On Adjudication (n6) 321-323. 
468 Levitski, The Supremes (n.408) 
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and internal influences on the Court, including the complex relations between the justices 
themselves (“peer effects”). 
Anat Peleg, another journalist recently wrote a book469about the complex interrelations 
between Israeli courts and the media. It investigates how media coverage of courts may 
influence judicial decision-making, by examining references to the media in judicial 
rulings, and by interviewing almost 100 professionals, 30 of which were judges470. Half 
of the judges were retired at the time of the interview, and the remainder agreed to 
participate anonymously471. There have also been a small number of judicial biographies, 
written by either journalists472 or academics473. However, only a limited number of them 
managed to obtain direct access to judges, usually after years of painstaking efforts and 
networking with senior officials474, and most of the time the judges that agreed to be 
interviewed were retired and therefore not expected to conform to the system’s 
restrictions475.  
3.3 Diversity of Israeli lawyers and law students 
The explanatory notes to the bill that reformed legal education in Israel in the 1990s 
stated: "The composition of students at law faculties is disturbingly homogenous. Only 
ten students from disadvantaged and development towns and only two Arab candidates 
were accepted to one of the faculties"476. Enabling colleges to award law degree 
accelerated the number of lawyers in Israel and allowed members of groups that were 
until then almost unseen at the Bar to enter the profession477.  Some have claimed that the 
growth in the number of lawyers in Israel transformed the legal profession from a 
                                                 
469 Anat Peleg, Open Doors: The Effect of the Media on Israeli Law (Matar 2012). 
470 A similar research method was used in other research that Peleg conducted: Bryna Bogoch and Anat 
Peleg, ‘Silence is no Longer Golden: Media, Public Relations and the Judiciary in Israel’ (2014) 4 Oñati 
Socio-Legal Series. 
471 Peleg explained how she managed to interview judges despite the restrictions: “When it turned out I 
would not be given an official approval from the courts’ administration, I carefully contacted several 
judges and explained why my research was important, and they trusted me and even referred me to more 
judges..”. Ido Baum “Judges Are Afraid Of The Media” TheMarker (17.2.2012) 
http://www.themarker.com/law/1.1644082  
472 Levitski, ‘Your Honor, Aharon Barak’ (n.453). 
473 Pnina Lahav, ‘Chief Justice Simon Agranat’ (n.453). 
474 Levitski, for example, convinced the justices to cooperate with her by “going from one to another...”. 
However, not everyone can simply walk the hallways of the Supreme Court and approach its justices to 
discuss controversial issues. Yuval Yoaz "Specialized In The Supreme Court" Haaretz (6.12.2006) 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1528939  
475 Aley Mishpat (the College of Law and Business review), volume 7 (2009). 
476 Anat Ro'ee, "The Law Colleges' Money-Making Machine Is Looking for New Customers" Calcalist 
(4.11.2015) http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3672637,00.html. 
477 Yuval Elbashan in Gilad Shalmor “Is the legal market in Israel really flooded with lawyers?” Channel 
2 News (4 November 2015) http://www.mako.co.il/news-channel2/Channel-2-Newscast-q4_2015/Article-
0438259d114d051004.htm; Katvan (n.393) 305. 
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monolithic group into a diverse profession, with more young Arabs and Orthodox Jews, 
gays, women joining the Bar and making their unique voice heard478. However, similar 
to the debate about judicial diversity, the discussion about the legal profession and legal 
education has relied more on contentions than on facts479. This section presents the 
limited data that are available about diversity in the legal profession and in legal 
education, and highlights the diversity-related matters that are yet to be empirically 
examined for both groups. 
Lawyers 
The Israeli Bar has not released official information on the demographics of its 
members480, except for occasional reports on gender distribution and the educational 
background of lawyers481. Nevertheless, scholars have used alternative indicators to 
explore the demographic changes to the Bar. Surveys conducted among lawyers and law 
students in Israel recently provide some information about the demographic differences 
between college and university law students and graduates, and affirm the common 
perception that there are significant gaps between them482. For instance, college students 
are older and have more previous academic and professional experience, compared with 
university students483. Moreover, substantially more college law students are the children 
of parents with no academic degrees compared to law students at universities; this may 
suggest that colleges did break the strong links between parents’ education and children’s 
chances of gaining an academic degree484. 
Research that relies on secondary data sources claims that since the law colleges opened, 
the number of Arabs, Jewish immigrants from the former USSR and Ethiopia, Orthodox 
Jews and residents of the peripheral districts of Israel have significantly increased in both 
law schools and the profession485. Other important patterns are the growth in the number 
of women in the profession, estimated in 45% in 2013 (a trend that started in the 1980s 
                                                 
478 Ziv (n76) 81 
479 Zer-Gutman (n.384) 248 
480 ibid 56, claims that the Bar does not collect data on the nationality of its members. However, the 
author of this thesis could not find any data that was publically available on other variables either (e.g. 
Jewish ethnicity, religiosity). 
481 However the Bar raised concerns regarding the nomination procedure and the lack of judicial 
diversity, as seen in Chapter 2. 
482 Katvan (n.393) 306 refers to two surveys he conducted in 2010-2011, one with law students from two 
colleges and one university, and the other with lawyers in Israel. 
483 Ibid 307.  
484 Ibid 309 
485 Zer-Gutman (n.384) relies on data from previous studies, statements made by Deans of law colleges, 
the press and inferential conclusions. 
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and therefore cannot be exclusively attributed to law colleges)486 and the “rejuvenation 
of the profession” so that today the majority of lawyers in Israel are less than 40 years of 
age487. 
According to CBS data, almost 93% of registered lawyers in Israel are Jewish488. This is 
similar to data found in another governmental report showing that 8.8% of lawyers in 
Israel in 2005 were Arabs489. Data obtained from the Civil Service Commission confirm 
that 8.6% of lawyers in the civil service are Arabs490. A different report, however, 
contested that while some 15% of Israeli lawyers are Arabs491, in the Ministry of Justice 
(which includes the Attorney’s office, the Public Defender’s Office and other legal 
offices), only 5% of the employees are Arabs492. This could be meaningful in terms of 
judicial diversity because the common presumption is that most judges are appointed 
from the public sector (an assumption that will be tested in this thesis). The proportion of 
Arabs in the legal profession is therefore not entirely clear but likely to be smaller than 
their share of the population (20%). Specific concerns have been expressed about the low 
number of Muslim Arabs and Arab women in the legal profession (and the judiciary)493. 
Some have speculated that Arab lawyers prefer to stay in the legal profession and refrain 
from applying to judicial positions due to financial reasons494. However, there are no 
current figures on the number of Arabs in the legal profession495 or any barriers they may 
face in their legal career.  
Not one reliable report was found to have data on the intra-Jewish ethnic attribution of 
registered lawyers. In 2014, the Bar formed a special forum for Haredi lawyers496, but it 
did not provide data on the number of Orthodox Jews amongst its members (or on any 
matter related to religiosity).  
                                                 
486 Ibid 57 
487 Ibid, ibid.  
488 CBS Labour Force Survey 2011 (publication 1504) (2012), table 2.17 “Employed Persons and 
Employees, By Occupation (Minor Group - Two Digits), Population Group and Sex”. On Table 2.1 
(employed persons and employees, by industry, population group and sex) (p.5) – lawyers and notary 
services are numbered at 44,400, thereof Jews – 41,400 (~93%). 
489 Ministry of Industry and Trade Lawyers In Israel – Characteristics And Employment In The Last 
Decade (2005) 
490 Personal communication (2.6.2015). 
491 The Sikkuy Report (n.409) 5 
492 Ibid 3 
493 Sausan Zahar, Adv., “Female Arab Judges In Israeli Courts: An Analysis of Gender and Ethnicity” 
(2015):  
http://www.israelbar.org.il/article_inner.asp?pgId=21930&catId=2217  
494 Luria (n.443). 
495 As seen below, there were, however, analyses on the number of Arabs in the judiciary.  
496 The Bar Press Release “For the First Time: an Orthodox Forum in the Bar” (8.6.2014) 
http://www.israelbar.org.il/article_inner.asp?pgid=196271&catid=6 
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Unlike religion and ethnicity amongst Israeli lawyers, the case of gender distribution in 
the legal profession in Israel has been investigated before, and there are relatively up-to-
date data, as well as some research, that shed light on the status of women lawyers in 
Israel today, including in the judiciary. Almost half of currently active lawyers in Israel 
are women. However, although 50% of associates in the top 100 law firms in Israel are 
women, men still dominate the senior levels (partners) in those firms where more than 
75% are male497. Moreover, only 10% of the heads or founders of the law firms were 
women. However, figures are substantially different in the public sector; the high 
proportion and successful progression of women lawyers in prosecutorial and judicial 
roles in Israel are rooted in the history of the legal profession in Israel, and even in the 
pre-state years, as reviewed in existing literature498. Today, women advocates make up 
almost 70% in the State Advocacy, with a distinct majority of women in the highest 
income ranks499.  
 
Law students 
The data on the demographics of law students is a bit clearer than for lawyers. The 
Council for Higher Education (CHE) and the CBS collect and publish data on socio-
demographic characteristics of students. However, there are some limitations (for 
example, no data are collected on Jewish ethnicity other than for new immigrants), and 
in some cases data refer only to some of the academic institutions and not all.  
In 2010/11, almost 85% of undergraduate students in universities, academic colleges and 
colleges of education in Israel were Jewish, and 12.1% were Arabs (almost double their 
rate in 1990, but still lower than their 20% share in the total population)500. For law 
students in particular, 93% of law students at universities are Jewish while only 6.3% are 
                                                 
497 This piece of data is quite similar to what was found regarding women’s participation in the solicitors’ 
profession in England and Wales, Pleasence and Balmer (n.121). 
498 Eyal Katvan, "No More 'Window Dressing': The Entry of Women into Prosecutorial and Judicial 
Roles Prior to and Following the Establishment of the State of Israel" (2010) 32 Tel-Aviv University Law 
Review [Hebrew]; Eyal Katvan, “The Entry and Integration of Women into Judicial Positions in Israel” 
in: Schultz, Ulrike, and Gisela Shaw, eds. Gender and Judging. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013. Katvan 
reviews the historical roots of the ‘feminisation of the legal profession in Israel’, leading to the high 
proportion of women in the judiciary. 
499 These figures have recently been reaffirmed in a report from 2016, showing that 65% of public 
prosecutors in Israel are women, and that 75% of Heads of the Prosecution service are women; see: . 
CEPEJ, Report On “European Judicial Systems – Edition 2016 (2014 Data): Efficiency and Quality of 
Justice” (here), 137-140.  In the UK, women accounted for 48% of solicitors employed in 
commerce/industry, 57% of Crown Prosecution Service solicitors and 62% of local government 
solicitors, Sullivan (n.119) 12. 
500 CBS (n.398) 460. In colleges of education, Arabs make up 26.3% of all students 
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Arabs. In colleges, the ratio is slightly different, with 91.7% of LL.B. students are Jewish 
and 7.3% are Arabs. Within the Arab group, Muslim Arabs are significantly under-
represented in higher education and specifically in law degrees, whereas Druze are 
slightly under-represented, and Christian Arabs are found in law schools in larger 
proportions than their representation in the population. 
Regarding intra-Jewish ethnicity in 2009, 43% of Jewish undergraduate degree recipients 
were born in Israel with 25.5% of Sephardic origin and 30.8% of Ashkenazi descent501. 
The most recent data on law schools are from in 2006-7 and only cover university law 
schools: 48% of law students were Israeli-born, with 23.5% of Sephardic origin and 
29.2% Ashkenazi502. Prima facie, this is a marginal difference between the groups, and 
only slightly different to the distribution in the Jewish population. However, these data 
only refer to university students. Data on college law students by origin could not be 
found. 
In the early years of the Israeli state, few women graduated from law schools, but today 
the proportion of female law students has grown to more than 50% on both undergraduate 
and graduate degree courses503. However, only a quarter of law faculty staff members are 
women, with even fewer women Law Deans. 
Table 1 summarizes the limited data regarding diversity in the legal profession and 
education504. 
 
                                                 
501 CBS Higher Education in Israel 2009 (n.397) 47 
502 CBS “Students at Universities, by degree, population group, religion, origin and field of study (table 
17)”, 105-6 
503 For further details see chapter 8. 
504Some further official data are presented in Chapters 7 and 8 where they are relevant to the 
demographics of lawyers and law students that participated in two surveys for this thesis. 
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Table 1. Representation in legal education and the legal profession in Israel505 
 General 
Undergraduate 
Population 
(universities  
& colleges) 
LL.B. 
Students/Recipients 
in Israel 
Qualified 
Lawyers in 
Israel 
Total in Israeli 
Population 
Women 57%506 50%507 43% 51% 
Arabs 15%  
(in 
universities508) 
8.5%  
(in universities) 
9% - 15%509 20% 
Arab subgroups 
Muslim510 
(Inc. 
Bedouins) 
11.5% 6.4% n/a ~18% 
Christian511 2% 2.6% n/a 2% 
Druze512 1.6% 1.3% n/a 1.6% 
Jews 86% 92% 93%  75% 
Jewish subgroups 
Ashkenazi 30% 28% n/a 33% 
Sephardic 
 
Ethiopian 
Jews 
24% 
 
0.4% 
18.8% 
 
n/a 
n/a 25-27% 
 
1.4% 
Israeli-born 46% 54% n/a 40% 
Religious n/a ~10% 
Ultra-
Orthodox 
n/a ~9% 
                                                 
505 Data were obtained from various sources published in recent years. Where possible, reference was 
made to the most updated data. 
506 As of 2014-15 (CBS ‘table 8.55 First Degree Students in Universities, Academic Colleges and 
Colleges of Education, By Field Of Study’ (27.9.2016)). 
507 CHE “Table 2: Students in High Education Institutions (Universities, Academic Colleges and Teacher 
Training Colleges) by degree and field, 1990-2013” (personal communication). 
508 As of 2015, CBS “table 2.15 First-Degree Students at Universities, By Sex, Age, Population Group 
and Field Of Study”. 
509 Different figures appear in the CBS and the Sikkuy Report (n409). 
510 CBS “The Moslem Population in Israel (Muslim Students, 2012-13) 15.10.2013 
(http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/publications/desc_exp/ahrab_education.pdf). Of the total 26,800 Muslim 
students in Israel in 2012-13, 84.5% were undergraduates students, and specifically 4.5% were law 
students (n=1,019). Compare: Muslim students comprised only 7.5% of all first degree recipients in 2014-
15 CBS “The Moslem Population in Israel” (12.9.2016) 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201611279. 
511 That figure refers to the general representation of Christians in the population of all students in Israel, 
as well as their proportion amongst undergraduate students (CBS Christmas 2015 - Christians in Israel 
(23.12.2015) http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201511346. In 2014-
2015 there were some 4,900 Christian undergraduate students in Israel, of which 8.6% were law students. 
Hence, their proportion of the total population of law students that year is 2.6%. 
512 CBS “The Druze Population of Israel (Druze students in higher education in 2012-13)”. 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/publications/desc_exp/druzim.pdf. Of the total 3,800 Druze students in this 
year, 5.4% were law students (n=205) and 81.7% were undergraduate students. The total number of 
undergraduate students that year was 190,810, therefore the proportion of Druze undergraduates was 
1.6% (see: Council for Higher Education, Higher Education System in Israel- 2014 (here). 
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Lack of data on diversity in the legal profession and education 
In recent years there are been some quantitative studies about the legal profession and, to 
a lesser extent, legal education in Israel. For example, surveys were conducted to 
investigate lawyers’ views about overcrowding of the profession513; others referred to 
socio-demographic characteristics of lawyers as drivers for working in the legal 
profession, and explored views about the future of the profession514. 
But a large number of issues remain completely unexplored, and some methodological 
issues have hampered empirical research in this area. The Bar does not collect and/or 
publish data about the background of its members. Additionally, the bodies that do 
publish data (e.g. CBS, CHE) do not collect data about all relevant variables (e.g. Jewish 
ethnicity). Statements made about the diversification of the legal profession and law 
school education following the opening of law colleges were not all made based on 
comprehensive empirical analysis. A survey of law students included 300 participants 
from three law schools515 and focused on first and second-year LL.B. students only. Some 
lawyers’ surveys had larger sample sizes516 but either did not collect data on socio-
demographic characteristics517, or had very few variables that can contribute to the 
discussion about judicial diversity518. Thus, despite the significant transformations the 
legal profession and education have undergone since the 1990s, the composition of the 
pool for judicial appointment is not completely clear at present due to a lack of sufficient 
data. 
Therefore, in addition to a comprehensive analysis of the composition of the Israeli 
judiciary, this thesis takes a closer look at diversity in law schools and legal profession in 
Israel. It aims to examine not only the demographics of these populations, but also the 
perception and views on the judiciary and on judicial diversity in particular amongst those 
who may become the next generation of judges in Israel.519 
This chapter discussed the limited development of judicial studies and studies about 
judicial diversity in Israel. It reviewed the existing data on judicial diversity, as well as 
                                                 
513 Bar Niv and others (n.385). 
514 Katvan (n.393). 
515 Ibid 
516 For example, in the survey described in Bar Niv’s article (n385) almost 2,900 lawyers participated.  
517 Ibid. The authors mention, under “background characteristics”, gender and professional seniority.   
518 Katvan (n.393) 
519 For a study about the factors that motivate or deter senior legal practitioners to consider applying for a 
position in high courts in the UK, see: Hazel Genn The attractiveness of senior judicial appointment to 
highly qualified practitioners- Report to the Judicial Executive Board (2008) Judicial Communications 
Officer. 
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data on diversity within the pool for judicial appointments: the legal profession and law 
students. It showed how the public and scholarly debate on judicial diversity has not 
mature into an evidence-based discussion. These factors emphasize the need for an up-
to-date, empirical study of judicial diversity in the entire judiciary as well as an 
investigation of diversity in the pool for future judicial appointments. This thesis aims to 
provide that in-depth, large-scale research into judicial diversity in Israel, covering 
judges, lawyers and law students. 
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CHAPTER 4:  UNDERSTANDING DIVERSITY IN ISRAEL 
This chapter reviews the main population trends and diversity of Israeli society, focusing 
on several population groups that are key both to the understanding of Israel's population 
and to contextualize claims about lack of judicial diversity. The first section reviews the 
latest data regarding Israel's population. The chapter then reviews some of the conceptual 
and practical challenges relating to the analysis of socio-demographic trends in Israel. 
4.1 Diversity of Israeli society 
While concerns about the judiciary in Israel failing to reflect the heterogeneity of Israeli 
society have been expressed frequently, there is little coherent and robust evidence to 
support these claims520. This chapter provides essential background on demographic 
trends and multiculturalism in Israeli society, placing this empirical study in a meaningful 
context. This review of Israeli society focuses on three main areas that are the key 
variables that arise when diversity is discussed in Israel: ethnicity, nationality/religion 
and gender. 
The definition of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, and its establishment as the 
homeland for Jews following the Holocaust, have created inherent tensions between Jews 
and non-Jews in Israel521. Some groups in the Arab minority in Israel express feelings of 
alienation from the state of Israel and its nationality-based definition522. Conflicts also 
characterise the relationships between different Jewish communities, with each group 
determined to leave its impression on the formation of the state’s identity523. These intra-
Jewish tensions can be attributed to the great spectrum of religious observance and 
conflicting world-views (e.g. liberalism versus conservatism) as well as to the large-scale 
immigration of Jewish people to Israel, in a relatively short period, from many different 
countries and cultures524. Furthermore, the Jewish ultra-Orthodox community (Haredim) 
rejects Zionism and/or other forms of Jewish nationality, and has until recently not 
                                                 
520 As seen in Chapter 2, claims about lack of diversity are usually jointly heard with wider arguments 
regarding the appointment procedures of judges; Mautner (n.1). 
521 The conflict refers both to Arabs that are Israeli citizens and Arabs who are not citizens but reside in 
Israeli territories or territories under dispute (e.g. Palestinians living in territories that were appended to 
Israel after the Six Days War). 
522 Those feelings have not once resulted in violent resistance to the state see: State Commission of 
Inquiry to Clarify Conflicts between Security Forces and Civilians in October 2000 – Final Report 
(2003).  
523 Gad Barzilai, Communities and Law: Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities (University of Michigan 
Press 2003) 13. 
524 Arie Kizel, The New Mizrahi Narrative in Israel (Resling 2014) 
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integrated into Israeli society (in terms of participation in military service, higher 
education and the job market525). These conflicting feelings are also translated into views 
regarding the legitimacy of the state and its institutions, and particularly the legitimacy 
of the legal system and its decision-making authority. 
Examining Israel’s population not only presents the complex inter-relations between the 
various groups that make up this society, but also highlights a link between Israel’s 
changing society and transformations in its legal culture (i.e. the judicialization of politics 
and the change in the Supreme Court’s perception of its role526). These trends should be 
understood in the context of wider political and social changes that have occurred in Israel 
since the late 1970s, namely the political upheaval of 1977, when the Labour party 
(Mapai/Avoda) lost the national elections after almost 30 years of consecutive rule, and 
the emergence of new social groups thereafter527. This has been described as the decline 
of the cultural and political hegemony that characterised Israel for several decades and 
the transition to a multi-cultural society528. The judicial system has not been immune to 
the challenges this new social reality has brought with it. In particular, calls from 
politicians and policymakers were made to take diversity into consideration when 
determining the makeup of the judiciary529. These opinions, and similar calls from 
minority groups in Israeli society, echo some of the major arguments in favour of judicial 
diversity that can be found in the existing literature530. They also emphasize the 
importance of diversity when discussing the judiciary, and the need to understand Israeli 
society as part of the judicial diversity debate. 
Within the social and political reality of Israel, concepts of nationality, religion and 
ethnicity often overlap and conflict with each other. Being a national home for Jews on 
the one hand and a democratic state on the other hand generates confusion, both on the 
conceptual and practical level531. The issue of the status of the Palestinian-Arabs that 
reside in the territories appended to Israel after the 1967 war adds to the underlying 
difficulty. Can the Arab citizens of Israel be called “Israelis” or does this concept only 
                                                 
525 Barzilai (n.523) 209.  
526 Menachem Mautner, “The Decline of Formalism and the Rise of Values in Israeli Law” (1993) 17 Tel 
Aviv U. L. Rev. 503 
527 Mautner, Law and the Culture of Israel (n.8) 
528 Mautner (n1) 425; Tamar Hermann and Ephraim Yaar-Yuchtman, "Unfortunate Misplacement: Israeli-
Jewish Public Perceptions of Israel in the Middle East" in David Tal (ed), Israeli Identity: Between Orient 
and Occident (Routledge 2013) 51. 
529 See chapter 2. 
530 See chapter 1  
531Uzi Rebhun, Gilad Malach and Ruth Gavison, Demographic trends in Israel (2009) Metzilah Center 
for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought. 
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describe Jewish citizens?532 What is the correlation between the religious and the national 
aspects of the term “Jewish”? Who can be defined as a Jew at all, for the purposes of 
registration, marriage, etc.? 
Yet these difficult questions have not remained the exclusive province of academics. 
Politicians have often failed to bridge the gap between the cultural-universal views and 
the secular-national ones, and, as seen in chapter 2, Israel does not have a constitution, or 
other binding definition of the society’s core values. Consequently, the courts have been 
asked, on many occasions, to determine some of these defining questions533. 
 
4.2 Data Resources on Israel’s Population 
The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), an autonomous unit within the Prime 
Minister’s Office, is the main body to collect and analyse statistical information regarding 
the state and its population in terms of wellbeing, health, economics, etc. One of the main 
publications of the CBS is the Population Census, which claims to provide the “fullest 
and most reliable picture of the country’s population and its characteristics”534. The 
census has been conducted six times since 1948, most recently in 2008-2009. Along with 
more recent notifications and publications by the CBS, the census forms the main 
foundation for data about population dynamics in Israel. 
There are advantages and disadvantages in using CBS data. Although it is a reliable, 
regularly updated and comprehensive data source, which is widely used in research on 
population trends in Israel, useful nuances are inevitably lost, given the size of the 
investigated population and the need to provide unified publications. This is particularly 
relevant where multi-layered issues, such as socio-demographic characteristics and ethnic 
identity, are concerned. For instance, defining nationality and religion (i.e. differentiating 
between Jews and Muslims) is rather straightforward and relies on reports from the 
Ministry of Interior; but collecting data about Jewish ethnicity, for example, is far more 
complicated. In census data the CBS defines a “Sephardic Jew” as someone whose father 
was born in a specified country, thus excluding those who opt to define themselves as 
Sephardic Jews regardless of their fathers’ birthplace or who have mixed heritage 
                                                 
532 Yoav Peled, Gershon Shafir Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship (Tel-Aviv UP 2005)  
533 Justice Yitzhak Engelrad, in his dissenting view in the Supreme Court decision of Na’amat v. Minister 
of the Interior (HJC 5070/95, 20.2.2002). 
534 CBS ”Population Census – What Is The Population Census?” 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/census/census/pnimi_sub_page_e.html?id_topic=1&id_subtopic=1 
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parents535. In different CBS reports, however, the self-determination of participants, 
rather than the place of birth of their parents, is used to generate data. This inevitably 
gives rise to different pictures of the society’s demographics. However, in the absence of 
a more robust data source, CBS data is primarily used in this research with additional data 
sources utilized where relevant. In addition, CBS data is also used when trying to analyse 
the current composition of the Israeli judiciary (by measuring the extent to which the 
judiciary reflects Israeli society), as well as the composition of the legal profession and 
legal education in Israel. 
4.3 Main Population Groups in Israel 
Recent data shows that there are some 8.4 million inhabitants in Israel536. This figure 
includes Israeli citizens as well as permanent residents who are not citizens. The latter are 
subject to all the obligations and duties of citizens, and enjoy most citizens’ rights 
(including social benefits, freedom of movement and employment). However, permanent 
residents are not given Israeli passports; they cannot vote or be elected to the Israeli 
parliament, and they are not eligible to serve in certain public positions that require 
citizenship as a pre-condition (including judicial posts)537. 
As Table 2 shows, According to official data relating to 2015, Jews form the majority 
group in Israel: Of the total population, 6.3 million are Jews (75%), and 1.75 million are 
Arabs (20.7% of the total population)538. The remainder (some 370,000 people) is 
classified as “others”. This includes non-Arab Christians, members of other religious 
groups539 and those non-classified by religion in the Ministry of Interior’s registry. It 
should be noted that this population evaluation does not include migrant workers, 
refugees and illegal aliens540. 
                                                 
535 Talia Sagiv, On The Fault Line: Israelis Of Mixed Ethnicity (Hakibutz Hameuchad 2014) 
536 CBS "table B/1.- Population, By Population Group" 
(http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications16/yarhon1016/pdf/b1.pdf). 
537 Although permanent residents are entitled to apply for citizenship, the majority does not do so, for a 
variety of reasons. Israel Democracy Institute “Who is a Citizen in Israel?” (2010) 67 Parliament 
http://www.idi.org.il. 
538 The figure of 1.75 million Arabs includes permanent residents. However, Palestinians that are not 
Israeli citizens or residents (i.e. those that reside either in the disputed territories or in Palestinian 
authority’s municipalities) are not counted by the CBS as part of Israel’s population (Evegenia Bystrov, 
Arnon Soffer Israel: Demography 2012-2030 – On the Way to a Religious State (Chaikin Chair in 
Geostrategy, University of Haifa 2012) 17 
539 Samaritans, Maronites, Armenians, Circassians and other. 
540 Totalling at 183,000 (see CBS Table B/1 (n.536). 
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Table 2: Main Israeli Population Groups by religion/ nationality (2015) 
Population 
Group 
Share of total 
population in Israel 
Sub-categories  
Jews 75% Jewish Ethnicity541 
Sub-group % of Jewish 
population 
Middle-east, Asia and 
Africa (Sephardic)542 
25% 
Europe, America and 
former USSR 
(Ashkenazi)543 
31% 
Israelis born to an Israeli- 
born father (‘Sabra’) 
44% 
 
Arabs 20.7% Legal status 
Israeli citizens 84% 
Permanent residents 16% 
Religious distribution 
Sub-group % of Arab 
population 
Muslims (including 
Bedouins) 
83% 
Christians 7.9% 
Druze 8.2% 
 
Others 4.3%  
                                                 
541 According to father’s /own place of birth. 
542 Including Ethiopian Jews. 
543 Including Jews from former USSR. 
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4.4 Intra-Jewish Ethnicity 
The Jewish community in Israel has been extremely heterogenic in its demographic and 
cultural composition. Israel encounters constant immigration from the diaspora, which 
has profoundly influenced its social and cultural dynamics544. Millions of immigrants 
arrived in Israel from a variety of states to create a challenging mosaic of social, religious 
and ethnic sub-groups. The dramatic growth in population size (from 872,000 inhabitants 
in 1948, to more than 8 million today) is one of the most distinctive population trends in 
Israel545. At the same time social and cultural gaps have emerged, along with feelings of 
alienation and claims of ethnic discrimination and the exclusion of certain groups from 
key positions in the state, including the judiciary546. 
When discussing the Jewish population of Israel, the CBS refrains from categorizing Jews 
by ethnic groups, but rather focuses on origin by continent of birth (in fact, the CBS does 
not even use the term 'ethnicity' or “Eda” - Jewish ethnic group - in its publications). To 
that end, the CBS differentiates between continent of birth (where the subject was born) 
and continent of origin, which refers to father’s place of birth. For example, someone 
born in Israel is defined as Sabra (Israeli-born) for purposes of “continent of birth”. But 
if that person’s father was born in Africa, s/he will be defined as “Africa” for continent 
of origin. If the father was also born in Israel, than the person would be defined as “Sabra” 
for both continent of origin and continent of birth.  
In terms of continent of birth, according to the CBS data547, in 2015 the total population 
of Jews in Israel was 6,334,500, of whom 4.8 million (76%) were born in Israel. In terms 
of continent of origin, the largest group in the Jewish community is that of Jews born in 
Israel to an Israel-born father (“Sabra”) with 45% of the total Jewish population; 31% 
(nearly 2 million) of Israeli Jews originate from Europe-America548; 14% (890,000) 
                                                 
544 According to the Law of Return, 1950-5710 (SH 51), every Jew has the right to immigrate to Israel 
and be given citizenship. Moreover, children/grandchildren or spouses of Jews are also entitled to that 
right.  
545 Yifat Holzman-Gazit, “Mass Immigration, Housing Supply and Supreme-Court Jurisprudence of land 
expropriation in early statehood”, in Ron Harris and others (eds) The History of Law in a Multicultural 
Society (n39) 
546 Norma Gurovich and Eilat Cohen-Kastro “Ultra-Orthodox Jews: Geographic Distribution and 
Demographic, Social and Economic Characteristics of the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish Population in Israel 
1996-2001” (2004) CBS 11; 
547 CBS "Table 2.9 - Jews, By Continent of Origin, Continent of Birth & Period of Immigration" 
(1.9.2016) http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton67/st02_09.pdf . 
548 This group has grown significantly following the large-scale immigration of Jews from the former 
USSR mainly in the years 1989-1995. 
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originated in Africa (including Ethiopian Jews) and 11% (almost 700,000) originated in 
Asia (including the Middle-East). 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 demonstrate the differences between the Israeli population based 
on continent of birth and continent of origin: 
Figure 2. Jews in Israel by continent of birth (2015) 
 
Figure 3: Jews in Israel by continent of origin (2015) 
 
Israel- Sabra
76%
Asia
3%
Africa
5%
Europe-
America
16%
Israel- Sabra
44%
Asia
11%
Africa
14%
Europe-America 
(inc. USSR)
31%
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As much as the geographic origin is important, it is inaccurate to discuss Jewish ethnicity 
in Israel without referring to socio-cultural definitions. As seen in previous chapters, one 
of the claims about lack of judicial diversity in Israel has focused on the Jewish ethnic 
group of judges, due to the claimed over-representation of Ashkenazi Jews amongst 
judges. Jews from North and South America, Europe and some regions of the former 
Soviet Union are defined as “Ashkenazi” Jews, whereas Jews who originated from 
Africa, Asia and the Caucasus (and the Muslim republics of the former USSR) are 
Sephardic Jews (also known as 'Mizrahim'). Ethiopian Jews, though originally from 
Africa, are usually regarded as separate from Sephardic Jews549. Table 3 summarizes the 
data regarding Jewish ethnicity, according to the CBS classification, as well as using 
categories that the CBS refrains from using in its publications:  
                                                 
549 This may be due to the unique characteristics of this community. Over the years it adopted some 
religious rituals and traditions that differ from other Jewish communities. Other factors that may 
differentiate this group are the rather late stage of immigration to Israel (in the late 1980s and 90s); see 
below for further discussion.  
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Table 3. Israeli Jews by continent of origin, continent of birth and ethnic groups 
('Eda')550 
Group Origin Number  
in Group 
% 
in Group 
% of total 
Jewish 
population in 
Israel 
Jews Born 
in Israel 
Father born in Israel 2,820,30, 59% 45% 
Father born in Asia + 
Africa (Sephardic) 
1,086,000 23% 17% 
Father born in Europe-
America (Inc. former 
USSR) (Ashkenazi) 
903,700 19% 14% 
Total Jews born in Israel 4,810,100 100% 76% 
 
Jews Born 
outside 
Israel 
Asia+ Africa 
(Sephardic) 
483,900 32% 8% 
Europe-America (Inc. 
former USSR) 
(Ashkenazi) 
1,040,600 68% 16% 
Total- Jews born outside 
Israel 
1,524,500 100% 24% 
 
All Jews  
in Israel 
Israel (Sabra) 2,820,300 45% 
 
100% 
Ashkenazi 1,944,300 31% 
Sephardic 1,569,900 25% 
Total 6,334,500 100% 
 
Table 3 shows, that Sephardic Jews form almost 25% of the Jewish population, whereas 
31% are Ashkenazi551. This seems, prima facie, a peripheral difference. However, claims 
of discrimination against Sephardic Jews have been heard in Israel since the 1960s. 
Beginning at the time of several defining political and national events as well as the 
emergence of critical studies and the multiculturalism debate552, these claims of 
discrimination have reached a crescendo. Essentially, the claim is that a selective 
hegemonic group of “nation builders” (mainly Ashkenazi, secular men, politically 
associated with the Avoda/labour movement553) has had the monopoly of key political 
                                                 
550 Based on data in the CBS "Table 2.9” (n547). 
551 Moshe Sikron, ‘Demography: Israel’s Population - Patterns and Trends’ (Noa Rozen ed, Magnes 
2004) 
552 Referred to by some as “the critical Mizrahi discourse” – see Sami Shalom Chetrit, ‘Intra-Jewish 
Conflict in Israel – White Jews, Black Jews’ (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics 2010) 
553 Mautner (n1) 425-6. 
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and social power positions in Israel, and that Sephardic Jews have been excluded from 
the public arena, including the media, legal system, governmental companies and 
academia.554. Examples of the under-representation of Sephardic Jews are numerous. 
During Israel’s 68 years of existence there has not been one Sephardic Prime Minister; 
there were only two Sephardic Presidents and only a few Sephardic Supreme Court 
justices; only one university in Israel had a Sephardic president, etc.555. While the gaps 
between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews have significantly narrowed over the years, there 
is still evidence of inequality in education and employment556. 
However, many in Israel tend to underestimate the ‘Jewish-ethnicity conflict’. In fact, 
investigations of the subject or raising claims about discrimination against Sephardic 
Jews have been often referred to as "pulling the ethnic genie out of the bottle". Scholars 
have claimed that when they write about the topic they are described as “trouble 
makers”557. Many times, the lack of data or an inability to distinguish between the various 
ethnic groups in Israel due to intermarriage or other reasons has been used as a pretext to 
ignore the issue. This was the case with Zamir Committee, which discounted claims about 
under-representation of Sephardic Jews in the judiciary based on a “general impression”.  
In some cases, the argument is that the intermarriages between various Jewish groups, the 
reduced gaps between groups and the growing representation of Sephardic Jews in elite 
positions have rendered the intra-Jewish ethnicity debate irrelevant558. For instance, in 
personal correspondence with the author of this thesis, a representative of the CBS stated 
that the CBS does produce some publications on Jewish ethnicity but "because this issue 
is less relevant than before (especially for the younger population), there are fewer and 
fewer publications on the matter"559. 
Moreover, the tendency of the legal system in Israel to ignore discrimination on grounds 
of ethnic origin, especially against Sephardic Jews (despite the general willingness to 
                                                 
554 Aziza Kazum, “Western Culture, Ethnic Labels and Social Introversion: Ethnic Inequality in Israel” 
(1999) Israeli Sociology 385.  
555 A prominent example from recent years would be a decision by the Bank of Israel’s Committee for 
Planning Banknotes, Coins and Commemorative Coins that did not choose any Sephardic Jews to appear 
on the new set of notes. The committee's chair (a former Supreme Court justice) said that dealing with 
Jewish-ethnicity is “funny” and that the committee did not look at ethnic origin because it would have 
been “stupid” and “meaningless” as this is a non-issue in contemporary Israel. Roi Mandel and Brit 
Peretz, "The Judge that chose the notes is defending himself" Ynet (28.4.2013) 
www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4373239,00.html 
556 Sammy Smooha, 'Class, interethnic and national divisions and democracy in Israel’ in Uri Ram (ed), 
Israeli Society: Critical Perspectives (Brerot 1993) 172-202. 
557 Yossi Dahan, in Weiss (n.337) 
558 Israel Blechman, “On The Ethnic Composition Of Faculty Members In The Israeli Research 
Universities” (2008) 33 Theory and Criticism 191 
559 pers comm: email correspondence (10.9.2015) 
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admit and address discrimination against Arabs, gays, immigrants and women) was 
recently identified and examined by Israeli scholars. The main argument is that even when 
Sephardic Jews have tried to use the legal tools available to fight discrimination, the 
courts have been reluctant to acknowledge their claims and have sometimes refused to 
admit that there was indeed a Sephardic “group” that could be discriminated against560. 
In light of these findings, as well as claims of under-representation of Sephardic Jews in 
the judiciary561, this thesis examines intra Jewish ethnicity as an important diversity-
related variable. 
More recently, issues of integration and multi-culturalism have arisen from the 
immigration to Israel (‘Aliyah‘) of people from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union 
(FSU)562. The Jewish-Ethiopian community is some 138,000 members strong (~1.7% 
of the total Jewish population)563. For various reasons, the integration of this community 
into Israeli society has been complex. For example, the rates of unemployment, juvenile 
delinquency and domestic violence, are all higher amongst this community than in the 
broader society564. Furthermore, overcoming stereotypes based on skin colour was 
described as another hardship affecting the integration of Ethiopians Jews in Israel565. 
Nevertheless, the number of Ethiopian students in universities and colleges is consistently 
growing, although they still constitute only 1% of the entire student population and they 
are not found in large numbers in law degrees566. 
The Jewish-Russian community is much larger than the Ethiopian, and amounts to some 
1 million members (15% of the Jewish population in Israel) who arrived in Israel mostly 
after the collapse of the Iron Curtain567. By virtue of its magnitude, in addition to 
                                                 
560 Biton, “Mizrahim and the Law” (n 457); Yifat Biton, “The Nature of Discrimination: Mizrahim in 
Israel between Visible and Invisible” (2011) 4 Ma’asei Mishpat Review 75-92. 
561 Merav Aloush-Levron, Yifat Biton “Mizrachim In The Supreme Court – A Necessary Repair Of 
Inequality” Ynet (20.11.2011) http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4150349,00.htmlץ 
562 Referred to in this thesis as either FSU or former USSR. 
563 CBS “The Ethiopian Population in Israel (press release)”, (9.11.2015): 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201511302http://www.cbs.gov.il/h
odaot2011n/11_11_301e.pdf    
564 Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute Towards the Full Integration of Ethiopian-Israelis: A Progress 
Report, (http://brookdale.jdc.org.il/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/Towards-the-Full-Integration-of-
Ethiopan-Israelis-April-2011.pdf). The Ethiopian-Israeli Population: Facts and Figures 2012 (Myers, 
JDC and Brookdale Institute publication 2012) 
http://brookdale.jdc.org.il/_Uploads/dbsAttachedFiles/Myers-JDC-Brookdale-Institute-Facts-and-
Figures-on-Ethiopian-Israelis-June-2012.pdf 
565 Task Force To Eradicate Racism Against Ethiopian Jews - Final Report (July 2016) 
(http://www.justice.gov.il/Pubilcations/Articles/Documents/ReportEradicateRacism.pdf). The taskforce 
was established by the government. 
566 CBS press release (n563) 8 
567 CBS, The Population of Immigrants from Former Soviet Union – Demographic Trends (1990-2001) 
(2006) http://www1.cbs.gov.il/www/publications/migration_ussr01/pdf/h_print.pdf .  
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intrinsically distinct characteristics (e.g. exceptionally high levels of educational 
attainment), the Jewish Russian community has enjoyed a reasonably successful 
integration into Israeli society568. However, one important characteristic of this group is 
the large number of non-Jewish members (almost 28%569). Some of these are defined as 
Christians and most were not classified by religion upon their arrival to Israel570. As seen 
further below, both Ethiopian and FSU Jews have been claimed to be under-represented 
in the judiciary, and therefore the examination of judicial diversity in this thesis will 
assess the validity of these claims. 
Several issues pose difficulties in examining intra-Jewish ethnicity. The first is the issue 
of mixed ethnic ancestry and inter-group marriage, which “blurs” the definition of ethnic 
origin. According to recent research, in the last three decades there has been a large 
growth in the number of inter-group (mixed origins) marriages within the Jewish 
population571. However, scholars claim that the growing rate of intermarriages has not 
contributed to decreasing the social gaps between these two ethnic groups572. 
Nevertheless, the difficulty of assessing ethnic distribution, especially when discussing 
equal representation and social representation, remains. 
Additionally, some of the data-collection methods of the CBS create further difficulties. 
As mentioned, when classifying Jews by ethnic origin, the CBS distinguishes between 
Israel-born and those born abroad. Regarding the latter, the CBS only collects data on the 
father’s ethnic origin and not, for example, the father’s father or the mother’s origin, 
which would provide a different picture. Thus, for instance, those born in Israel whose 
father was also born in Israel are defined as “Israelis”, and their further ethnic origin is 
not assessed. This creates difficulties for researchers who wish to examine and define the 
ethnicity of the population that was born in recent decades to parents who were born in 
Israel. In other words, even though second and third generations of immigrants might 
continue to identify themselves with their ethnic ancestry, for the purposes of the CBS 
they are only defined as Israelis, and their further ethnicity is overlooked. 
One possible solution to amend this anomaly would be to ask Israelis to define themselves 
in terms of ethnic origins, rather than ascribing identity according to an inflexible 
                                                 
568 Asher Arian, Michael Philippov, Anna Knafelman Auditing Israeli Democracy 2009 – Twenty Years 
of Immigration from the Soviet Union (The Israel Democracy Institute, 2009) 
www.idi.org.il/media/212581/madad_2009_hebrew.pdf  
569 CBS (n567) 5 
570 Most of them came to Israel by virtue of the Law of Return as a result of family ties to Jews. 
571 Sagiv (n.535) 
572 Ibid. 
106 
 
formula. Findings from the CBS’s Social Survey (2008)573 show significant differences 
between how Israelis defined their origin, and how they are categorized by the CBS; for 
example, whilst the CBS counts 25% of Israeli Jews as originated from Asia or Africa, 
only 7% of survey participants described themselves as such. It seems essential, therefore, 
to take this complexity into account when dealing with the issue of Jewish ethnicity in 
this thesis. 
4.5 Jewish Religiosity 
The Jewish society in Israel today is made up of observant and non-observant Jews, 
comprising a wide spectrum from the ultra-Orthodox (“Haredim) to religious-Zionist 
Jews and to those who regard themselves as secular. However, as is the case with Jewish 
ethnicity, the differences between them are not clear-cut and mainly rely on self-
definition. There is also no exhaustive definition of who is an ultra-Orthodox Jew, nor an 
official database to determine the level of religiousness of Israeli citizens.  
Figure 4. Israeli Jews by self-definition of religiosity 
 
The data in Figure 4 is based on self-definition of religiosity574. Despite the multiple 
categories, it would be safe to say that the majority of Jews in Israel observe the Jewish 
tradition to some extent. The importance of religiosity goes beyond theology; it is strongly 
                                                 
573 CBS “Social Survey 2008 - How Do the Jews in Israel Define Their Origin? (Press release)” (17 June 
2009) http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=200919122.  
574 CBS “Social Survey 2009: The Jewish Population: The Place Of Religion In The Public Life Of 
Israel” (17.11.2011) http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201119012 
ultra-orthodox 
(Hardei)
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religious 
orthodox
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linked with political views, perceptions of the state, and specifically views on the role of 
courts and the level of trust in them: 
“…The level of Jewish religiosity is consistently linked to the 
distinctions between different sectors of the Israeli population -ethnic 
groups, classes separated by education and income - as well as to 
positions on issues such as democracy, the Law of Return, ‘Who is a 
Jew,’ and the status of women” 575. 
There is no clear information on the number of ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel, and the 
figures differ greatly depending on the method of examination (the approximated number 
ranges from 280,000 to almost 1 million)576. Regardless of its size and separatist nature, 
the Haredim have a substantial impact on public life, mainly through participation in the 
parliamentary coalition. Yet despite their significant political influence, the Haredim 
remain segregated in many other aspects of public life. Most notably, this group has been 
exempt from military service and therefore does not participate in one of the most 
important duties of an Israeli citizen. Traditionally, Hardeim did not attend higher 
education institutions, which may explain the low estimates of Orthodox lawyers, despite 
a gradual change in the past 15 years577. Furthermore, the court system, and especially 
the Supreme Court, has traditionally been regarded by this sector as illegitimate and anti-
religious578. However, most recent data show that in the past three years there have been 
some 9,000 Hardei students in colleges and universities each year, including in law 
schools579. 
The situation for other religious groups is, in many ways, different580. One of the most 
important of these is commonly referred to as religious-Zionist Jews. This group divides 
into many sub-groups, but can be generally described as successfully integrated into 
society, mainly thanks to its participation in military service, high numbers of academics, 
dominance in the labour force, and their visibility in the media and popular culture. 
Although not hostile to state institutions, some communities within this group treat the 
                                                 
575Israel Democracy Institute, “A Portrait of Israeli Jews: Beliefs, Observance and Values of Israeli 
Jews” (2012) https://en.idi.org.il/media/1351622/GuttmanAviChaiReport2012_EngFinal.pdf 
576CBS Report Measurement and Estimates of the Population of Ultra-Orthodox Jews (March 2011); 
Gurovich and Cohen-Kastro (n.546) 
577 Today more Haredim attend universities and colleges, some of which operate special degree programs 
for Haredi students. See: Assaf Malhi, Bezalel Cohen, Dan Kaufman, Attitudes And Barriers In Relation 
To Higher Education Amongst The Hardei Community (The Jerusalem Institute For Israel Studies 2008) 
578 Yedidya Shtern “The Hardeim And The Law” (16.3.2016) http://www.idi.org.il/םירפס-
םירמאמו/םירמאמ/haredi_and_law/ 
579 CBS "Higher Education in Israel - Selected Data for 2015/16 On the Occasion of the Beginning of the 
New Academic Year", p.7 
580 This group is estimated to have 700,000 members, almost 15% of the Jewish population and 10% of 
the entire population in Israel.  
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court system with wariness, especially when the court is perceived as “too liberal” or 
secular, and when it deals with matters of state and religion. Given the claims about 
under-representation of religious Jews in the Israeli judiciary, this study will examine the 
level of religious observance of Jewish judges as one of the measures of judicial diversity. 
4.6 Arabs 
The Arab population in Israel consists of three main religious sub-groups: Muslims, 
Druze and Christians. There are 1.48 million Muslims in Israel (18% of the entire 
population) and they form the largest sub-group within the Arab group581. This group has 
been experiencing internal transformations, mainly as a result of the collision between 
cultural tradition and modern daily life582. The very low rate of women participating in 
the labour force (24%; lower than any other religious group) is an example of the 
somewhat conservative character of this group. In 2014-2015, only 7.3% of all recipients 
of academic degrees in Israel were Muslim, and law is not considered a popular field 
amongst them. The Bedouins are a sub-group of Muslims, but are distinguished in 
various ways, including their forms of residence, their religious rituals and their relations 
with the Israeli state (for example many Bedouins volunteer to do military service in the 
IDF583). In addition to high crime rates, tensions between religious and secular members, 
the Bedouin population is ranked last in the socio-economic rating in Israel, with high 
rates of unemployment and very low rates of higher or any education584, especially 
amongst women. Two recent appointments of Bedouins to senior positions in Israel 
(Professor Alian Al-Karnawi as President of an academic college in Israel, and Judge 
Nasir Abu-Taha as a District Court judge) were described as achievements that would 
hopefully enhance the advancement of this community585. 
There are some 166,000 Christians in Israel (2% of the total population)586. The vast 
majority of them are Arabs (79%)587. Christian-Arabs have recently been reported as 
                                                 
581 CBS “The Moslem Population in Israel” (n.510) 
582 The Knesset Research and Information Centre (2006) Discrimination against Arabs in Employment 
and Workplace. 
583 Unlike Jews and Druze, Bedouins (and all other Arabs) are not obligated by law to serve in the army. 
However, as opposed to Muslims and Christian Arabs, a growing number of Bedouins do choose to 
undertake military service.  
584 Bedouins in the State of Israel (Knesset, Lexicon of terms) at: 
http://knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/bedouim_eng.htm 
585 Talila Nesher “For the first time in Israel: a Bedouin was appointed as president of an academic 
institute” Haaretz (19.6.2012) http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/1.1735471 
586 CBS “Christians in Israel” (n.511). 
587 The remainder are Christians that immigrated to Israel with their Jewish family relatives by virtue of 
the Law of Return, mostly during the 1990s in the immigration waves from the former Soviet Union. 
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having the highest success rates in matriculation examinations, both in the general 
population and amongst all Arabs588. Christians make up 2% of all students in academic 
institutions in Israel, and they are represented in law schools in similar numbers. 
As of 2015, the Druze population in Israel was counted as totalling some 138,000 people 
(1.6% of the total population, and 8% of the Arab group)589. Their religion, inter-relations 
with the Arab world and identification with the Israeli state (including participation in 
military service) make this a unique group. In fact, the very inclusion of the Druze within 
the “Arab” group may be questionable. Nevertheless, there are similarities to other 
minority groups in Israel (for instance, low rate of labour force participation amongst 
Druze women), but also some unexpected figures: for instance, the representation of 
women amongst students for a bachelor’s degree in Israel is higher in the Druze group 
than in the Jewish one (64.1% compared with 57.5% respectively). Overall, their share 
of the total student population in academic institutions is in line with their representation 
in the population (1.5%) with only a small number studying law. 
Relations between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority, as well as the political 
institutions of Israel (and the justice-system in particular) have been fragile over the years 
and were influenced by the Israel-Arab conflict and claims of inequality towards the Arab 
citizens of Israel590. Arabic is an official language in Israel, Arabs are represented in 
parliament and there is formal equality for all citizens. However, it is quite clear that state 
funds are not distributed equally between Jewish and Arab authorities591, nor is equal 
opportunity given in the job market592. Consequently, feelings of foreignness and distrust 
amongst the Arab population are high and have been strengthened by discrimination 
experienced in many aspects of life593. 
In an attempt to eradicate discrimination with regard to employment, the Civil Service 
Law (Appointments) has been revised to include a stipulation that “appropriate 
representation” should be given to different sectors – including Arabs – when making 
appointments to governmental offices. Similarly, a Parliamentary Inquiry Committee was 
                                                 
588 CBS (n.511). 
589 CBS “The Druze population of Israel (press release)” (24.4.2016) 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201611119) 
590 Ron Shapira, ‘Time for Sulcha’ (2006) 48 Hapraklit 433, 447 
591 Barzilai (n.523) 97-147. 
592 The Knesset Research and Information Centre (2002) The Judicial Treatment Of Groups In The 
Population 
593 The Knesset, Discrimination Against Arabs (n582) 
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established594, as well as “The Authority for the Economic Development of the Arab, 
Druze and Circassian Sectors”, in order to maximize the economic potential of these 
communities595. In the judicial context, one justice of the Supreme Court is an Arab 
(Salim Joubran) and an Arab representative was elected for the first time in 2011 as the 
Bar's representative to the Judicial Nominations Committee596. The Arab group in Israel 
is very dynamic and a key factor for judicial diversity in Israel, and is investigated in 
detail in this thesis. 
4.7 Gender 
In 2014, there were 3,042,900 women over 15 years of age in Israel, slightly more than 
men597. The average number of live births for Israeli women is three, significantly higher 
than in other OECD countries (1.71). The percentage of women participating in the labour 
force amounts to 59.1% (comparing to 69.3% for men)598. Since the establishment of the 
state and by virtue of the declaration of independence, women formally enjoy all rights 
and share most of the same duties as men (including military service for Jewish women). 
Yet, as with many other democracies, this formal equality does not always materialize 
into actual equality. Some of the most important milestones in the battle for gender 
equality in Israel have occurred in the HCJ, with defining cases relating to equal 
representation for women in government corporations, the right of women to be elected 
to religion departments in local councils, and women’s right to serve as combat pilots in 
the IDF.599 
The last decade has witnessed a significant rise in the number of employed professional 
women in Israel with an academic background, as well as in the number of women in 
management positions. However, women still dominate “traditional” fields of 
occupation, mainly education, health, welfare and nursing, which are characterized by a 
relatively low wage. There is also a significant gender pay gap, which exceeds 30%. In 
higher education institutions, 56.7% of all students are women, and they constitute more 
                                                 
594“Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on the Integration of Arab Employees in the Public Sector” 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/committees/eng/ParInqCommittees_eng.asp 
595Prime Minister’s Office 
http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/PrimeMinistersOffice/DivisionsAndAuthorities/Pages/AuthorityfortheEc
onomicDevelopment.aspx 
596 Adv. Khaled Zoabi 
597 CBS “International Women's Day 2016” (6.3.2016) 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201611055 
598For secular Jewish women, the numbers are even higher and show 80% participation rate, compared to 
only 28% amongst Arab women. 
599 Barak-Erez (n.45) 40-47. Israel is the only country in the world to apply compulsory conscription in 
the army to women.  
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than half of the graduates with second and third degrees in Israel600. Of law students, the 
numbers of women and men are equally distributed. According to recent publications, 
women constitute 46% of all Israeli lawyers. The issue of female representation in the 
Israeli judiciary will be a key focus of this study. 
This chapter provided key background information on the demographics of Israeli 
society. This information is critical to any assessment of the extent to which the Israeli 
judiciary, legal profession and law students reflect the complex make up of Israel’s 
society. It also forms the background to understanding the approach and methods used in 
this study to analyse judicial and legal diversity in Israel, which is set out in the following 
chapter. 
  
                                                 
600 CBS ‘Israel Compared to OECD Countries Selected Data from the publication’ Society in Israel No. 
2" http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=200923233. Again, numbers are 
even higher in the Arab sector – 67% of all Arab students are women.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODS 
 This chapter explains the research methods and analytical approach that were used in the 
empirical designs of this study. It is divided in two parts. The first part outlines how the 
empirical analysis mapping the current state of judicial diversity in Israel was carried out, 
the second part outlines how the two surveys with Israeli lawyers and law students (the 
“pool” for judicial appointments) were conducted and analysed. 
Part One: Mapping Judicial Diversity in Israel 
5.1 Research approach 
A key aim of this thesis is to produce an extensive, up-to-date profile of the composition 
of the Israeli judiciary. It does so by collecting and analysing information on the 
background characteristics of judges in all courts in Israel’s General Courts system601, 
using a range of measures and variables that represent the key socio-demographic features 
of Israel’s population. Over the years, presumptions, claims and speculations about the 
extent to which the judiciary in Israel is representative of Israeli society have been made. 
Some claims were supported by limited evidence (e.g. regarding the number of women 
or Arabs in courts), but most claims about the diversity of the Israeli judiciary have not 
been substantiated by reliable empirical evidence.  This is due in part to the lack of official 
data on either the judiciary or the “pool” from which judges are usually selected (Israeli 
lawyers). Also, the few previous studies on this issue have focussed only on the Israeli 
Supreme Court, excluding the rest of the court system. There are over 700 judges in the 
Israeli judiciary, and the Supreme Court’s 15 justices make up only 2% of the entire 
judiciary. A reliable picture of the state of judicial diversity in Israel, therefore, requires 
an assessment of diversity across the entire judiciary.   
Based on the unique characteristics of Israeli society and the claims about the lack of 
diversity in the judiciary, it was decided to focus on two main topics. The first is 
representation, i.e. the extent to which certain population groups and sectors are 
represented in the current composition of Israeli judges. The second theme is 
progression, i.e. the extent to which different groups manage to attain offices in various 
courts, positions and seniority levels in the Israeli judiciary. 
                                                 
601 For details about courts that are not included in this research see “Research Population” below 
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Two obvious variables to examine in Israel are religion and ethnicity. It is important to 
note the way this study handled ethnicity and religion, concepts that sometimes overlap 
in the discourse about Israeli society. As previously reviewed, Israeli society is 
characterised by ethnic, religious and nationality-related conflicts. A pivotal one is the 
relationship between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel. In this context, 
there are several complexities when trying to statistically examine them because some of 
the definitions are either ambiguous or controversial. For example, Judaism, in the Israeli 
context, is considered both a religion and nationality (as distinct from citizenship, which 
is “Israeli”)602. Therefore, when examining population trends in Israel, Jews can be 
compared to other nationalities (e.g. Arabs) but also to other religious groups (e.g. 
Muslims, Christians). Furthermore, sub-groups within the Jewish majority (that differ in 
level of religious observance, ethnic origins etc.) as well as within the Arab minority 
(which is divided by both religion and nationality factors) require careful consideration. 
 
Therefore, when talking about ethnicity and nationality in this study, it includes the 
distinction between Jews and Arabs (Christian, Muslim and Druze) as well as the 
distinctions between different Jewish ethnic groups. The latter specifically relate to the 
claims about over-representation of Ashkenazi Jews amongst judges compared with 
Sephardic Jews and members of recent Jewish migration communities (Ethiopian Jews 
and former USSR Jews that immigrated to Israel in the early 1990s). Another source of 
tension in society, which gave rise to claims about the lack of judicial diversity, is the 
representation of religious and ultra-Orthodox Jews in the judiciary. 
Gender has also been a main factor in the discussion about judicial diversity in Israel, 
and one of the only factors about which some reliable data have been published603. 
Although the number of women in the judiciary has increased in recent years, it is 
questionable whether women progress to higher courts and senior positions in the courts 
system as often as their male colleagues.  
                                                 
602 The Israeli authorities have traditionally separated citizenship (i.e. ‘Israeli’) from nationality and 
religious/ethnic categories. The separation and definition have become an important arena for legal, social 
and public debate. Ruth E Gavison, The Law of Return at Sixty Years: History, Ideology, Justification 
(Metzilah Center 2011); Yedidia Stern, “There Is No Israeli Nationality” (2014) 22 The Lawyer 60-61; 
the latest decision of the Supreme Court in this matter affirmed the differences between nationality, 
religion and citizenship: CA 8573/08 Uzi Ornan et al. v. The Minister of Interior et al, (2.10.2013).  
603 E.g. Shetreet (n.6); Katvan (n498) 
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Professional and academic background have been claimed to have an important effect 
on nominations and promotion of judges. There is some evidence to indicate that 
substantial numbers of judges were state prosecutors or advocates in the court system 
prior to being appointed to the judiciary and this has resulted in a homogeneous make-up 
of the judiciary604. A similar claim is that Israeli judges are mostly graduates of two 
leading universities605. This research, therefore, examines the legal education of current 
judges606. Finally, claims about nepotism in the Israeli judiciary are assessed by 
examining the number of judges with family ties to other judges607.  
 
5.2 Research questions 
In relation to these factors, this study attempted to answer the following questions: 
Ethnic and religious backgrounds of judges: 
1) Are Ashkenazi Jews over-represented in the judiciary? What is the proportion of 
Sephardic Jews and recent Jewish immigrants in the judiciary? 
2) What is the proportion of non-Jews amongst Israeli judges? Are Arabs under-
represented in the judiciary? Are there any differences between different religious 
groups within the Arab minority? (e.g. Christians, Muslims). 
3) What is the proportion of religious and Orthodox Jews amongst judges? 
Representation and progression of women and ethnic groups in the judiciary: 
4) Are women and men equally represented in the judiciary? 
5) Are women and certain ethnic groups (e.g. Arabs) concentrated in lower judicial 
positions, and/or in courts that are considered less prestigious? 
6) To what extent do women and ethnic minorities manage to attain senior positions 
in the judiciary? 
7) Are female judges concentrated in specific courts? 
                                                 
604 Yuval Yoaz "When the Judge Is a Former Prosecutor, No Wonder There Are Hardly Any Acquittals" 
Haaretz (29.10.2007) http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1453591, according to which a fifth of all judges 
worked for the State Advocacy prior to being appointed; Shachar, "On the Structure of the Supreme Court 
(n52) 406; Friedman (n39) 199. 
605 These claims mostly focused on the Israeli Supreme Court. Salzberger, "The Israeli Supreme Court at 
50 years” (n.441) 153; Shachar (n.52) 407 
606 Given that colleges only opened law schools in the mid-1990s, judges drawn from this pool are more 
likely to have been appointed fairly recently and could therefore be expected to be seen more often in 
lower courts.  
607 Ma'anit (n316) reviews several examples of judicial appointment of family relatives and the public 
criticism that followed; based on this the Nominations Committee recently set strict rules regarding the 
appointment of relatives. For more details, see chapter 2. 
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Professional, educational and family background of serving judges: 
8) Are most judges graduates of Hebrew University and Tel-Aviv University?  
9) How many judges graduated from Israeli law colleges? 
10) What proportion of judges come from the private sector?  
11) Are lawyers from the courts system or the State Attorney over-represented in the 
judiciary? 
12) How many judges have family ties to the judiciary? 
Data were also collected on a wide range of additional variables, including judges’ non-
legal education, age and number of years in the legal profession prior to appointment. 
 
5.3 Methodology 
Data Sources 
Practical difficulties emerge when trying to conduct research on judges in Israel, mainly 
because of three factors: the lack of previous research; the fact that the judicial system 
either does not collect and/or publish official data on judges’ backgrounds608; and the 
reluctance of officials (including judges) to publically address the diversity issue.  
Conducting interviews with or administrating questionnaires to a sample of judges would 
be a credible approach to gather evidence on their demographic background, or their 
attitudes towards various issues. However, surveying sitting judges is usually not feasible 
in Israel609, since judges rarely participate in academic research. Moreover, because this 
research aims to provide a full picture of diversity in the Israeli judiciary, interviews with 
a selection of judges could not provide a clear picture of the actual state of diversity in 
the court system. Therefore, data on judges for this thesis had to be obtained through the 
biographical information (curriculum vitae) of sitting judges provided on the official 
website of the Judicial Authority (the Webpage)610. The Webpage was used as the 
primary data source for this part of the research; it is the official resource for judges’ CVs, 
it provides a range of information about Israeli judges and it is updated frequently. 
                                                 
608 It is also the case that even in jurisdictions such as England and Wales where official statistics are 
published, ethnicity is not always straightforward because there can sometimes be a relatively high level 
of unknown ethnicity.  See, for example, Judicial Diversity Statistics 2016: Judicial Office Statistics 
Bulletin (2016); Rackley, Women, Judging and the Judiciary (n.127) 10. 
609 Chapter 4 presented two relatively recent publications that involved anonymous interviews with 
retired and, in very few cases, serving judges. 
610 http://www.court.gov.il/heb/home.htm 
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There are, however, several limitations to the data available on the Webpage. First, CV 
data are not consistent for all judges, with some judges revealing more information on 
their CVs than others611. In an official response to an inquiry made by the author, the 
supervisor of the Freedom of Information Act in the Israeli courts system asserted that 
the outline of judges’ CVs is generally similar but not necessarily identical612. Second, 
the CVs do not explicitly cover some variables that are key to the examination of judicial 
diversity in Israel; in particular, judges do not explicitly disclose their ethnicity, 
nationality and level of religious observance. Thus, for instance, no Arab judges directly 
state they are Arab or what religious group they relate to, and Jewish judges do not 
affiliate themselves with an ethnic group (Eda). 
It became clear that some data would need to be collected either by deduction from the 
CVs613 or obtained elsewhere. Therefore, multiple publically available sources of 
information on judges were also used to collect data not specified in the CVs (covered in 
more detail below). These complementary sources included secondary analysis reports614, 
media publications around appointments of judges or meetings of the Nominations 
Committee615 and manual web searches in designated websites616. Despite this, in some 
cases information remained unavailable.  
Research population and sampling 
The immediate research population for this study should logically be all serving judges 
in Israel. However, there are various types of judges across different courts and even 
within the same court, and (as discussed in Chapter 2) Specialised Religious, Military and 
                                                 
611 For instance, compare between these two profiles of judges: 
(http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/cv/fe_html_out/judges/k_hayim/208153958.htm) 
(http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/cv/fe_html_out/judges/k_hayim/163238942.htm). 
612 Pers. Comm (20.10.2014). According to the letter, this is the format for judges' CVs: “born 
in…arrived at Israel in… high school…military service, academic studies, internship, legal qualification, 
professional legal experience, date of appointment, and sometimes there is information about professional 
literature the judge has written. CVs of retired judges, however, are not presented according to a set 
format, and some information about them is missing. The courts system sees great importance [in the 
issue of judges’ CVs on the website] and is working regularly to complete the missing data”.  
613 Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (n429) 18. The researchers were convinced that the ethnic 
identification of judges based on the information on the Webpage was “highly reliable”, but when in 
doubt they had to “contact people who knew the judge in question”. 
614 The Israeli Courts System (2010) Semi-annual Report; Oz Almog, Sharon Hornstein "Patterns of Law, 
Justice and Delinquency among Israeli Arabs” People- Israel: Your Guide to Israeli Society (Samuel 
Neaman Institute for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology) 
http://www.peopleil.org/ArticleFiles/7819/7819.pdf; for 2008: 6.9%; the Sikkuy report (n.409). 
615 Some media reports include valuable information on the backgrounds of judges. See for example Hen 
Ma'anit, "Kaboub is aspiring to reach the high court" Globes (20.3.2016) 
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001111403. But there will always a reliability issue to 
consider with media reports. 
616 For instance, “Beit Hatfutsot, the Museum of the Jewish People” (http://www.bh.org.il/). 
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Labour Courts operate alongside the General Courts system. There are similarities and 
differences in the appointment procedure, selection criteria, legal background and 
diversity of judges between the General Courts and Specialised Courts. 
The research includes all judges in the General Courts system, the main court system with 
the largest number of judges and widest jurisdiction. To determine which judges and 
courts outside the General Courts system should also be included in this research, the 
following criteria were considered:  
1) legislation that governs court administration and conduct;  
2) procedure for appointing judges and their eligibility criteria;  
3) appointing body and the selection committee;  
4) composition of the court;  
5) availability of data on the judges.  
Based on this, the study encompasses:  
• All judges in the General Law Courts of Israel: the Supreme Court, District Courts 
and Magistrates Courts (including their special jurisdiction, e.g. family courts),  
• All judges in Labour Courts (one national and five regional courts),  
• All registrars in the abovementioned courts. 
 
Although Labour Courts are part of the Specialized Court system and have a unique 
jurisdiction, they form an integral part of the judicial system, and their judges' CVs appear 
on the same Webpage along with judges from the General Courts. Registrars are an 
important component of the Israeli judiciary and serve in all courts in the General Courts 
system as well as Labour Courts. They are appointed by the Chief Justice with the 
approval of the MoJ, and must meet the appointment criteria for Magistrate's Courts 
judges617. In Magistrate's Courts, there are also senior registrars who are appointed by the 
Judicial Nominations Committee618. In some cases, individuals can be both judges and 
registrars (e.g. a registrar of the Supreme Court and a Magistrate’s Court judge), and 
many judges serve as registrars before being appointed to the judiciary. The Webpage 
includes registrars and judges (including Labour Court judges) on the CV page619.  
                                                 
617 The Courts Law, s.84 
618 The Courts Law, s.84a(a)(1) 
619 However, some judicial reports tend to differentiate between judges and registrars, or omit registrars 
from the general count of judges. 
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The study does not include: Religious Courts; Military Courts; the Authority for 
Enforcement and Collection620 and other specialised ex-judicial tribunals621. This is 
mainly because those courts have separate management systems and legislation 
governing their operation and jurisdiction, as well as a distinct appointment procedure622 
and eligibility criteria623. 
The next step was to quantify the number of judges in each court comprising the research 
population. The judiciary is a dynamic system in which judges are promoted, appointed 
or retire during the year. Therefore, the total number of judges fluctuates during different 
times in any one year. Reports are published sporadically, but with inconsistencies. In 
this research, in order to avoid inaccuracies, judges that appeared on the CV webpage 
were used as the research population (and sampling frame), and the number of posted 
biographies was used as the total number of judges. A judge that serves in two courts was 
counted only once624. As Table 4 shows, the number of judges with CVs on the judiciary 
webpage in November 2015 almost entirely matches the number of judges in the 
judiciary’s 2015 annual report625. 
                                                 
620 This authority is separated from the General Courts system. It only has registrars, who are appointed 
by a different committee (Appendix 1). This excludes the registrars of the Authority from this research; 
however, they may need to be considered in future research (see Chapter 9). 
621Including disciplinary tribunals in the civil service and dozens of appeals committees and quasi-judicial 
hearings between the citizens and public authorities (Shetreet (n.6)).  
622 Shetreet (n.6) 131. 
623 Religious courts rely on religious laws, have almost only men as judges, do not require legal 
education, etc. Regulations for Rabbinical Judges (Training Conditions and Arrangements), 1955 (s.1). 
Similarly, because of the religious and ethnic composition of the population of army personnel, it is 
plausible to assume that almost all military judges are Jewish. In addition, information about judges from 
special courts (except for Labour Courts) cannot be found on the Webpage or elsewhere, which makes 
them almost impossible to investigate independently. 
624 The assignment of these judges to courts was according to their permanent position. For example, 
judges that were permanently in Magistrate’s Courts, but in a temporary position as registrars in District 
Courts were counted as ‘judges’ in ‘Magistrate’ Courts for the purpose of this study. The judicial post 
was considered the default position. 
625 The Israeli Judiciary- 2015 (http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/haba/dochot/doc/shnati2015.pdf). The data 
are of 31.12.2015. This report includes judges from the Supreme Court, District Courts, Magistrates 
Courts and Labour Courts, i.e. exactly the same courts included in this study. 
119 
 
Table 4: Estimated number of judges and registrars in Israel 
Source Judges Registrars Total 
This study (based on CVs) (November 2015) 652 73 725 
The Judiciary’s Annual Report 2015 666 61 727 
 
At the time of this research, 725 presiding judges were listed on the official CV Webpage 
and data on all of them were collected. Thus, all judges from the Supreme Court, District 
Courts, Magistrates’ Courts and Labour Courts were included626, as seen in Table 5 
below.  
Table 5. Research population based on the structure of the Israeli Judiciary 
Division Number of judges 
and registrars627 
% of the total research 
population 
Supreme Court  17 2.3% 
District Courts 180 24.8% 
Magistrates’ 
courts 
Magistrates’- 
general 
343 47.3% 
Family 65 9% 
Traffic 28 3.9% 
Juvenile 16 2.2% 
Total 
Magistrates’ 
452 62.3% 
Labour Courts National 
Labour court 
10 1.4% 
Regional 
Labour 
courts 
64 8.8% 
Total 
Labour 
74 10.2% 
Courts Management628 2 0.3% 
Total 725 100% 
 
                                                 
626 A previous version of this study by the author from 2010, which is referred to in specific places in this 
thesis, applied a stratified random sampling method to Magistrate’s Courts (and sampled 40% of all 
judges in this court). At that time 474 judges (67%) of the entire Israeli judiciary were analysed. 
627 The term ‘judge’ in this table and this chapter refers to the total number of judges and registrars in all 
seniority levels. When the difference between the various positions is meaningful, they are referred to 
distinctively.  
628 Given the very small number of judges in the courts management, they are not referred to in the rest of 
this thesis, as they are marginal to the analysis. 
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Operationalization of “diversity” 
In empirical legal research, operationalizing concepts and evaluating the measures taken 
by validity, reliability, etc., is not simple629. Diversity in the judicial context can mean 
many things, and many variables are key to the characterisation of Israeli judges. 
However, previous studies tended to focus on a few core variables (gender, ethnicity, 
race630, educational background and professional experience). Specifically, it has been 
argued that analysis of the success of ethnic minorities and women to attain judicial 
positions should include a wider range of variables in order to point to factors that are 
influential on their appointment chances631. Hence, it is important not just to look at 
ethnicity and gender but also to examine a wider range of variables and their possible 
interaction with ethnicity and gender, in order to assess the representation of different 
groups in the judiciary. 
Because this research aims to create the first extensive profile of the Israeli judiciary, an 
expansive approach was applied and data on as many variables as possible were gathered. 
The importance of collecting as much data as resources and time allow has been 
highlighted in empirical legal research generally632, and it is especially relevant to this 
research as it is attempting to create a new detailed database for analysing judicial 
diversity in Israel.   In addition to the obvious variables of gender, age, ethnicity, etc., this 
study also included data on military service, professional experience, place of internship, 
non-legal academic degrees, and place of birth outside of Israel. Overall, data on 25 
variables were collected (Table 6), including variables and courts that have been 
overlooked in previous research. As mentioned in section 1.4 above, some variables that 
are relevant to the judicial diversity debate in other jurisdictions, such as sexual 
orientation, political outlook or social class, were not examined in this thesis, because 
they are either less relevant to the characteristics of Israeli society or not commonly 
mentioned in the context of lack of diversity in the Israeli judiciary. 
 
                                                 
629 Lee Epstein and Andrew D. Martin, ‘Quantitative Approaches To Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter 
Cane and Herbert M. Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (OUP 2010) 908 
630 As mentioned earlier, some concepts regarding population groups might overlap. Jewish, for example, 
refers to both religion and nationality, and there are also various ethnic groups within the Jewish sector. 
“Ethnicity” might therefore refer to the differences between Arabs and Jews, but also describe the various 
ethnic groups in the Jewish community. This study attempted to differentiate between the concepts as 
much as possible to avoid misunderstandings. 
631 Thomas (n5) 5 
632 “basing inferences on more data rather than less is always preferable” (Epstein and Martin (n629) 910) 
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Table 6. Background Characteristics of Presiding Judges –Variables and tactics to obtain information 
 Variable and categories How was the information obtained? 
1.  Name Directly from CV 
 2.  Gender 
3.  Date of birth 
4.  Division (current position) 
5.  District (current position) 
6.  Current position in court (e.g. judge, registrar) 
7.  Nationality/Ethnicity (i.e. Jewish, Arabic)  Indirect Name 
Media reports 
8.  Religion (e.g. Jewish, Muslim, Christian etc.) Indirect Name 
Secondary education 
Media reports 
Military service 
9.  Level of religiosity (e.g. Orthodox) Indirect Secondary education 
Appearance and religious 
symbols 
Media reports 
10.  Jewish Ethnic group (i.e. Sephardic/Ashkenazi etc.) Indirect Surname 
Country of birth other than Israel 
Media reports 
11.  LL.B. (including the type and name of academic institution if the degree was obtained 
in Israel). 
Directly from CV 
 
12.  LL.M. (including the type and name of academic institution if the degree was obtained 
in Israel) 
Directly from CV 
 
13.  PhD (if in Laws) 
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14.  Place of Internship I 
15.  Place of Internship II (where applicable)633 Directly from CV 
 16.  Place of Internship III (where applicable) 
17.  Military service/ National Service 
18.  Professional legal experience prior to judicial appointment  
19.  Years of practice before first judicial appointment (based on year of admission to the 
Bar and date of first appointment to the judiciary) 
20.  Date of appointment to current position 
21.  Non-legal education – undergraduate 
22.  Non-legal education – graduate 
23.  Place of birth other than Israel 
24.  Known family ties to other judges The judiciary’s Webpage634 
25.  Other  Directly from CV 
                                                 
633 Until 1994, the compulsory internship duration was two years and it was customary to divide the period between two separate offices (e.g. a court during the first year, and a 
private firm in the second); therefore older judges would be more likely to list two places of internship, and accordingly younger judges will have usually interned in one place.  
634 http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/rashut/family.htm  
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Cross –referencing and data validation  
Whilst the majority of variables are straightforward and could be gathered from the 
judges’ CVs, the CVs did not reveal information on every variable, and some variables 
were more problematic to assess. The website does not directly provide data on the 
following:  
• Nationality (there is no explicit differentiation between Jews, Arabs and others);  
• Ethnicity (for Jews, clearly determining the Jewish ethnic origin; for Arabs, 
differentiating between Druze, Christian, Bedouin and Muslim); 
• Religion and religiosity (judges refrain from clearly stating their religious attribution 
or level of observance).  
Furthermore, this information is not released to the public regularly (or at all) and cannot 
be verified directly with judges themselves.  It was therefore necessary to look for 
alternative means of assessing these factors. The approach chosen was to examine:  
• Further background information available in the CV (surname, place of birth, 
educational background, etc.)  
• External religious or ethnic symbols or characteristics if available in judges’ photos 
(e.g. head cover, skullcap).  
• Further examination of additional external resources  
Nationality, i.e. the distinction between Jews and Arabs, was normally determined by 
the forename and surname of judges. This was, overall, straightforward; however, in very 
few cases of judges with names that may be either Jewish or Arab, advanced measures 
had to be applied. This included, for example, categorizing judges based on their 
educational background (e.g. attended an Arabic-speaking high school) or residential 
environment in the past (if provided)635. A similar approach was used in previous studies 
in Israel of defendants636 and judges637, where the researchers did not have access to 
                                                 
635 The classification of judges by place of residence was done based on common knowledge, and/or the 
CBS data about composition of localities by population groups. See for example: CBS, Statistical 
Abstract of Israel 2015, “Table 2.16 localities (1) and population, by district, sub-district, religion and 
population group”. 
636 Rahav and others, “Disparities between Jews and Arabs in the Criminal Law System” (n426). 
637 Gazal-Ayal and Sulitzeanu-Kenan (n429) 18. In this study, judges were classified as Arabs or Jews 
based on their names and biographic information on the Court System’s website. However, when they 
were unsure, the authors verified judges’ ethnic identity by contacting people who knew the judge in 
question. 
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official data on nationality and differentiated between Jews and Arabs by their surname 
and place of residence. 
The distribution of judges to different religious groups was mainly relevant to the various 
sub-groups within the Arab minority. The distinction was complicated, as Druze, Muslim 
(including Bedouin) and Christian Arabs often have similar names. However, some sub-
groups have their own distinct residential communities, educational institutions and 
sometimes names (e.g. an Arab judge named Mohammed is most likely a Muslim)638. 
Additionally, information about military service can also assist in differentiating between 
members of the Arab community: any Arab judge that mentions their military service in 
their CV is highly likely to be Druze (or, more rarely, Bedouin)639. External web resources 
were used as cross-referencing and data validation tools to finalise the categorization, or 
in cases where the information on the CV was not enough to determine the religious 
group640. If the data could not be validated, however, the judge was classified as “Arab-
other”. 
There are many claims about lack of representation of religious Jews in the judiciary641. 
In order to ascertain level of religiosity amongst Jewish judges, a combination of two 
components was used. First, the judge’s photo was useful in some cases to identify 
judges’ religious background based on their appearance642. For example, Jewish religious 
men usually wear a Yarmulke (skullcap)643, and women wear some form of a head cover; 
therefore judges who clearly appeared to have worn these in their official photo were 
classified as ‘religious’. Second, inferences were drawn from other details that judges 
provided. For example, male judges that disclosed they were educated in Jewish religious 
institutes in their childhood or attended a Hesder Yeshiva (a program combining military 
service with Torah studies) are likely to be religious or observing Jews. For female judges, 
an Ulpana (an educational institution for religious girls) and national service (rather than 
                                                 
638 Oz Almog "Forenames in the Israeli Arab community" (20.4.2009) People- Your Guide to Israeli 
Society (http://www.peopleil.org/details.aspx?itemID=7858). 
639 Out of the Arab minority, only those groups which volunteer (Bedouin) or are drafted into military 
service.  
640 For example, “The First Bedouin Judge to Be Appointed to a District Court” Channel 2 News 
(25.11.2011) http://www.mako.co.il/news-law/legal/Article-2a9ed0873fad331017.htm; Sikkuy Report, (n 
409).  
641 There were no claims about under-representation of observant judges of different religions. 
642 As long as the photo provided was of decent quality. 
643 Religious and orthodox Jewish men usually grow long beards, but that is not necessarily unique to 
them as some secular judges also have long beards. Therefore, the beard was only a strengthening 
indication in cases where the judge had other religious indications. 
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military service) may also be evidence of religious observance644. External data resources 
such as media reports were also used (mostly relevant to senior judges who attract media 
attention). However, in light of the difficulties of ascertaining the level of religious 
observance with a high level of confidence, an auxiliary category was created to include 
those judges with religious background that did not have clear outward signs and could 
not be safely referred to as “religious”. Thus, the 3 categories for religiousness were: 
religious, with religious background and Jewish without sign of religiousness. The latter 
included all judges without visible indication of observance, without information 
regarding religious educational background, or where external data could not establish 
their religiousness.  
One of the most difficult variables to identify was the ethnic origin of Jewish judges. 
The traditional distinction between different Jewish ethnic groups (‘Eda’) is made by 
country of birth of either the person in question or their father. Table 7 shows one common 
way of classifying Jewish ethnicity by country of birth.  
  
                                                 
644 This method is of course not straightforward and poses some difficulties. For instance, not all religious 
men wear Yarmulke, not all women wear head cover, though they might still define themselves as 
religious. In addition, some judges seem to have practiced their religion in the past (as children and 
adolescents) according to their biographies, but do not seem to do so today.  
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Table 7. Categorization of Jewish ethnicity by country of birth 
Country Categorised in this research as: 
Afghanistan Sephardic 
Algeria Sephardic 
Argentina Ashkenazi 
Armenia Ashkenazi 
Australia Ashkenazi 
Austria Ashkenazi 
Azerbaijan USSR* 
Bahamas Ashkenazi 
Belarus USSR 
Belgium Ashkenazi 
Brazil Ashkenazi 
Bulgaria Sephardic 
Britain Ashkenazi 
Canada Ashkenazi 
Chile Ashkenazi 
China Sephardic 
Colombia Ashkenazi 
Czech Republic Ashkenazi 
Denmark Ashkenazi 
Egypt Sephardic 
Ethiopia Ethiopian 
France Ashkenazi** 
Georgia USSR* 
Germany Ashkenazi 
Greece Sephardic** 
Hungary Ashkenazi 
India Sephardic 
Iran Sephardic 
Iraq Sephardic 
Israel Sabra 
Italy Ashkenazi** 
Kirgizstan USSR* 
Latvia Ashkenazi 
Lebanon Sephardic 
Libya Sephardic 
Lithuania Ashkenazi 
Mexico Ashkenazi 
Moldova Ashkenazi 
Morocco Sephardic 
Netherlands Ashkenazi 
Norway Ashkenazi 
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Poland Ashkenazi 
Romania Ashkenazi 
Russia USSR 
Seychelles Sephardic** 
Slovakia Ashkenazi 
South Africa Ashkenazi 
Spain Sephardic 
Sweden Ashkenazi 
Switzerland Ashkenazi 
Syria Sephardic 
Tunisia Sephardic 
Turkey Sephardic 
UK Ashkenazi 
Ukraine USSR 
Uruguay Ashkenazi 
USA Ashkenazi 
Uzbekistan USSR* 
Yemen Sephardic 
Zimbabwe Ashkenazi 
 
* Muslim states of the former USSR are categorized in this research in line with the 
CBS definitions as USSR or Ashkenazi although Jewish immigrants from these 
countries are commonly viewed as Sephardic/ Mizrachi. 
** The named category applied in this study is commonly used but not exclusive. Thus, 
for example, Jews born in France can be either Ashkenazi or Sephardic, depending on 
their origin. 
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Overall, it is agreed that Jews from Europe, North America and the former USSR are 
considered Ashkenazi, while Jews from North Africa, the Middle East and Asia are 
Sephardic or Mizrachi (i.e. Eastern). Jews who were born in Israel to an Israeli-born father 
are defined as Sabra (i.e. Israeli-born without distinct ethnicity). However, there is a lack 
of official data on the distribution of Israel-born Jews to various ethnic groups. The CBS 
collects data on Jews’ origin, and analyses the data by dividing Jews by continent of origin 
(Europe-America, Africa and Asia645) but does not use the terms Ashkenazi or Sephardic. 
Oddly enough, official bodies in Israel do not consistently collect information on the 
ethnicity of Jews, even though they have data about population groups, religion, gender, 
etc. For various reasons, as Israeli scholars have noted, Jewish-ethnicity is perceived by 
official bodies as a non-issue despite its significant presence in the public debate646. This 
approach results in inconsistent data about Jewish ethnicity, and presents challenges to 
examining the background of judges (as well as lawyers and law students) against the 
general population. 
Neither the CBS approach nor the division in Table 7 are exclusive and unequivocal. 
There are countries or areas for which the classification is less clear.  For example, Jews 
from Greece, the Balkans and from the Muslim countries of the former USSR are 
regarded as Sephardic by some and as Ashkenazi by others. Jews from France, North and 
South America are likely to be Ashkenazi but may also be immigrants from middle-
eastern countries, which would normally classify them as Sephardic. Ethiopian Jews that 
have immigrated to Israel during the 1980s and 1990s are a distinct ethnic group (Eda).  
In addition, the official classifications do not reflect the growing rate of ethnic 
intermarriages between Jews in Israel, even though it is estimated that 1 in 5 Jewish 
Israelis is born to a family of mixed ethnic origin (multi-ethnic)647. Because the CBS 
classification (by father) does not consider the mother’s ethnic origin when determining 
the Eda, the concept of multi-ethnicity is not found in CBS publications. Moreover, 
collecting data on father’s country of birth but not on grandfather’s raises a problem when 
investigating ethnicity of those who were born in Israel and according to official 
                                                 
645 In most of its analyses, it refers to Jews’ continent of origin according to the following rule of thumb: 
for persons born in Israel it displays their father's continent of birth, for persons born abroad it shows their 
own continent of birth. CBS Israel Abstract, 2015, table 2.6 “Jews, by continent of origin, sex and age”. 
646 Biton (n457); Blechmen (n558); in private email correspondence, a CBS official mentioned that 
Jewish ethnicity is no longer considered an important issue; hence, the CBS does not collect data on the 
ethnic origin anymore (see more details in chapter 4). 
647 Sagiv, ‘Israelis of Mixed Ethnicity’ (n.535)15; Barbara S. Okun and Orna Khait-Marelly, "The impact 
Of Intermarriage on Ethnic Stratification: Jews in Israel" (2010) 28 Research in Social Stratification and 
Mobility 375-394. 
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publications are categorised as Sabra, disconnected from the common ethnic categories. 
Jews who were born in Israel now form the majority of Israeli habitants, yet their ethnic 
origin is not acknowledged by the CBS’s definitions648. Thus, self-definition is necessary, 
especially in light of intermarriages; but without direct access to judges to allow them to 
self-identify their ethnic origins, it is impossible to obtain self-definitions. 
The Approach to data collection in complex variables and its possible limitations 
As clearly evident from the above sections about the operationalization of diversity in this 
research and data validation tactics (including in Table 6), some diversity variables were 
harder than orders to collect data on. This research adopted an expansive definition of 
diversity, despite the lack of published data on some of the aspects relating to judicial 
diversity. Although it is believed that such an expansive approach is essential- perhaps 
inevitable- in a study that aims to create, for the first time, a profile of the Israeli judiciary, 
it nonetheless has limitations that need to be considered and understood. 
As shown in Table 6, twelve diversity variables were directly available from the CV’s 
and the data on them are considered highly reliable: name, gender, date of birth (when 
provided), the division and district of the current judicial position, the judge’s legal and 
non-legal higher education, the professional background, military service, years of 
practice prior to the first appointment to the judiciary and the country of birth. Other 
variables- mainly nationality and religion- were not directly available from the CV’s but 
could be verified and cross-examined with other sources and can therefore be considered 
reliable. 
However, ‘Jewish ethnicity’ and ‘level of religiosity’ were harder to gather data about, 
and the classification of judges based on these complex variables was done carefully, and 
wherever possible, with reference to external reliable sources. Therefore, caution needs 
to be exercised when interpreting the findings in relation to these variables. For example, 
the classification of Jewish judges by ethnicity was very complex, because judges do not 
specify their ethnic affiliation with one Eda or another649. One option could have been 
simply not to examine the Jewish ethnicity of judges. But as Jewish ethnicity is a much-
discussed issue in relation to judicial diversity, it was important to at least try to 
                                                 
648 If a person was born in Israel to an Israeli-born father, they are classified as “Sabra”, that is with no 
affiliation to a Jewish ethnic group, although they may well be affiliated to an ethnic group based on their 
grandfather’s place of birth.  
649 Other researchers that tried to obtain data about Jewish ethnicity from the Judicial Nominations 
Committee were refused. Anat Georgi, “It Would Take 99 Years to Reach Equality between Sephardic 
and Ashkenazi Jews”, TheMarker (25.3.2013) http://www.themarker.com/news/1.1976460.  
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investigate this aspect of judicial diversity by researching publicly available information 
on members of the Israeli judiciary. This had to be done indirectly through a combination 
of details from judicial CVs and/or from external resources. Figure 5 below illustrates 
how this extrapolation from existing information occurred. 
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Figure 5. Determining Jewish judges' ethnic group in this study 
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Some Jewish judges were born outside Israel, which provided essential information 
regarding their ethnic origin650. Other judges have a distinct surname that is typical of 
certain ethnic origins (based on common knowledge as well as websites that analyse 
Jewish ethnicity by surnames651). This approach was used in a previous study of 
academics in Israel that tried to overcome the lack of ethnicity data652. However, this 
approach does not capture multi-ethnicity, as it focuses on an element that is normally 
inherited from the father (surname) and excludes the mother’s ethnic affiliation. In 
addition, although this method is reliable for male judges, it could be problematic with 
female judges because Israeli women do not always keep their maiden name after 
marriage. Another obstacle with surnames is that many judges carry a Hebraized surname, 
which is neutral to ethnicity653. For these, unless place of birth outside Israel was 
indicated, other measures had to be taken in account to code ethnic origin654. However, 
in many cases, there were no reliable indicators and the judge was identified as “Jewish, 
ethnicity unclear”. 
 
Statistical analysis 
This study examined the extent to which certain population groups and sectors are 
represented in the current composition of Israeli judges. Comparison is made with several 
relevant populations: lawyers in Israel (the current pool for judicial appointments), as well 
as law students (who form the future pool) and the general population655. However, 
official data for some populations are either partial or unavailable. This research is the 
first to try to map the diversity of the Israeli judiciary, as well as the diversity of the legal 
profession and law students in Israel. Thus, reference to the broader aspects of 
representation was often complex and in some cases- impossible. Instead, cautious 
references were made to elements that had some data to support them (e.g. the gender 
                                                 
650 For instance, a judge who stated he had been born in Syria was classified Sephardic.  
651 A reliable source for Jewish genealogy is “Beit Hatfutsot, the Museum of the Jewish People” 
http://www.bh.org.il/database-articles.aspx?55484.  
652 Blechman (n558) 
653 Converting traditional Jewish surnames into Hebrew names became a social norm in the early years of 
Israel. Gideon Turi, “Hebraized Surnames in Israel as A ‘Cultural Translation’: A Skeletal Exercise in the 
Semiotics of Culture”, in Nurit Gertz (ed.), Vantage Point: Culture and Society in Israel (Open 
University Press 1988) 152-171.  
654 Media reports, for example: Nir Har-Zahav “Four New Candidates – Sephardic” Arutz Sheva 
(24.11.2011) http://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/229194. 
655 For instance, if there are only 10% female judges and 90% male judges, this suggests 
disproportionality, but also significant under-representation of women compared with almost 50% of 
lawyers being women, and a 50-50 ratio in the general population. 
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distribution in the legal profession), or to specific groups within the relevant populations 
(e.g. lawyers in the civil service). 
In terms of statistical measures, because the main goal is to summarize the data collected 
about judges, measures of central tendency (e.g. mean, median, percentages) are used in 
order to describe the distribution of the different variables656. Where applicable, the 
findings of this research are compared to previous findings or to similar data in other 
jurisdictions or in other legal arenas in Israel itself657. 
Interactions between variables 
This research also measures how diversity variables interact and whether the links 
between them are statistically significant. This analysis may contribute, for example, to 
an understanding of gender-specific issues (e.g., the “glass ceiling effect”). Because there 
are 25 variables in the dataset, the number of potential combinations and cross-tabulations 
is very large. However, this thesis focused on the interaction and intersection of variables 
that are either considered highly important in Israel (e.g. ethnicity, nationality) or have 
been highlighted in the judicial literature as being significant (e.g. gender). When the 
relation between two variables was explored (e.g. between gender and position in court) 
a chi-squared test was used, with adjusted standardised Pearson residuals (referred to as 
PR) also used to indicate which specific cells may cause the “lack of fit”.658 Thus, a 
significant chi-squared test might indicate differences between groups (e.g. Jews and 
Arab judges), and Pearson residuals are used to establish which individual groups are 
making a particularly important contribution to the overall significant result. 
Part Two:  Methodology in the Lawyer and Law Student Surveys 
5.4 Objectives 
Research in other jurisdictions has demonstrated the link between judicial diversity and 
the diversity of the pool of applicants (or potential applicants)659. Although lessons and 
evidence from other jurisdictions suggest that diversity of the population of legal 
                                                 
656 Epstein and Martin (n629) 912 
657 This study did not employ non-probability sampling, but it can nevertheless use descriptive inferences 
from the general population or other populations, as it encompassed all judges in the General Courts 
system. 
658 Pearson residuals with absolute scores in excess of two or 3 indicate that the lack of fit for a particular 
cell is making an important contribution to an overall significant chi-squared test. Alan Agresti, 
Categorical Data Analysis (3rd edn, Wiley 2003) 
659 Regarding the UK: Thomas (n5) 31, 49; Hurwitz and Lanier (n108) 333.  
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professionals and law students does not always translate into a diverse judiciary660, a 
diverse judiciary is arguably less likely to exist without a diverse pool of applicants. In 
Israel, the immediate pool of potential applicants for judicial posts is that of practising 
Israeli lawyers (registered members of the Israeli Bar)661. As well as lawyers, law students 
are also an important group to consider in terms of the diversity of the judicial pool 
because many of them would eventually take the Bar exams and practice the profession, 
and they are therefore potential future applicants for judicial appointments662. 
The second part of the research set out to explore the demographics and views of Israeli 
lawyers and law students on the legal profession, judges, the judicial system, judicial 
appointments and judicial diversity. By collecting personal background data on the survey 
participants, the study provides an insight to the demographics of lawyers and law 
students in Israel, compared with the general population as well as the judiciary.  By also 
including an attitude survey for each group, this enabled an examination of the differences 
and similarities in lawyers and law student views on the core issues of this research. All 
of this helped to assess whether there are any trends that may influence the future pool 
for judicial appointments663. 
The objectives of the survey element of the research were: 
1. To assess the attitudes and perceptions of lawyers and law students on: 
(a) Israeli society, nationality, ethnicity and self-definition; 
(b)  the legal profession and legal education; 
(c) the judicial system; 
(d) diversity in legal education, the legal profession and the judiciary, including what 
should be done about judicial diversity in Israel.  
2. To map the demographics of the current pool and future pool of applicants for judicial 
appointments and: 
(a) identify factors in the lawyer and law student populations which may be related 
to diversity in the Israeli judiciary (e.g. under-representation of certain groups in 
the legal profession and legal education); 
                                                 
660 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight and Andrew D. Martin, “The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its 
Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court” (2003) 91 California Law Review 903–
65; Wald (n103); Holder (n371). 
661 Due to the eligibility criteria requiring applicants to be, inter alia, members of the Bar (The Courts 
Law, Article B: Competence). 
662 The importance of law students to the pool for future judicial appointments has also been examined in 
other jurisdictions; for example: Thomas (n5) 53-54. 
663 Compare: Sullivan, Barriers to the Legal Profession (n119) 
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(b) highlight the similarities and/or differences between lawyers, law students and the 
demographics of judges in Israel; 
3. To examine the possible links between the background of lawyers and law students, 
and their career plans, their views of Israeli judiciary and perceptions regarding 
judicial diversity in Israel; 
4. To identify possible barriers or incentives among lawyers and law students to consider 
a future judicial career.  
 
5.5 The questionnaires 
Using online survey methodology in this research 
Given the main objectives of this part of the research, it was important to choose a 
methodological tool that would provide a large amount of data for quantitative analysis. 
A survey, therefore, was the best method as it enables the systematic gathering of 
information and statistical analysis of a range of variables relevant to this research664 (e.g. 
background characteristics, views and perceptions)665. The decision to conduct a large-
scale quantitative study and not, for example, a qualitative study, was also a result of the 
lack of existing data on the subject matter. In the absence of previous research and 
established datasets in Israel, it seemed essential to gather baseline information that would 
provide solid answers to the research questions, and to assist future studies in this field. 
An online survey was used for both populations666. Web surveys are used in a wide range 
of disciplines and are considered a highly convenient research tool, which enables the 
creation and delivery of surveys to participants in an “expeditious manner… [and] 
produce results in synchronous time”667. Moreover, owing to the nature of this research 
(e.g. dealing with controversial, political or socially-charged issues), it was likely that 
respondents would be more willing to participate in an anonymous survey at their own 
convenience668. Choosing an online survey rather than hard copy or mail questionnaires 
was also favoured for technical and cost-efficiency reasons. Performing the survey online 
obviates the need for the researcher to be present in Israel or to hire people to personally 
                                                 
664 Robert M. Groves and others, Survey Methodology (2nd edn, Wiley 2009), p. 2. 
665 Elizabeth A. Buchanan and Erin E. Hvizdak, “Online Survey Tools: Ethical and Methodological 
Concerns of Human Research Ethics Committees” (2009) 4 Journal of Empirical Research on Human 
Research Ethics 37-48, 37 
666 For a review of the strengths and weaknesses of web surveys see: Mick p. Couper, ‘Web surveys: A 
review of issues and approaches’ (2000) 64 The Public Opinion Quarterly 464-494. 
667 Ibid. 
668 Bobby Duffy and other, “Comparing Data from Online and Face-To-Face Surveys” (2005) 47 
International Journal of Market Research 618-619.  
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supervise the distribution of surveys669. Moreover, it is easier to distribute a survey to a 
large number of participating institutions and individuals at the same time using an online 
method rather than hard copies670. Finally, this kind of project relies largely on the good 
will and active collaboration of institutions that do not necessarily have a direct or 
immediate benefit in its results. It was important, therefore, not to create unnecessary or 
excessive burdens on the participating institutions (e.g. to ask the Bar or law schools to 
distribute hard copies and collect them following completion)671. Using an online survey 
simply required the participating institutions to send a brief message by email to reach a 
maximum number of lawyers and students with a direct link to the survey.  This increased 
the number of law students and lawyers that could potentially be invited to participate in 
the survey. And because both lawyers and law students regularly use the internet672, 
online distribution of the survey would likely increase the sampling frame673 (i.e. the 
target group that has a chance to be included in the sample). 
Online surveys are not without drawbacks674. They may have coverage and nonresponse 
problems675, as participants in web surveys interact with the survey using their own 
devices and must have access to the Internet676. Nevertheless, this was not a major 
concern in this study, given that using the Internet is an important component in the daily 
routines of both lawyers and law students677. Using an online survey is therefore an 
appropriate tool in this study and is in line with the target population’s proficiency and 
availability. However, other response issues that are typical to online surveys were taken 
into account.  General mistrust of the internet and online surveys678, reluctance to share 
opinions in a “non-traditional environment” and perception of online surveys as spam and 
privacy concerns are just some of the factors that may affect response rates679. Therefore, 
in addition to choosing a secure survey tool that would guarantee the safe collection and 
                                                 
669 When performing multinational research, the key advantages of online surveys (i.e. greater speed and 
lower cost) are especially meaningful. Ibid 617. 
670Groves and others (n664) 158. 
671 Norman M. Bradburn, Seymour Sudman and Brian Wansink, Asking Questions: The Definitive Guide 
to Questionnaire Design - For Market Research, Political Polls, and Social and Health Questionnaires 
(Wiley 2004) (table 10.1). 
672 All law schools in Israel communicate with their students using the internet, either by emails to 
distributions lists, using web tools (e.g. Moodle) and in some cases new media as well. Lawyers in private 
firms as well as the public sectors also use the Internet as a pivotal working tool. 
673 Groves and others (n664) 71. 
674 Ibid, 384; Buchanan and Hvizdak (n665).  
675 Buchanan and Hvizdak (n665) 38). 
676Groves and others (n664) 157-158. 
677 However, older lawyers may be reluctant to respond to a survey via computer (compare: Ibid, 158). 
678 Similarly, Couper (n666, 465) mentions the “over surveying effect”, meaning people today are 
bombarded with survey invitations which may cause them to ignore the survey. 
679 Buchanan and Hvizdak (n665) 38-39. 
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storage of survey data and confidentiality of participants, it was decided to draft a 
relatively detailed introduction to the survey that would provide a clear and sound 
explanation of the purpose of the research, its author and the confidentiality guaranteed 
to participants (see Appendix 2 and Appendix 3). Additionally, in order to increase 
reliability, it was important to distribute the survey using official and credible 
organisations such as universities and the Israeli Bar. 
Language 
The official language(s) of the state have not been regulated in comprehensive or 
constitutional laws in Israel. Instead, it is governed by legislation enacted by the British 
Mandate680 that has subsequently been interpreted by other laws and court rulings. 
Hebrew is the de facto principal official language in Israel, whereas the status of Arabic 
is less clear. Arabic is officially recognized in certain important areas such as government 
documents681, and enjoys recognition above that usually granted to languages of national 
minorities in other democratic states682. However, Arabic does not have the official status 
that Hebrew enjoys. In short, Hebrew is the primary language in Israel, and Arabic has 
an official status to an extent that is not equal to Hebrew. 
This survey was conducted only in Hebrew. Law students and lawyers in Israel need to 
demonstrate a good command of Hebrew in order to be admitted to the LL.B. program in 
Israeli academic institutions683, to register as interns684 and to successfully sit the Israeli 
Bar Association qualification exams, which are held in Hebrew685. Given the sensitive 
nature of some of the issues that the questionnaire addresses (nationality, religion, ethnic 
and other diversity in the Israeli judiciary), one could argue that the survey could have 
                                                 
680 Article 82 of the King's Order-in-Council (“Official Languages”). 
681 The state is obliged to publish all its orders, advertisements and official papers in Arabic, and Arabic is 
found on postal stamps, banknotes and identity cards. However, several court rulings had to strengthen 
the status of Arabic and its use by official authorities (HCJ 4112/99 Adalah and Association for Civil 
Rights in Israel v. Tel-Aviv Yaffo Municipality et. Al., 56(5) PD 393 (25.7.2002)). 
682 Alexander Jacobson, “The Status of the Hebrew and Arabic Languages in Israel”, The Metzilah Centre 
for Zionist, Jewish, Liberal and Humanist Thought (2014); Aviad Bakshi “Is Arabic an Official Language 
in Israel?” The Institute For Zionist Strategies (November 2011) 
http://izsvideo.org/papers/bakshi2011.pdf. 
683 Elana Shohamy, Bernard Spolsky and Abdel Rahman Mara'i “The Teaching of Hebrew in the Arabic-
speaking Sector”, Language Policy Research Centre (Bar-Ilan University, 1996) 
http://www.lprc.org.il/lprc/generalPage.aspx?pageID=MinistryofEducation2. In addition, admission to 
most universities is based on the combined result of the matriculation certificate and the Psychometric 
Entrance Test (PET), which even though it may be taken in Arabic, some universities still request 
candidates to take a Hebrew Proficiency Test. 
684 section 1, The Bar Association Rules (Knowledge of Hebrew and Exam fees in Hebrew, the laws of 
the State of Israel and Practical Courses), 1962 (“Proof of Knowledge of Hebrew”). 
685 Section 3(c) of The Bar Association Regulations (Procedures of Exams in Israeli law and Practical 
Courses), 1962). 
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provided participants with a language option, including Arabic and other commonly-used 
languages in Israel (e.g. Russian, English). However, as the survey’s target group (Israeli 
law students and lawyers) should all be literate in Hebrew, and given the technical 
complications of running the survey in multiple languages, it was decided to only run the 
survey in Hebrew686. (See Appendices 2 and 3 for an English translation of both 
surveys.) 
Survey composition 
The majority of questions were identical in both the Lawyer and Law Student Surveys.  
The Law Student Survey was slightly shorter (60 questions) than the Lawyer Survey (69 
questions). Both surveys comprised a brief introduction followed by four sections.  
Section 1: Legal education and the legal profession. This section asked about the 
educational institution where the survey participant studied law, qualifications (legal and 
non-legal), professional expertise and current employment (for lawyers). Additionally, 
this section attempted to map the motivations of lawyers and law students to choose law 
and their future career plans, including judicial office. Participants were also asked 
whether they had any immediate family in the legal profession and in the judiciary687. 
Section 2: Judicial decision-making, the judiciary and judges. This section primarily 
consisted of rating-scale questions, asking participants to indicate the extent to which they 
agree with statements regarding judicial decision-making, the Israeli judiciary, selection 
process, etc. Other questions examined the extent to which respondents felt that specific 
population groups are represented in the judiciary (e.g. women, Muslim Arabs, Sephardic 
Jews). The section ended with the key question “Do you think something should be done 
about judicial diversity in Israel?” and explored views on possible ways to increase 
diversity or arguments against judicial diversity688. The questions were presented in as 
balanced a way as possible, in order to avoid biased responses689. In addition, because the 
terms “diversity” and “judicial diversity” are not common in legal discourse in Israel, this 
section (and the introduction to the survey) tried to explain them clearly. 
Section 3: Nationality, Society and Population. This section dealt with fundamental 
topics on the public agenda in Israel (i.e. self-definition and collectivism, identification 
                                                 
686 Future research should consider conducting the surveys in Hebrew and Arabic to examine differences 
in the participation rates and response patterns of Arab-speaking students. 
687 This question addressed the common claims of nepotism in the judiciary and the profession. 
688 Based on the arguments for and against judicial diversity as presented in Chapter 1. 
689 For the caveats of using “loaded” words and politically charged issues in questionnaires, see 
Bradburn, SSudman and Wasnik (n671) 5-8. 
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with the state, trust in political institution). Some questions were based on existing 
polls690, and their purpose was not only to see if lawyers and law students possess similar 
views to that of the public691, but also to see how these views might be related to 
perceptions of judicial diversity or plans for a judicial career692. Similarly, it sought to 
examine whether respondents’ previous experiences of discrimination could be related to 
perceptions of the legal profession, the judiciary and diversity. 
Section 4: Personal Background. This section addressed a wide range of personal 
variables in order to collect as much data as possible on the backgrounds of participants 
while still protecting their anonymity. Alongside more straightforward matters (e.g. 
gender, country of birth, age group), complicated questions about self-definition (of 
ethnic or religious affiliation) were presented. 
 
Software 
UCL’s online survey tool, Opinio, was used to conduct this survey693. Opinio is freely 
available to UCL researchers, is generally thought to be reliable and provides several 
reporting functions, which made it preferable to other web-based survey tools. UCL’s E-
Learning Environments (ELE) also provided technical support with the survey 
administration, which was valuable given some of the complexities and challenges694 that 
arose in running the survey in Hebrew. The surveys ran for 10 weeks between August 
and October 2014695. Specific setting was used to avoid multiple submissions (using 
cookies and IP address identification696).  
 
                                                 
690 E.g. Tamar Herman The Israeli Democracy Index 2013 (the Israel Democracy Institute, 2013) 
(http://en.idi.org.il/media/2726731/2013-Democracy-Index-Main-Findings.pdf). 
691 Hadar (n94) 
692 As mentioned in Chapter 1, lack of judicial diversity affects the public’s trust in courts, especially 
amongst ethnic minority groups. This survey therefore aims to examine whether similar trends occur 
amongst lawyers and law students from various ethnic and minority groups in Israel. 
 
694 ELE and Opinio’s user guide indicate that surveys can be conducted in Hebrew. However, there are 
issues in doing so.  For example, Hebrew is written from right-to-left, but Opinio’s default design is left-
to-right. In addition, Opinio could only generate reports and summaries in the HTML format for this 
survey, because it was in Hebrew. In order to conduct more advanced analysis the reports had to be 
manually converted to SPSS format. 
695 During that period, there were several outages (initiated by ELE) when the surveys were unavailable to 
respondents for relatively short intervals of time. 
696 Groves and others (n.664) 384. 
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Pilot / testing stage 
In order to test the design of the survey, the performance of Opinio and the clarity of the 
questions, a pilot of the survey was conducted with a small sample of Israeli lawyers and 
law students. A request to participate in the pilot was sent to nine lawyers and three law 
students that were personally known to the author in a professional capacity. The pilot 
survey was also sent to two family members of the author, who do not have any legal 
background. In total, eight of the 14 individuals took part in the pilot; six of these 
participants were lawyers and 2 were also law research students (as well as qualified 
lawyer). The Pilot Group forms a reasonably diverse sample of Israeli society and the 
population of legal professionals in terms of gender, professional background, level of 
Jewish religious observance and ethnicity (see Table 8). Unfortunately, the Israeli-Arab 
law student and lawyer to whom the request was sent did not respond to the pilot request. 
Table 8. Participants of the Survey Piloting stage 
Pilot 
Participant 
Legal 
Background 
Gender Ethnicity Position/sector 
A Lawyer Female Ashkenazi 
Jew 
Legal assistant to a senior 
district judge, former 
associate in a private law 
firm 
B Lawyer Female Sephardic 
Jew 
Lawyer in District 
Attorney’s Office 
C Lawyer Male Sephardic 
Jew 
Partner, private firm 
D Lawyer Male Sephardic 
Jew 
Partner, private firm 
E Lawyer Male Mixed 
Jewish origin 
Self-Employed lawyer and 
university lecturer 
F Lawyer Male Ashkenazi 
(religious) 
Jew 
Lawyer at NGO 
G Lawyer & 
student 
Female Mixed 
Jewish origin 
PhD student, former 
prosecution lawyer 
H Lawyer & 
student 
Female Sephardic 
Jew 
PhD student, former lawyer 
at NGO 
 
All respondents were asked to take the online survey and then answer five questions about 
their experience with the research. Most respondents said the survey was clear. Some 
however, said that the design of the matrix questions made them hard to understand. 
Therefore, where possible and given Opinio’s limited interface and design options, 
amendments were carried out.  Participants were also asked to comment about the length 
of the survey and whether it had any missing or unnecessary questions. Some respondents 
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thought it was overly long, but also mentioned there were no questions that should be 
removed.697. Similarly, whilst there were several comments about questions or statements 
that may be added to the survey, these could all be accommodated by the “other: please 
specify” option in many questions. Nevertheless, several comments or suggestions by 
pilot participants were insightful and led to minor changes in the wording of some 
questions698. 
5.6 Sampling 
Target population699 
The surveys targeted two populations: (1) all Israeli lawyers and (2) all law students in 
Israel. The former is defined as lawyers who are Israeli citizens and registered members 
of the Bar. This includes lawyers of all levels of seniority and experience in the 
profession, from the public and the private sector and all types of professional 
specialization. The second group is law students who attend law faculties in higher 
education institutions in Israel. Similar to lawyers, this group is viewed broadly and 
includes students of all years and all degree levels in laws (e.g. LL.B., LL.M., research 
degrees and special schemes such as executive programmes), including universities and 
academic colleges. In the absence of reliable, existing statistics on the target populations, 
it was necessary to create a dataset with as many lawyers and students as possible. 
Therefore, when determining the sampling frames, a broad approach to the terms “Israeli 
lawyers” and “Israeli law students” was applied, in order to produce a valid and reliable 
profile of the demographics of those populations and their views of judicial diversity and 
other related matters700. 
                                                 
697 It was agreed, however, to remove the progress bar, which respondents felt reinforced the lengthiness 
of the survey and could lead to participants abandoning the survey A progress bar is a common graphical 
tool in online surveys that visualises the progression of participants in the survey (i.e. how much have 
they left for completion). The effect of this tool on survey participants is not entirely clear; Richard D. 
Yentes and others, ‘Effects of survey progress bars on data quality and enjoyment’ (2012) Poster 
presented at the 27th annual meeting of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychologists, San 
Diego, CA http://www.jwilliamstoughton.com/conference_papers/Yentes_et_al_SIOP12.pdf. 
698E.g. the inclusion of an NGO category in the question that dealt with legal work experience. 
699 “The target population is the group of elements for which the survey investigator wants to make 
interferences by using the sample statistics. Groves and others (n.664) 69-70 
700 On the importance of collecting as much data as resources and time allow, and on as many 
observations (or respondents) as possible, in order to make reliable and valid inferences, see Epstein and 
Martin (n.660) 910 
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Frame population: Lawyers’ Survey 
According to the Israeli Bar, in 2014 (the year the survey was distributed) there were 
56,578 qualified lawyers registered as members of the Bar701. However, other sources 
suggest that there are more than 63,000 lawyers in Israel, but only approximately 50,000 
of them pay the Bar membership fees and are therefore eligible to practice the 
profession702. On either measure, Israel has one of the highest rates of lawyers per capita 
in the world, with an estimated ratio of one lawyer per 150 people703. For the purposes of 
this research, the target group of the Lawyers Survey is registered members of the Bar.  
The Bar’s website does not specify a department that conducts research or collects data 
about Israeli lawyers. Therefore, an initial contact with the Israeli Bar was made using 
the online enquiry form asking if the Bar would facilitate the distribution of the Lawyer 
Survey704. The enquiry was forwarded to the Bar’s Vice-President along with a full 
version of the Lawyer Survey and a summary of the research. The request was then 
forwarded to the CEO. After some delays, the Bar agreed to include a message about and 
link to the survey in its weekly newsletter and on its website. This request to the Bar 
occurred during a period of significant tensions between the Bar and the court system, 
mainly surrounding the Bar’s controversial decision to resume surveying lawyers for 
feedback on judges. The Judges’ Feedback Form is a survey to be filled in by lawyers, 
where they are asked to evaluate the performance of judges. In response, the Courts 
Administration announced that it would cease any relations with the Bar. Eventually, the 
survey was distributed in November 2014 and its results were presented in January 
2015.705  It is not clear whether this had any effect on the Bar’s willingness to facilitate 
this research. Because this research deals with judicial diversity and appointment, it may 
be that it was perceived as a potentially additional source of tension between the Bar and 
the courts, which the Bar wanted to minimise. 
                                                 
701 “96 newly qualified lawyers joined the 56,482 members of the Bar” The Israel Bar Association, 
Messages from the Bar’s Spokesman ship (7.9.2014) 
(http://www.israelbar.org.il/article_inner.asp?pgid=198587&catid=6)  
702Hila Raz, “2090 Lawyers Were Qualified Tonight; The Number Of Lawyers In Israel Crossed 63,000”, 
TheMarker (14.6.2012) (http://www.themarker.com/law/1.1731947)  
703 Zohar Shahar Levi “BDI: the number of lawyers in Israel - one per 150 persons” Calcalist (25.5.2014) 
(http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3631984,00.html)]; Ziv (n.76) 9.  
704‘Comments and Suggestions’ section (http://www.israelbar.org.il/reaction.asp) (sent May 2014). 
705 Yasmin Gueta, “Despite the Courts’ Administration’s Objection: The Bar Resumes the Judges’ 
Feedback” TheMarker (26.6.2014) http://www.themarker.com/law/1.2359786. 
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The Bar’s website has over 4,000 visits a day (on average)706, and it provides various 
services and has “established itself among [Bar] members and the general public, as a 
useful, effective and important source of information”707. Specifically, the website is the 
main platform for posting messages from the Bar’s press office. Updates and posts are 
also included in the newsletters sent to lawyers via the Bar’s email distribution list. At the 
time of this survey, this distribution list included some 37-38,000 lawyers that had 
provided the Bar with their email addresses and consent to be sent emails708. The Bar 
Vice President agreed to place a message about the Lawyer Survey on the Bar’s website 
and in the weekly online newsletter to lawyers. Therefore, for the purpose of this research, 
the sampling frame should be the population of lawyers who receive online mailings from 
the Bar. 
On 14 August 2014, the Bar posted the notice about the Lawyer Survey on its website, 
under the “posts and updates” section709. It was not possible to know how many people 
viewed this message on the website710. Two weeks later, a notice was included in the 
weekly newsletter711. Following a relatively low response rate, the author requested and 
the Bar subsequently agreed to include the message again in the newsletter sent on 11 
September 2014712. However, when this did not produce a substantially higher response 
rate, additional steps were taken to reach the target population using a distribution list 
from one of Israel’s leading legal online databases (details below). 
Frame population: Law Student Survey 
It is not entirely clear how many law students were enrolled in Israel at the time of the 
survey. According to media publications, there were 20,000 LL.B. students in the 
academic year 2013/14 in 14 higher education institutions in Israel: four universities and 
                                                 
706 Israel Bar Association Annual Report – Review By The VP (2012-2013) 
http://www.israelbar.org.il/UpLoadFiles/activity_report_2013_site.pdf, p.5 
707 ibid, p.21 
708 The Bar estimated that of the 38,000 lawyers who receive the newsletter, 20-30% actually open it 
(pers. comm). The number of lawyers who view the Bar’s website is harder to estimate, and additionally 
the public can also access the Bar’s website. Either way, the sampling frame (i.e. lawyers included in the 
Bar’s mailing list) amounts to 63-70% of the entire lawyers’ population. As far as is known, this sampling 
frame should be fairly representative of the entire lawyers’ population. 
709 http://www.israelbar.org.il/article_inner.asp?pgid=197990&catid=1138 (14.8.2014) 
710 Personal communication (27.8.2014). However, the numbers of people who took the survey at the time 
when the message was posted is detailed below. 
711 The Bar News – Issue No. 14, Thursday 28 August 2014 (“Posts And Updates”) 
http://www.israelbar.org.il/alonim_art.asp?catId=4843 
712The Bar News – Issue No. 16, Thursday 11 September 2014 (“Posts and Updates”) 
http://www.israelbar.org.il/alonim_art.asp?catId=4848. For a visual of the notifications on the Bar's 
website, see Appendix 4. 
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ten academic colleges713. However, data from the Council for Higher Education in Israel 
(CHE) 714 show that there were 18,750 law students in Israel (5,219 in universities and 
13,531 in academic colleges). Of these, 15,959 students were registered for an LL.B., 
2,536 for a Master’s degree and 255 were doctorate students in law. Given the relatively 
high number of law students and institutions, the best way to target the entire population 
of law students was through a direct appeal to all law schools in Israel. These include the 
following 4 universities and 10 colleges: 
Universities: 
• Haifa University 
• Bar-Ilan University 
• Tel Aviv university 
• Hebrew University (Jerusalem) 
 
Academic Colleges: 
• Inter Disciplinary College (IDC) Herzliya 
• Ono Academic College 
• Netanya Academic College 
• College Of Management 
• Sha’arei Mishpat College 
• Centre Of Law And Business (Ramat Gan) 
• Peres Academic Centre 
• Carmel Academic Centre 
• Sapir College 
• Zefat Academic College 
 
The strategy was to gain the cooperation of the Deans of all Law Schools by asking them 
to distribute the Law Student Survey to all their registered law students. Deans have full 
access to the entire student email list in their institutions, and it is reasonable to assume 
that most law students would be likely to open an email sent to them by the Law School 
Dean or on the Dean’s behalf. An email request was sent in May 2014 to all fourteen 
Deans of Law in Israel (see English translation in Appendix 5). The email (in Hebrew) 
summarised the research and outlined the request to distribute the survey to all law 
students in their faculty. 
 
                                                 
713 Hila Raz, Yasmin Gueta “Do not study law?” TheMarker (10.10.2013) 
http://www.themarker.com/law/1.2137098. 
714 Council for Higher Education, “Students in Institutions of Higher Education (Universities, Academic 
colleges and Teacher training colleges) by Degree and Field of Study”, table 2 (personal 
communications); Council for Higher Education “Selected data for the opening of the academic year 
2013/2014” (10.10.2013) (here) 
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Four Deans responded to the first email, and following a further request two weeks later, 
four more Deans replied715. Additional reminders were sent to the remaining six Deans 
during August. Eventually 12 out of the possible 14 law faculties agreed to participate. 
The coverage of the target population therefore lacks two law faculties (IDC Herzliya and 
Ono Academic College). IDC is one of the first academic colleges in Israel and has 
operated a law school for some twenty years. Ono Academic College is estimated to have 
the highest number of law students compared to all other law faculties716. In recent years, 
it opened two unique campuses for Orthodox-Jewish students. Both colleges are located 
in the central district of Israel and are not state-budgeted, meaning they charge high tuition 
fees. Given their student populations, these are two law colleges whose participation 
would have been valuable.  But without their participation in the survey, the sample frame 
still encompassed 70% of the entire target population, comprising 14,000 law students. 
The entire sampling frame was then invited to take part in the survey (that is, all law 
students from the 12 participating institutions), meaning that in this research the sample 
and the sampling frame overlap. 
To facilitate the survey distribution for each institution, an email was sent to the faculty 
administrators, with suggested instructions and a survey invitation to students (see 
English translation in Appendix 6)717. All participating institutions were also asked to 
send a reminder to students 2-3 weeks after the first email had been sent, and this helped 
to increase the number of participants. The survey was open for just over two months and 
closed on 31 October 2014.  All participating institutions were subsequently asked to 
provide information about the population of law students in their institute to help assess 
the sample frame. Most institutions were not able to fully comply with this request, due 
to either resource issues or a desire not to disclose information about their students. 
5.7 Survey responses  
Background 
The surveys were launched in early August 2014, when several important events occurred 
in Israel that may have had a bearing on the survey response rate. The first factor was the 
                                                 
715 Some Deans decided to participate immediately, while others forwarded the request to their legal 
advisor or their institution’s Ethics Committee, or asked to receive further information and documents 
(e.g. the questionnaire, the author’s CV, etc.). 
716 Ro’ee (n.476).  
717 Most institutions sent the request to their students using the exact wording the author had suggested, 
but others made minor variations For example, one Dean added a personal note encouraging students to 
participate; another mentioned that the author was an alumna of the faculty. In another university, 
students were told that the survey was not compulsory. 
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launch of operation “Protective Edge” (8 July-26 August 2014), which meant the survey 
was distributed in the midst of the war. The immediate effect was that most academic 
institutions and large numbers of lawyers were in the missile firing range. Some faculties 
(mainly in the south of Israel) had to temporarily close down. Additionally, some 15,000 
students were recruited to serve in the reserves during the operation, meaning that if there 
were law students from participating institutions amongst them, their ability to respond 
to the survey could well have been affected718.  
More generally, lawyers in the affected districts of Israel may have been less available to 
check their work emails, and even the Bar and the courts system had special 
communications arrangements in place for the duration of the operation719. The conflict 
also caused increased inner tensions in Israel, which escalated into riots, demonstrations 
and heated debates in the Knesset and the media720. This may have influenced some of 
the participants of the survey, especially when approaching questions regarding the state 
of Israel, their self-identification, etc.721. A separate but important additional background 
factor was the tension between the courts system and the Israeli Bar at the time (described 
above) following the Bar’s decision to resume the process of providing feedback on 
judges722.  It is important to note, however, that while the above-mentioned factors may 
have affected the response to the survey (i.e. the scope of responses or content) they did 
not seem to have influenced the sampling frame. In addition, the effect of the unusual 
security situation was mitigated to an extent by the fact that each population received two 
reminders or messages regarding the survey and could presumably participate once the 
security situation stabilised (that is, when the second messages were sent in September 
and October 2014). 
                                                 
718 Moran Regev, “30% of reservists in Protective Edge – students”, Ynet (24.7.2014) 
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4549353,00.html; on the effect of armed conflicts on survey 
participation: William G Axinn, Dirgha J. Ghimire, and Nathalie E. Williams, “Collecting Survey Data 
during Armed Conflict” (2012) 28 Journal of Official Statistics 153-171 
719 Special facilitations for registration of interns in September 2014 
(http://www.israelbar.org.il/article_inner.asp?pgId=197666&catId=87); a request to lawyers to refrain 
from taking execution proceedings throughout Israel, in light of the general reserve draft 
(http://www.israelbar.org.il/article_inner.asp?pgId=197359&catId=1138)). 
720 Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom (eds), The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge (Institute for National 
Security Studies 2014). 
721 See Nadia Hilou, Itamar Radai, and Manal Hreib, “Operation Protective Edge: Implications for 
Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel”, in The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge (ibid). Also, see the Bar’s 
National Ethics Commission’s special notice from 15 July 2014, 
http://www.israelbar.org.il/article_inner.asp?pgId=197263&catId=1138). 
722 Revital Hovel, “Despite The Opposition Of Grunis: The Bar Returns The Judges’ Feedback”, Haaretz 
(26.6.2014) http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/1.2359887 
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Responses to the Lawyer Survey 
Shortly after an invitation to take the survey had been placed on the electronic noticeboard 
on the Bar’s website and included in the newsletter, the response rate was low (only 31 
lawyers had completed the survey). Another notice about the survey appeared in the 
following Bar newsletter, after which a small increase in the number of participants was 
observed. After pursuing additional ways to distribute the survey through the Bar were 
examined that did not materialize723, Israel’s leading online legal databases were 
contacted to explore whether they could provide an effective means of reaching out to 
Israeli lawyers. These websites usually have thousands of subscribers, and almost every 
legal professional in Israel requires routine access to at least one database in order to 
perform legal research, review updates, etc. Also, subscribers and users of these databases 
are likely to be a wide range of practicing lawyers (in terms of areas of legal expertise, 
type of workplace), contact with subscribers is via emails to distribution lists, and several 
databases comply with the anti-spam regulations in Israel724. 
After contacting numerous databases and websites725, Nevo was selected to distribute the 
survey726. Nevo is a legal database containing case law from all courts and tribunals in 
Israel, as well as legislative updates, pleadings, a wide range of legal literature, and is the 
official publisher of the judgments of the Israeli Supreme Court. Its distribution mailing 
list consists of 33,000 people, the vast majority of whom are lawyers but there are also 
judges, universities and professional libraries727. Nevo does not have an accurate profile 
of its subscribers, but they claim that it represents the population of lawyers in Israel.728 
A special advertisement was created to fit the requirements and layout of Nevo (see 
Figure 6). The survey was sent on 23 October, around 9am (Israel time) following the 
recommendation of Nevo729. It was sent to 33,637 recipients.  
                                                 
723 The Presidents of the districts of the Bar were asked to send the survey to their district’s members, 
assuming that lawyers might be more likely to open an email from their district council rather than a 
general email from the Bar. However, none of the Presidents agreed to distribute the survey. 
724 Telecommunications Act (Telephone and Broadcast) (Amendment No. 40), 2008. 
725 Nevo (http://www.nevo.co.il/); Proguides (http://www.martindale.co.il/Search.aspx?Lang=en-US); 
Takdin (http://www.takdin.co.il/); Lawdata 
(http://www.lawdata.co.il/lawdata/startDefault.asp?swKnisa=&swExIP=) and Psakdin 
(http://www.psakdin.co.il/). 
726 Psakdin’s response and quote were also reasonable, but they responded quite late, at which stage the 
survey had already been sent by Nevo.  
727 Emails are sent to subscribers, former subscribers or those that signed-up for updates without a 
subscription.  
728 This information is displayed on Nevo’s homepage. 
729 Their experience shows that emails that are sent earlier in the day are more likely to attract the 
attention of the recipients. Pers.comm 
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Figure 6. Poster invitation sent to Nevo's distribution list requesting lawyers to 
take the survey (Hebrew)  
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The total number of Nevo recipients who opened the link to the survey was 887730, when 
the survey closed the number of stored responses was 742, the number of usable responses 
was 671 and the number of fully completed responses was 384. As discussed further in 
chapter 7 below, the calculation of the response rate is not straightforward. The response 
rate should be measured against the total number of lawyers who were invited to the 
survey, however, the latter figure cannot be verified due to the possible overlaps and/or 
gaps between the various distributions lists used to maximize the response to the 
survey731. 
 
Table 9. Lawyers Survey Responses 
Sender Means of communication Date No. of Responses following 
distribution 
Responses Useable 
Responses 
Israeli 
Bar  
Notice on the Bar’s 
website 
14.8.2014 51 31 
1st notice in the Bar’s 
newsletter 
28.8.2014 
2nd notice in the Bar’s 
newsletter 
11.9.2014 111 
 
70 
 
Nevo Email with poster to 
Nevo’s distribution list 
23.10.2014 742 
 
671 
 
Total   2.11.2014 742 671 
 
While using Nevo clearly increased the exposure of Israeli lawyers to the survey, the 
possible effects regarding both coverage and response should be considered. Firstly, as 
mentioned, Nevo does not analyse data regarding its subscribers and/or email recipients, 
therefore it is hard to know if they have specific or unique characteristics. Also, being a 
paid database, some lawyers may not be able to afford a subscription. The coverage is 
therefore not ideal, and in future research it would be better to approach the target 
population using several databases and/or other tools the Bar possesses to approach its 
members (e.g. a specified email sent to the distribution list). However, it is felt that the 
                                                 
730 This figure was presented to the author 10 days after the survey had been sent. Nevo claimed they 
could not know how many people opened the email, but that the number of clicks was actually twice as 
high as their average. Pers.comm (email 2.11.2014). 
731 There are some 38,000 recipients to the Bar’s newsletter, and 4,000 daily visits to the Bar’s website; 
Nevo’s distribution list covers over 33,600 recipients. How many lawyers appear on both lists? How 
many of the listed recipients actually received the survey notification by email? In the lack of a 
comprehensive emailing list for the sample frame, it was impossible to answer these questions, but it is 
possible to estimate with caution that the response rate was approximately 2%, as shown further in 
chapter 7.1.1. 
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Lawyer Survey did produce a reasonable sample of useable responses, given the 
circumstances and the need to comply with anti-spam laws in Israel.  
 
Responses to Law Student Survey 
On 26 August 2014, approximately two weeks after the survey had been launched in 10 
institutions, there were 1,350 stored responses and 750 completed responses on Opinio. 
In late October 2014, when the survey closed, the numbers had increased significantly, 
with 2,163 stored responses and 1,176 completed responses. It means that an additional 
730 students took the survey after the reminder had been sent, and the average increase 
in the numbers of participants in institutions following the reminder was 42%. The 
average participation rate in universities (20%) was slightly higher than in colleges (18%). 
The highest number of participants was at the Hebrew University (17.1%; n=332) 
whereas the institution with the highest rate of participation compared to the faculty’s 
size was Peres Academic College, where 31% (n=103) of students took the survey. Table 
10 displays the distribution of students who participated in the survey and indicated their 
institution’s name (n=1,935). 
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Table 10. Summary of response rate in participating law faculties 
Educational institution Estimated Number of 
students732 
Participated in the 
survey 
Response rate 
within 
institution 
% of all 
responses in 
the survey  
All law LL.B. LL.M. After 1st 
email 
Total 
Responses 
 
 
Universities  
Haifa Uni. 1000 800 200 89 112 11.3% 5.8% 
Tel-Aviv Uni. 1600 - - 156 243 15.1% 12.5% 
Hebrew Uni. 1460 - - 266 332 23.3% 17.1% 
Bar-Ilan Uni. 800 - - 157 236 30.2% 12.2% 
Colleges  
College of Management 983 948 35 32 45 4.5% 2.3% 
Netanya Academic 
College 
1400 - - 81 117 8.0% 6% 
Sha’arei Mishpat College  1468 1468 0 186 258 18.0% 13.3% 
Centre of Law and 
Business 
1140 1140 0 145 213 19.1% 11% 
Carmel Academic Centre 900 900 0 111 175 19.8% 9% 
Sapir College 255 255 0 32 54 21.0% 2.8% 
Zefat Academic College 190 190 0 32 47 25.3% 2.4% 
Peres Academic Centre 332 332 0 92 103 31.2% 5.3% 
  
Total  11,528   1,411 1,935 16.8% 99.7%733 
                                                 
732 Where possible, data was obtained directly from the faculties. Otherwise, an estimation was made based on either official data (e.g. CHE) or the. Also, not all institutions offer an 
LL.M. program. Those that offer but did not provide data were labelled (-), while those who do not offer were labelled (0). Only universities offer law research degrees but neither of 
them provided data regarding their research students. 
733 The remainder were participants who ticked ‘other’ or names of academic institutions that did not partake in this study. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE REALITY OF JUDICIAL DIVERSITY IN 
ISRAEL  
This chapter presents the findings of the first large-scale quantitative analysis of the 
demographic profiles of the 725 judges that make up the judiciary of the general courts, 
labour courts and registrars in Israel. The results of this study are the core of this thesis, 
as they answer one of its key questions: What is the state of judicial diversity in Israel 
today? The findings in this chapter provide important answers to questions about the 
composition of the Israeli judiciary; questions that have been part of the public debate for 
several decades but until now have not been adequately answered. These findings on the 
current state of judicial diversity in Israeli also provide the necessary baseline information 
to understand how judicial diversity might develop in Israel in the future734.  That issue 
will be explored in Chapters 7 and 8, which present findings on the makeup and attitudes 
of Israel lawyers and law students, who form the pool for future judicial appointments.  
 
Key diversity factors 
6.1 Gender735 
The first significant finding is that women judges are a majority in the Israeli judicial 
system: 52% of all Israeli judges are women and 48% are men736. Based on a comparative 
report about European judicial systems from 2016, this finding places Israel just above 
the average percentage of women judges in the 42 countries listed (51%)737. In England 
and Wales, for example, 25.2% of judges in courts are female738. 
 
                                                 
734 Full details of the statistical analyses carried out for this chapter are found in Appendix 7 (including 
chi-square results and adjusted Pearson residuals).  
735 In 2015, women comprised 50.4% of the population in Israel (CBS “Table 2.19 - Population, by 
population group, religion, age and sex, district and sub-district – average 2015” (1.9.2016)). 
736 As a comparison, in 1992 only 25% of all judges were women and, according to Zamir report (n.336), 
in 2001 the proportion of women was 43% (para 29). 
737 Israel is included in this report but as it is based on 2014 data, the proportion of women was 51%, less 
than in this study (see CEPEJ report (2016), n.499, p.101-102). The proportion of women is close to that 
in the Netherlands (56%) but smaller than in France (62%) and Romania (74%); compare: Thomas (n.5) 
91-97. 
738 Women make up 43.8% in UK tribunals but a large proportion of tribunal members are not legally 
trained.  2015 Judicial Diversity Statistics Judicial Office Statistics Bulletin (30.7.2015) 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/judicial_diversity_statistics_20151.pdf. 
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However, when cross-analysing judges’ gender and type of court in which they serve, 
highly significant differences appear between men and women. As seen in Table 11, there 
are two main trends concerning gender: first, the higher the court the fewer women 
judges, and second, a significantly high concentration of female judges is found in 
Specialized Courts (e.g. Family Courts, Juvenile Courts). These trends provide some 
evidence that the “prestige effect” and the “caring role effect” exist in the positioning of 
female judges in Israel. 
Table 11. Gender distribution of judges by type of court/division 
Court Division Gender % Number 
Male Female 
Supreme Court 71% 29% 17739 
District 57% 43% 181 
Labour courts Regional 33% 67% 64 
National 43% 57% 7 
Total labour 34% 66% 71 
Magistrates courts General 48% 52% 343 
Family 37% 63% 64 
Juvenile 29% 71% 17 
Traffic 46% 54% 28 
Total magistrates 45% 55% 452 
Total 48% 52% 725 
 
Prestige theory 
Looking at all the courts included in this study (Table 11), the highest proportion of 
female judges is found in Labour Courts (66%), which are part of the Specialized Court 
system. In the Israeli three-tiered General Courts system, the highest proportion of female 
judges is found in the lowest judicial division: the Magistrates Courts740. This is the only 
division that mirrors the overall gender distribution in Israeli courts, and even exceeds it 
with 55% of all Magistrates judges being female741. However, in District Courts, the 
percentage of women judges falls to 43%, and drops even further to 29% in the Supreme 
Court742. Therefore, female representation at the higher levels of the judiciary is lower 
                                                 
739 This number consists of 15 justices and 2 registrars.  
740 This is similar to other jurisdictions where the overall number of women in the judiciary is high, but 
men still dominate the more prestigious and powerful courts (Rackley (n.127) 20). 
741 This is probably due to the fact that almost all Israeli judges sit in Magistrate’s Courts. 
742 In 2015, there were four women justices in the Supreme Court, including the President Miriam Naor, 
and one registrar. This compares with the UK where only 1 out of 12 justices on the Supreme Court is a 
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than their representation in the judiciary as a whole, as well as what is known regarding 
the proportion of women in the legal profession and amongst law students. Nevertheless, 
the presence of women in high courts in Israel is quite similar to the situation in other 
influential institutions in Israel (e.g. women make up 27% of Knesset Members743). The 
exception to that trend is Labour Courts744, in which the majority of judges are women in 
both the regional courts and the National Labour Court745, although their proportion in 
the lower division (Regional Labour Courts) is higher than that of the National Labour 
Court (67% compared with 57%, respectively). 
In addition to the cross examination of gender with the type and level of court, another 
important aspect of judicial “prestige” is the seniority that women manage to attain in the 
judiciary. According to data published in the Israeli press in 2011, women were not only 
the majority of judges, but also held various key positions in the judicial system746. 
However, Israeli feminist scholars have claimed that despite the growing number of 
women in the judiciary overall, they are still relegated to stereotypical legal areas, such 
as family law and conflict resolution in the workplace747, and do not constitute the 
majority in higher courts. This study examined the type of position that women judges 
held in Israeli courts in November 2015 (Figure 7). The findings present a mixed picture 
of the position of Israeli women judges, which provides some evidence that the 
advancement of women in the Israeli judiciary is still limited to lower courts and junior 
positions, but only to some extent748. 
                                                 
woman; CEPEJ report (n.737) 330; Yasmin Gueta, “Who Needs A Woman in the Supreme Court?” 
TheMarker (24.08.2014) http://www.themarker.com/law/1.2413695. 
743Current Knesset Members of the 20th Knesset – Women Knesset Members 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mkindex_current_eng.asp?view=3 
744 Compare: Frances Raday, "Women in Law in Israel: A Study of the Relationship between Professional 
Integration and Feminism" (1996) 12 Georgia State University Law Review 525, 526. In the 1990s 
women were already the majority of judges in Regional Labour Courts and Traffic Courts, says Raday. 
745 However, according to some, the concentration of women in Labour Courts is an indication of 
“tracking” women to specific areas of law, including conflict resolution in the workplace (Orit Kamir, 
“The Women Took over the Judiciary? A Journalistic Misleading’ (2008) Women’s Parliament 
http://womenparlament.com/article_page1fa6.html?id=367&scid=83).  
746Ella Levi-Vinriv, “Are Women Discriminated in the Legal Profession and the Academia?” Globes 
(08.3.2011) http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000628341. The judicial system received a 
prize from the Civil Service Commission for those figures. 
747 Similar claims were made in other jurisdictions. Women who specialize in family law, for example, 
were often told that this field is “not sufficiently prestigious for high judicial appointment”- see Kenney, 
Sally Jane. Gender and justice: Why women in the judiciary really matter. Routledge, 2013, p.25 
748As with the distribution by type of court, the differences between men and women in positioning in 
courts were statistically significant, mainly given the disproportionate number of men as Vice-presidents 
of courts and the high proportion of women as judges and registrars. 
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Figure 7. Gender distribution of judges by position in courts 
 
As Figure 7 shows, women have the highest representation in the most junior position in 
the judiciary (registrars), and men are still a majority in the most senior positions. There 
are twice as many male Vice-Presidents of courts (67%) as female Vice-Presidents (33%) 
in Israel, and men make up a majority of Presidents of courts (52%). However, there are 
more female (54%) than male (46%) Senior Judges749, and numerous women hold key 
positions in the judiciary, including the most senior position in the Israeli judiciary: Chief 
Justice (President) of the Israeli Supreme Court, a post currently held by Miriam Naor.  
Looking more specifically at seniority, a cross analysis of the type of court with seniority 
of the judicial position reveals that even in some courts where there are overall more 
female than male judges, there are fewer women than men in senior positions (Table 12). 
For example, in Magistrate’s Courts, where 58% of judges are women, only 35% of Vice-
                                                 
749 The position ‘senior judge’ is relatively new in the Israeli judicial system. A procedure published by 
the Courts Administration detailing the criteria for appointing senior judges suggests, that judges are 
appointed to this position based on the length of time they served in the court. However, often senior 
judges are presidents and vice-presidents of courts whose appointment has expired and automatically 
become ‘senior judges’. Moreover, senior judges can only be Magistrates, District or Labour court judges 
(see: Procedure instructions of the Director of Courts (no. 6-09) “criteria for appointment of a senior 
judge” http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/haba/menahel/doc/03306510.pdf). However, this procedure was 
criticized for granting the status of a "senior judge" to judges as a means of promoting them and raising 
their salaries without being defined as "vice-presidents", see: Anat Ro’ee “judges receive an addition of 
thousands of shekels a month - without being promoted” Calcalist (14.6.2009) 
https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3304885,00.html.  
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Presidents are women; and in the National Labour Court, the President is a man, while 
60% of all judges are women. In Regional Labour Courts, however, 80% of Presidents 
are female and women comprise 67% of all judges in Regional Labour Courts. 
Table 12: Female representation in the Israeli judiciary by court and position  
 
Supreme 
Court District 
Labour- 
National 
Labour- 
Regional 
Magistrates 
(including 
family, 
traffic and 
juvenile) 
Total % 
of women 
in this 
position 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
 
Registrar 1 50% 8 73% 0 0%750 11 79% 3 43% 23 66% 
Senior 
registrar751 n/a 1 100% n/a n/a 20 54% 21 55% 
Judge 3 30% 58 44% 3 75% 25 64% 184 58% 273 54% 
Senior 
judge n/a 6 50% n/a 2 67% 19 54% 27 54% 
Vice 
president 0 0% 4 22% 1 100% 2 40% 17 35% 24 33% 
President 1 100% 1 17% 0 0% 4 80% 4 57% 10 48% 
 
Total % of 
women in 
this court 
5 29% 78 43% 4 57% 44 67% 247 55% 378 52% 
 
It is notable how few women serve as Presidents of District Courts, with only one of the 
possible six Presidents being a woman (17%)752. This proportion is not only lower than 
the overall proportion of women as Presidents of courts (48%) but also low in relation to 
the overall proportion of women in District Courts (43%). In an earlier version of this 
study conducted by the author in 2010, four of the six (68%) District Court Presidents 
were women. So in less than five years, the representation of women in the key role of 
                                                 
750 There is only one registrar in this court, a male (Kamel Abou Kaoud). He appears as a judge on the 
CV but serves as a registrar in this court; he was therefore was counted as registrar. There were no female 
registrars. 
751 Except for unusual circumstances, Senior Registrars are only found in Magistrate's Courts (see 
Chapter 5). 
752 In 2016 this changed even further, with the appointment of a male judge as the President of Tel-Aviv 
District Court, leaving no women as Presidents in District Courts. 
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District Court President had changed substantially753. This reflects how a few 
appointments can substantially change the gender balance at this level of the Israeli 
judiciary, given the small number of Presidents in the District Courts (6). 
 
The caring role effect 
A common claim in the study of judicial diversity worldwide is that women judges tend 
to be concentrated in parts of the judiciary that deal with issues concerning women, such 
as family and juvenile courts. These courts may be seen as more related to women’s 
caring characteristics (i.e. conflict resolution in domestic and family matters, juvenile 
delinquency.)754. Table 11 indicates that this caring role effect exists in Israeli courts, 
with women constituting 63% of all judges in Family Courts, and 71% of all Juvenile 
Courts judges. These are much higher proportions of female representation than in other 
courts in the Israeli judicial system.  The number of women judges in Labour Courts is 
also very high (66%). This statistically significant figure does not seem to relate to either 
the prestige theory or the caring role effect, as judges appointed to Regional and the 
National Labour Courts need to meet the criteria for District Court judges (i.e. be more 
experienced than Magistrate’s Court judges where Family and Juvenile Courts are 
located).  This could reflect similar trends found in other jurisdictions where women have 
attained fuller representation in the judiciary and there is little evidence any longer of the 
caring role and the prestige effect.755 
6.2 Nationality/religion 
The public discourse over nationality and nationalism in Israel usually refers to the inter-
relations between the Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel. However, because of the 
potential overlap between nationality and religion, such discussion also relates to the 
relations between different religious groups in Israel, and therefore the two elements 
(nationality and religion) are discussed jointly here. 
 
                                                 
753 Three female Presidents of District Courts retired since the 2010 study and were subsequently 
succeeded by men. Compare: regression trends regarding the representation of women in senior positions 
and higher courts in other jurisdictions (e.g. Canada) (Rackley (n127) 22). 
754 Kamir (n745) claims that the high concentration of women in Family, Labour and Juvenile courts is 
indicative of the marginalization of women to areas stereotyped as feminine fields; Thomas, 
‘Understanding Judicial Diversity’ (n.105) 3). 
755 Thomas, ibid 9-10. 
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The judiciary does not publish data about the religious identification of serving judges, 
nor do judges mention this clearly in their CVs756. However, the representation of the 
Arab minority in the composition of Israeli judiciary has been one of the only issues to 
be addressed in previous research on the judiciary as well as by Zamir committee. In 
2001, the Zamir Report stated that only 4% of judges in Israel were Arabs757. Later 
publications showed different figures, with the most recent publication stating that the 
figure is 7.7%. This is to be compared with nearly 21% of the general population in Israel 
being Arabs. While these earlier reports found that Arabs are under-represented in the 
judiciary, the exact nature of the under-represented was not clear.  For instance, are there 
differences between various religious groups within the Arab minority, and how does this 
relate to their representation in the legal profession and in law school populations?  
The current research found that 91.7% of judges in Israel are Jewish, with the remainder 
8.3% being Arabs (this amounts to 60 judges that are Muslim, Christian and Druze)758. 
This ratio is not representative of the overall distribution of these groups in the Israeli 
population, where 76% are Jewish, 24% are ‘others’, of which the vast majority are Arabs. 
Figure 8 illustrates how the representation of Arab judges found in this study compares 
with findings in other reports on Arab representation in the judiciary over the last decade. 
                                                 
756 However, email correspondence with the Knesset’s Research Unit confirmed that data about religious 
and ethnic affiliation is indeed provided to the courts system by judicial candidates using the application 
forms (pers.comm 16.12.2015). 
757 However, it is not entirely clear which data underpinned this conclusion. 
758 Two Bedouin judges were counted as Muslim; for judges of possibly mixed religious background, it is 
impossible to tell whether some of the judges are either Jews or Arabs. Similarly, if a judge with an Arab 
name is actually of mixed origin (e.g. a Jewish mother and an Arab father) it could not be determined in 
this study. 
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Figure 8. Arab representation in the Israeli judiciary (1989-2015)759 
 
These figures suggest that the number of Arabs in the Israeli judiciary has quadrupled 
since the late 1980s (when there were only single numbers of Arab judges) and has grown 
steadily (but slowly) in the past decade.  However, Arabs are still significantly under-
represented in the Israeli judiciary in relation to their proportion in the general population. 
It is hard to contextualize this finding in relation to the legal profession because, as seen 
earlier, the proportion of Arabs in the legal profession is not clear or regularly updated.  
According to government data from 2005, almost 9% of lawyers in Israel were Arabs, but 
a report from 2008 claimed that their proportion has increased to 15%760. 
Arab judges by religious group 
Studies on judicial diversity in other jurisdictions have emphasised the dangers in looking 
at ethnic minorities as a unified group, overlooking their unique characteristics. Unlike 
previous publications in Israel, this study examines the representation of the Arab 
minority in the judiciary by more detailed sub-groups761.  
                                                 
759 The data for 1989 – Shetreet (n.6) 286; for 2005 – Hornstein and Almog (n 614); for 2008: 6.9%: 
presented in a Knesset discussion about integration of Arabs in the public service (Revital Hovel, “New 
Research: 7.7% Of Israeli Judges Are Arabs, Despite The Judiciary’s Promise To Integrate Them” 
Haaretz (2.6.2015) www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/.premium-1.2649879; 7.8%: the Sikkuy report (n.409) 2; 
2014: Luria (n.443). 
760 See Chapter 3, comparing the Sikkuy report (n.409) with official government and CBS data. 
761 Distinguishing between judges based on sub-groups in the Arab sector was not easy. Some factors 
were used as indicators; for example, military service implied that the judge is likely to be Druze, or a 
Christian (church-managed) high school implied that the judge was Christian. However, this is not clear-
cut, as there are Arabs who serve in the IDF and there are non-Christian students in church schools etc.  
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The Arab group in Israel consists of several sub-groups that differ from each other in their 
religious affiliation, ethnic self-definition and other factors.  However, in this research 
project identifying which of various religious groups Arab judges belonged to was not 
straightforward. The simple cases were where judges had a distinct name: for example, 
Mohammed (Muslim) or William (Christian). In some other cases, the judge’s religious 
affiliation was published in the media, but this mostly covered senior Arab judges (e.g. 
Justice Joubran of the Supreme Court, a Christian Arab). However, some Arab names are 
“neutral” and do not point to a certain religious group762. In these cases, other data were 
taken into consideration, including the judge’s secondary education, their place of 
residence763 and military service. However, this approach did not always clarify religious 
affiliation. For instance, nine of the 60 Arab judges gained their secondary education in 
church schools in Israel764. Yet this cannot necessarily be used to conclude their level of 
religious observance, as non-Christians attend these schools too.  In any case it would be 
hard to determine whether they practice their faith or not in the absence of any other data 
to validate religious observance (e.g. traditional religious dress).  Therefore, as with the 
classification of Jews to various ethnic groups or levels of religiousness, some caution 
needs to be exercised when interpreting the findings of this study on the distribution to 
religious sub-groups within the Arab group in the Israeli judiciary.  The findings do differ 
from other reports on this issue765. 
                                                 
762 Almog, ‘Forenames in the Arab population in Israel’ (n.638). 
763 The CBS publishes profiles on almost all towns, villages and other forms of residence in Israel. Thus, 
for example, a judge born and raised in Daburiyya, where 99.7% of residents are Muslim, is most likely a 
Muslim. 
764 St. Joseph School and the Baptist School, both in Nazareth.  
765 Data from the Knesset’s Research Unit (pers.comm 15.12.2015) claimed that 92.1% of judges are 
Jewish, 2.8% Christian, 4% Muslim and 1% Druze. This data relies on the judicial system’s records, but 
it refers to there being only 667 judges. Also, in both cases Christians are well-represented in the 
judiciary while Muslim Arabs are under-represented. 
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Figure 9. Representation of Israeli judges by religious group766 
 
 
In line with concerns raised in the past about the low number of Muslim judges in the 
Israeli judiciary767, this research found that less than 2% of judges in Israel are Muslim768. 
Specifically within the Muslim group, there are two Bedouin judges in the entire 
judiciary: this represents 0.2% of the judiciary compared to an estimated 2.75% of the 
total population769. The proportion of Druze judges (0.7% or 5 judges) is also smaller 
than the Druze representation in the general population (1.6%). However, the proportion 
of Christian Arab judges identified in this research (5.4%) is almost three times higher 
than their share of the total Israeli population (2%), and the only Arab justice in the Israeli 
Supreme Court is Christian. This over-representation of Christians in the judiciary is 
                                                 
766 Data on the general population rely on the CBS reports; “Arab other” refers to judges who are clearly 
Arabs, but could not be affiliated with a specific religious group (i.e. Arab name but no other indication to 
suggest a specific category). A more cautious estimation calculated 30 Christian Arab judges (4.2% of the 
entire judiciary); yet that would only increase the proportion of “Arab other” and still mean there are 
twice more Christian judges than their proportion in the general population. 
767 Yuval Yoaz, “A committee is trying to find Muslim candidates for justiceships” Haaretz (4.2.2006) 
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/678742.html; figures for 2005 according to which one third of all 
Arab judges, and only 2% of all judges in 2005, were Muslim (Almog, n.614). 
768 It should be mentioned however, that a journalistic review presented an opposite situation, claiming 
that of the 52 Arab judges, 27 are Muslims, 18 Christians and 7 Druze. Hovel (n.759). 
769 It is not entirely clear how many Bedouins are in Israel due to the large number of Bedouin living in 
illegal or unregulated settlements. A report from 2016 claims that there were 231,000 Bedouins (2.75% of 
the general population). Myers-JCD- Brookdale, The Bedouins in Israel: Facts and Figures (2016) 
http://brookdaleheb.jdc.org.il/?CategoryID=390&ArticleID=2096  
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consistent with this community’s over-representation in higher education and key 
positions in Israel770. 
Prestige effect 
Cross-analysis of nationality with the judges’ court showed no statistically significant 
findings. However, Table 13 shows that Arab judges constitute almost 10% of all judges 
in all Magistrates Courts (including Family, Juvenile and Traffic Courts). Overall, 73% 
of all Arab judges preside in Magistrates Courts. However, it appears that the proportion 
of Arab judges in Family Courts (less than 5%) is significantly smaller than their 
representation in other Specialized Courts as well as in the general Magistrates Courts. 
Furthermore, in higher courts the proportion of Arabs decreases. There are only 7% of 
Arab judges in Labour Courts771, and 6% in District Courts. 
Table 13. Arab representation in the judiciary by type of court 
Division Category Arab judges 
N % 
Supreme Court 1 
 
6% 
District Courts 10 
 
5.5% 
Labour Courts Regional 4 
 
6% 
National 1 
 
14% 
Total Labour 5 7% 
Magistrates’ Courts General 36 
 
10.5% 
Family 3 4.7% 
Juvenile 2 12% 
Traffic 3 
 
11% 
Total Magistrates’ 44 9.8% 
Total- all courts 60 8.3% 
 
Furthermore, there were no statistically significant differences between Jews and non-
Jews regarding the seniority of positions in courts. Whilst 12% of registrars and senior 
registrars are Arabs, and two thirds of Arabs in the judiciary are judges, there are five 
Arab Senior Judges (10% of all senior judges), 6 Arab Vice-Presidents of courts (1 
                                                 
770 See discussion in Chapter 4. 
771 In the National Labour Court, there is one Arab registrar 
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Muslim, 4 Christians and 2 Druze), and one Arab President of a court. In addition, 
examination of Arab judges’ position in courts and the type of court they serve in reveals 
that the most diverse distribution in terms of positioning of Arab judges is seen in 
Magistrates Courts, where Arabs are found in all ranks (except for registrars) from Senior 
Registrars to Presidents (See Table 14). 
Table 14. Arab representation in the judiciary by position in courts 
  Magistrates’ 
(including 
family, traffic 
and juvenile) 
District Labour- 
Regional 
Labour- 
National 
Supreme 
Court 
Total % 
of Arabs 
in this 
position 
Registrar 0% 0% 14% 100%* 0% 8.3% 
Senior 
registrar 
13.5% 0% n/a n/a n/a 13% 
Judge 9.1% 6% 5.1% 0% 7.7% 7.9% 
Senior 
judge 
11.4% 8.3% 0% n/a n/a 10% 
Vice 
president 
10.4% 5.5% 0% 0% 0% 8.2% 
President 14.3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4.8% 
Total % 
of Arabs 
in this 
court 
9.8% 
 
5.5% 6% 14.3% 6% 8.3% 
*n=1 
Therefore, the prestige theory is only partially supported by this study’s findings for Arab 
judges. While there are clearly fewer Arab judges then Jewish judges in high courts or as 
presidents of courts, in some cases they hold senior positions in higher proportions to 
their representation in the judiciary, especially as senior judges and vice-presidents of 
courts. 
Unlike the court and nationality analysis, cross-analysis of the geographical location of 
courts and nationality of judges was highly significant. Specifically, Arabs judges preside 
in significantly larger proportion to their representation in the national population in two 
districts: North, where they constitute nearly 36% of all judges in the district, and Haifa 
(18.5%). This trend is not necessarily restricted to lower courts in those districts.  In the 
Nazareth District Court (part of the Northern district), five of 15 judges (33%)772 are 
Arabs. These figures are not only significantly higher than the proportion of Arabs in the 
                                                 
772 In Haifa’s District Court, however, only three of 31 judges are Arabs (9.7%) 
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judiciary overall, but also substantially exceeding Arab representation in the national 
population. However, the high level of Arab representation in the courts based in these 
areas is in line with the high density of Arabs in the northern part of Israel:  44% of Israeli 
Arabs reside in the Northern District and constitute 53% of the population there773. In 
other districts, especially in Tel-Aviv and Central districts, there are far fewer Arab 
judges. Jerusalem and South districts also have small numbers of Arab judges. 
6.3 Military service 
Unlike the general IDF recruitment rate, which stands at about 50% of the population of 
conscripts, 637 of 725 (88%) judges served either in the IDF or in national service.  The 
high proportion of judges with military service may be related to the fact that most judges 
are Jewish and not Orthodox, meaning they are not part of the population groups that 
have traditionally been exempt from service. The remainder of judges without military 
service either did not serve or did not provide information about military service in their 
CV. As expected, the vast majority of Jewish (94.3%) judges served in the Army. As far 
as this information is available, all Druze judges served in the military, compared with 
only three non-Druze Arab judges.  In practice (though never regulated by law), Israeli 
Arabs have been traditionally exempt from military service. The exemption includes 
Bedouins, though in this community many volunteer to the IDF. Druze men, however, 
are not exempt from service. 
6.4 Jewish ethnicity  
As mentioned earlier, since Israeli judges do not provide their ethnicity or mention their 
parents’ country of birth, additional indicators had to be examined in order to make an 
assessment of ethnicity. When the judges’ country of birth other than Israel was provided 
or when male judges had a definitive surname, the classification was distinct for either 
Ashkenazi or Sephardic (or USSR774). For women, when they had a double surname and 
both components were definitive, the above classification was also used. However, when 
male judges had no distinctive surname, or when women had a distinct surname but it 
could not be assumed that this was their maiden name, the categorisation used was 
“appears to be [Sephardic/Ashkenazi]”. Moreover, Jewish judges that could not be 
                                                 
773 CBS "The Arab Population in Israel 2008" http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/statistical/arab_pop08e.pdf 
774 The latter relates only to judges who were born in the former USSR and immigrated to Israel in the 
1990s. 
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categorised (e.g. women with mixed double surnames, Hebraised surnames, etc.) were 
labelled as ethnicity “unknown”. 
Jewish ethnicity of judges by their country of birth only 
Israeli Judges do not provide data on their father’s country of birth, which makes the 
comparison to official statistics about ethnic origin complicated775. While some 76% of 
all Jews in Israel were born in Israel776, 578 Jewish judges (87%) stated they were born 
in Israel. Of the remaining Jewish judges, 78 mentioned a country of birth other than 
Israel777: 55 (70%) are Ashkenazi (e.g. born in Romania, Poland etc.) 778 and 22 (28%) 
are Sephardic (i.e. born in Asia or Africa). Prima facie, Ashkenazi judges are significantly 
over-represented amongst judges who were not born in Israel779. However, when 
compared with official statistics about the population of Israeli Jews who were not born 
in Israel, Ashkenazi's are only slightly over-represented amongst judges (71% compared 
with 68% of the general population of Israeli Jews born outside Israel). Moreover, when 
measured against the entire Jewish population (the majority of which was born in Israel), 
the differences between Ashkenazi's and Sephardic look marginal (Figure 10). 
                                                 
775 The Knesset’s Research Unit informed the author that data about judges’ parents’ country of birth is 
unavailable in the courts system. Pers.comm 
776 Some 4.8 million Israeli Jews were born in Israel (http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton67/st02_09.pdf)  
777 Nine judges did not mention their country of birth and one judge’s country of birth could not be 
classified by ethnicity. 
778 Seven judges were born in the former USSR, but since all of them immigrated to Israel during the 
1970s they cannot be classified as new immigrants. As explained above, the classification is estimated 
and may be wrong when it comes to countries that cannot be exclusively associated with one Eda or 
another. 
779 As mentioned earlier, it is estimated that 28% of the Israeli population is Sephardic and 33% is 
Ashkenazi. 
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Figure 10. Jewish judges’ ethnicity by country of birth compared with the Jewish 
population 
 
 
Two caveats should be mentioned in this context. First, the data regarding the general 
population relies on CBS publications, which do not categorize Jews by ethnic group but 
rather by country of birth (for example, the CBS does not use the terms Ashkenazi or 
Sephardic but rather “Europe-America”, etc.). Second, and more importantly, the 
category “Europe-America” includes some 900,000 people that immigrated to Israel in 
the 1990s from the former USSR, of which some 600,000 were Jews780. Therefore, 
without this community, Ashkenazi Jews born outside Israel would make-up 33% of all 
Jews born abroad, not 68%.  
 
Nevertheless, amongst Israeli judges, not one judge was found to have immigrated to 
Israel in the 1990s. Therefore, the Ashkenazi group of judges born outside Israel does not 
necessarily reflect the composition of Israeli Jews born outside Israel, as it consists of 
Jews that in most cases immigrated to Israel before the 1990s. The share of the former 
USSR immigrant population of the total population of Israel has grown since the 
beginning of the wave of immigration in 1990, and today they make-up some 15% of the 
entire Jewish population in Israel781. Yet, as seen below, this is not reflected in the current 
composition of the Israeli judiciary. The lack of Ethiopian Jews and Jews from former 
                                                 
780 CBS (n567) 11, 16. 
781 Ibid 
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USSR amongst judges has been discussed recently in the Judicial Nominations 
Committee782 and is evident in this study783. 
Jewish ethnicity by country of birth and other factors 
As Jewish ethnic origin is dependent on several factors, the analysis of Jewish ethnicity 
of judges cannot rely solely on a review of the judges born outside Israel. An examination 
of all Israeli judges based on additional factors was performed. But as the examination of 
judges’ ethnic origin conducted in this research could not be identical to the methods used 
by the CBS to record ethnicity, there are limitations in the extent to which direct 
comparisons can be made between this study’s findings and the CBS figures. Table 15 
shows this study’s estimated Jewish-ethnic distribution amongst judges. Almost two 
thirds (64%) of the entire judiciary appear to be Ashkenazi Jews. A small proportion 
(15%) of judges are either Sephardic or likely to be Sephardic784. However, the high 
number of judges that could not be classified (20%) demonstrates the difficulty in 
determining Jewish ethnicity without direct access to judges’ personal data. 
Table 15: Jewish ethnicity of Israeli Jewish judges (by external factors and country 
of birth other than Israel)785 
Jewish ethnic group (Eda) Count % of Jewish judges  
Ashkenazi 175 26.3% 
Appears to be Ashkenazi  251 37.8% 
Sephardic  40 6% 
Appears to be Sephardic 64 9.6% 
Unclear 135 20.3% 
Total 665 100% 
                                                 
782 Tova Tzimuki, “MK Ilatov Demands Urgent Hearing: New Immigrants Are Excluded From the 
Nominations Procedure”, Yedioth Ahronoth, (30.11.2015) 18. This study, however, found only four 
judges who were born in the USSR, and all of them arrived in Israeli during the 1960s and 70s, so they 
cannot be regarded as part of the USSR community in Israel that immigrated after the fall of the USSR.  
783 The situation changed in September 2016 with the appointment of the first Ethiopian Jewish judges to 
Israeli courts (Yair Altman, “2 Female Lawyers Appointed As Israel's First Ethiopian Judges”, Israel 
Hayom (30.9.2016) http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=36853). However, this 
study relies on data that was collected up to November 2015. 
784 A previous version of this study from 2010 found only one Sephardic judge in the Supreme Court 
(5%); however, the appointment of Justice Uri Shoham in 2012 and later Justice Meni Mazuz doubled the 
number of Sephardic justices on this court. 
785 Where country of birth other than Israel was provided, this made the classification of Jewish ethnic 
groups easier. However, when the judge was born in Israel other indicators were used, for instance, 
surname, publications about the judge’s ethnicity (mostly relevant to high profile senior judges). When 
indicators were strong (i.e., birthplace that can be easily categorized, distinct surname for men), the 
classification was more definitive. However when the indicators were weaker, the judge was either 
classified as “appears to be” or “not clear”. 
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Figure 11. Jewish ethnicity of judges compared with Israeli population 
 
The proportion of Sephardic judges appears substantially lower than estimates of their 
representation in the wider Israeli population, while the Ashkenazi sector is over-
represented in the judiciary in relation to their representation in the wider population. 
Comparison to the general Jewish population is not straightforward. The CBS counts 
Jews by their own and their father’s country of birth, but judges cannot be classified in 
the same way because there is a lack of data on judges’ parental place of birth. 
Nevertheless, Figure 11 shows how the study’s findings compare with official data on the 
origin of Jews in Israel786. This study’s findings support claims made by politicians and 
activists about the lack of representation of non-Ashkenazi Jews in the judiciary. 
 
Prestige effect 
The possible existence of a prestige effect amongst Jewish judges was also examined by 
a cross-analysis of the ethnic affiliation of Jewish judges, the court in which they serve 
and the type of position they hold in the judiciary. As Table 18 and Table 17 below show, 
Ashkenazi Jews are over-represented in the highest courts and in senior judicial positions 
across the Israeli judiciary. 
 
                                                 
786 In this figure for judges, “appears to be” was counted jointly with Ashkenazi/Sephardic (accordingly).  
64%
31%
55%
16%
25%
45%
Jewish Judges entire Jewish population Jewish population (without
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Table 16. Israeli judges’ Jewish ethnicity and type of court 
Division Category Ashkenazi Sephardic Jewish- 
unknown 
Magistrates Regular 58% 19% 23% 
Family 54% 26% 20% 
Traffic 80% 8% 12% 
Juvenile 73% 0% 27% 
Total 59% 18% 22% 
District 71% 12% 17% 
Labour Regional 68% 10% 23% 
National 83% 17% 0% 
Total 69% 10% 21% 
Supreme Court 81% 12% 6% 
Total 64% 16% 20% 
 
Ashkenazi Jews are over-represented at the senior levels of the court system in relation 
to their representation in the judiciary as whole, while Sephardic Jews are under-
representation at all main court levels except Magistrates Courts, and have their highest 
representation in the Family Division of the Magistrates Courts. These findings are in line 
with a journalistic article that examined the ethnic composition of Israeli judges in 2007, 
and found that only 10% of judges in District Courts and in the Supreme Court were 
Sephardic Jews787. In this study, the largest proportion of Ashkenazi Jews is found in the 
Supreme Court (81%). Until 2012, only five of the total of 82 Supreme Court justices 
appointed since the establishment of the Court were Sephardic (6%). Over the years, 
significant gaps (sometimes of over a decade) have occurred between the appointment of 
one Sephardic judge and that of another. Until 2014, when Justice Meni Mazuz was 
appointed to join Justice Uri Shoham, two Sephardic justices had never served in the 
Supreme Court at the same time. 
As Table 17 shows, Ashkenazi Jews also hold the majority of senior judicial positions in 
almost all judicial posts, and the differences between them and Sephardic judges were 
statistically significant788.  
 
                                                 
787 Weiss (n337) reviewed all 155 judges in these courts (referring to them as ‘senior judges’) and, in the 
absence of official data, determined ethnicity by their surname and other biographic information (e.g. 
country of birth). 
788 The chi-square result of the cross-tabulation between Jewish ethnicity and type of court and position in 
court was significant when only Jewish judges were examined (using both a wide definition of ethnicity 
including USSR, and a narrower approach including only Ashkenazi, Sephardic and unknown). When 
similar analyses were run on the entire dataset (including non-Jews), the results were not significant, 
probably due to the number of categories.  
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Table 17. Jewish judges’ ethnicity and position in court 
Judicial Position Ashkenazi Sephardic Jewish – 
ethnicity 
unknown 
Registrar 51% 15% 33% 
Senior registrar 42% 18% 39% 
Judge 66% 14% 20% 
Senior judge 55% 24% 20% 
Vice president 70% 18% 12% 
President 75% 20% 5% 
Total 64% 16% 20% 
 
Ashkenazi Jews are over-represented amongst Vice-Presidents (70%) and Presidents 
(75%) of courts in relation to their overall representation in the Israeli judiciary (64%). 
In contrast, Sephardic judges are most strongly represented amongst Senior Registrars 
(18%), Senior Judges (24%) and Vice-Presidents (18%) in relation to their overall 
representation in the judiciary (16%).  It is important to note that the proportion of 
“unknowns” is large in almost all categories, and therefore some caution needs to be 
exercised in interpreting these results. Finally, a correlation that may be related to prestige 
is the one between Jewish ethnicity of judges and the geographical district in which they 
preside. Sephardic judges are highly more likely than Ashkenazi judges to serve in courts 
in the Southern district of Israel, which is generally seen as a socially and culturally 
peripheral area within Israel. 
 
6.5 Religious observance (amongst Jews) 
The research attempted to examine Jewish “religiousness” amongst the judiciary because 
of claims within Israel that the courts are “too liberal and secular” and do not reflect the 
Jewish religious and Orthodox sector of Israeli society. The challenges in ascertaining the 
religious observance of Jewish judges have been explained earlier alongside the methods 
used to attempt such identification in this study.  Given these limitations, Figure 12 shows 
that 15% of Jewish judges appear to either practice their faith or have Jewish religious 
background (e.g. attended state-religious educational institutions)789. This is close to the 
proportion of Jews in the Israeli population (20%) that says it is religious (including ultra-
Orthodox). If only those judges who are clearly religious are considered (6%), this 
suggest an under-representation of actively religious Jews amongst the Israeli judiciary 
                                                 
789 In most cases, these judges did not have any external characteristics that implied they were practicing 
their faith, but they did gain a religious education and even higher education of this kind.  
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in relation to their representation in the wider Israeli population (20%) and the 38% who 
define themselves as “traditional” in religious observance. However, three Supreme 
Court justices are identified as religious Jews (17%)790, which suggests that claims of this 
court being too secular may no longer be true. No Orthodox Jews (Haredi) were identified 
in the judiciary, but it should be remembered that they are absent from the pool for judicial 
appointments for reasons explained earlier791.  
Figure 12. Israeli Jewish judges by religious observance 
 
6.6. Relationship between gender and ethnicity/nationality 
Even though there are more women than men in the Israeli judiciary, the results of this 
research have already shown that women are yet to attain senior positions in the court 
system, especially in the high courts, in equal proportion to men. It has also been claimed 
that it is harder for women from ethnic minority groups to break the “glass ceiling” in 
Israel and that most women in senior positions in Israel are Ashkenazi rather than 
Sephardic Jews, Jewish rather than Arab, etc.792. To explore the legitimacy of these 
claims, the relationship between nationality, ethnicity and gender in the Israeli judiciary 
was examined. Broadly looking at nationality, 361 (95%) of all female judges are Jewish, 
which is higher than the proportion of Jews in the entire judiciary. When broken down to 
                                                 
790 Elyakim Rubinstein, Nil Hendel and Noam Solberg.  
791 Haredi Jews rarely gain higher education degrees, and therefore do not meet any of the criteria to be 
admitted to law schools or the Israeli Bar. Only in the last decade have specific LL.B. programs been 
launched for this community. Their rejection of the authority of the courts system is another obstacle. For 
an extensive analysis, see: Michael Keren and Gad Barzilai Position Paper no.9: Integration of 
Peripheral Groups into Society and Politics– the Haredim in Israel (The Israel Democracy Institute 
1998); Daniel Freidman, “Appointment of Judges and the Issue of Appointing Haredi Judges to the 
General Law Courts” (1997) 7 Ha-Mishpat 6 
792 e.g. Yifat Bitton (n.457) 459 
Religious 
Jewish
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Jewish with 
religious 
background
9%
Jewish without 
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various population groups, the gaps between men and women in the same ethnic category 
becomes clearer: 
Figure 13. Gender and ethnicity/nationality of Israeli judges 
 
The findings presented in Figure 13 suggest that, despite women comprising a larger 
proportion of the judiciary than men in Israel, there are significant gender gaps between 
different ethnic groups in the Israeli judiciary. Women are particularly poorly represented 
amongst judges from groups or sectors that are already under-represented in the judiciary 
(i.e. Arabs, Sephardic Jews). The most substantial differences between men and women 
are found amongst Arab judges, where there are 2.5 times more men than women. 
71.7%
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61.5%
38.5%
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38.5%
61.5%
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Figure 14. Gender and religion of Israeli judges 
 
Figure 14 shows the gender distribution of Israeli judges by their religious group. This 
analysis was also statistically significant, with the most prominent findings relating to 
Jewish and Muslim judges. While women make up the majority of Jewish judges (54%), 
Muslim judges are almost all male (92%). Although no female Druze or Bedouin judges 
were identified, the proportion of women amongst Christian judges (39%) is much higher 
compared to other Arab groups (8% of Muslim judges are female and 0% of Druze judges 
are female). The findings reflect the complexity of women’s status in the Arab community 
in Israel.  While there are a growing number of Arab women who gain higher education 
degrees, there are still low rates of Arab women in the workplace793. Similar data was 
presented in a recent report by an Arab female lawyer, who called for greater 
representation of Arabs and specifically Arab women in the legal profession and the 
judiciary794. 
 
Amongst Jewish judges, although there are more female (54%) than male (46%) judges, 
there was an uneven distribution of gender within the Jewish groups. There are 
significantly more female than male judges amongst Ashkenazi judges and Jewish judges 
                                                 
793 Hornstein and Almog (n.614) 
794 Sausan (n.493) found that six judges and two registrars (out of 612 judges) were Arab women, i.e. 
1.3%.  
45.7%
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100.0%
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whose ethnicity could not be determined, but in the Sephardic group there are 1.6 more 
male than female judges. 
6.7 Age  
In examining judicial age it is important to note that the compulsory retirement age for 
all judges in General Courts system and Labour Courts in Israel is 70795.  Overall, the 
mean age of judges who provided data on their date of birth (n=530)796 is 50.35 and the 
median is 48 years (s.d.=8.29), with the youngest judges being 36 years old and the oldest 
being 70 years old. Male judges are, on average, almost six years older than female 
judges, which is a statistically significant difference. A factor that may partially explain 
the age differences between male and female judges in Israel is military service; men are 
required to serve 3 years, while women’s average service is two years.  This may also 
help to explain why most women start their academic studies at a younger age than men 
in Israel. 
 
There were no statistically significant differences in age between the various ethnic and 
religious groups in the judiciary. The average age for Jewish judges was 50.5 (SD=8.29), 
and for non-Jews: 48.5 (SD=8.1). Furthermore, it appears that the mean age at the time 
of the first judicial appointment was 41 (SD=6.0, n=531), the youngest judge to be 
appointed was 28 years old and the oldest 62 (mode: 39). Statistically significant 
differences were also found between Jews and Arabs regarding the age when joining the 
judiciary, with Arab judges being 37.8 years old on average, and Jewish judges 41.3 
(t=4.238, p=0.011). This may be partially due to the fact that most Jewish judges serve in 
the IDF and therefore start their legal career a few years later than Arab judges who do 
not serve in the IDF.  
 
6.8 Academic Background 
LL.B. 
Almost all serving Israeli judges (95%) obtained their LL.B. in Israel797. Those who 
studied abroad attended mostly UK law schools. Of those who studied in Israel, almost 
                                                 
795 s.13, the Courts Law; s.8(a) the Labour Courts Law. 
796 Half of the female judges (n=190) did not provide their date of birth, and they make-up 97% of the 
missing values in this category. 
797 Twenty-nine judges studied abroad, and seven judges did not provide data regarding their LLB.  
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all (90% or 620 judges) are university graduates, and only 10% (69 judges) are college 
graduates798. This is opposite to the trend in the legal profession and legal education 
today, in which the majority of lawyers are college graduates and the majority of law 
students attend colleges799.  However, it reflects the fact that Israeli judges are appointed 
from amongst senior and experienced legal practitioners, who would have been more 
likely to have obtained their law degrees before law colleges came into existence (in the 
1990s).  
 
Nevertheless, when the educational background of Israeli judges is examined, signs of 
diversity emerge.  For many years the Israeli judiciary appeared to be almost entirely 
made up of graduates from the Hebrew University and Tel-Aviv University800, and this 
remains a commonly held view about Israeli judges. This study, however, shows that 10% 
of the current judiciary in Israel have graduated from colleges801, and amongst university 
graduates there is now representation from a much wider variety of universities in Israel, 
although the two thirds of judges (67%) are still Hebrew University or Tel-Aviv 
University graduates802: 
                                                 
798 When calculated against all serving judges (not just those who studied in Israel), the number of college 
graduates amounts to 15%, compared with only 3% college graduates found in the 2010 study. 
799The data for lawyers relies on the Bar; in 2011, almost 40% of higher education students in Israel were 
in colleges, and almost 80% of law students attended colleges. CBS, ‘Higher Education in Israel - 
Selected Data for the New Academic Year 2012/13’ (21.10.2012) 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201206276) 
800 Compare: 81% of judges in the High Court and Court of Appeal in England and Wales have Oxbridge 
degrees (Thomas n5 49). 
801 In the 2010 study, only 3% of judges were college graduates. 
802 In the 2010 study, 46% of judges were Hebrew University graduates compared to a third from TAU. 
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Figure 15. Academic institution in Israel where judges gained their LL.B.  
 
 
Amongst the 10% of Israeli judges that graduated from Israeli colleges, the most 
prominent institution is the College of Management with 30 judges (4.4% of all judges 
and 43% of judges who graduated from a college), followed by IDC Herzlyia (1.9% of 
all judges and 19% of judges who graduated from a college). This reflects the established 
status of these institutions and the fact that they have been operating law degree 
programmes for more than two decades. 
 
When cross-analysing the type of academic institution and gender of judges, no 
significant results were found803. Similarly, there were no statistically significant 
differences between Jewish and Arab judges or between the various religious groups in 
the judiciary in relation to where they obtained their LLB. However, the type of academic 
institution judges attended was found to be strongly correlated with three other variables: 
Jewish ethnicity, position in court and type of court. Even though Ashkenazi and 
Sephardic judges were most likely to be university graduates, only 5% of Ashkenazi 
judges were college graduates compared with 15% of Sephardic judges. In addition, the 
                                                 
803 All the analyses in this section is confined to judges who studied in Israel and provided information on 
their LL.B. When analysis was run with judges who studied abroad or did not provide any information, 
the results were skewed by these other categories, so the analysis presented here only includes judges 
who graduated in Israel. 
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positioning and seniority of judges correlated with the institution they attended.  No 
college-graduates served as Senior Judges or Vice-Presidents of courts, but they are 
highly more likely to be Registrars or Senior Registrars than were university graduates804. 
Finally, the higher one goes up the judicial hierarchy, the fewer college graduates are 
found in the higher courts. Thus, 80% of all college-graduate judges serve in Magistrate’s 
Courts, there is only one college-graduate judge in the District Courts and none in the 
Supreme Court. The largest proportion of college graduates was found in Traffic Courts 
(24%) followed by Family Courts (19.3%) and Regional Labour Courts (16.4%). The 
positioning of college-graduates judges in lower or less prestigious courts can be partially 
attributed to the fact that the first graduates of law colleges joined the legal profession in 
the mid-1990s and are likely to be amongst the younger and less experienced members 
of the judiciary805. 
LL.M. 
Almost 45% of serving judges in Israel (323 of 725) indicated on their CVs that they had 
gained an LL.M., of which 91% (294) were obtained in Israel and 7% (22) were obtained 
abroad (mostly in the US and UK). Almost all judges (99%) with an Israeli LL.M. gained 
it at a university rather than a college, reflecting the fact that most colleges in Israel do 
not offer LL.M. programmes. As Figure 16 shows, the largest proportion of judges with 
an LL.M. obtained it from Tel-Aviv University (31%).  (Only 26 serving judges (4%) had 
a PhD in law, predominately through Israeli universities.) 
 
   
                                                 
804 26% of registrars are college graduates. 
805 Judges are appointed to their first judicial post (Magistrates Courts usually) after at least 10-15 years 
have elapsed since the end date of their studies, and for higher instances the number grows accordingly 
(Freidman n791, 7). Therefore, it makes sense to see few college graduates in lower courts, but one would 
probably expect to see growing numbers of them in the near future, as they would be much more 
dominant in the “pool”. 
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Figure 16. Judges with an Israeli LL.M. by academic institution 
 
 
Extra-legal education 
In Israel, law students are not required to take courses or degrees in extra-legal subjects, 
and this has prompted some concerns about the educational uniformity of Israeli 
judges806. However, this study found that 17% of serving judges (121 judges) had a non-
legal higher education background807. No patterns emerge in terms of academic field, and 
there is good representation from natural sciences, social sciences and humanities). The 
growing interdisciplinary nature of legal education and the popularity of academic 
programmes combining law and other fields is discussed in more detail in Chapters 7 and 
8, and it seems that Israeli judges reflect this trend to some extent. 
6.9 Professional background 
Internship 
Until twenty years ago, law graduates were required to undertake two years of internship 
prior to sitting the Bar exams, whereas today they are only obliged to undertake a one 
                                                 
806 Mordechai Heller, “Appointment of Judges – The Solution To The Supreme Court Crisis” (1999) 8 
Tchelet 54 
807 Some judges provided information about studies but did not clarify whether they actually graduated 
with a degree in the subject; others mentioned they had an undergraduate degree but did not specify a 
subject.  
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year internship808.  Data were available on 580 of the 725 judges (80%) in the study809.  
Reflecting the change in the internship rule, most judges were identified as having one 
place of internship, but over a third (39% or 227) of judges were identified as having 
undertaken more than one internship. Table 18 below outlines the places and sectors 
where judges received their training as interns.  
Table 18: Israeli judges’ place of legal internship 
Law Sector First/only 
internship 
Second internship 
N %810 N % 
Private 226 40% 149 65.7% 
Public Courts  223 39% 33 14.5% 
State attorney 88 15% 33 14.5% 
IDF 11 2% 4 1.8% 
Police 3 0.5% 1 0.4% 
Government 
offices 
6 1% 3 1.3% 
Public- other 13 2% 4 1.8% 
Total public 344 60% 78 34.3% 
Total 570 100% 227 100% 
 
Amongst first internships, almost two-thirds (60%) interned in the public sector, with the 
vast majority (39%) interning in the courts, (39 judges or 7% interned in the Supreme 
Court). However, a substantial proportion (40%) interned in private firms. This 
contradicts the prevalent view that most Israeli judges were prosecutors for the State’s 
Attorney before becoming judges. In fact, this research shows that 15% of judges interned 
in the State Attorney’s offices. This proportion may seem high to some811, but it is 
significantly lower than the proportion of judges who interned in the private sector (40% 
as single internship, 65.7% as second internship). 
 
                                                 
808 This has recently changed with the decision to extend the internship to 18 months. Zohar Shachar 
Levy, “It’s Final: Legal Internship Is Extended from One Year to a Year and a Half”, Calcalist (2.2.2016) 
(http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3680063,00.html). The change takes effect from 
September 2016. 
809 155 judges did not provide any information regarding internship.  
810 The percentage is calculated against the relevant category, e.g. percentage of judges who reported 
doing this internship. 
811 See data in Chapter 5 on the claimed over-representation of prosecutors in the judiciary. 
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As some judges undertook only one internship while others had more than one internship, 
a combined assessment of internship background was carried out. Figure 17 illustrates 
the findings for all judicial internships according to whether judges undertook internships 
(1) in the private sector only, (2) in the public sector only or (3) in a combination of the 
private and public sectors812. The results show there is no significant difference between 
the categories, and an almost equal proportion of judges interned in the public sector, the 
private sector or both. 
Figure 17. Israeli judges' internship experience by legal sector 
 
Areas of legal practice 
Israeli law requires that applicants for judicial office must have practised law for a certain 
period to be eligible to apply for a judicial position. Figure 18 displays the results for 719 
judges where information existed on their professional experience as lawyers prior to 
being appointed to the judiciary. The categorisation is “public sector only”, “private 
sector only” and “mixed background”. The results run counter to the common assumption 
that public sector lawyers dominate the Israeli judiciary. The single largest proportion of 
serving judges in Israel (48%) have practised in the private sector only. Only a fifth (21%) 
had practised solely in the public sector, and almost a third (31%) had practice experience 
in both the private and public sectors.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare these 
figures against the distribution of lawyers in these sectors in the legal profession, as such 
data do not currently exist for the Israeli Bar. 
                                                 
812 The first two categories refer to judges who did either one internship or two, while the latter is by 
definition for those who interned in more than one place. 
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Figure 18. Israeli judges' legal practice experience by sector 
 
Legal practice experience  
On average, it took judges 13.1 years of professional practice (s.d.=5.4), before they were 
first appointed to the judiciary813. Over a third (36%) or 255 of 711 judges who reported 
relevant data had ten years of experience or less when appointed to the judiciary. 
However, the experience range is wide, with some judges having only gained five years 
prior to their first appointment, and others reaching the bench after 30 years of practice. 
This may be a result of the differences between judicial posts in terms of the eligibility 
criteria: judicial appointments to the District Courts require a minimum of 10 years legal 
practice experience, while for Magistrate’s Courts it is only 5 years. 
                                                 
813 This research counts years of professional practice from the year in which the judge was admitted to 
the Israeli Bar. 
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Figure 19. Israeli judges’ years in practice prior to first judicial appointment 
 
 
There was no statistically significant difference between men and women in terms of 
years of practice prior to appointment (t=1.557, p =0.124), although the average period 
of practice before appointment for male judges (13.4 years) was slightly longer than 
female judges (12.8 years). However, the average number of years of practice for non-
Jewish judges (12.1 years) was significantly lower than Jewish judges (13.2 years). Cross 
analysis of the type of court with the range of years of professional experience prior to 
being appointed to the judiciary did not reveal any substantial difference, other than a 
concentration of judges with 6-10 years of experience in Regional Labour Courts, which 
is in line with the requirement to have practised law for at least seven years to be eligible 
for this position. 
 
6.10 Geographical distribution 
The Israeli court system is divided into 6 main districts, with the largest number of courts 
in the areas of highest population density. The most highly populated cities in Israel are 
Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv and Haifa (in that order)814.  Figure 20 below shows the organization 
of Israeli courts by district and location.  
                                                 
814CBS “The Biggest Cities in Israel 2012-2013” http://www.cbs.gov.il/statistical/big_city139.pdf 
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Figure 20. Detailed structure of the general courts system in Israel by district and location815 
                                                 
815 This figure was created for the purposes of this study. It is an English adaptation of the courts’ organisational structure as published (in Hebrew) in the Judicial System Annual 
Report 2015 (http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/haba/dochot/doc/hofesh_meida2015.pdf), p.7 
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As Figure 22 show, the population density in large metropolitan cities is mirrored in the 
high proportion of judges in these cities. Tel-Aviv has 26% of all judges816, Jerusalem 
has 16% and Haifa has 12%. The two figures show the distribution of judges into the six 
jurisdictional districts in Israel (Figure 21) as well as the distribution by each of the 26 
individual court locations in Israel (Figure 22)817. 
 
Figure 21: Geographical distribution of judges by court regional district 
 
                                                 
816 Tel-Aviv, Israel’s business centre has more judges than any other city in Israel, reflecting the scope of 
commerce there. 
817 The findings of this study are similar to the judiciary’s report, although the latter does not seem to 
include registrars in the count and does not provide a distribution by geographical district for Labour 
Courts and General Courts combined (see semi-annual report 2014, p.10-11). 
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Figure 22: Geographical distribution of judges by court location  
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6.11 Family ties between judges 
It appears that 33 of the 725 serving judges in the study (4.5%) have known family ties 
to other judges (serving or retired) by marriage, ancestry or sibling relationships. This 
contradicts the common perception in Israel that the judicial system is nepotistic and that 
sectors that are excluded from this “closed club” are inherently less likely to be 
represented in the judiciary. However what this finding cannot do is say how this figure 
compares with the situation in the Israeli judiciary in the past818. 
Summary  
This chapter presented the findings from the first comprehensive examination of the 
composition of Israeli judiciary. The research employed publically available data on 
serving judges in Israel in a novel way. It aimed to collect and analyse data on as many 
background variables as possible, bearing in mind the unique characteristics of Israeli 
society, as well as the changes in the legal profession and legal education in Israel in 
recent years. 
 
Overall, the research found that the Israeli judiciary has diversified over time but still 
does not completely reflect the diversity of Israeli society. Women now make up the 
majority of all judges in the Israeli judiciary, but they still do not constitute the majority 
of judges in higher courts and in senior judicial positions. Muslim Arabs and Sephardic 
Jews are under-represented in the judiciary in relation to their representation in the 
population. Ethiopian and USSR immigrants and Orthodox Jews are almost non-existent 
in the judiciary.  
 
The research also dispelled some long-standing myths about the judiciary in Israel.  
Contrary to popular view, the largest proportion of Israeli judges have a private practice 
background, college law graduates are now represented amongst the serving judiciary, 
and judges have diverse and sometimes inter-disciplinary academic and professional 
backgrounds.  There is also little evidence of nepotism in the Israeli judiciary, with only 
a very small proportion of current judges having any family connections to the judiciary.  
The Supreme Court’s current composition is significantly more diverse than it used to be, 
                                                 
818 See Chapter 9 for suggestions for future research. 
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and today the Court has an Arab, two Sephardic Jews, three religious Jews, and five 
women (including the Chief Justice) on its bench. The findings of this research, therefore, 
paint a picture of a dynamic judiciary in Israel that is more diverse than is generally 
thought, but at the same time is not completely representative of the diversity of Israeli 
society. 
 
Having created a detailed profile of the Israeli judiciary, the next question to consider is: 
What could be learned and projected about judicial diversity in Israel from looking at the 
pool of potential applicants for judicial appointment - that is Israeli lawyers and law 
students. Chapters 7 and 8 provide the findings of the second part of this research project, 
which examined the views and backgrounds of Israeli lawyers and law students.  By 
combining these three sets of data (i.e. judges, lawyers and law students) it is hoped that 
an even more complete picture of judicial diversity in Israel will emerge. 
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CHAPTER 7:   UNDERSTANDING THE POOL FOR JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS:  ISRAELI LAWYERS 
Chapter 6 examined the state of diversity in the Israeli judiciary today, and produced an 
in-depth profile of Israeli judges, their professional and educational backgrounds and 
socio-demographic characteristics. However, understanding judicial diversity in Israel 
also requires an understanding of the “pool” from which judges are appointed, which in 
Israel is exclusively Israeli lawyers. This research operates on the assumption that 
understanding the demographics and views of lawyers in Israel will broaden and deepen 
the picture of judicial diversity in Israel as it is now and how it may develop in the future. 
There are no existing data regarding the composition of the Israeli legal profession or the 
perceptions or intentions of Israeli lawyers about the judiciary. The research findings 
presented in this chapter set out the first detailed analysis of the background 
characteristics of Israeli lawyers, their attitudes towards Israeli courts and judicial 
diversity, as well as their views about applying for a judicial post. 
A large-scale online survey of Israeli lawyers (the “Lawyer Survey”) was distributed 
between August and October 2014. The Lawyers Survey serves three main goals:  
(1) To provide for the first time in Israel a socio-demographic profile of lawyers based on 
18 background characteristics;  
(2) To examine Israeli lawyers’ attitudes to the judiciary and judicial diversity, and  
(3) To assess Israeli lawyers’ interest in pursuing a judicial career in the future.  
These findings contribute to an understanding of judicial diversity in Israel in two 
important ways.  First, they provide the first ever detailed profile of the immediate pool 
for future judges in Israel, and in doing so indicate the extent to which diversity in the 
judiciary may change in future. Second, by revealing for the first time in an empirically 
reliable way how members of the legal profession perceive judicial diversity, these 
findings help to assess the validity of previous anecdotal information about lawyers’ 
attitudes to judges and diversity.  Along with the findings on judicial diversity in Israel 
(Chapter 6) and the findings from a similar survey of Israeli law students (Chapter 8), the 
findings of the Lawyer Survey provide important and critical information needed to 
understand judicial diversity in Israel. 
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7.1 PART 1:  Demographics of the Israeli legal profession 
7.1.1 Note on demographics of the Israeli legal profession and the response rate 
in the Lawyer Survey 
It is important to bear in mind that official data in Israel about both the general population 
and legal profession is partial and not always reliable (i.e. it is often unclear how data 
were collected and analysed). At the time of this survey, there were over 56,000 registered 
active lawyers in Israel819. Of this group, 38,000 were registered to receive email 
messages from the Israeli Bar, and a similar number of lawyers were included in the email 
distribution list for the Israeli online legal database Nevo. Distributing the survey both 
through the Bar (a statutory entity that incorporates all registered lawyers in Israel) and 
Nevo (a reputable private dataset) aimed to widen the range of lawyers that would be 
exposed to the survey. Given the nature of work of most Israeli lawyers and the 
widespread use of the Internet as an essential working tool, an online survey distributed 
to lawyers via emails, newsletters and notifications on websites was felt to be a reliable 
and valid tool for this target group.  
A total of 671 lawyers took the survey. Rather than measuring the response rate based on 
the number of all registered lawyers in Israel (i.e., the target population), it would be more 
accurate to measure it against the frame population, that is: the number of lawyers who 
were invited to the survey. However, as explained in chapter 5, caution should be 
exercised here because the exact number of lawyers who were invited to take the survey 
is unclear. As explained, both the Bar and Nevo’s distribution measures were used in 
order to maximize the participation in the survey, but the possible overlaps between the 
lists, in addition to the lack of a single comprehensive emailing list that can be monitored 
by the author, pose difficulties to accurately calculating the response rate. Thus, for 
example, when the number of usable responses is measured against the number of Nevo’s 
distribution recipients, the response rate was 2%, but it is not entirely clear how many 
lawyers are on both Nevo’s and the Bar’s distribution lists, how many emails failed to be 
sent, etc.  
Whilst the distribution measures seem suitable to maximize the participation (in the 
absence of direct access to a fixed, controlled database of all Israeli lawyers), the low 
                                                 
819The Israeli Bar Association, Activity Report- 2013-2014 
http://www.israelbar.org.il/UpLoadFiles/activity_report_2014_site.pdf, p.6. The actual number of 
qualified lawyers exceeds 60,000, but some 6,000 lawyers have withheld their membership. Hila Raz, 
"How Many New Lawyers Joined This Year and How Many Of Them Live In Tel-Aviv?" TheMarker 
(20.5.2012) http://www.themarker.com/law/1.1711714. 
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response rate raises several concerns. Firstly, the difference between the target 
population- all registered lawyers in Israel- which is estimated in over 56,000 lawyers, 
and the sample frame- all lawyers who receive the Bar’s newsletters and/or Nevo’s 
emails, might raise a coverage error. Secondly, the difference between the respondents to 
the survey, and the sample frame, and in particular the low response rate, may raise non-
response errors. However, several measures were taken in this study to minimize the 
possible effects of the coverage and non-response errors. As mentioned, given the low 
response to the Bar’s messages, it was decided to add another distribution measure – 
Nevo. This wide-spread, online legal database is believed to provide a good coverage of 
Israeli lawyers. Using it for this survey significantly increased the exposure of lawyers to 
the survey, and accordingly the number of responses.  
 
In the absence of official data on the legal profession, it is difficult to estimate the extent 
to which the respondents are representative of Israeli lawyers. However, the very limited 
data that exist (and discussed below) support the assumption that there was no significant 
coverage problem and the respondents seem to be generally representative of the legal 
profession. The following section explores the background characteristics of those Israeli 
lawyers that took part in the Lawyer Survey and compares these findings, where possible, 
with known demographic information on Israeli society, the legal profession and judges 
(as found in chapter 6)820. As the findings show, the respondents in the Lawyer Survey 
were of diverse background, including ethnicity, legal education, work district and 
professional expertise, age and mode of employment, etc. There is indeed a gender 
imbalance, as Lawyer Survey respondents were disproportionately male (see Figure 23 
below). However, overall, no statistically significant differences between men and 
women respondents were found regarding views and attitudes expressed in this survey 
(see, for example, section 7.2.8 below). Furthermore, the comparison between Lawyer 
Survey and Student Survey respondents, summarized in Table 29 in chapter 9 below, 
shows that despite the differences in the sample size and response rates, the differences 
between the actual background characteristics of lawyers and law students are overall not 
substantial. Additionally, the attitudes, views and intentions made by participants in both 
surveys were overall similar, as further shown in chapter 9, suggesting that the possible 
effects of the low response rate may have been mitigated by adequate coverage. Future 
research, however, would definitely benefit from having a fixed list of contact details for 
                                                 
820 Full details of the statistical analyses conducted for this chapter are found in Appendix 8. 
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all lawyers in Israel, and updated data on the demographics of the entire lawyer population 
in Israel, both will enable a better control of the coverage and assessment of response 
issues.  
 
7.1.2 Gender 
There are no official statistics about the gender distribution in the legal profession in Israel 
today821. However, publications from previous years claimed that 43%-46% of qualified 
lawyers in Israel were women822. Assuming these sources are reliable, male lawyers were 
over-represented in the Lawyer Survey (65%) compared with female (35%)823. This 
needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the results. It also differs significantly to the 
proportion of women in the judiciary, as found in this thesis (52%). 
Figure 23. Proportion of women in the Lawyer Survey, profession and judiciary 
 
7.1.3 Religion, nationality and ethnicity 
Overall, there are no official statistics regarding the religious, national or ethnic 
distribution of Israeli lawyers. The Bar does not publish figures about these variables 
                                                 
821 In 2011, 43% of lawyers were women (The Israeli Bar Association, Jubilee Issue: 1961-2001 (2011), 
http://www.israelbar.org.il/UpLoadFiles/orach-hadin_new_issue_11.pdf).. 
822 Zer-Gutman (n384) 251; Nurit Roth, “The Bar’s Jubilee: the Number of Lawyers Has Doubled over 
the Past Decade”, TheMarker (22 May 2011) http://www.themarker.com/law/1.644973, 43% of lawyers 
in 2010-11 were women; Yasmin Gueta, “45% Of Lawyers Are Women- So Why Is There No Woman in 
the Picture?” TheMarker (6.3.2014) http://www.themarker.com/law/1.2261778; Anat Roe’e, “The 
Inflated Balloon of the Law Faculties Begins to Lose Air”, Calcalist (12.11.2014) 
http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3644777,00.html, according to which 46% of lawyers in 
Israel in 2014 were women. 
823 There were 368 missing values in this questions, i.e. participants that did not indicate their gender. 
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either from its official records or by surveying lawyers. The only data found were on the 
proportion of Arabs in the legal profession, and that data are not consistent and out-of-
date. Therefore, it was not possible to contextualize the findings of the Lawyers Survey 
in comparison with the lawyers' population; instead references to the general population 
or to judges were made where applicable.   
The dominant religious/national group in the Lawyer Survey is Jews, who are 
significantly over-represented compared with their share of the general population. 
Religious minorities account for small proportions of the survey participants (under 10%, 
see Table 19). This distribution is almost identical to the religious and national 
composition of the judiciary presented in chapter 6. It is also very similar to the religious 
distribution of lawyers in the Civil Service, although Christians and Muslims have 
slightly greater representation there824. As Table 19 shows, the main gap between the 
survey participants and the general population is in relation to Muslims, which are 
significantly under-represented in the survey. However, in the absence of current data it 
is unclear what the current religious distribution is in the legal profession. 
Table 19. Lawyers' religious self-definition compared with general population825 
Religious/national category Lawyer Survey General population 
N % % 
Jewish 337 91% 75% 
Muslim 4 1% 17% 
Druze 2 0.5% 1.5% 
No religious affiliation 18 5% 4%826 
Christian 3 1% 2% 
Mixed/other 8 2% n/a 
Total 372 100% 100% 
  
                                                 
824 91% are Jewish, 4% Muslim, 1% Druze and 3% Christians. In light of the under-representation of 
Arab lawyers, the Ministry of Justice decided to proactively encourage Arab students, lawyers and jurists 
to join the Civil Service; “Partners: a conference to encourage the integration of lawyers and academics of 
the Arab sector, Druze and Circassian, in the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary” (30.9.2014) (here)  
825 Data on the general population are from: CBS report “The Druze Population of Israel" (20.4.2015); 
CBS report “Christmas 2013 – Christians in Israel”; CBS, Statistical Abstract Of Israel 2014 “Population, 
By Population Group, Religion, Age, Sex And Number Of Males Per 1,000 Females” (Table 2.5), 
Pp.100-101. 
826 This figure includes both mixed/other and no religion. 
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7.1.4 Religiosity 
There is no official data on religiosity of Israeli lawyers; therefore, it is hard to 
contextualize the figures displayed in Figure 24.  On the one hand, the common 
perception is that religious and Orthodox Jews are under-represented in the judiciary and 
in the legal profession. On the other hand, the number of religious and ultra-Orthodox 
lawyers is arguably increasing827. 
Figure 24. Lawyers' self-definition of religious observance 
 
 
Compared with the distribution in the Jewish population in Israel828, seculars (54%) seem 
over-represented in this survey (compared with 42% of the population); Orthodox and 
traditional Jews are slightly under-represented (9% and 35%, respectively); and the 
number of religious lawyers resembles the general population of religious Jews (11%). 
However, compared with the judges’ analysis, which found some 15% of judges to either 
appear religious or have a religious background, it seems that there are more lawyers with 
a religious or practicing background829. Several surveys found that the level of religious 
                                                 
827 An indication can be found in the special Orthodox forum established by the Bar (n496) stating it 
aimed to serve “thousands” of Orthodox lawyers. 
828 The surveys that deal with religiosity separate Jews and non-Jews in data collection and analysis. CBS, 
Israel in Figures 201413 (here), and a large-scale survey from 2009: A Portrait of Israeli Jews: Beliefs, 
Observance, and Values of Israeli Jews, 2009 (Israel Democracy Institute, 2011). 
829 33% if religious, Orthodox and traditional are counted jointly. Yet this should be read with caution, 
because lawyers were asked for their self-definition, whereas judges’ religiosity was assessed by external 
measures (e.g. clothing, biography, etc.). 
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observance varies between Jews and non-Jews830, but in this survey, there was no 
evidence of such differences between religious groups831. 
7.1.5 Jewish ethnicity 
The Bar does not publish reports on the ethnic or national origins of its members (e.g. 
lawyers' countries of birth) or on their self-defined ethnicity. As such, the findings of this 
survey appear to be the first attempt to map the ethnic origin of Jewish lawyers in Israel 
today. Yet the difficulties in collecting and analysing data about Jewish ethnicity requires 
caution in interpreting the results. As explained earlier, this survey addressed Jewish 
ethnicity in two ways: (1) by self-definition and (2) by country of birth of the subject and 
their father (similar to official definitions). 
By self-definition 
In the Lawyer Survey, there were twice as many self-defined Ashkenazi lawyers than 
self-defined Sephardic lawyers. A significant proportion of lawyers (14%) described 
themselves as “mixed” or “other”, categories that are absent from official statistics832. 
The dichotomy between Sephardic and Ashkenazi lawyers resembles the findings for 
judges, although judges’ ethnicity had to be assessed indirectly and not by self-definition. 
Especially prominent is the lack of Ethiopian Jews (only one lawyer in this survey or 
0.3%, compared with 1.5% of the general population). As the following sections will 
show, many participants think that Ethiopian Jews are under-represented in the legal 
education, the profession and the judiciary, a perception that is supported by the findings 
of this survey. 
By country of birth 
In accordance with official publications, data regarding fathers’ or own country of birth 
were coded by the following categories: Ashkenazi, Sephardic, Ethiopian, former USSR 
and “Sabra” (Israeli born)833. The overwhelming majority of lawyers who took the survey 
(86%) were born in Israel, and almost 38% of those lawyers said their father was born in 
Israel meaning they fall within the category of Sabra. Lawyers whose own (or fathers’) 
                                                 
830 CBS, “Israel in Figures 2014” (n828). 
831 Probably because of the very small number of non-Jewish lawyers in this survey. 
832 As Sagiv (n.535) shows, some 20% of Israeli Jews are of mixed Jewish ethnic origin (by 
intermarriage). 
833 Most former USSR countries would be categorised as Ashkenazi, however the Muslim republics are 
listed as Sephardic. Moreover, it is unclear regarding some of the states how their Jewish communities 
can be categorised. Jews from Georgia, for example, see themselves as a unique group that differs from 
the Ashkenazi/Sephardic dichotomy. For more information on how the different countries were 
categorised, see chapter 5. 
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country of birth was not Israel were categorised using the remaining categories mentioned 
above.  
The differences between the two approaches to Jewish ethnicity are especially prominent 
for Ashkenazi and former USSR Jews. Although 31% of lawyers are classified Ashkenazi 
by father's country of birth, almost 45% of lawyers define themselves as Ashkenazi. The 
opposite trend was found for the category of “former USSR” by country of birth/origin, 
where almost 10% of survey participants would fall into this category, but only 3% of the 
survey participants actually define themselves as former USSR Jews834. This further 
illustrates the differences between the methods used by the CBS to define intra-Jewish 
ethnicity, and the results when Jews are asked for their self-definition of the same matter. 
Nevertheless, by both approaches, Ashkenazi Jews are clearly over-represented in the 
Lawyer Survey, whereas Ethiopian, former USSR and Sephardic Jews are under-
represented compared with the general population. What is clear is that the ethnic 
composition of lawyers is more diverse than that of judges. For example, former USSR 
Jews are nearly non-existent in the judiciary835, but they are represented in the Lawyer 
Survey. Finally, Ashkenazi lawyers were significantly more likely to be university 
graduates than lawyers from other ethnic groups. 
7.1.6 Age, location and income  
As Table 20 shows, 53% of lawyers who took part in the survey are under the age of 44, 
and this reflects the “rejuvenation” of the profession in the last two decades836. In terms 
of location, compared with the general population there is an over-representation of 
lawyers in the survey from the central and Tel-Aviv districts. However, this distribution 
reflects the geographical distribution of lawyers by membership in the various Bar 
districts, as published by the Bar and displayed in Table 20. In terms of income, a survey 
from 2013 found that 25% of lawyers earn less than the average wage in Israel (mostly 
lawyers in small firms or in the periphery)837. In the Lawyer Survey 16% earn about the 
same as the average, and 15% earn below the average. 
                                                 
834 This pattern resembles a study that showed immigrants from USSR feel more Jewish or Israeli than 
Russian; Elazar Leshem, The Integration of Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (1990-2005): A 
Multi-Disciplinary Infrastructure Study (JDC 2009). 
835 As shown in chapter 6 
836 Zer-Gutman (n384) 251, 60% of lawyers in Israel in 2010 were aged below 40. 
837 Ella Levy-Weinriv, Hen Ma’anit, “The Cream of Israeli Lawyers” Globes (28.10.2013) 
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000889319  
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Table 20. Lawyers’ age, income level and residence district 
Personal 
characteristics 
Categories % of lawyers in survey 
Age group (n=375) 18-24 0.2% 
25-34 24% 
35-44 29% 
45-54 25% 
55-64 13% 
Other 9% 
 
Income level (n=364) Not Working 2% 
Well Below Average 4% 
Below Average 10% 
About The Same As 
Average 
16% 
Well Above Average 29% 
Above Average 39% 
 
Residence district 
(n=369) 
 Lawyer 
Survey 
General 
population838 
South 6% 14% 
North 8% 16% 
Haifa 10% 12% 
Jerusalem 15% 13% 
Tel-Aviv 23% 16% 
Central 38% 24% 
 
7.1.7 Military service 
Israeli law requires compulsory military service (IDF) for men and women839, although 
Arabs are exempt (but not Druze840), as are Orthodox Jews who are “skilled Torah 
students”. In this survey, 90% of lawyers had served in the IDF (of which 93% are 
Jewish), which significantly exceeds the average yearly draft rate (65%). In addition, 
5.2% of lawyers in this survey did National Service (instead of military service)841, and 
only 5.7% had not served at all (the majority of them non-Jewish). The proportion of 
                                                 
838 CBS, Table 2.15 “population, by district, sub-district and religion” (10.09.2015), p.2 
839 The Defence Service Law (Consolidated Version), 5747–1986. For a review of the complexity and 
ramifications of the IDF service see: Meir Elran and Gabi Sheffer (eds), Military Service in Israel: 
Challenges and Ramifications (Institute for National Security Studies 2015). 
840 Muslim and Christian Arabs can volunteer to serve, but despite an increase in the number of 
volunteers, their share of the general recruit population is marginal. Jackie Khourie, Gili Cohen “an 
increase in the number of Christian and Muslim Arabs that are being drafted to the IDF, yet they still only 
amount to dozens” Haaretz (17.11.2014) http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/.premium-1.2487624 
841 The Knesset’s Research and Information Centre The National-Civil Service in Israel (2014)  
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those who served in the IDF in the Lawyer Survey is very high, but that can be partially 
explained by the large number of Jews in the survey. 
7.1.7 Legal education 
LL.B. 
Almost 95% of survey respondents obtained their LL.B. in Israel. A majority (52%) 
gained their LL.B. in universities as opposed to colleges (46%) or other institutions 
(2%)842 (Figure 25). However, it is generally believed that the number of lawyers who 
graduated from colleges now exceeds the number of lawyers who are university law 
graduates.  In the years 1998-2009, different sources indicate that 55% of qualified 
lawyers were college graduates843, and in the years 2000-2010 their proportion increased 
to 60%844.  
Figure 25. Lawyer survey respondents by type of LL.B. institution attended 
 
                                                 
842 As mentioned in Chapter 5, the universities are older higher education institutes, budgeted by the state, 
considered to have a high threshold for law faculties, and their tuition fees are subsidised. The colleges 
are younger, most of them are not state-budgeted and therefore their tuition fees are very expensive, but 
the admission criteria are lenient. 
843 The Israeli Bar Association "The National Lawyers Index" (20.5.2009) 
http://www.israelbar.org.il/article_inner.asp?pgId=81284&catId=6 
844 Katvan (n393) claims that the number of college graduate lawyers greatly exceeds the number of 
university graduates; Roth (n822). 
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Figure 26 shows how the Lawyer Survey respondents were distributed according to the 
academic institution where they obtained their LL.B. 
Figure 26. Lawyer survey respondents by academic institution (LL.B) 
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It is difficult to assess the extent to which these survey participants are representative of 
all Israeli lawyers, because the distribution of all registered lawyers by LL.B. awarding 
institution is not clear. In 2009, the Bar reported845 that the institutions that qualified the 
largest number of lawyers in the previous decade were Tel-Aviv University, IDC College, 
College of Management, Sha’arei Mishpat College and Netanya College (in that order). 
The participants in the Lawyer Survey do not completely follow this trend. However, the 
Bar’s figures referred only to lawyers who joined the Bar after 1998, whereas the Lawyer 
Survey was open to lawyers from a much wider range of admission years (1965-2014). 
Legal education in Israel is dynamic, and the legal profession has also changed since 
2009. A more recent publication846 showed that IDC College, Tel-Aviv University, 
College of Management, Hebrew University and Bar-Ilan University (in that order) 
qualified the highest number of lawyers between 2002-2012. It is therefore not surprising 
to see the largest proportion of lawyers in this survey coming from Tel-Aviv University, 
as well as Hebrew University and Bar-Ilan being second and fourth.  Ono College, a 
relatively young institution, was ranked second to last in the Bar report from 2009, but its 
proportion in this survey reflects the exceptionally large number of students and graduates 
it has today847. Overall, the survey generally reflects the known trends about LL.B. 
academic institutions, although lawyers who graduated from IDC and the College of 
Management may be under-represented. 
LL.M. 
Survey respondents reflect the increasing popularity of LL.M. programmes in Israel848, 
with 32% holding an LL.M. or in the process of gaining one. This is slightly higher than 
official data, which indicates that a quarter of all undergraduate law students (in colleges 
and universities alike) continue to a Master’s Degree in Law849. However, the Lawyer 
Survey LL.M. figure is lower than the proportion of Israeli judges with an LL.M. 
(44%)850. 
                                                 
845 The Lawyers Index (n843)  
846 Raz, “How Many lawyers joined” (n819). 
847 According to figures published by the Bar, more than 20% of newly qualified lawyers in December 
2014 were from Ono College (Statistical Data- Data regarding qualification 2014 
http://www.israelbar.org.il/article_inner.asp?pgId=227072&catId=1809).  
848 Nadav Alon “an LL.M.- who would benefit from it and why” Calcalist (6.7.2012) 
http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3576291,00.html 
849 Council for Higher Education (Planning and Budgeting Committee), “Selected Data Ahead of the 
Opening of the Academic Year 2014-15”, (2014) here 15 
850 Two percent of lawyers either had a PhD or were studying for one at the time of the survey (compared 
with 4% of judges). 
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Other qualifications 
Many academic institutions in Israel offer combined programmes of law with another 
degree. This is said to highlight the fact that Israeli institutions are educating lawyers of 
the future to provide them with an academic background that is not exclusively legal but 
is inter-disciplinary851. All the universities that teach law in Israel offer a variety of 
combined programmes with non-legal degrees; however only a minority of colleges 
provide similar programmes. As there is no official data on the number of lawyers with a 
non-legal degree, these findings provide an initial (but not comprehensive) indication of 
how widespread inter-disciplinary law degrees are amongst Israeli lawyers. 
Amongst lawyers taking part in survey, almost 45% have non-legal degrees852, of which 
16% did their LL.B. in a combined program with another non-legal degree, and 33% had 
obtained a non-legal degree separately from their legal education (or were studying for 
one at the time of the survey). This contrasts with Israeli judges, where 17% were found 
to have a non-legal undergraduate or graduate degree853; however, this may be due to the 
more recent popularity of interdisciplinary programs in law faculties. 
Amongst those lawyers in the survey who had taken non-legal studies854, the largest 
proportions were in Business Management/MBA (28%), Economics (21%) and 
Humanities (11%)855. Additionally, 18% of lawyers in the Survey had a non-legal 
qualification or certificate; the most popular ones were a teaching certificate, mediation 
and medical and health-related training (e.g. nurses, paramedics, etc.)856. 
7.1.8 Experience in the legal profession 
This section covers the following aspects of the survey respondents’ experience in the 
legal profession: seniority, position, sector, district of work and specialization. 
Almost 90% of the survey participants were working in the legal profession at the time 
of the survey. Only 4% of lawyers had been qualified to practice law in other countries, 
                                                 
851 In some law faculties in Israel, more than 50% of students take a combined program. Aviv Bartela, 
“More law students are taking an additional degree”, YNET (14.10.2013) 
www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4440035,00.html; Roe’e, “The Inflated Balloon of the Law Faculties” (n 
822). 
852 A total of 29 lawyers answered ‘yes’ to both the question about a combined program and of a separate 
non-legal degree. 
853 See Chapter 6 
854 97 answers were given for this question.  
855 These figures refer to non-legal degrees in combined programmes with laws. In separate degrees, the 
leading ones were Business Management (19%), Social Sciences (19%), Humanities (18%) and Political 
Science (16%). 
856 Currently there is no similar data regarding judges on the Website, therefore the populations cannot be 
compared on this. 
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and only 2% gained professional experience abroad. As Table 21 shows, overall, the 
variables relating to employment characteristics in the Lawyer Survey showed a diverse 
picture of lawyers with varying degrees of experience, specializations, sectors and 
positions in the legal profession. 
Table 21. Lawyer Survey respondents experience in legal profession 
Legal employment experience Variables % of lawyers  
in survey 
Admission to legal profession (n=577) 1965-1985 10% 
1986-2003 36% 
2004-2014 54% 
   
Years in legal profession (n=543) Less than 5 years 30% 
5-10 years 22% 
10-15 years 15% 
More than 15 years 33% 
   
Current employment sector (n=536) NGO 1% 
State advocacy 2% 
Courts system 5% 
Public sector- other 5% 
Other 5% 
Private firm 81% 
   
Mode of employment (n=522) Self-employed 57% 
Salaried worker 42% 
n/a 1% 
   
Position (n=521) Senior partner 1% 
Department manager 2% 
Other 3% 
In house/ legal advisor 5% 
Legal assistant 5% 
Partner 7% 
Associate 26% 
Self-employed 42% 
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More than half (54%) of the survey respondents were admitted to the Bar in the decade 
prior to the survey. This reflects the known substantial increase in the number of lawyers 
entering the profession in Israel in recent years857. Yet there is good representation of 
lawyers of varying degrees of experience, and qualification year was spread across 5 
decades.  
The overwhelming majority of survey participants (81%) have spent the bulk of their 
legal career in the private sector. This closely reflects the findings of a 2009 publication, 
which estimated that 80% of registered lawyers work in private firms, with the remainder 
in either the public sector or in-house legal consultants858. Only 7% of respondents in the 
survey said they had worked in the courts system. There was also a diverse range of 
professional expertise amongst lawyers in the survey, with Litigation the most prevalent 
area of expertise (44.5% of lawyers mentioned it as their professional expertise) followed 
by Property Law (28.1%), Tort Law (24%) and Company Law (22.2%)859. 
As Table 22 shows, almost half of the lawyers (47%) in the survey worked in the Tel-Aviv 
district860, while a third (33%) worked in the peripheral areas of Israel (i.e. south, north 
and Haifa). Compared with data from the 2014 Bar Activity report, there was an over-
representation in the survey of lawyers working in the peripheral areas (33% in survey 
compared with 20% in Bar report). 
Table 22. Work district of lawyers in the survey compared with Bar data 
District Lawyer Survey Bar report861 
South 5% 5% 
Central 6% n/a 
Haifa 10% 4% 
Jerusalem 14% 14% 
North 18% 11% 
Tel-Aviv 47% 66% 
 
 
                                                 
857 Roe’e (n822): 57% of Israeli lawyers in 2014 had qualified for the Bar in the preceding decade. 
858 Anat Ro'ee, "how much do legal counsels earn?" YNET (19.7.2009) 
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-3748512,00.html 
859 17% of respondents ticked “other” in this question.  
860 54% if counted with central district, as per the Bar’s geographical distribution 
861 (n819) 49 
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Legal Internship 
Since 1994, the required length of internship in Israel has been one year862, but prior to 
that law graduates were required to do two years of internship863. Given the relatively 
young age of the survey participants, it is therefore not surprising that three-quarters 
(75%) had interned for one year864. A quarter of the lawyers in the survey interned in the 
public sector, 60% in the private sector and 12% in both. Broken down into categories, 
71% of lawyers’ interned in a private firm, 18% in the court system, 11% in the state’s 
advocacy and 8% in other public sector branches. 
 
7.1.9 Family ties in the profession 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a common belief in Israel is that the judiciary tends to appoint 
“insiders” based on professional, family or friendly acquaintances, and excludes 
candidates who lack these connections865. In the Lawyer Survey, almost one-third of the 
lawyers (31%) had family members in the legal profession (i.e. siblings, spouses or 
parents), of whom 10% had relatives in a judicial office (i.e. 3% of all respondents)866. It 
is hard to compare these findings to the entire lawyers’ population or to other professions 
due to lack of data, but the proportion of lawyers who are connected to the judiciary by 
family ties seems small. For comparison, this research project showed that 4.5% of sitting 
judges have declared family ties to other judges (sitting, retired or deceased). At least as 
far as this survey shows, the claims about family ties between the profession and the 
judiciary are not substantiated. However, this survey did not cover professional, business 
and friendship ties between lawyers and judges. 
                                                 
862 S.35, The Bar Association Law, 5721-1961. This changed in October 2016 following a decision to 
extend the internship to 18 months (Hen Ma'anit, "Lawyers' internship duration to be extended to 18 
months" Globes (02.2.2016) http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001100010). 
863 “The flooding of the profession: Licence number 100,000”, Israel Bar Jubilee (n821) 8-10. 
864 The remaining 100 lawyers (16.5%) interned for two years and 43 lawyers had other lengths of 
internship. 
865 As reviewed in previous chapters, the Judicial Nominations Committee has recently decided to restrict 
the number of judges with family ties to other judges. 
866 The questions about family ties were ‘branched’, that is: lawyers were asked about family ties in the 
profession (total respondents 564); those who answered yes (n=173) were then referred to a follow-up 
question about ties to judges. Only 17 lawyers answered yes, meaning they amount to 10% of lawyers 
with family ties in the profession. 
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7.2 PART 2: Lawyers’ experiences and attitudes  
Very few surveys with lawyers have been conducted and published in Israel, and most 
have dealt with wages, employability and working hours867. The Lawyer Survey 
attempted to empirically examine Israeli lawyers’ experiences of and attitudes to a 
number of key issues related to the legal profession, judiciary, judicial diversity and the 
state of Israel. 
7.2.1 Identification with the state and with being Israeli 
Lawyers were asked about their identification with the state and self-definition as Israeli. 
The objective in these questions is twofold: first, to see whether lawyers (who are an 
integral part of law enforcement in Israel) identify with the state and its main institutions; 
second, to examine how feelings of identification and belonging (or alternatively, 
exclusion) might influence the motivation of lawyers to join the judiciary, their views 
about judicial diversity and the fairness of the judicial system. 
Figure 27. Lawyer identification with the state and being 'Israeli’  
 
As Figure 27 shows, the overwhelming majority of lawyers in the survey define 
themselves “completely” as Israeli and identify with the state of Israel and its institutions, 
exceeding the general population in similar questions in opinion polls868.  However, it 
                                                 
867Ella Levi-Weinriv, "51% Of Lawyers: Do Not Want Our Children to Become Lawyers" Globes 
(30.5.2011) http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000649693&fid=829); Yasmin Gueta 
“Lawyers in 2014: Work More, Earn Less and Send More CVs” TheMarker (1.7.2014) 
http://www.themarker.com/law/1.2364309.  
868 Surveys found that 65% of the population feel part of Israel to a very high or high extent (72% of Jews 
and nearly 28% of Arabs), Tamar Hermann and others, The Israeli Democracy Index 2012 (Israel 
Democracy Institute (here) 73-74. 
1% 1%1% 3%5%
17%
94%
79%
Extent of self-definition as Israeli Extent of identification with the state
Not at all To a little extent To some extent Absolutely
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should be remembered that the Lawyer Survey took place at a time of heightened security 
(operation Protective Edge), and this may have led to an increase in feelings of patriotism 
and a sense of belonging to the state. 
 
7.2.2 Attitudes to judges and judicial decision-making 
So far as can be determined, the Lawyer Survey is the first survey to ask Israeli lawyers 
about their views on judicial matters, including the factors that influence judicial 
decision-making. From Figure 28 it appears that lawyers do not see a contradiction 
between agreeing that judges are objective and professional decision-makers, and 
believing that background characteristics of judges and parties may influence the judicial 
outcome. 
Figure 28. Lawyer general attitudes to judges and judicial decision-making 
 
7.2.3 The Israeli judiciary 
Focusing on the Israeli judiciary, lawyers were asked to indicate their satisfaction with 
the courts system (Figure 29) and respond to statements that reflect common perceptions 
about the Israeli judiciary (Figure 30). While the latter is asked in this survey for the first 
time, the issue of satisfaction with the profession (especially in light of the increase in the 
number of lawyers) had been dealt with in previous surveys. The proportion of lawyers 
who are dissatisfied with the professional level of judges (over 30%) is noteworthy, as is 
46%
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the fact that only 13% of respondents are satisfied with the efficiency of the courts 
(similarly to the Bar survey from 2011869). 
Figure 29. Lawyer satisfaction with courts and judges in Israel 
 
In relation to the composition of Israeli courts, most lawyers believe that the Israeli 
judiciary does not reflect Israeli society or the composition of the legal profession in 
Israel. Additionally, only one-third of lawyers felt that the Israeli judiciary is balanced 
and fair. 
Figure 30. Lawyer attitudes to composition and characteristics of the Israeli 
judiciary 
 
Based on the survey results, it appears that Israeli lawyers feel that background 
characteristics of judges and parties do play a role in the judicial decision-making process 
(despite the ethos that judges are impervious to external implications). They view the 
                                                 
869 The survey found that 57% of lawyers were concerned about the length of court proceedings (Levi-
Weinriv n.867). 
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judiciary as a liberal, secular institution, but at the same time, feel that it is a-political, 
that judges are objective and professional decision-makers and that Israeli judges are not 
detached from daily life. 
7.2.4 Trust in the courts system and other non-elected state institutions870 
The public’s trust in state institutions (and the judiciary in particular) is highly important 
in democracies. Lack of trust might be reflected in a decline in political participation and 
a sense of belonging to the state on the part citizens, and it may undermine the 
government’s legitimacy871. Israel, as many other western democracies, has witnessed a 
general decline in public trust in political and other institutions872. Specific opinion polls 
in Israel have focused on the Supreme Court, which traditionally held very high levels of 
public trust, second only to the IDF. However, in the past 15 years, the public’s 
confidence in the Israeli Supreme Court has fallen significantly (e.g. from 84% in 2000 
to 52% in 2009)873. However, different surveys have produced different results in terms 
of public trust in courts in Israel. A survey from 2015 that asked about the general courts 
system (not only the Supreme Court) found that only 30% of the public trust the courts 
system fully or largely874, while the 2015 CBS Social Survey found that 58% of the Israeli 
public trust the courts system to a large or some extent875. The most recent Democracy 
Index found 62% support for the Supreme Court in Israel, which was an improvement 
from preceding years876. 
No previous surveys about the level of trust of Israeli lawyers in state institutions and the 
courts system were found. There have been public opinion polls on these issues, and 
where relevant the results of the Lawyer Survey are compared with these.  In the Lawyer 
Survey (Figure 31), the courts system is the second most trusted state institution (after the 
IDF) of those asked about. The proportion of lawyers who largely trust the courts (42%) 
is lower than other public opinion polls in which the courts system gained 52% trust877, 
                                                 
870 This survey focused on non-elected institutions on the basis that it would be better to compare the 
courts to other non-elected bodies. 
871 Hadar, “Public Confidence in Government Institutions Over the Past Decade in Israel’ (n94); Barak-
Erez (n45) 123.  
872 Mike Hough and Julian V. Roberts, Confidence in justice: An international review (Home Office 
2004); Hadar (n94). 
873 Hadar (n94); Hermann and others (n868) 54-71, questions 17.1-17.10. 
874 Hen Ma’anit, “New Survey Shows: Public Trust In The Courts System, The Knesset And The Police 
Reaches A New Low”, Globes (26.10.2015) http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001076264 
875 CBS "Selected Data from the 2015 Social Survey" (n80). 
876 Tamar Hermann and others, The Israeli Democracy Index 2015 (Israel Democracy Institute, 2015) 
http://en.idi.org.il/media/4254068/democracy_index_2015.pdf, p.82. 
877 Hadar (n94). 
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but much higher than other polls if "large extent" and "some extent" are counted jointly. 
Thus, compared to 58% of the public that trust the courts to a large or some extent in the 
2015 CBS Social Survey and 62% of the public that trust the Supreme Court (Democracy 
Index 2015), 82% of lawyers trust the courts to a large or some extent. While national 
and religious affiliation was found in previous studies in Israel to be directly related to 
the level of public trust in state institutions878, in this survey there were no statistically 
significant differences between Jews and non-Jewish lawyers’ level of trust in courts.  
Figure 31. Lawyer trust in non-elected state institutions879 
 
7.2.5 Composition of the Israeli judiciary 
As seen in Figure 32, just over a majority of Israeli lawyers (52%) think that the Israeli 
judiciary does not reflect the composition of Israeli society, while a larger proportion of 
lawyers (75%) did not feel that the senior judiciary in Israel was diverse and reflective of 
Israeli society. 
                                                 
878 For example, The IDI found that in 2009 90% of Jews trusted the IDF, compared with only 16% of 
Arabs. 
879 Data labels smaller than 4% were removed from the figure. The “don't know” labels were removed 
from the figure, as they were marginal and in some cases null. 
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Figure 32. Lawyer views of the extent of judicial diversity in Israel 
 
The survey explored lawyers’ views on judicial diversity further by asking their views on 
whether specific groups were over or under represented in the Israeli judiciary880. A 
majority of Israeli lawyers (55%) think that new immigrants are under-represented in the 
judiciary, followed by Druze (46%), Christian Arabs (40%), Muslim Arabs (41%). and 
Sephardic Jews (38%) (Figure 33). 
Figure 33. Lawyer beliefs about representation within the Israeli judiciary 
 
Previous studies about judicial diversity (not in Israel) have found correlations between 
judicial diversity and the perception of the fairness of and trust in courts881.  While one 
has to bear in mind the differences between general polls in other jurisdictions and this 
                                                 
880 The survey did not define representation. 
881 Thomas (n.5) 55; Hazel Genn and others, Tribunals for Diverse Users (Department for Constitutional 
Affairs 2006); Thomas, Diversity in the Jury System (n.110). 
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survey, which was conducted with Israeli lawyers only, the Lawyer Survey found a highly 
significant correlation between lawyers’ views on judicial diversity in Israel and the 
extent of their perception of the fairness of courts and their trust in courts. Lawyers who 
thought the judiciary was diverse were highly more likely to think it was balanced and 
fair (53% of lawyers who agreed the judiciary was diverse also thought it was balanced 
and fair). However, 31% of lawyers who disagreed and 64% of lawyers who strongly 
disagreed that the Israeli judiciary was diverse or reflective of society also thought it was 
not balanced and fair. Furthermore, lawyers who thought the Israeli judiciary was diverse 
had high levels of trust in the courts882, while lawyers who strongly disagreed that the 
judiciary was diverse were highly more likely to have low levels of trust in courts. 
7.2.6 Justifications for judicial diversity  
While the majority of lawyers in the survey did not think that the Israeli judiciary is 
diverse (with the exception of gender), the survey went on to further explore whether they 
thought the judiciary should be diverse. As Figure 34 shows, three-quarters of lawyers in 
the survey felt that the Israeli judiciary should represent a variety of sectors in Israeli 
society (76%); almost two-thirds (60%) felt that the composition of the judiciary should 
reflect the society in which it operates, and three-quarters (74%) felt that diversity is an 
important component in the courts' legitimacy. It is clear therefore that Israeli lawyers 
who participated in this survey had strong feelings about the importance of judicial 
diversity in general and specifically its applicability to the Israeli judiciary. 
                                                 
882 e.g. 66% of lawyers who agreed the judiciary was diverse trusted the courts largely, compared with 
only 21% of lawyers who strongly disagreed the judiciary was diverse who trusted the courts largely. 
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Figure 34. Lawyers' views on the importance of judicial diversity 
 
However, somewhat contradictory views also emerged. For instance, 63% of lawyers 
agreed that the professional conduct of judges is the only relevant factor to ensure public 
trust in the judiciary, and 70% of lawyers who strongly agreed that judicial diversity is an 
important component to courts' legitimacy also strongly agreed or agreed that the 
professional conduct of judges is the only relevant factor to ensuring the public trust in 
courts. This statement may seem contradictory to being supportive of judicial diversity if 
the professional level of judges is regarded as separate from judicial diversity. However, 
if diversity is seen as integral to merit, this result would not be surprising. It may be that 
the lawyers in this survey view diversity and professionalism of judges as complementary 
rather than conflicting terms, but the survey did not ask that question directly. 
7.2.7 Should something be done about judicial diversity in Israel? 
A key question in the survey was “Do you think something should be done about judicial 
diversity in Israel?”, as it provided a measure of whether lawyers are satisfied with the 
current policies on judicial diversity in Israel. Two-thirds of lawyers in the survey (66%) 
said “yes”, which suggests that most lawyers believe something should be done about 
judicial diversity in Israel. 
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Those survey participants who said something should be done about judicial diversity in 
Israel were then asked to specify what should be done (Figure 35), while those who said 
nothing needed to be done about judicial diversity were asked to elaborate on why they 
felt nothing should be done (Figure 36). 
Figure 35. Lawyer views on what should be done to promote judicial diversity 
 
Of the total of 269 respondents883 who identified specific actions they felt were needed 
to increase judicial diversity, many support a proactive approach, such as embedding 
diversity as an official consideration in the nominations procedure (71%; n=192), or 
asking the Bar to identify eligible candidates amongst its members (56%; n=151). Under 
the “other” category, some participants made interesting suggestions (e.g., that law 
faculties should encourage candidates from disadvantaged groups to study law).
                                                 
883 It should be noted that respondents could tick more than one option in this question. Therefore, 
although 269 participants entered answers in this question, the total number of responses was 579. 
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Figure 36. Lawyer views on why no action is needed on judicial diversity in Israel 
 
The views displayed in Figure 36 echo common arguments against action to increase 
judicial diversity. For example, just over half (51%) of lawyers in the survey who felt 
nothing needed to be done are worried about the effect of diversity on the professional 
level of judges (similar to the “merit argument” reviewed earlier). Almost a half (47%) 
who feel nothing needs to be done are concerned that diversifying the judiciary would 
harm its legitimacy and the level of public trust in courts (this argument resembles 
statements made by senior judges in Israel in the past884). A different view, also held by 
47% of these lawyers, does not necessarily deny there is a problem with judicial diversity, 
but suggests that it would improve over time and no action should be initiated. 
7.2.8 What might account for lawyers’ differing views on judicial diversity? 
It is clear that the majority of lawyers in the survey believe that something should be done 
about judicial diversity. But what are the factors that account for this view? Can it be 
associated with specific background characteristics or attitudes of Israeli lawyers? The 
following sections present the results of a cross-analysis of lawyers’ views on judicial 
diversity and a broad range of respondents’ characteristics, views and experiences. 
Lawyers’ background characteristics:   
Lawyers’ views on judicial diversity in Israeli were not correlated to any of the following 
background characteristics of those lawyers who took part in the study: gender885, 
                                                 
884 See Chapter 2 above for statements made by the Zamir Committee, as well as former Chief Justice 
Beinisch. 
885 Albeit a higher percentage of women support it compared to men (71% of women said yes, compared 
with 65.1% of men).  
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nationality or religion886, level of religious observance887, self-identification as Israeli, 
sector of work, age, income level or the type of institution lawyers attended888.  However, 
lawyers’ views on judicial diversity were correlated to Jewish ethnicity, military service 
and self-definition as Israeli. 
 
Jewish ethnicity: There was a highly significant correlation between self-defined Jewish 
ethnicity and views regarding judicial diversity. Ashkenazi lawyers are far less likely to 
think something should be done about judicial diversity, while Sephardic lawyers are far 
more likely to think something should be done. In other words, lawyers of Ashkenazi 
origin, who are over-represented in the judiciary, are significantly less supportive of 
action to increase judicial diversity, while members of an under-represented group in the 
judiciary (Sephardic Jews) are significantly more likely to support action to increase 
diversity. 
Figure 37. Relationship between lawyer views on action for judicial diversity and 
their Jewish ethnic group (n=344 )889 
 
 
                                                 
886 Perhaps because the Jewish group is so dominant amongst respondents of this survey. 
887 Although lack of fit was observed for traditional (‘Massorti’) respondents who were more likely to 
think something should be done (77%). 
888 Although 74% of lawyers who graduated from a college thought something should be done about 
judicial diversity in Israel, compared with only 62% of lawyers who are university graduates. 
889 For Ethiopian n=1. 
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Military service and definition as Israeli: Those lawyers who had done military service 
were statistically more likely not to support action for judicial diversity than those lawyers 
who had not done military service or who did national service890.  However, it seems that 
this outcome is mostly a reflection of the fact that 95% of participants served in the IDF 
or did National Service. Similarly, significant correlation between those who define 
themselves as Israeli and decreased support in action to increase judicial diversity was 
found (35% of lawyers who absolutely define themselves Israeli felt no action should be 
taken for diversity, compared with less than 8% of the rest of the lawyers). Yet this, as 
well, may also be a result of the proportion of lawyers who absolutely define themselves 
as Israeli (94%), rather than actual differences between groups. 
Perceptions about courts and diversity:  
Lawyers’ response to the question “should something be done about judicial diversity in 
Israel?” was highly correlated with their views about the judiciary and judges. The more 
satisfied lawyers were with the judiciary (e.g. efficiency, fairness) and the more 
convinced they were that it was diverse, the more likely they were to deny action on 
judicial diversity. Similarly, lawyers who felt the judiciary was not reflective of Israeli 
society, not efficient, fair or professional enough, were substantially more willing to 
consider action on judicial diversity. 
Court efficiency, the professional level of judges: The more satisfied lawyers were with 
the efficiency of courts, the less likely they were to think something should be done about 
judicial diversity. Similarly, the lower the level of satisfaction amongst lawyers with the 
professional level of judges, the more willing they were to consider action regarding 
judicial diversity891. Support for greater judicial diversity, therefore, was linked to 
dissatisfaction with the courts and with judges. 
Trust in courts: Additionally, lawyers’ views regarding action on diversity were highly 
associated with the extent to which they trust the court system. The greater the trust in 
courts, the less convinced the lawyers were to think something should be done about 
judicial diversity (Figure 38). This finding provides empirical support for there being a 
                                                 
890 35% of lawyers who served did not agree that something should be done about judicial diversity, 
compared with only 21% of lawyers who did not serve and answered similarly. 
891 For example, 78% of lawyers who were strongly dissatisfied with the professional level of judges 
supported action for judicial diversity, compared with 48% of lawyers who were strongly satisfied with 
the same factor. 
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correlation between the composition of courts and the extent to which they are trusted in 
Israel. 
Figure 38. Lawyer trust in courts and attitude to judicial diversity (N=369) 
 
Characteristics and composition of the Israeli judiciary:  Figure 39 presents Israeli 
lawyers’ views about the Israeli judiciary that were significantly correlated to their views 
about the need to taking action to increase judicial diversity. For example, lawyers who 
agreed that the Israeli judiciary was secular were more in favour of action on judicial 
diversity (73%) than those who did not think the judiciary was secular (60%). Of the 30% 
of lawyers that thought the judiciary is not balanced and fair, 77% supported action to 
increase judicial diversity. This suggests that a relationship exists between the perception 
of fairness of courts and judicial diversity exists amongst Israeli lawyers. Lawyers in the 
survey who thought the Israeli judiciary does not reflect Israeli society were supportive 
of action on judicial diversity (77%). Similarly, lawyers who believe the judiciary should 
reflect society were highly likely to support action for judicial diversity (76% supporting 
action on judicial diversity, compared with only 30% amongst lawyers who do not think 
the judiciary should reflect Israeli society). Finally, lawyers in the survey who feel that 
diversity will inevitably improve over time were less supportive of action for diversity 
(58%) than lawyers who did not think diversity would improve over time (88%). 
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Figure 39. Relationship between lawyer support for action on judicial diversity 
and attitudes towards Israeli judiciary 
 
 
Attitude towards judiciary and judicial decision-making:  Lawyers in the survey who 
view the judiciary and the judicial decision-making process in a formalistic way were 
unlikely to support action for diversity Figure 40. For example, Israeli lawyers who think 
judges are objective and neutral were not strongly supportive of action to increase judicial 
diversity (only 58% supported such action). However, lawyers who agreed that “Judicial 
diversity is an important component in the courts’ legitimacy” were generally supportive 
of action for judicial diversity (76% supporting such action). Nevertheless, there was no 
significant correlation between lawyers' views on whether “Judges’ professionalism is the 
only factor relevant to public trust in the judiciary” and their views on the need for judicial 
diversity. This suggests that Israeli lawyers who support action to increase judicial 
diversity do not necessarily think that diversity contradicts the professionalism of judges. 
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Figure 40. Relationship between supporting action for judicial diversity and 
position regarding diversity and decision-making 
 
Position regarding affirmative action in Israel:  Lawyers were asked to specify groups 
that were, in their view, most worthy of affirmative action (in general) in Israel. Lawyers 
that thought Sephardic Jews were most worthy of affirmative action were far more likely 
to support action for judicial diversity (97%). However, lawyers who thought that none 
of the groups was worthy of affirmative action were less supportive of action for judicial 
diversity (44% of them said no to action on judicial diversity). This suggests that lack of 
support in the overall concept of affirmative action is linked to opposing action for 
judicial diversity892. 
 
7.2.9 Lawyers’ attitudes to and experience of the legal profession 
The Lawyer Survey also explored the participants’ attitudes and experiences of the legal 
profession and legal education, including their attitudes towards diversity in both of these 
sectors.  
                                                 
892 In fact, several comments in open-text boxes specifically said they oppose any form of affirmative 
action for judicial appointments.  
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Reasons for choosing the profession 
Lawyers taking part in the survey were asked to reflect on their reasons for choosing the 
legal profession. “Material” factors such as expected income, social status and the 
prestige affiliated with the profession were less dominant than intellectual interest, 
aptitude, ideology and beliefs. 
Figure 41. Lawyers’ reasons for choosing the legal profession (n=561)893 
 
Satisfaction with the legal profession 
Almost three-quarters (72%) of lawyers who took part in the survey were generally 
satisfied with the legal profession894. However only a small proportion of lawyers in the 
survey (19%) said they were satisfied with the professional level of their lawyer-
colleagues. These findings reiterate the Bar survey from 2011, which found that the 
majority of lawyers were concerned about the deterioration in the professional level of 
lawyers895. 
                                                 
893 Because participants could tick more than one option, the total number of responses to this question 
was 1,171, and the results add up to more than 100%. 
894 In comparison, a survey from 2011 found that 51% of Israeli lawyers would not want their children to 
join the legal profession (Levi-Weinriv, n.867). 
895 Ibid. 
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Figure 42. Lawyers' satisfaction with the legal profession896 
 
Previous experiences of discrimination 
Lawyers were asked whether they had ever experienced discrimination during their in 
education, at work or specifically in courts. There were 393 reports of discrimination (on 
various grounds). As Table 23 illustrates, although the workplace was more prone to 
reports of discrimination, a few lawyers felt they had been discriminated in courts, mostly 
based on age or ethnicity897. 
                                                 
896 This figure and the following figures combined the original 6 degrees of agreement into 3: agree, 
disagree and not sure. 
897 No previous examination of lawyers’ experiences of discriminations was found, but a 2011 survey 
found that 18% of lawyers were concerned about judges’ attitudes towards lawyers (Levi-Weinriv n.867). 
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Table 23. Lawyers' experiences of discrimination 
Grounds for discrimination Where N  % 
Nationality  Studies 12 3% 
Work place 10 3% 
Courts 19 5% 
Religion/level of religious observance Studies 11 3% 
Work place 22 6% 
Courts 17 4% 
Ethnicity/ ‘Eda’ Studies 25 7% 
Work place 34 9% 
Courts 34 9% 
Gender Studies 9 2% 
Work place 54 14% 
Courts 24 6% 
Sexual orientation Studies 3 1% 
Work place 6 2% 
Courts 1 0% 
Disability (mental, physical etc.) Studies 1 0% 
Work place 8 2% 
Courts 2 1% 
Age Studies 9 2% 
Work place 48 13% 
Courts 36 9% 
 
Overall, previous experiences of discrimination were not correlated to lawyers’ position 
on the need to address judicial diversity, except for discrimination on the grounds of 
religion and ethnicity at work: Over 90% of lawyers who reported they had been 
discriminated at work on grounds of religion (n=20) and 88% of lawyers reporting 
discrimination on grounds of ethnicity at work (n=30) supported action to increase 
judicial diversity.  
 
Diversity of the Israeli legal profession 
The survey asked Israeli lawyers for their views on the extent to which the legal 
profession in Israel is diverse. As far as can be determined, this is the first time the views 
of Israeli lawyers have been canvassed on this issue.  Lawyers who participated in this 
study distinguished between the general population of legal professionals and the senior 
lawyers (e.g. partners in firms). While 62% of lawyers agreed that the Israeli legal 
profession is diverse and reflects Israeli society, only 7% thought this was the case for 
senior lawyers. Similar patterns emerge regarding specific groups (see Figure 43). If the 
findings of this survey are representative of the entire lawyer population, than the 
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participants rightfully pointed to new immigrants, Druze and Ethiopian Jews898 as under-
represented, but missed the under-representation of Arabs. 
Figure 43. Lawyer views on group representation within the legal profession 
 
7.2.10  Diversity in legal education 
While almost 60% of participants believed that the population of law students in Israel 
(in colleges and universities alike) is diverse and reflects Israeli society, only 15% held 
the same view on the population of the most academically outstanding law students899.  
However, when asked to what extent specific groups were represented amongst law 
students, many lawyers did not know how to estimate the representation of specific 
groups in Israeli society (Figure 44). This seems understandable, given the lack of 
publically available data on the diversity of Israeli law students. 
                                                 
898 There was also the option “Other”, and Ethiopian Jews were mentioned in this category as under-
represented more than any other group. 
899 However, some 19% of lawyers ticked “don't know”, which suggests they did not have sufficient data 
to establish an opinion on this matter (as opposed to their perception of diversity in legal education in 
general, for example). 
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Figure 44. Lawyers' views on the representation of groups in legal education 
 
The groups that lawyers considered under-represented in legal education are new 
immigrants (‘Olim’) and Druze. Ethiopian Jews were also specified often (and more than 
any other group) in the “other” category. The fact that participants identified Ethiopian 
Jews separately from the new immigrants group (although there is some overlap between 
the groups) highlights their view of this group as specifically under-represented in the 
legal education in Israel. 
As seen in chapters 3 and 4, lawyers’ perceptions about the under-representation of 
Ethiopian Jews in legal education is in line with the data regarding the under-
representation of Ethiopian Jews in higher education in Israel. However, there are no clear 
data on the composition of law students in Israel, therefore it is hard to say whether 
participants’ estimations of diversity in legal education are correct. There are no data 
regarding Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews amongst law students. Existing statistics 
regarding Arab students differentiate between Christian Arabs who are adequately 
represented in law schools, and Muslim and Druze who are under-represented. The largest 
proportions of participants in the Lawyer Survey did not know the extent of representation 
of Christian Arabs and Druze, while the largest proportion thought Muslims were 
adequately represented in legal education although official data suggests otherwise. 
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However, lawyers correctly identified that women are adequately represented in legal 
education. 
7.3 PART 3: Professional intentions of Israeli lawyers 
The Lawyer Survey was also specifically designed to try and understand what could be 
learned and projected about judicial diversity from looking at the immediate pool of 
potential applicants for judicial appointment900. This section explores the results of the 
survey about career plans of Israeli lawyers, especially the possibility of a judicial career, 
and the motivations and barriers that may influence Israeli lawyers’ decisions to apply for 
judicial office. The Lawyer Survey is the first time these subjects have been 
systematically explored with Israeli lawyers before. 
7.3.1 Plans to continue working in the profession 
Figure 45. Lawyer intentions to be working in legal profession in 5 years (n=563) 
 
As Figure 45 shows, most Israeli lawyers (92%) either plan to stay in the profession (59%) 
or would probably do so (33%). Those lawyers (32) who said they do not plan to stay in 
the legal profession identified various reasons for their decision, mostly their age (that is, 
they are close to retirement; n=9), boredom and professional burnout (n=8), long hours 
and working conditions (n=5) and the acceleration in the number of lawyers in the market 
(n=4). 
                                                 
900 For the importance of career progression as a lever for bringing about change in the composition of the 
judiciary, Thomas (n5). 
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7.3.2 Desire for a judicial career 
A key question in the survey asked participants whether they would consider applying for 
a judicial position at some point in their legal career. For some lawyers this may be too 
early, but for lawyers with professional experience of more than five years a judicial 
career is more probable. However, Figure 46 shows that lawyers are fairly even divided 
on this issue: a third (33%) said they would not consider a judicial career, another third 
(34%) said they might, while over a quarter (28%) said they would consider applying to 
be a judge in the future.  
Figure 46.  Lawyer intentions to apply for a judicial post in future  
 
7.3.3 Likelihood of being appointed to a judicial position  
In addition to asking lawyers intentions to apply to be a judge, all lawyers were also asked 
to estimate their chances of being appointed if they did apply for a judicial position901.  
As Figure 47 shows, a majority of lawyers in the survey (58%) feel they would have a 
high to moderate chance of being appointed to the judiciary if they applied.  
 
                                                 
901 This question was only directed to lawyers and was not included in the Law Student survey because 
most students would not be able to estimate their success in future applications, given the early stage of 
their professional qualification and limited experience. 
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Figure 47. Lawyer view of chance of being appointed to the judiciary (n=519) 
 
As lawyers are the immediate pool for judicial appointments, these results were analysed 
to determine which factors are most likely to predict how lawyers estimate their 
likelihood of being appointed to the judiciary.  Age and seniority in the legal profession, 
income level, previous experiences of discrimination in Israeli courts and the level of trust 
in courts were all strongly associated with lawyers’ estimation of their chances of success 
if they applied for a judicial office. Factors that were not statistically correlated with 
perceived prospects of appointment to the judiciary were: gender, Jewish ethnicity, 
nationality and religion, residence district, type of academic institution902, level of 
religious observance, level of satisfaction with the profession903, employment sector and 
identification with Israeli and self-definition as Israeli. 
Age and experience in the profession: Young lawyers (25-34) tended to estimate their 
chances as moderate (36%), while older lawyers (55-64) were more likely than any other 
age group to think their chances were very low (presumably because they may be closer 
to retirement or may have been unsuccessful in applying to the judiciary in the part). 
Eighteen percent (18%) of lawyers with relatively little experience in practice (5-10 
years) thought their chances to be appointed were low, whilst very experienced lawyers 
(more than 15 years) were highly more likely to think their chances were very high (15%). 
                                                 
902 Although there was a high proportion of university graduates who perceived their chances as very 
high. 
903 Despite a high number of lawyers who were very satisfied with the profession and estimated their 
chances as high. 
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There was strong evidence that lawyers’ income levels were related to their view of their 
chances of being appointed to the judiciary.  A majority (54%) of Israeli lawyers in the 
study who said they earn well above the average felt they had a very high or high chance 
of being appointed, while 31% of Israeli lawyers in the study who earn below average 
thought their chances were low. 
In most cases, lawyers’ previous experiences of discrimination did not predict how they 
would estimate their success when applying to the judiciary. However, lawyers who 
reported being discriminated in courts on grounds of nationality, ethnicity or religion 
were likely to estimate their chances to be appointed as either very high or very low. It is 
not entirely clear why discrimination in courts is the only form of discrimination that is 
statistically correlated to lawyers’ estimated success in securing a judicial position. It may 
be that being discriminated in courts is a predictor of lawyers’ perception of their success 
in the judiciary, either towards perceived inclusion in the judiciary or exclusion from it. 
However, the total number of lawyers who reported being discriminated in courts on 
grounds of nationality (n=19), religion (n=17) and ethnicity (n=33) is too marginal to 
base conclusions on904. 
Perceptions of success: Lawyers who took part in the survey were also asked to identify 
elements “leading to one’s success in Israeli society”. Most lawyers thought that 
connections and previous acquaintances were highly meaningful to success in Israel 
(69%), followed by education and skills (50%). The correlation between how lawyers 
estimate their chances of success in the judiciary and their opinion on general success 
factors in Israel was overall non-significant, except for education and nationality and 
religion. Nearly 75% of all lawyers who estimated their appointment chances as very high 
thought that education was very meaningful in one's success in the Israeli society. 
Furthermore, 67% of lawyers who estimated their chances of being appointed to the 
judiciary as low thought that one’s nationality or religion are meaningful to success in 
Israel.  
Finally, lawyers’ extent of trust in the courts system was highly associated with their 
estimates of the chance of success in obtaining a judicial position, particularly for lawyers 
whose level of trust was low.  A quarter (26%) of lawyers who thought their chances of 
being appointed were low had very low levels of trust in the courts system. Conversely, 
                                                 
904 Compare: Suellyn Scarnecchia, "Gender and Race Bias against Lawyers: A Classroom Response." 
(1989) 23 U. Mich. JL Reform 319. 
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only two lawyers (1.2%) amongst those who trust the courts to a large extent estimated 
their chance to be appointed as very low. It appears, therefore, that lawyers’ level of trust 
in courts affects not only their position regarding judicial diversity, but also their 
perception of successfully attaining a judicial career. 
 
7.3.4 Reasons for not considering a judicial career 
Israeli lawyers taking part in the survey were also asked to identify possible reasons why 
they would not consider applying to be a judge.  As shown in Figure 48 the leading reason 
for lawyers not to consider a judicial path was age (23%). Some of them mentioned they 
were too old to change career, while others said they were too close to judges’ retirement 
age (70) so would not be eligible to apply905. 
Figure 48. Lawyers' reasons for not considering a judicial career (n=120)906 
 
In addition to the somewhat expected considerations (e.g. working condition of 
judges907), at least 20 lawyers (17%) said they would not want to become judges given 
                                                 
905 Respondent 1031499 in the Lawyer Survey: “At my age […] I will not gain the tenure and experience 
required of a judge before I retire.” 
906 Respondents specified 179 reasons displayed in this figure. This was an open question and therefore 
some respondents mentioned more than one reason, and the percentage add to more than 100%. The 
responses were then coded for analysis. A similar process was done in section 7.3.5 below. 
907 Several commentators mentioned the restrictions imposed on judges by law as deterring them from 
considering a judicial career: “It imposes many restrictions on other activities and is a total change of 
lifestyle. Low-value, long hours and inability to do a good job considering the resources the system 
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the character of the Israeli judiciary (usually under the categories ‘the judiciary is unjust’ 
and ‘no identification with the system’). Some participants provided more detailed 
answers to this question. Some of them demonstrated feelings of dissent and disrespect 
towards the judiciary, while others pointed to deficiencies in the judicial appointments 
procedure and the homogeneity and “nepotism” of the judicial system.  For example: 
“based on my experience, the Judicial Nominations Committee is 
driven by irrelevant considerations, ignores past experience, 
knowledge and professional ability and prefers ‘insiders’ as part of its 
petty busyness approach… additionally it enjoys the privilege of 
confidentiality on its decisions…”908. 
In other instances, lawyers mentioned their group or ethnic affiliation as a barrier to 
appointment: “[the judiciary is a] closed club and for an ethnic minority member this is 
much harder [to get in]”909. A belief in the importance of connections was demonstrated 
by another respondent: “I tried [applying], naively, and learned first-hand how the 
nominations system really works. Unfortunately I do not have the right connections, 
though I have the right skills”910. One Orthodox-Jewish woman stated that she was given 
a Jewish halachic (religious) ruling according to which she was prevented from working 
as a judge911; this is an issue that might benefit from further exploration, in light of the 
growing number of Orthodox law students and qualified lawyers. These quotes suggest 
that the variety of reasons and barriers that influence lawyers’ decision not to embark on 
a judicial career is perhaps more nuanced than appears in the quantitative findings.  
As mentioned, no research was found to explore the factors that motivate Israeli lawyers 
to consider a judicial career, or possibly deter them from applying for one. A report in 
England and Wales investigated the factors that attract highly qualified practitioners to 
senior judicial positions912 and found, that the main factors deterring potential applicants 
were: workload and working conditions; loss of autonomy; the expected salary; not 
having the right judicial temperament, etc. Despite the differences between the 
participants in the Lawyer Survey and the practitioners that were interviewed in the 
                                                 
provides judges. Promotion is political and not based on skills or ability” (Respondent 1028278 in the 
Lawyer Survey). 
908 Respondent 1062107. 
909 Respondent 1060299. 
910 Respondent 1060612. 
911 Respondent 1061441. 
912 Genn, The Attractiveness of Senior Judicial Appointment (n519). Compare: Judicial Appointments 
Commission Barriers to Application to Judicial Appointment (report) (2013) 
https://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/sites/default/files/sync/about_the_jac/research-attitudes-to-judicial-
appointment-2013.pdf.  
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England and Wales report, it seems like very similar factors deterred lawyers from 
considering a judicial career. However, while female practitioners raised concerns about 
the senior judiciary in England and Wales being predominantly male, the gender 
composition of the Israeli judiciary was not mentioned as a barrier to considering a 
judicial career in the Lawyer Survey, for obvious reasons. 
7.3.5 Reasons to consider a judicial career 
The survey also allowed lawyers to express their views on why they would consider 
applying for a judicial position. Of the 150 lawyers that responded to this question, over 
a quarter (41 or 27%) would apply because they wanted to promote social change, and an 
equal proportion were confident they possessed the skills to become good judges 
(aptitude). Almost a quarter also felt that they had a vocation to be a judge (24%) and that 
a judicial career would be interesting (23%). 
  Figure 49. Lawyers' reasons for considering a judicial career (n=153) 
 
The previous section showed that being part of a certain ethnic, religious or sectorial 
group sometimes drives participants to exclude the possibility of a judicial career or 
estimate they would not be appointed. However, some lawyers from minority groups 
mentioned their sectorial affiliation as a reason to positively consider a judicial career: “I 
am part of the Arab minority in Israel and […] realized that there is an urgent and acute 
need to appoint judges from minority groups, especially in areas with an Arab majority it 
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would improve the judiciary in many levels”913. Others said they would like to promote 
under-represented sectors and make their voices heard in the judiciary914. 
7.3.6 Factors that may be associated with desire for a judicial career 
Understanding what drives lawyers to consider a judicial career is an important factor in 
any discussion about judicial diversity, as lawyers are the only pool for judicial 
appointments in Israel and their perceptions of barriers and incentives can influence future 
appointments. The answer to the question “will you consider a judicial career” is likely 
to lie in an intersection of various factors, including the demographics of lawyers, their 
professional experience and their perceptions about the judiciary and judicial diversity. 
Thus, the study conducted a cross-analysis of lawyers’ answers to this question and other 
key questions covered in the survey to see if any specific factors were correlated to Israeli 
lawyers’ willingness to apply for a judicial appointment.   
 
The analysis found that lawyers’ tendency to consider a judicial career was not correlated 
to any of the following background characteristics of those lawyers who took part in the 
study: the type of academic institution lawyers attended; their religion or level of religious 
observance; place of residence or district of work; income level; gender and position 
regarding whether something should be done about judicial diversity in Israel.  However, 
a series of other factors were strongly correlated to whether lawyers would consider a 
judicial career. In summary, lawyers that were most likely to consider a judicial career 
are those who are younger, less experienced, have worked in the public sector, identify 
with the state of Israel, are generally satisfied with the legal profession, the courts and the 
professional level of judges, and think they have good chances of being appointed.  
Age and years of experience in the profession:  
There was a statistically significant correlation between lawyers’ age group and their 
desire for a judicial career. Specifically, lawyers in the age group 35-44 were more likely 
to consider a judicial career (42% of this age group said yes) than older lawyers (55% of 
55-64 years would not consider a judicial career). This makes sense, given that the latter 
are closer to retirement. In addition, almost half of the lawyers with 15 years of 
professional experience or more did not consider a judicial career (although they thought 
                                                 
913 Respondent 1062110 
914 Respondent 1060660:"I would like to promote justice, and represent the ‘other side’ of the 
population". 
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they had good chances to be appointed, as seen earlier), while lawyers with less than 5 
years practice constituted 41% of all lawyers who considered a judicial career favourably 
and were less likely than others to answer no to this question915. 
Jewish ethnicity: 
 Surprisingly, there were no apparent differences between Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews, 
except that Ashkenazi lawyers were more likely to say they would not consider a judicial 
career, and lawyers of mixed background tended to say “maybe” more than other intra-
Jewish groups. 
Previous experiences of discrimination:  
There is some suggestion from studies in other jurisdictions that lack of diversity in the 
judiciary as well as previous experiences of discrimination in courts may deter women 
and ethnic minority lawyers from applying to join the judiciary916. However, the results 
of the Lawyer Survey do not support this.  The only correlation between discrimination 
and considering a judicial career was found amongst lawyers who said they had been 
discriminated in their workplace because of their religion, with 45% of them saying they 
would consider a judicial career. It was shown earlier that several experiences of 
discrimination were highly associated with lawyers’ assessment of their success if applied 
to become judges; however, this effect was not significant in relation with the possibility 
of a judicial career917, and in any case the number of lawyers in the survey who reported 
discrimination was small. 
Identification with the state:  
Almost 90% of lawyers who said they would consider a judicial career also strongly 
identified with the state of Israel and its institutions. Similarly, the lower the identification 
with the state, the weaker the desire to join one of its key institutions - the judiciary (e.g. 
there was no lawyer who said they did not identify at all with Israel who also said they 
would or might consider joining the judiciary). However, it is important not to draw too 
much significance from this as almost (80%) of lawyers in the survey said they largely 
identified with Israel. 
                                                 
915 Although for this experience level, the chances of being appointed are slim or non-existent.   
916 Sullivan (n119). 
917 The relatively small sample of lawyers who reported discrimination in this survey may also affect the 
results. 
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Satisfaction with courts and judges: 
There was a highly significant correlation between what lawyers think of judges and the 
courts system, and whether they would want to become judges themselves. 
Unsurprisingly, the higher their satisfaction was with the efficiency of courts and the 
professionalism of judiciary, the greater their willingness to join the judiciary. For 
example, 56% of lawyers who were satisfied with the courts' efficiency said they would 
consider a judicial career, whereas only 25% of lawyers who were not satisfied with the 
efficiency courts would consider joining the judiciary.  
Trust in courts:  
Similar correlations were found in relation to lawyers’ level of trust in courts. Over 60% 
of lawyers who said they were interested in a judicial career also said they trusted the 
court system to a large extent; in contrast amongst lawyers who said they had little or no 
trust in the court system only 9% said they would consider a judicial career.  
Professional background: current work sector, previous experience and internship 
Three-quarters (74%) of lawyers who were working in the courts system at the time of 
the survey were positively considering a judicial career, as well as all lawyers from the 
State Advocacy (n=6). However, lawyers from the private sector were significantly less 
willing to consider a judicial career (only 25%).  
Lawyers’ past experience was also a strong predictor of their plans for a judicial career. 
Respondents who had worked in the public sector in the past were most likely to consider 
a judicial career, as were lawyers with past experience in the courts system: 47% of 
lawyers with experience in the public sector and 70% of lawyers with experience 
specifically in the court system would consider a judicial career, compared with only 22% 
of those who had no public sector experience. As discussed earlier, there is a general 
belief in Israel that the majority of Israeli judges are appointed from either the courts 
system or the State Attorney’s office, although the analysis in Chapter 6 found that in 
reality a third of judges had worked in the private sector, a third in the public sector and 
a third had mixed professional background. The Lawyer Survey did find, however, that 
lawyers were highly more motivated to consider a judicial career if they had worked in 
the public sector, and specifically in the courts system and State Advocacy. Almost half 
(66 of 136, 49%) of the lawyers who interned in the public sector were willing to consider 
a judicial career, compared with only 22% of lawyers who interned in the private sector. 
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Satisfaction with the legal profession:  
Similar to the correlation between satisfaction with the courts and desire in a judicial 
career, the higher the satisfaction with the legal profession, the more likely lawyers in the 
survey were to consider a judicial career. Over three-quarters (78%) of lawyers who said 
they would consider a future judicial career were highly satisfied or satisfied with the 
legal profession. However, 69% of lawyers who said they were not interested in a future 
judicial career were also satisfied with the legal profession918. 
Chances of actually being appointed:  
Unsurprisingly, there was a correlation between those lawyers who said they would 
consider a judicial career and those who thought their chances to be appointed were high 
or moderate; 45% of lawyers who said they would consider a judicial career thought their 
chance of being appointed if they applied was very high or high. 
Summary of main findings 
The Lawyer Survey represents the first multi-variable portrait of Israeli lawyers to date. 
Despite a low response rate, the respondents appeared fairly representative of what is 
known about the demographics of the legal profession in Israel.  As a result, the findings 
are helpful in contributing to our understanding of the state of diversity in the legal 
profession in Israel, and provide a glimpse into the pool for judicial appointments. 
Overall, the Lawyer Survey showed a legal profession in Israel that is more diverse than 
judges in some aspects, including academic background (e.g. type of institution attended, 
non-legal education), the proportion of non-Ashkenazi Jews as well as religious and 
Orthodox Jews. However, the balance between Jews and non-Jews is almost identical 
amongst lawyers and judges, while the proportion of female lawyers in the survey is lower 
than the proportion of women in the judiciary. 
The survey also provides some important and novel insights into lawyers' perceptions of 
diversity in the judiciary, as well as the legal profession and in legal education. There 
appears to be a consensus amongst Israeli lawyers that judicial diversity is important, 
particularly in the Israeli context, and that the Israeli judiciary does not reflect the 
diversity of Israeli society or the composition of the legal profession. Moreover, two-
thirds (66%) of the Israeli lawyers in the survey agree that action should be taken 
regarding judicial diversity in Israel, even though almost two-thirds (63%) think that 
                                                 
918 117 lawyers of 169 who would not consider a judicial career also strongly agreed or agreed they are 
generally satisfied with the profession. 
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judges’ professional conduct is the only relevant factor in assessing public trust in courts. 
Finally, while the majority of lawyers who took part in the survey plan to stay in the legal 
profession, only a minority (28%) said they would consider applying for a judicial post 
in the future. The next chapter explores similar issues with the other key group in the pool 
for judicial appointments, Israeli law students. 
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CHAPTER 8: UNDERSTANDING THE POOL FOR JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS: ISRAELI LAW STUDENTS  
The previous chapter presented the results of the Israeli Lawyers Survey, which   
generated the first in-depth profile of Israeli lawyers and revealed Israeli lawyers’ views 
on a wide range of issues including the courts and judiciary in Israel, judicial diversity 
and their possible intentions to pursue a judicial career. A similar large-scale online 
survey of Israeli law students (the “Law Student Survey”) was conducted between August 
and October 2014. The Student Survey had three main goals: (1) to provide for the first 
time in Israel a broad socio-demographic profile of Israeli law students based on 18 
background characteristics; (2) to examine students' attitudes to the judiciary and judicial 
diversity, and (3) to assess law students' interest in pursuing a judicial career in the future.  
This chapter presents the results of the Law Student Survey919. 
8.1 Part 1: Demographics of Israeli law students  
8.1.1 Note on demographics of the Israeli law students and the survey  
Unlike Israeli lawyers, for whom hardly any socio-demographic official data exist, 
several official bodies in Israel publish periodical reports about Israeli students in higher 
education (including law students). These reports, mainly by the CBS and the Council for 
Higher Education (CHE) predominantly focus on several population groups (e.g. Arabs, 
women, new immigrants) but do not consistently review law students in all institutions 
(i.e. colleges and universities) and normally do not refer to intra-Jewish ethnicity, 
religiosity and other variables that are important for this study. Moreover, publically 
available reports do not cover Israeli law students’ views on the Israeli judicial system, 
judicial diversity and a possible judicial career.  
When the Law Student Survey closed in October 2014, there were 2,163 stored responses 
on Opinio, of which 1,941 were usable920. The total number of law students in Israel in 
all academic institutions in the academic year 2013-14 (the year the survey was 
distributed in) was 15,959.  Thus the response rate in the Student Survey was 12%, much 
higher than for the Lawyer Survey (2%). If the response rate is calculated more accurately 
based on the number of law students in the academic institutions that took part in this 
                                                 
919 Full details of the statistical analyses carried out for this chapter are found in Appendix 9. 
920 Meaning for participants who entered some data in their survey and did not have completely empty 
data lines. The number of usable responses is based on the question with the highest number of answers 
(q.2). 
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survey, the response rate is even higher (almost 17%). Based on official data about law 
students in Israel, the respondents to the Law Student Survey are overall representative 
of the law student population in Israel at the time of the survey with a few exceptions, 
specifically in relation to Muslim Arabs. The participants came from a range of 
backgrounds (in terms of age, ethnicity, income, residence, etc.), and provided insights 
about how Israeli law students feel about a number of key issues related to judicial 
diversity in Israel. 
 
8.1.2 Current enrolment in a legal degree  
The distribution of survey respondents according to the degree they were currently 
pursuing was closely representative of all Israeli law students.  Most of the participants 
in the survey (88%) were LL.B. students, who make up 85% of the Israeli law student 
population. The law student participants in the survey were less representative in terms 
of the type of educational institution they were attending, with university law students 
comprising a larger proportion of the survey respondents (47%) than their representation 
in the Israeli law student population (28%). One reason that could account for this is that 
two of the larger colleges did not participate in the survey, meaning some 5,000 college 
law students were absent from the sample. Nevertheless, the sample still included almost 
1.5 times more college than university students, which is important given the claims in 
Israel that law colleges are responsible for Israel’s overpopulation of lawyers and the 
decline in the profession’s prestige921. 
                                                 
921 Katvan (n393) 302 
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Table 24: Law Student Survey respondents compared with Israeli law student 
population  
Degree/ institution type 
Student Survey Law students population922 
N % N % 
Degree type 
LLB students 1,671 88% 15,959923 85% 
LL.M. students 190 10% 2,536924 13% 
Doctoral students 41 2% 255 1.3% 
Total  1,902 100% 18,750 100% 
 
Institution type 
Academic colleges students 1,003 52% 13,531 72% 
University students 913 47% 5,219 28% 
Other/ n/a 13 1% - - 
Total 1,929 100% 18,750 100% 
 
As Figure 50 shows, Hebrew University had the largest number of students in the survey 
(n=332) and comprised 17% of all the survey participants. However, in terms of the total 
number of students in the faculty and the number of students that took the survey, Peres 
Academic Centre (the newest law school in Israel) had the largest participation rate: 31% 
of its law students took the survey (which comprised 5% of all the survey participants)925. 
 
 
 
                                                 
922 Data as of 2013-14: CHE ‘table 10- “Students in Institutions of Higher Education by Level of Degree, 
Type of Institution and Field of Study’. 
923 8.3% of all undergraduate students in Israel (260,000).  
924 4.6% of all graduate students in Israel 
925 Colleges that hardly had any graduates in the Lawyer Survey are found in rather large numbers in the 
Law Student Survey (e.g. Sapir, Peres, Carmel). This is understandable given that the Lawyer Survey 
participants are older and therefore graduated from older law faculties. 
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Figure 50. Law Student Survey respondents by academic institution 
 
  
8.1.3 Non-legal education and qualifications 
There are claims that legal education in Israel is one-dimensional because academic 
requirements in law schools have not obliged law students to gain a broader academic 
education, and therefore the worldviews and analytical abilities of lawyers and judges are 
limited. As the findings in Chapter 6 revealed, 17% of Israeli judges have a non-legal 
degree in addition to their legal degrees. While almost 45% of lawyers that took part in 
the Lawyer Survey had non-legal degrees (of various types), almost 36% of law students 
in the survey had or were studying for a non-legal degree926. Of this 18% had or were 
taking a combined program, and 21% had already obtained a non-legal degree. This is 
lower than the figures published recently which indicate that in several Israeli law schools 
more than 50% of students study for a non-legal degree in addition to their LL.B.927. 
Nevertheless, both the lawyers and law students in the two surveys for this research 
project have a more interdisciplinary academic background than Israeli judges.  The most 
                                                 
926 651 students responded yes to one question (i.e. they either had a combined program or had a separate 
program) and 28 said yes to both, adding up to 679 of all respondents. 
927 Bartela (n851); Roe’e (n822). 
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popular fields of non-legal studies for participants in the law Student Survey are shown 
in  and are similar to the findings in the Lawyer Survey.  
Figure 51. Law Student Survey participants with non-legal degrees by academic 
field 
 
In addition, 14% of law students in the survey had a non-legal qualification (n=255), 
which was also similar to the proportion found in the Lawyer Survey. The most popular 
certificates and qualifications were teaching and training, medical and health-related, 
accounting and bookkeeping and engineering.  
 
8.1.4 Gender 
The Law Student Survey respondents closely reflected the gender balance in Israeli law 
schools and in higher education in Israel in general. In 2012-13, women comprised the 
majority (57%) of all students in higher education in Israel928. The proportion of women 
studying law significantly increased in the last two decades, and in 2012-13 (the latest 
available figures) 49% of law undergraduate students were women929. Survey 
respondents closely reflected this with 53% female respondents. This is very similar to 
                                                 
928 CHE The Higher Education System in Israel 2014 (n512) 35. 
929 ibid, 37 
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the gender distribution amongst Israeli judges (52% women), but higher than participants 
in the Lawyers Survey (35% women). 
Table 25. Representation of women in Law Student Survey, Israeli law schools and 
Israeli higher education   
Type of degree 
 
Women in  
Law Student 
Survey 
Women in 
Israeli  
law student 
population930 
Women in Israeli 
higher education 
population931 
N % N % N % 
Undergraduate 
(LL.B.) 547 54% 7,944 50% 107,719 57% 
Graduate 
(LL.M.) 61 49% 1,352 53% 33,418 61% 
Postgraduate 
(PhD) 16 51% 131 51% 5,681 53% 
Overall 
distribution  634 53% 9,427 50% 148,383 57% 
 
8.1.5 Religion, Nationality and Ethnicity 
Unlike the findings for Israeli judges and lawyers in the previous chapters, respondents 
to the Law Student Survey were generally representative of the population in terms of 
religion, even though there was an under-representation of Muslims. Table 26 shows that 
the dominant religious/national group among law students was Jews, with religious 
minorities accounting for 12% of the law students in the survey. 
                                                 
930 CHE “Table 2: Students in High Education Institutions (Universities, Academic Colleges and Teacher 
Training Colleges) by degree and field, 1990-2013” (pers. Comm.) 
931 CHE 2014 report (n.512). 
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Table 26. Religious group representation in Student Survey, Israeli law schools, 
higher education and general population933 
 
Official figures show that Arabs are under-represented in higher education in general and 
specifically amongst law students in Israel934, and the findings of the Law Student Survey 
support the official position. The CHE reported in 2013 that only 12% of students in 
higher education institutions are Arabs935.  However, the previous findings in this study 
have shown important differences between the sub-groups within the Arab sector in 
Israel, and the need to differentiate between these sub-groups in the analysis. Christian 
students are generally well represented in law faculties (2.5% of the entire law student 
population), and in this survey they compromise 1.5% of participants. Law is considered 
a less popular field among Druze students (1%)936, and in this survey only 0.9% of 
participants defined themselves Druze. Only 6.2% of law students in Israel are Muslim, 
and in this survey 3% of students defined themselves as such. Thus, Muslims are the only 
Arab group that is substantially under-represented amongst participants of the Law 
Student Survey. 
                                                 
932 Based on data received from CHE referring to 2013-14 (pers.comm: email September 2014). 
933 N=1,169, missing 994. Although the survey questions about religion included additional options (e.g. 
Circassia, Samaritan) these are not included in the analysis due to the minimal number of responses. The 
official data displayed in this table were obtained from the following sources: CBS report “The Druze 
Population of Israel (2012-13)”; CBS report The Moslem Population in Israel – higher education data” 
(15.10.2013); CBS report “Christmas 2013 – Christians in Israel”; 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton65/st08_56.pdf; 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201511097; 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton65/st02_05x.pdf 
934 See Chapter 3 for more details. 
935 “Pluralism and Equal Opportunity In Higher Education: Expanding Access Of Arabs, Druze And 
Circassians To The Academia In Israel” http://che.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2013  
9365.4% of Druze students study law (compared to 8.9% of Jewish students see: 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/publications/desc_exp/druzim.pdf  
Religious/national 
category 
Law Student 
Survey 
Law student 
population 
(LL.B.)932 
Higher 
education 
population 
General  
population 
N % N % N % % 
Jewish 1,030 88% n/a 92% 171,099 87% 75% 
Muslim 33 3% 1,019 6% 26,800 8.7% 17% 
Druze 11 1% 166 1% 3,800 1.2% 1.5% 
No religious 
affiliation 
67 6% n/a n/a n/a n/a 4% 
Christian 18 1.5% 450 3% 5,900 1.9% 2% 
Mixed/other 9 1% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
243 
 
Religion and type of academic institution 
It is often claimed that the academic colleges of law are more diverse than law faculties 
in universities in Israel937. In this survey the correlation between academic institution and 
self-defined religious group was significant, providing further evidence that colleges are 
more diverse than universities in that sense. For instance, as Figure 52 shows, Muslims, 
Druze and Christians were much more likely to be college not university students, while 
the majority of Jewish law students were university students. 
Figure 52. Law students in survey by religion and type of academic institution938 
 
Religion and gender 
As shown earlier, women account to almost 70% of all Arab students in Israel. However, 
in the Law Student Survey exactly half (26 of 52) of the participants who defined 
themselves as Arabs were women. Cross analysis of gender with religious group in the 
Law Student Survey participants reveals similar ratios (): 617 of 1,027 (53%) Jewish 
participants are women, and 71 of the 137 (52%) non-Jewish students are women. There 
were more Muslim and Druze men than women among the Law Student Survey 
respondents939, however 14 of 18 Christian Arab students are women (78%). This is 
                                                 
937 Elbashan in an interview to Shalmor (n.477); Ziv (n.76) 81 
938 In this figure responses in the “other” category for institution was removed as it was marginal, as was 
the Samaritan category for religion (n=1). 
939 Of the very few law students who defined themselves as Druze, only one was a woman. 
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substantially different from the findings on the judiciary (where 28% of non-Jews are 
women) and lawyers (where 17% of non-Jews are women)940.  
Figure 53. Law students in survey by gender and religious group (n=1,164) 
 
 
8.1.6 Jewish ethnicity 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are very partial official statistics about the representation 
of intra-Jewish ethnic groups in higher education in Israel. The official bodies that publish 
periodical reports tend to prioritize specific population groups (e.g. Arabs, Ethiopian 
Jews), so there are inconsistencies in what is known about the representation of all ethnic 
groups in higher education. The Law Student Survey contributes to a deeper 
understanding of the current Jewish ethnic makeup of Israeli law students. This survey 
considered Jewish ethnicity in two ways: (1) by self-definition and (2) by country of birth 
of the student and his/her father (similar to official definitions). 
By self-definition:  
Amongst Jewish law student participants in the survey the most prominent finding is that 
the distribution between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews was almost equal.  This contrasts 
with the Lawyers Survey where there were twice as many self-defined Ashkenazi lawyers 
than Sephardic lawyers, and in the judges’ analysis almost two thirds of judges were 
                                                 
940 The total number of Arabs in the Lawyer Survey was very small to begin with, but of 34 lawyers who 
identified themselves as affiliated with religious groups other than Jewish or none (i.e. Muslim, Druze, 
Christian, no religious affiliation, mixed/other), only 6 were women (17%). 
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Ashkenazi (64%). The proportion of students who describe themselves as “mixed” or 
“other” was very high, perhaps reflecting the growing rate of inter-ethnic marriages in 
Israel941. Especially noticeable is the low number of Ethiopian Jews in the survey (n=9, 
1%). However, this is only slightly lower than their representation in the general 
population (1.6%) and it is almost identical for 2013-14 figures for students studying for 
law degrees (1.1%)942. There is a relatively small proportion of students who define 
themselves as “former USSR”943; but as was found in the Lawyer Survey, the figures 
completely change when country of birth (rather than self-definition) is examined. 
Figure 54. Jewish-ethnicity (self-defined) of law students in survey (n=1,103) 
Interestingly, a substantial proportion of law students who did not identify themselves as 
Jewish in the survey question about religion did specify an intra-Jewish ethnic affiliation: 
60% of those who identified themselves as lacking religious affiliation or chose the option 
“Other” nevertheless chose specific categories of Jewish ethnicity944. It seems that many 
law students may not necessarily identify themselves as Jewish but still affiliate with 
specific Jewish ethnic groups. 
                                                 
941 As shown in Chapter 3, it is estimated that 20% of Jewish Israelis are of mixed Jewish-ethnic origin. 
942 In 2014-15, the proportion of Ethiopians amongst all Jewish students was 1.2%, compared with their 
share of the 20-29 age group amongst Jews (3.3%). However, the proportion of Ethiopians in higher 
education is constantly growing. CBS, "The Ethiopian Population in Higher Education in Israel, 1999/00-
2015/16" (28.11.2016) http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201611365 
943 In a country where there are some 1.2 million inhabitants from the former USSR, one would 
presumably expect to see larger numbers of self-defined “Russian Jews” in such a survey.  
944 Of the 67 law students who ticked “no religious affiliation”, 41 specified an ethnic group they relate to 
(of which 21 defined themselves as Ashkenazi). 
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By country of birth 
A total of 1,055 (88%) law students in the survey were born in Israel, meaning the 
majority of respondents are “Sabra” (a similar proportion to that of lawyers and judges). 
Over 85% of those born outside Israel have been living in Israel for more than 15 years. 
Almost 57% of law students stated that their father was also born in Israel, in which case 
the only way to affiliate them with an ethnic group (other than Sabra) would be to examine 
their ethnic self-definition. Table 27 compares law students’ self-definition of Jewish 
ethnicity and categorizations by country of birth.  This shows that only 16% of students 
are actually defined as Ashkenazi by their father’s country of birth, and only 19% are 
defined as Sephardic by their father’s country of birth. The difference derives mostly from 
the high rate of those whose father was born in Israel, but also could be related to 
preferences or desire to be affiliated with a specific group (other than Sabra). Relatively 
few law students (3.4%) defined themselves as former USSR Jews, but when country of 
birth is examined, their proportion increased to 7.7%. Perhaps despite their father’s 
country of birth, Jews from the former USSR prefer to affiliate with other ethnic groups 
(or none). Overall, in comparison to the Lawyer Survey and the Judges’ Study, the Law 
Student Survey had a larger proportion of Olim (Jewish immigrants)945. 
Table 27. Law students’ Jewish ethnicity: self-definition and country of birth 
Jewish ethnic category (Eda) By father’s  
country of birth 
By self-definition 
N % N % 
Ashkenazi 182 15.9% 382 34.6% 
Sephardic 218 19.0% 371 33.6% 
Israel (sabra) 651 56.7% n/a n/a 
Ethiopian 9 0.8% 9 0.8% 
Former USSR 88 7.7% 37 3.4% 
Irrelevant n/a n/a 103 9.3% 
Mixed n/a n/a 191 17.3% 
Other n/a n/a 10 0.9% 
Total 1,148 100% 1,103 100% 
 
                                                 
945 As mentioned previously, in September 2016 for the first time two female Ethiopian Jews were 
appointed to the Israeli judiciary. But at the time of this study, there were no Ethiopian judges and less 
than five judges originated from the USSR. 
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Some Israeli academics claim that law schools in colleges have a more diverse student 
body than law schools in universities.946  However, very little evidence exists to support 
these claims. The Law Student Survey adds important evidence to the debate about the 
composition of Israeli law colleges. A strong correlation was found between the type of 
academic institution law students attended and their self-defined intra-Jewish ethnic 
group (Figure 55). Although the overall proportion of self-defined Ashkenazi and 
Sephardic law students in the survey was almost identical (35% and 34% respectively), 
only 30% of Ashkenazi law students attended a college, compared with 63% of Sephardic 
law students. Law students who self-defined as mixed (n=189) or former USSR (n=36) 
also were more likely to be university students.  
Figure 55. Law student Jewish ethnicity (self-defined) and academic institution 
 
8.1.7 “Religiousness” 
Although almost half (46%) of all law students in the survey said they were “secular”, a 
large proportion (40%) said they practice their faith to some extent (if “religious” and 
“traditional” are combined). Compared with the general population, participants in the 
Law Student Survey are generally representative in terms of religious observance, with 
the one exception of an under-representation of Orthodox Jews. Data on Orthodox 
students in higher education in Israel are unclear.  According to the CHE, in 2014 there 
were 4,855 Orthodox Jewish students in budgeted academic institutions in Israel, the 
majority of whom study in unique academic facilities947; however, according to the CBS, 
                                                 
946 Shalmor (n.477); Katvan (n.393) 
947 CHE (n512) 56-57 
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in the same year there were 8,300 Orthodox undergraduate students948. Nevertheless, their 
overall proportion in higher education is 3%949, significantly lower than their estimated 
proportion in the population (11%). What is not clear, however, is how many Orthodox 
Jews study law. In this survey, 2% of students defined themselves as Orthodox950. 
Figure 56. Law Student Survey: self-definition of religious observance  
 
 
8.1.8 Age, military service, personal status and place of residence 
The single largest age group in the Law Student Survey was those 25-34 years of age 
(n=617, 52%), and overall 80% were 18-34 years old.  More than 80% of law students in 
the survey had served in the IDF951 (of which 93% are Jewish952). Similar to lawyers and 
judges, this is a much higher rate than the recruitment to the IDF in the general population. 
Only 9% of law students had not served at all (the majority of them non-Jewish). Law 
students who took part in the survey tended to reside in the central areas of Israel, however 
there are slightly more law students than lawyers from development towns and peripheral 
areas (south and north). 
                                                 
948 CBS "Higher Education in Israel - Selected Data for the New Academic Year 2015/16" (14.10.2015), 
p.6 
949 "The Higher Education System in Israel: Current Status and Future vision" a presentation by the 
chairman of the CHE (October 2015). 
950 Had Ono College taken part in this survey, the proportion of orthodox Jews would have been higher, 
as Ono College has the highest number of orthodox Jewish students. 
951 The figure for students includes 925 who answered yes and 20 who said they were part of the 
Academic Reserve scheme at the time of the survey.  
952 n=860. 
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8.1.9 Family ties with the profession and the judiciary 
A total of 371 students (21%) stated they had a family member in the legal field, of whom 
32 (8.5%) had a family member in the judiciary (this was 1.8% of all respondents). These 
figures are lower than the number of reported family ties between lawyers and the legal 
profession and/or the judiciary. There is no other data available on this issue for Israeli 
law students.  
8.1.10 Reasons for studying law 
The three most prevalent reasons law students in survey gave for choosing to study law 
are: intellectual interest, aptitude and ideology (Figure 57). These are identical to the 
reasons lawyers in the Lawyer Survey gave as reasons for choosing the legal profession. 
Figure 57. Law Student Survey: reasons for choosing to study Law (n=1,843)953 
 
 
8.1.11 Professional and employment intentions954 
Even though virtually all law students (99%) said they would sit the Israel Bar exams, 
fewer law students (87%) actually intend to work in the legal profession following that, 
and only 46% estimated they would be working as lawyers in five years’ time (Figure 58).  
Amongst the over 200 survey participants who estimated they would not work in the 
                                                 
953 Because students were allowed to tick more than one reason for choosing to study law, the number of 
responses is greater than the number of participants who answered this question (n=3,936), and the 
percentages add up to more than 100%. 
954 This part of the survey was obviously more relevant to lawyers, however law students were asked 
similar questions (with required adjustments) as some of them (graduate and postgraduate) have already 
qualified as lawyers or have worked in the profession in varying capacities (e.g. pre-internship). 
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profession in five years' time, a variety of reasons were given955, the most prevalent being: 
having another qualification or profession (26%); lack of desire or interest to work in the 
profession (20%); adverse work conditions (e.g. long hours) and the market being full of 
lawyers (12%). However, 26% of these students did not actually know why they would 
not want to practice in 5 years’ time (which is perhaps understandable given the early 
stage of their career). 
Figure 58. Law Student Survey: plans to work in law in 5 years (n=1,788) 
 
 
Internship:  The vast majority of law students in the survey (84%) intended to look for 
an internship in Israel after completing their studies. Of these: 36% said they would 
pursue an internship in the private sector, 30% in the public sector, 7% specifically in the 
court system and 22% were undecided.  This means there is an even split amongst law 
students between public (37% - public plus courts) and private sector (36%) internships. 
Amongst the 725 law students who mentioned they had already worked in the legal 
profession (during pre-internship, as paralegals, etc.956), 44% did so in the private sector, 
26% in the public sector and 27% in both. 
 
8.1.12 Experience of discrimination 
Law students in the survey provided over 1,000 reports of experiences of discrimination 
in the work place or studies. Students mentioned ethnicity, gender and age as the 
prominent grounds associated with experiences of discrimination, and as Table 28 shows, 
                                                 
955 The answers typed in the “please specify” textbox were coded into 6 categories including don’t know/ 
not applicable (n=203). 
956 This figure may include students who have already qualified and worked as lawyers, alongside 
students who have performed a pre-internship. 
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discrimination was generally more likely to occur in the work place than in academic 
institutions.  
Table 28. Law Student Survey: experiences of discrimination 
Grounds for discrimination Where N  % 
Nationality  Studies 87 7% 
Work place 59 5% 
Religion/level of religious observance Studies 79 7% 
Work place 77 7% 
Ethnicity/ “Eda” Studies 97 8% 
Work place 129 11% 
Gender Studies 75 6% 
Work place 150 13% 
Sexual orientation Studies 15 1% 
Work place 20 2% 
Disability (mental, physical etc.) Studies 20 2% 
Work place 15 1% 
Age Studies 59 5% 
Work place 128 11% 
Other957 Studies 27 2% 
Work place 33 3% 
 
  
                                                 
957  In the “other” category respondents mentioned various factors, but the most dominant ones were 
discrimination based on political affiliation (n=11) and place of residence or socio-demographic 
background (n=12). Additionally, 42 students used this category to state they had never been 
discriminated against. Furthermore, although 104 comments were inserted in the text-box, only 60 of 
them specified whether this happened in the work place or studies. Therefore, only those who specified 
where the discrimination occurred are recorded in the table. 
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8.2 Part 2: Law students’ experiences and attitudes 
Chapter 7 highlighted the value of investigating the attitudes of lawyers to the judiciary 
and judicial diversity, as they form the current pool for judicial appointments. Although 
law students are not in the immediate pool for judicial appointments, their views on those 
same topics are important in understanding how judicial diversity may develop in future 
in Israel.  These findings, along with the Lawyer Survey, explore issues have not 
previously been asked of law students in Israel. 
8.2.1 Identification with the state and with being Israeli  
Law students in the survey were asked to indicate the extent to which they (1) identify 
with the state and its institutions and (2) define themselves as Israeli. 
Figure 59. Law student identification with the state and being Israeli  
 
Almost all law students (88%) in the survey said they absolutely defined themselves as 
Israeli, and three-quarters (74%) said they identified with the state of Israel and its 
institutions. These are similar rates to those in the Lawyer Survey and higher than the 
general population when asked similar questions in opinion polls958. However, as with 
the Lawyer Survey, it is difficult to determine whether the security situation at the time 
of the survey may have affected these responses. Significant variations were found 
between members of different religious groups in the Law Student Survey, with Jews 
highly more likely to absolutely identify with the state and its institutions (95%), while 
non-Jews and law students without a religious affiliation were highly more likely to 
                                                 
958 Compare: IDI surveys found that 65% of the population felt part of Israel to a very high or high extent 
(72% of Jews and nearly 28% of Arabs, Hermann and others (n868).  
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identify to a small or some extent, or not at all. A similar significant correlation was found 
for religion and the extent to which law students define themselves Israeli959. 
8.2.2 Attitudes to diversity in law schools and the legal profession 
Legal profession: Exactly half of the students strongly agree or agree with the statement 
that the population of lawyers in Israel is diverse and reflects Israeli society. However, 
only 10% (144 of 1,311) of students agree that the population of senior lawyers in Israel 
(e.g. partners in firms) is diverse. When asked to indicate how representative specific 
population groups are in the legal profession, almost half of law students (48%) felt that 
new immigrants were under-represented in the legal profession. However, large 
proportions (45%) of law students also said they did not know how to estimate the extent 
of representation of non-Jewish groups. A majority (56%) estimated that women are 
adequately represented in the legal profession. 
Figure 60. Law student views on group representation in the legal profession 
 
  
                                                 
959 Jews were highly more likely to define themselves as Israeli compared with minority groups. 
Compare: 2007 survey that found that 34% of Israeli-Arabs feel part of the state of Israel and its problems 
(Israel Democracy Institute, "Arab Identity In A Jewish And Democratic State" (2008) 58 Parliament) 
(here). 
18%
23%
24%
39%
19%
22%
48%
59%
26%
26%
13%
49%
45%
49%
13%
8%
14%
9%
4%
8%
35%
6%
15%
37%
42%
44%
24%
19%
23%
36%
Women
Muslim Arabs
Christian Arabs
Druze
Religious Jews
Ashkenazi Jews
Sephardic Jews
New immigrants (‘Olim’)
Under-represented Adequately represented Over-represented Don't know
254 
 
Law schools: Almost two thirds (61%) of law students either strongly agreed or agreed 
with the statement “the population of law students in Israel (in colleges and universities 
alike) is diverse and reflects Israeli society”. However, only 19% thought that the 
population of outstanding law students in Israel is diverse. The proportion of law students 
who did not know how to assess the representation of specific population groups amongst 
law students was quite high (see Figure 61).  However those who did attempted to express 
their views were generally correct. In particular, students felt that new immigrants (55%) 
and Druze (46%) are under-represented in legal education. Ashkenazi Jews were the 
group most perceived as over-represented in legal education, and Ethiopian Jews were 
mentioned more than any other group under the “other” section as under-represented960.  
Most law students (79%) also believe that women are adequately represented in law 
schools. 
 
Figure 61. Law student views on group representation in the legal education 
 
                                                 
960 48 of 299 students who responded to the “other” category specified Ethiopian Jews as under-
represented.  
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8.2.3 Attitudes to judges and judicial decision-making 
So far as can be determined, the Law Student Survey is the first survey to ask Israeli law 
students about their views on a wide range of judicial matters, including the factors that 
influence judicial decision-making. A majority of law students felt that background 
characteristics of judges and parties are meaningful to judicial decision-making (69% and 
59% respectively), but at the same time 40% believed that “judges are professional, 
objective and neutral decision-makers” (Figure 62).  
Figure 62. Law student general attitudes to judges and judicial decision-making  
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8.2.4 The Israeli judiciary 
Law students were also asked a series of questions about the Israeli judiciary specifically 
(Figure 63).  Just over a third (37%) of law students feel that the Israeli judiciary is 
balanced and fair, while 32% feel the Israeli judiciary is politically oriented. The clearest 
result is that almost two thirds (63%) of law students do not feel the Israeli judiciary 
reflects Israeli society, while law students are less certain about the whether the Israeli 
judiciary reflects the legal profession.  
Figure 63. Law student views on the characteristics of the Israeli judiciary 
 
 
The link between the lack of diversity and the public perception of the fairness of courts 
has been highlighted in this thesis in relation to existing research as well as the findings 
of the Lawyer Survey. The Law Student Survey also found a significant correlation 
between students’ perception of the composition of the Israeli judiciary and their view on 
the statement “the judiciary is balanced and fair”. Students who thought the judiciary was 
reflective of the composition of the Israeli society, were highly more likely to think it was 
balanced and fair (61% of students who agreed the judiciary was reflective also thought 
it was balanced and fair). However, 45% of students who did not believe that the Israeli 
judiciary was reflective of society also thought it was not balanced and fair.  
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8.2.5  Trust in the courts system and other non-elected state institutions  
The importance of the public trust in courts and the general decrease in the trust Israeli 
courts in recent years has been highlighted earlier, and the Law Student Survey set out to 
explore trust in the courts and other state institutions amongst law students. There have 
so far not been any studies that looked into the level of trust in courts amongst law 
students, although the issue has been explored generally in public opinion polls. Law 
student level of trust in courts (87%) is significantly higher than public trust (58% in the 
most recent CBS survey961). But law student trust in courts is similar to that found in the 
Lawyer Survey (82%). 
Figure 64. Law student trust in non-elected state institutions962 
 
 
The correlation between the level of trust in courts and the extent to which law students 
define themselves as Israeli and identify with the state was statistically significant: the 
less law students defined themselves as Israeli and identified with the state, the less trust 
they had in courts. For example, while 83% of law students who trust the courts to a large 
extent also identify with Israel largely, 36% of law students who have no trust in the 
judiciary identify with Israel only to a little extent. However, there was no significant 
correlation between the trust in courts and students’ nationality or religion, although 
                                                 
961 CBS (n.80) 
962 The “don't knows” were removed as they were marginal and in some cases null. 
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Muslim law students tended more than other groups to trust the courts to some or little 
extent (22% of Muslims had little or no trust in courts, compared with 11% of Jews). 
8.2.6 Composition of the Israeli judiciary 
As seen above, most law students think that the Israeli judiciary reflects neither the 
composition of Israeli society, nor the lawyers’ population. When asked directly about 
the extent of diversity in the Israeli judiciary and senior judiciary (Figure 65), law students 
were very decisive saying that neither the general judiciary nor the senior judiciary are 
diverse and reflect Israeli society. 
Figure 65. Law student views on the extent of judicial diversity in Israel 
 
When asked to rate the representation of specific population groups in the judiciary, 
students identified new immigrants, Druze, Muslim and Christian Arabs and Sephardic 
Jews as underrepresented in the judiciary (see figure 66). This corresponds to what is 
known about the under-representation of Olim, Druze, Muslims and Sephardic Jews, but 
is not an accurate view of Christian representation in the Israeli judiciary (as discussed in 
Chapter 6). In addition, 43% of law students in the survey thought that women were 
under-represented in the judiciary, whereas women now actually comprise a majority of 
Israeli judges.  
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Figure 66. Law student beliefs about representation in the judiciary 
 
 
8.2.7 Justifications for judicial diversity 
The survey also explored law students’ views about the importance of judicial diversity.  
The results show that Israeli law students not only think the Israeli judiciary is not diverse 
(above), but also believe that it should be diverse.  As Figure 67 shows, 83% of law 
students agreed that diversity is an essential component in the legitimacy of courts, and 
70% of law students believed that the composition of the judiciary should reflect the 
society in which it operates963. Almost all law students in the survey (85%) feel it is 
important that a variety of sectors in Israeli society be represented in the judiciary. At the 
same time, 54% of students agreed that “judges’ professional conduct is the only relevant 
factor in assessing public’s trust in courts”, and almost half (49%) think that the judicial 
system will diversify over time.  This suggests that law students (like the lawyers in the 
Lawyer Survey) may not see diversity as contradictory to professionalism.
                                                 
963 This add together the numbers of students who agreed or strongly agreed with this statement (931 of 
1325, 70%). 
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Figure 67. Law student views on the importance of judicial diversity 
 
 
8.2.8 Should something be done about judicial diversity in Israel?  
The Law Student Survey (as did the Lawyer Survey) also explored law student views on 
what if anything should be done about judicial diversity in Israel.  Three quarters (76%) 
of law students felt that something should be done about judicial diversity in Israel 
(compared with 66% of lawyers). Of the 976 participants964 who identified what needs to 
be done to increase judicial diversity, law students strongly supported the inclusion of 
diversity as a consideration in the nominations procedure (65%), and were also supportive 
of having an open discussion about diversity (45%) and encouraging the Bar to be 
proactive about increasing diversity (53%).
                                                 
964 Respondents could tick more than one option in this question. Therefore, the total number of responses 
was 1,997. 
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Figure 68. Law student views on what should be done to promote judicial diversity 
(n=976) 
 
 
Amongst those law students who thought no action should be taken on diversity. Most 
thought that increasing diversity would harm the professionalism of judges (48%); that 
attempts to diversify the system would harm public confidence in the courts (49%) and 
that diversity would improve over time without intervention (44%). 
Figure 69. Law student views on why no action is needed on judicial diversity in 
Israel (n=302) 
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8.2.9 What might account for law students’ differing views on judicial diversity?  
The analysis considered whether any specific characteristics of law students were 
strongly correlated to particular views on judicial diversity. Overall, students from sectors 
and groups that are (or are considered) under-represented in the judiciary (e.g. Sephardic 
Jews, college students) are significantly more likely to think something should be done 
about judicial diversity than those students from groups that are over-represented in the 
judiciary (e.g. Ashkenazi). Also, the less law students identify with the state of Israel and 
trust its institutions, the more likely they are to support action for judicial diversity. 
Furthermore, law students who said they had been discriminated on the grounds of 
religion, nationality, gender and ethnicity were also more likely to support action for 
judicial diversity.  Law students' views on judicial diversity were not correlated with any 
of the following characteristics of survey participants: age group, income level, and 
religion/nationality. However, there was a particularly high percentage of a small number 
of Muslim respondents feeling that something should be done (29 of 30, 96.7%). 
Similarly, Christians and Druze students also supported action for diversity in higher rates 
than the overall trend (93% and 82% respectively). 
 
The following section reviews the background characteristics and attitudes of law 
students that were highly correlated with views on the need for action on judicial diversity 
in Israel. 
Law students’ background characteristics 
There were highly significant differences in law students’ views on whether or not 
something should be done about judicial diversity by their gender. Female law students 
were far more likely than male law students to feel that something should be done about 
judicial diversity (81% for females compared to 71% for males), despite women not being 
under-represented overall in the judiciary.
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Figure 70. Law student support for action on judicial diversity, by gender 
 
 
There were highly significant differences in views by law students’ self-defined Jewish 
ethnicity. This was mainly a consequence of stark differences between the views of 
Ashkenazi students (65% of whom felt something should be done) and Sephardic Jews 
(88% of whom felt something should be done). Thus, Ashkenazi Jews are highly less 
likely to think something should be done about diversity compared with law students of 
Sephardic origin. Law students from the former USSR had similarly low levels of support 
for action on diversity as Ashkenazi law students, despite their being members of a group 
that is under-represented in the judiciary (unlike Ashkenazi students). 
Figure 71. Law student views on action for judicial diversity and their Jewish 
ethnic group (n=1,066) 
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There were also highly significant differences in views according to the law students’ 
level of religious observance. As Figure 72 shows, this is predominantly a consequence 
of a low percentage of secular law students feeling something should be done and a far 
higher percentage of traditional (Massorti) law students feeling something should be done 
about judicial diversity. 
Figure 72. Law student views on action for judicial diversity and their level of 
religious observance (n=1,129) 
 
 
Finally, law students’ views about the need to do something to increase judicial diversity 
differed significantly by the type of academic institution they attended. A significantly 
higher percentage of college law students felt something should be done about judicial 
diversity (516 of 641, 80.5%) compared to university law students (457 of 632, 72.3%). 
This resembles the trend in the Lawyer Survey, in which lawyers who graduated from 
colleges were highly more likely to support action on diversity than university law 
graduates. 
 
Experience of discrimination 
There were differences in law student views on judicial diversity based on their personal 
experience of discrimination (see Figure 73 and Figure 74). In particular, respondents 
who reported being discriminated against during studies or at work based on religion, 
nationality, gender and particularly ethnicity were all significantly more likely to feel 
that something should be done about judicial diversity. 
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Figure 73. Law student views on action for judicial diversity and their experience 
of discrimination during studies 
 
 
Figure 74. Law student views on action for judicial diversity and their experience 
of discrimination at work 
 
 
In addition, and as the Lawyer Survey found, law students’ views on groups in Israel that 
are worthy of affirmative action was strongly related to their support for judicial 
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diversity. Thus, 91% of law students who believe Sephardic Jews are worthy of 
affirmative action, and 83% of those who believe that Arabs would benefit from such 
action, thought something should be done to increase judicial diversity in Israel.  
 
Attitudes to the state, courts and judiciary 
There was some evidence of a relationship between law students’ identification with the 
state and their views on judicial diversity. The percentage of law students who feel 
something should be done to improve judicial diversity fell as the proportion of law 
students who identified with the state increased. 
 
Trust in courts: There was a highly significant association between the degree to which 
law students trusted the court system and whether or not they felt something should be 
done about judicial diversity. As trust in courts decreased, the proportion of law students 
feeling that something should be done on judicial diversity increased; 70% (316 of 450) 
of law students who trusted the courts to a large extent felt something needed to be done 
to increase judicial diversity, but this rose to 94% (to 16 of 17) of those who did not trust 
courts at all (Figure 75). The common claims of those wishing to increase judicial 
diversity in Israel refer to the correlation between lack of diversity and decline in the 
public trust in the judiciary. While these claims have never been empirically investigated, 
the Lawyer and Student surveys provide evidence of a correlation between lawyer and 
law student trust in courts and their stand on action for judicial diversity. 
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Figure 75. Law student trust in courts and attitude to action on judicial diversity 
(n=1,162) 
 
Fairness of the Israeli judiciary: The extent to which the judicial system is perceived as 
fair by law students is strongly correlated to law student support for judicial diversity (a 
similar correlation was found amongst Israeli lawyers in the previous chapter). Almost 
all law students (90%) who said they do not feel the judiciary is balanced and fair support 
action for judicial diversity, compared with only 65% of law students who believe the 
judiciary is balanced and fair. Figure 76 shows the relationship between Israeli law 
students’ attitudes to the Israeli judiciary and the extent of their support in action to 
increase judicial diversity. 
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Figure 76. Relationship between student support for action on judicial diversity 
and attitudes towards Israeli judiciary 
 
 
The importance of judicial diversity: There was a highly significant association between 
law student views about the judicial decision-making process and their support for action 
to increase judicial diversity in Israel. For example, students who strongly view judges in 
the traditional perspective of "professional, objective and neutral decision-makers” were 
less likely to think something should be done about judicial diversity compared with law 
students who do not view judges as objective; 69% of the first group support action for 
judicial diversity compared with 83% of the second group. Similarly, there was a highly 
significant correlation between the view that judges are detached from daily life, and 
thinking that something should be done about judicial diversity. The more law students 
rejected the idea that “judges sit in an ivory tower and are detached from everyday life”, 
the less likely they were to say that something should be done about judicial diversity and 
vice versa965. Finally, law students were more likely to support action for judicial 
diversity in Israel the more they agreed with the view that judicial diversity was an 
                                                 
965 The strongest support for the view that something should be done about judicial diversity was found 
amongst law students that neither agreed nor disagreed that judges sit in an ivory tower – 82% said yes to 
action. 
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essential part of the judiciary’s legitimacy and the more they agreed that the judiciary 
should reflect the society in which it operates. 
 
Figure 77. Relationship between supporting action for judicial diversity and 
position regarding diversity and decision-making 
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8.3 Israeli law student likelihood of pursing a judicial career 
The Law Student Survey (like the Lawyer Survey) also specifically explored the career 
plans of Israeli law students, especially the possibility of a judicial career, and the 
motivations and barriers that may influence Israeli law students’ future decisions to apply 
for judicial office. Mapping the intentions of Israeli law students in relation to their future 
career in the judiciary is the first time this subject has been systematically explored with 
Israeli law students. 
 
8.3.1 Interest in a judicial career 
Only a small proportion of law students are currently not interested at all in a future 
judicial career: 20% said no when asked if they would consider applying for a judicial 
position in future.  Three-quarters (76%) of law students who took part in the survey said 
they would consider applying (31%) or that they might consider applying (45%).  The 
proportion of law students that positively said they would considered applying for a 
judicial position is similar to the proportion of lawyers in the Lawyer Survey who said 
they would consider applying (28% said yes, 34% said maybe).  
Figure 78. Law student intentions to apply for a judicial post in future (n=1,798) 
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8.3.2 Reasons for not considering a judicial career 
Law students were invited to give reasons why they would not be willing to consider 
applying for a judicial position in the future. The most prevalent reason (28%) was a 
general lack of interest in the judiciary.  Other more common reasons were a belief on the 
part of law students that they did not have the skills to be a judge (17%), that they prefer 
to focus on their current or other career (16%), the burden of judicial hours (11%) and the 
fear of the responsibility that goes with a judicial post (10%).  
Figure 79. Law student reasons for not considering a judicial career (n=276)966 
 
 
A relatively high proportion of law students (21%) said “Other”, and a more in-depth 
reading of the comments students provided reveals that there are students whose 
unwillingness to join the judiciary stems from feelings of distrust or alienation. Overall, 
10% of students excluded the possibility of a judicial career in the future based on distrust 
in the judiciary and lack of identification with it. Thus, one respondent said: “It is a 
corrupt system that has no legal boundaries or definitive moral standards. I would not 
want to partake of such a system” (this respondent defined himself as an Orthodox 
                                                 
966 Respondents were allowed to enter more than one reason, thus the percentages do not up to 100%. 
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Jew)967. Another participant, who defined himself as a male Sephardic Jew from a 
settlement, gave two reasons for not considering a judicial career: first, his sectorial 
affiliation968 and second, his lack of trust in the system969. Others said: “Israeli law does 
not reflect the moral ideology in which I was raised”970 or “Israel’s regime is illegitimate 
and undemocratic and therefore I would not want to partake in it as a judge”971.  Several 
students also expressed frustration and disappointment with the judicial nominations 
procedure. One of them said: “I believe that I will not be accepted [in the judiciary] and 
even if I am accepted, it would only be for lower courts without being promoted…. This 
is mainly because of my origin and my social and financial background”972. 
8.3.3 Reasons for considering a judicial career 
The most commonly stated reason by law students to consider a judicial appointment was 
the view of the judiciary as a tool for social change (44%, compared with only 27% 
lawyers). A quarter (24%) said the reason was their interest in the work of the judiciary, 
19% are attracted by the status and prestige of the judicial post, while 14% believed they 
had the aptitude to become good judges. Many participants (11%) mentioned they wanted 
to change the judicial system and improve it. 
 
                                                 
967 Respondent 1024541 in the Law Student Survey 
968 He did not mention what he meant by “sectorial affiliation” but it can be presumed he was referring to 
the fact that he was religious and/or settler. 
969 Respondent 1028491 in the Law Student Survey 
970 Respondent 1003884, ibid. 
971 Respondent 1005465, ibid. 
972 Respondent 1016108 ibid, a Jewish participant of Caucasus origin. He mentioned he was from a 
development town and that he had been discriminated against in light of his ethnic origin in the workplace 
and during his studies. 
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Figure 80. Law student reasons for considering a judicial career (n=822) 
 
 
Some law students from minority groups identified their sectorial affiliation as a reason 
for positively considering a judicial career. For example, a respondent that defined 
himself as an Orthodox-Jew stated: “Because I am part of a minority group, I think that 
if I am found professionally eligible [for judgeship] I will significantly contribute to the 
human and scholarly legal diversity in Israel”973. Another Orthodox-Jew said almost 
identical things stating he/she would apply because they belong to a sector that is “under-
represented in the court system”974.  Similarly, a participant who self-identified as an 
Ethiopian Jew said: “I know I can contribute a lot to the Israeli judiciary, and what is 
unique about me is that I come from a population group that is unfortunately 
[underrepresented], that is the Ethiopian community”975. A participant who self-defined 
as an Arab woman said:  
“As a woman in the Arab sector who aspires for social equality 
generally and for the Arab sector in particular, I see myself…capable 
of making a change…. I believe that the Arab voice should be heard 
without filters..”976.  
Another Arab participant made a similar comment:  
                                                 
973 Respondent 1006762 in the Law Student Survey 
974 Respondent 1011919. 
975Respondent 1009633.  
976 Respondent 1014050. 
44%
24%
19%
14%
12%
11%
11%
8%
3%
3%
Social change, ideology
Interest
Status and prestige
Aptitude, right skills for the job
Other
Delivery of justice
Desire to improve the judiciary
Desire to promote my sector/ sectorial interests
Sense of mission
Aspiration/dream to become a judge
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“I belong to the Arab minority in Israel and I believe that with this path 
I can contribute to… bringing both peoples closer. Also, this would be 
my contribution to the state in which I live [but] have not served or 
fought for”977.  
This respondent appears to sees the judiciary not just as a personal inspiration or a way 
to promote the representation of her sector, but also as a means of contributing to the state 
in lieu of military service. Some Sephardic Jews978, Muslims and students from 
development towns979 made similar remarks. This suggests that being part of a minority 
group may have implications for student’s plans for a judicial career: it could lead to 
feeling excluded from the system and not wanting to partake in it, but it could also 
encourage students towards aspiring for inclusion. 
8.3.4 Factors that may be associated desire for a judicial career 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, understanding what drives members of the pool 
for judicial appointments to consider a judicial career is important for any discussion 
about judicial diversity. Although students do not make-up the immediate pool for 
judicial candidates, they are the direct pool for lawyers who are the immediate pool from 
which judges in Israel are selected.  Their views about a possible judicial career are 
therefore important in understanding how judicial diversity might develop in the long 
term, and what factors may affect this. 
Personal characteristics 
The following factors and characteristics of law students who participated in the survey 
were not correlated with their interest in a judicial career: type or district of residence; 
intra-Jewish ethnicity; level of religious observance; stand on action for judicial diversity 
in Israel; gender; nationality or religious self-definition.  However, of the small number 
of Muslim law students (n=33), almost 50% would positively consider a judicial career; 
this is higher than all other ethnic groups (including Jews). 980 
Students’ age group was correlated to their willingness to consider a judicial career, with 
older students (45-54 years) more likely to reject the idea of a judicial career than younger 
                                                 
977 Respondent 1016902 
978 Respondent 1022031: “I think the judiciary should better reflect society… I am a woman of Sephardic 
origin, from Israel’s cultural periphery and therefore can add such diversity [to the judiciary]”. 
979 Respondent 1035278 in the Law Student Survey: “…I see that the Arab sector and Muslims in 
particular are not represented in the system, especially women, and I support gender equality in the field”. 
980 This connects to some of the earlier comments from Arab law students who indicated their nationality 
as a driver for considering a judicial career and is encouraging in light of the small proportion of Muslim 
judges today. 
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students (18-24 years). This is unsurprising, given that such older law students would 
have fewer opportunities than the youngest law students to consider applying for a judicial 
career. 
There was a significant relationship between the type of educational institution law 
students attended and their willingness to consider a judicial career, with more college 
law students willing to consider a judicial career than university law students, and fewer 
college law students being indecisive about their willingness to consider applying to the 
judiciary in future. This suggests that the current low levels college graduates in the 
judiciary will not deter current college law students from considering a judicial career in 
the future.  
There was also a strong correlation between law student plans for an internship and the 
likelihood that they would consider a judicial career. Law students who aspire to intern 
in the courts system or in the public sector more generally were highly more likely to 
consider a judicial career that those who wished to intern in the private sector. While 68% 
of students wishing to intern in the courts system also said they would consider a judicial 
career, only 27% of students planning to intern in the private sector would considered it. 
A similar trend was observed for lawyers (Chapter 7), and this suggests that intentions to 
apply for a judicial office may be shaped at a very early stage of a person’s legal career 
in Israel. 
There was a strong correlation between law students’ current income level and their 
willingness to consider a judicial career. Law students with income above or well above 
the average were twice as likely to say they were not interested in a future judicial career 
compared to law students whose income is well below the average (33% and 16% 
respectively). 
Experience and perception factors 
Previous experience of discrimination on the grounds of age and nationality in the 
workplace were found to relate (strongly) to law students’ plans for a judicial career.   
Law students who reported being discriminated against in this way were willing to 
consider applying for a judicial position in future: 50% who felt they had been 
discriminated against at work based on their nationality would consider a judicial career, 
and 44% of law students reporting discrimination on the grounds of age at work would 
consider applying for a judicial position. 
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There was also a correlation between the extent to which law students defined themselves 
as Israeli and their willingness to consider a future judicial career. The few law students 
who identified as Israeli to a small extent were highly more likely to say no to the question 
about applying for a judicial position in the future than law students who defined 
themselves as Israeli.  
There was a highly significant correlation between law students’ trust in the courts and 
their willingness to consider a judicial career. Law students who had high levels of trust 
in the courts were also highly likely to consider a judicial career in future (45% of students 
who would consider a judicial career trusted the courts largely), whereas students whose 
trust in courts was low were likely to say they would not consider a future judicial career.  
And not surprisingly, a high proportion (54%) of law students who strongly believe the 
judiciary is balanced and fair said they were willing to consider applying for a judicial 
post in the future (54%), while a third (34%) of law students who said they would not 
consider a future judicial career strongly disagree or disagree with the statement that the 
judiciary is balanced and fair. 
Summary of main findings 
The Law Student Survey along with Lawyer Survey (covered in Chapter 7) have helped 
to broaden the analysis of judicial diversity in Israel by shedding light on the makeup and 
attitudes of the two groups that comprise the current and future pool for judicial 
appointments in Israel. 
The survey found that vast majority of students believe the Israeli judiciary is not diverse, 
they feel that the judiciary should reflect the composition of Israeli society in which it 
operates, and they strongly support action to increase judicial diversity in Israel. Law 
students from minority groups (e.g. Arabs) and/or groups that are under-represented in 
the judiciary (e.g. Sephardic Jews, college students) were highly likely to support action 
to increase judicial diversity in Israel. 
While the vast majority of law students intend to qualify as lawyers and work in the legal 
profession, they were less certain about staying in the profession in the future and even 
less certain about whether they would consider applying for a judicial position in future. 
Several important factors appear to shape law students’ willingness to consider a judicial 
career in the future, such as their level of trust in courts, age, income, type of law school 
they attend, and career plans in the legal profession. Experiencing discrimination or being 
part of a group that is currently under-represented in the judiciary (e.g. college students) 
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did not appear to deter today’s Israeli law students from aspiring to have a judicial career. 
But willingness to consider a future in the judiciary does appear to depend on having trust 
in the court system and believing that the current judicial system is fair and balanced. 
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CHAPTER 9:  THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL DIVERSITY IN 
ISRAEL 
“We must acknowledge the cultural diversity of Israeli society, which 
consists of three major cultural groups: secular Jews, religious Jews and 
Arabs…[and] we must make the necessary normative conclusions 
stemming from Israel’s multi-culturalism…. The Supreme Court must 
understand that it can no longer function in a manner that makes large 
groups in society think it acts as an agent of one group only. The 
Supreme Court must understand that a situation in which … [a] group 
feels alienation and perhaps hostility towards the court is 
undesirable”981.   
This statement captures many of the issues that underlie this study982. While Mautner 
focuses only on the Israeli Supreme Court, his assertion about the changing nature of 
Israeli society and the adaptations required of that court is relevant to the entire Israeli 
court system and to any study of judicial diversity in Israel. 
In the past four decades, Israel has experienced far-reaching changes in its social 
demographics and in the relations between Israeli political institutions and the courts; 
amongst them are the judicialization of politics, the transformation of the courts system 
from a dispute-resolution mechanism to an influential political player, and deep socio-
cultural changes in society. Judicial diversity has become a critical policy issue in Israel 
embodying all these changes. Yet the exact nature of diversity in the Israeli judiciary has 
remained a mystery. In a state where the judiciary is increasingly involved in resolving 
political conflicts but is perceived as failing to reflect the diversity of Israeli society, it is 
all the more important that an accurate picture exists of the current state of judicial 
diversity in Israel and there is some reliable understanding of the composition of and 
attitudes amongst those who make up the pool for future judicial appointments (Israeli 
lawyers and law students). 
Over the years, numerous claims have been made about the lack of diversity in the Israeli 
judiciary, especially in the Supreme Court. Some claims focused on the socio-
demographic characteristics of judges, asserting that too many judges were Jewish, 
Ashkenazi and secular men. Others thought that the problem was the cultural and 
                                                 
981 Menachem Mautner, ‘The Supreme Court: Three Periods’ (2009) 10 Law and Business 585, 591-592. 
982 Mautner does not think that the composition of the court ought to be more diverse, rather he proposes 
alternative ways to make the court more accessible to various groups in society (e.g. to use more Jewish 
Law in its decisions or to change the state’s symbols to bring Arabs closer, etc.) ibid, 592 onwards. 
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ideological homogeneity of judges (that Israeli judges were too liberal and too activist). 
Additional criticisms focused on what was believed to be judges’ homogeneous academic 
background and professional experience, arguing that this scholarly and professional 
homogeneity was responsible for creating a gap between the courts and the public983. 
However, most of these claims about judicial diversity in the Israeli judiciary were 
concerned only with the Supreme Court, examined a very limited number of variables 
and did not use detailed and reliable empirical evidence to support or substantiate these 
claims. The consequence of this has been to leave the public and scholarly debate about 
judicial diversity in Israel without any solid foundations, and therefore to be limited in 
both scope and impact. Moreover, while much of the focus on judicial diversity in Israel 
has been on the representation of women and Arabs in the judiciary, almost all other 
issues relating to the composition of Israeli judiciary have remained unexamined. Perhaps 
the most prominent unexplored issue has been the intra-Jewish ethnicity of judges; this 
may be because of the difficulties associated with obtaining and interpreting information 
about Jewish ethnicity, or it may be because the legal system has traditionally ignored the 
issue of Jewish ethnicity984. 
This multi-faceted research project is the first to empirically investigate the state of 
judicial diversity in Israel amongst the current judiciary and amongst lawyers and law 
students who make up the pool of candidates for future judicial appointments. Prior to 
this research, the public debate about judicial diversity in Israel has relied primarily on 
anecdotal “evidence” and unsubstantiated impressions about the judiciary, the legal 
profession and law students - and hardly ever been based on robust data. The main goal 
of this research was to establish a sound empirical basis for understanding judicial 
diversity in Israel.  To do so it conducted 3 inter-related empirical studies: a detailed 
analyses of all the publically available data on all judges in the main courts in Israel, as 
well as two large-scale surveys of the background, attitudes and experiences of Israeli 
lawyers and law students. As well as producing some insights into the reality of judicial 
diversity in Israel today and its prospects for the future, the findings from these three 
                                                 
983 Heller, “The Solution to the Supreme Court Crisis” (n806). 
984 Yifat Bitton (‘Mizrahim and the Law: The ‘Missing’ As ‘Present’, n457) claims that Sephardic Jews 
have been invisible to Israeli law despite years of persistent and proven discrimination but were never 
recognised by law as such. This “dynamic of denial” created inherent difficulties in the battle of 
Sephardic Jews for equality. In an interview, Bitton claimed that the lack of data on Jewish ethnicity of 
judges is part of the overall disregard for the topic: “ the study of Sephardic Jews in law is the study of 
‘nothing’: there is no data, no statistics, no discrimination… it is about lack of transparency… when the 
topic is raised as a subject for research, it is barred for formalistic reasons [because] it is categorized as 
political and not legal”. Weiss (n337). 
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studies form a new evidence-based foundation for future policy discussions and research 
on judicial diversity in Israel. 
This chapter reviews some of the central findings of this research project and relates these 
findings to the wider debate about judicial diversity in Israel and elsewhere. It considers 
how these research findings speak to issues such as the public perception of judges and 
the court system, and whether common views about judicial diversity in Israel are more 
myth than reality. It also explores the wider question of whether a “liberal paradox” lies 
at the heart of the judicial diversity debate in Israel, and considers what implications the 
research findings may have for policy and future research on the judiciary in Israel. 
9.1 What the main research findings tell us about judicial diversity 
in Israel 
The purpose of this research was to address the key issues arising in the context of judicial 
diversity in Israel: what is the current composition of the Israeli judiciary in terms of the 
background characteristics of judges? To what extent does the judiciary represent Israeli 
society? Do Israeli law students and legal practitioners have the same demographic 
characteristics as judges? How do lawyers and law students in Israel perceive judicial 
diversity and the prospect of a judicial career?  While the findings have confirmed that 
some assumptions about the Israeli judiciary are true, the findings have also exposed the 
fact that many common and long-held views about who makes up the Israeli judiciary are 
myths. 
Religion, nationality and ethnicity 
The findings confirmed the widespread belief that Ashkenazi Jews are over-represented 
in the judiciary and Sephardic Jews are under-represented. This refutes the assertion of 
the Zamir Committee (based on general impression rather than factual examination) that 
there was no apparent problem with the representation of Sephardic Jews in the judiciary. 
This research also found that the populations of Jews that immigrated to Israel from the 
USSR and Ethiopia in the early 1990s have virtually no presence in the judiciary although 
they jointly amount to over 1.1 million people and 15% of the entire Israeli population985. 
                                                 
985 This has very recently changed with the appointment of two Ethiopian-Jewish women to Magistrates 
Courts (September 2016). 
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This finding supports a recent assertion by a member of the Judicial Nominations 
Committee that new immigrants are “excluded” from the judiciary986. 
The findings also reveal that while 25% of Israel’s population is not Jewish, only 8.3% 
of the Israeli judiciary are non-Jews. Furthermore, Muslim Arabs are significantly under-
represented in the judiciary compared with their representation in the Israeli population, 
in contrast to Christian Arabs that are represented in the judiciary in a higher proportion 
than their share of the population. However, the distinction between Arab judges based 
on their religion would benefit from having direct access to official data or to judges 
themselves; the current estimation heavily relies on external factors and cross-referencing 
of data, which cannot guarantee a perfectly accurate assessment.  Ultra-Orthodox Jews 
are, not surprisingly, not found in the judiciary, but the proportion of religious judges or 
judges with religious backgrounds seems larger than is commonly assumed. The current 
Supreme Court, specifically, has three religious justices, rendering the “one seat for a 
religious Jew” policy almost irrelevant.  The prestige effect was apparent amongst Arabs 
and Sephardic Jews in courts and judicial positions. Most Arab judges sit in Magistrate’s 
Courts, and their representation decreases the higher up the judiciary one goes. 
Gender 
Women form 52% of the current Israeli judiciary. But even though the majority of judges 
in Israel are women, they are not evenly represented across courts.  Arab and Sephardic 
women are significantly under-represented in the judiciary compared with men from the 
same ethnic groups.  The highest proportion of female judges is found in the lowest 
judicial division (Magistrate’s Courts), and the proportion of female judges decreases the 
higher up one goes in the judiciary hierarchy. Women are also found in larger proportion 
in junior positions, while men are the majority of Vice-Presidents and Presidents of 
courts. All of this confirms the existence of the prestige effect in the Israeli judiciary, 
despite the fact that there is a gender balance within the judiciary overall.  In addition, the 
high proportion of women in Juvenile and Family Courts indicates that the caring role 
effect exists in Israel.  Despite the steady increase in the number of women, ethnic 
minorities and under-represented sectors in the judiciary as a whole, the prestige effect is 
still evident in Israel. 
                                                 
986 Tzimuki (n782) 18. The data upon which MK Ilatov based his concerns was obtained from the Courts’ 
Management and analysed by the Knesset’s research centre. 
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Educational and professional background 
The research also examined the validity of common claims about the educational and 
professional backgrounds of judges.  It is widely believed in Israel that the judiciary is 
dominated by graduates of two universities, who have almost exclusively worked for the 
State’s Advocacy or the courts prior to being appointed as judges. The study’s findings 
partially refute these assumptions. While 90% of judges have in fact attended universities 
and only 10% are graduates of Israeli colleges, the latter figure seems to be growing987. 
But most judges have, as is widely believed, attended the Hebrew University and Tel-
Aviv University, with more than 65% of all judges gaining their LL.B. from these two 
institutions. Amongst Israeli Supreme Court Justices, all but one are graduates of these 
two universities, the other having studied abroad. However, two other faculties have 
generated almost a fifth of all judges (Bar-Ilan and Haifa universities). Clearly, the 
Hebrew University and Tel-Aviv University still dominate the judiciary, but there are 
signs of changes in that respect. 
In terms of professional background, a somewhat surprising proportion of judges spent 
their internship or legal practice years in the private sector (36% for internship, and 48% 
for practice), and almost a third of judges had a mixed professional experience in both the 
private and public sectors before joining the bench. Therefore, the findings of this 
research refute the common perception that Israeli judges are exclusively drawn from the 
public sector. 
Family ties 
The research also attempted to at least partially examine claims that the Israeli judicial 
selection process is nepotistic and relies on family (and other) ties rather than professional 
skills.  This was a belief also expressed by a substantial proportion of participants in the 
Lawyer and Law Student Surveys. However, this study found that only 4.5% of Israeli 
judges have known family ties to other judges (serving or retired) by marriage, ancestry 
or sibling relationships.  Nevertheless, this finding requires further investigation. Even 
though it was possible to obtain data on judges’ declared family ties, the judiciary’s 
webpage does not provide data about other relations between judges and senior members 
of the legal profession, in the public or private sectors or the Israeli Bar. Close friendships, 
business partnerships and professional acquaintances are not listed, but they are claimed 
                                                 
987 In the 2010 previous version of this study, only 3% of the sampled judges were college graduates. 
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to exert a strong influence on the judicial appointment and promotion process in Israel988. 
In order to determine whether there are fewer family ties now compared to the past, 
additional data on previous years needs to be obtained. A recent development raises hopes 
that further information on this issue may be forthcoming. Under the Freedom of 
Information Law, the press published an official list of people and parties with whom 
Israeli judges are prevented from discussing their cases989. 
9.2 A new picture of judicial diversity in Israel 
Israeli Judges Study 
The findings of the Israeli Judges Study (set out in Chapter 6) reveal a new, complex and 
multi-layered picture of diversity in the current Israeli judiciary. On the one hand, it can 
no longer be said that the judiciary is exclusively Jewish, male, Ashkenazi and consists 
of graduates of two universities following a career in the public service. Rather, there are 
more women, Arabs, Sephardic Jews, and college graduates in the judiciary than ever 
before, and the professional and educational background of Israeli judges today seems 
increasingly diverse. On the other hand, women are still more likely to serve in lower or 
less prestigious courts; they are seen less in senior positions and are highly concentrated 
in Family and Juvenile Courts. Muslim Arabs are significantly under-represented in the 
judiciary, as are Sephardic Jews. So while the judiciary in Israel is dynamic, it still does 
not reflect the composition of Israeli society nor do the impressive number of women 
judges in the Israeli judiciary result in substantial numbers of women in higher courts and 
senior positions. The Israeli judiciary is no longer homogenous, but it also does not appear 
as if diversity is structurally and systematically embedded in it yet. 
This study placed a specific focus on understanding the Jewish ethnic origin of Israeli 
judges, a matter that has been ignored for years by the judiciary but was actually one of 
the main reasons for claims about lack of diversity. The judicial system’s disregard of the 
ethnic issue is not unique. Unlike gender and nationality, which have been investigated 
before, Jewish ethnicity has for years been a denied matter, almost a non-issue990. The 
                                                 
988 See for example a review of the matter from 2005: Nurit Amitai, “The appeal is granted, and say hello 
to your folks” (16.6.2006) Walla! News http://news.walla.co.il/item/924884 ; Very recently a petition to 
the court forced the Ministry of Justice to publish a list of its workers that agreed to provide data on 
family ties with presiding judges: Ma’anit (n316). 
989 The aim is to ensure that cases and legal proceedings are assigned to judges who do not have any 
conflict of interest. Ido Baum, Efrat Neuman “The list that every lawyer must know” TheMarker 
(13.9.2016) http://www.themarker.com/law/1.3065986  
990 Several Israeli scholars believe that the conspiracy of silence around the issue of ethnic origin is the 
result of the desire of Israeli elites (e.g. academic, political and judicial) to maintain their status, and fear 
that the opening of the ethnic issue for discussion will spark protests. Blechman (n558). 
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CBS’s view on Jewish ethnicity is that it less relevant today, especially for the younger 
generation, and therefore the CBS hardly publishes reports relating to this issue. The 
Council for Higher Education in Israel (CHE) turned down requests from journalists and 
scholars trying to obtain information about the representation of Sephardic Jews in the 
academia991. The Head of the CHE’s Planning and Budgeting Committee, when asked 
recently about the gaps between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews in academia, said:  
“I have no data on this, and I do not think the system checks that…. 
This issue is blurred… I do not think that is the problem. We are 
focused on encouraging Arabs and women who are in the system and 
find it difficult to reach the higher levels”992.  
It is no surprise, therefore, that there are no official data on the proportion of Sephardic 
Jews in legal education, the legal profession and the judiciary. 
The issue of the under-representation of Sephardic Jews in the Israeli judiciary has been 
neglected, either because of an unwillingness to address an issue many would like to 
believe was no longer of concern in Israeli society, or because of the practical difficulties 
in assessing the ethnic origin of judges. A prominent example of this attitude is found in 
the Zamir Committee’s response to allegations about the under-representation of 
Sephardic Jews: 
“It seems that it would be inappropriate, and practically impossible, for 
the court administration to sort its judges by ethnic criteria, whether for 
statistical purposes or for other requirements. In the absence of such 
data, based on a general impression, it seems that in fact there is not a 
serious problem in the composition of judges in terms of [Jewish] 
ethnic origin”993. 
In other words, even though the Committee declared it did not have the required data on 
the ethnic composition of the judiciary, it could nevertheless rely on a “general 
impression” and conclude there was no problem with the representation of Sephardic 
Jews in the judiciary. This is problematic in two respects. First, the courts administration 
collects some data on judicial candidates’ ethnicity, country of birth and religion. While 
it is not clear whether information on Jewish judges’ country of origin (i.e. parents’ 
country of birth) is collected994, the Zamir Committee could have decided that such data 
                                                 
991 Amnon Levi “The True Face of the Ethnic Demon (n445); Blechman (n558) 
992 Rotem Shtarkmen, Lior Detal, ‘The Hebrew University Has 4 Billion Worth Of Assets” TheMarker 
(29.10.2016) http://www.themarker.com/markerweek/1.3105225 
993 Zamir Report (n336) para 29. 
994 Judicial applicants may not be asked to record this information when they apply; however during the 
assessment process applicants were asked by the psychologists of the judicial training course to provide 
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should be collected to allow for judges’ ethnicity to be examined995. Second, the 
Committee’s dismissal of problems with ethnic diversity in the judiciary solely based on 
a general impression and in the absence of reliable data, is concerning996. 
Measuring judges’ “Eda” was a major challenge in the Judges Study, and the results must 
be read with caution. However, it was the first attempt to systematically investigate the 
ethnic composition of the Israeli judiciary as a whole. Even though no thorough academic 
investigation of the representation of Sephardic Jews in the judiciary could be found, a 
journalistic report in 2007 found that only 10% of judges in District Courts and in the 
Supreme Court were Sephardic Jews997. The findings of this thesis, conducted 8 years 
later, found generally similar results albeit with some indication of progress in the 
representation of Sephardic Jews in the judiciary. Despite the difficulties in investigating 
Jewish ethnicity, it is hoped that the findings in this study will prompt the judiciary to 
rethink its attitude regarding the relevance and importance of this issue, and especially its 
resistance to the collection, analysis and publication of data on judges’ Jewish ethnic 
affiliation. 
Lawyer and Law Student Surveys  
Given the tremendous changes that have occurred in both legal education and the legal 
profession in Israel in the past two decades, both the Lawyer and Law Student Surveys 
provide a unique insight into the pool for future appointments to the Israeli judiciary. In 
the period 2000-2010, the number of lawyers in Israel doubled998, and in two decades the 
legal profession has grown more than five-fold, from over 10,000 lawyers in 1990 to over 
56,000 lawyers in 2016. Legal education has also experienced similar change: in the mid-
1990s there were only four law schools in Israel, whereas today there are 14 law schools.  
Given this dramatic transformation in the size and character of the legal profession, it is 
surprising that there have been so few studies of how these transformations have 
                                                 
information. Hen Ma’anit, “Naor Instructed: Do Not Ask Candidates about Their Ethnic Affiliation” 
Globes (9.06.2016) http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001131251. 
995 Pers.comm with the Knesset’s Research Unit (letter from the Unit to MK Yitzhak Cohen, dated 
30.6.2014, sent to the author by email on 16.12.2015), in which a Unit official confirmed that an analyses 
perform by the Unit were based on the information that judicial candidates provide about their country of 
birth, their religious affiliation, etc. However, as to country of origin, an official document by the Unit 
states that the courts management does not collect data on judges’ parents’ country of birth. 
996 For a journalistic article criticising this conduct see Weiss (n337). Weiss interviewed former Justice 
Zamir, who admitted that that Committee experienced difficulties examining the ethnic origin of Jewish 
judges (similar to the difficulties this thesis faced) and that “the bottom line was that I and the committee 
members did not feel there was any problem with the reflection of Sephardic Jews in the judiciary”. 
However, Weiss mentions there was no Sephardic Jewish member on the Committee. 
997 Ibid; Amnon Levi’s 2013 documentary (n445).  
998 Raz (n819).  
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influenced the composition of the legal profession. Moreover, there has not been any 
attempt (prior to this research) to examine how the changes in the legal profession and 
legal education might ultimately affect the composition of the judiciary in Israel. While 
the Lawyer and Law Student Surveys cannot provide unequivocal evidence of the 
demographics of Israeli lawyers and law students (given the limitations of the survey and 
its samples), the surveys do provide an insight into the characteristics of these two groups 
and their respective views of judges, courts and judicial diversity in Israel. This in turn 
provides some basis on which to assess whether changes in the judiciary’s profile are 
likely to happen in the future. 
Demographics of the pool for future judicial appointments 
The analysis of background characteristics of the Lawyer Survey participants is the first 
multi-variable portrait of Israeli lawyers to date. Overall, the Lawyer Survey population 
seems more diverse than judges. Many more lawyers (46%) gained their LL.B. in a 
college compared with judges (10%), and many more lawyers (45%) had a non-legal 
degree compared with judges (17%). In addition, the proportion of Sephardic Jews as 
well as religious and Orthodox Jews amongst lawyers appears to exceed that of the 
judiciary. The distribution to various religious groups (i.e. Jews and non-Jews) amongst 
lawyers in the study is almost identical to that of judges, although the proportion of 
women lawyers in the survey is lower than the proportion of women in the judiciary. That 
said, it is important to consider the possible effect of coverage and, moreover, low 
response rate issues, and the caution that needs to be exercised when interpreting the 
Lawyer Survey results and findings. Whilst the possible effects did not seem powerful in 
the views and attitudes part of the survey (e.g., there were no statistically significant 
differences between men and women lawyers’ views despite the gender imbalance of 
survey participants), they do affect the ability to confidently ascertain that the Lawyer 
Survey respondents represent the population of Israeli lawyers. As shown in chapter 7, 
Despite a low response rate, the Lawyer Survey appeared to reflect what is known about 
the demographics of lawyers in Israel, except the low proportion of women respondents; 
but because so little is known about Israeli lawyers today, more research and official data 
are required in order to further develop and strengthen the findings of this study. 
As with the Lawyer Survey, the Law Student Survey was the first attempt to 
comprehensively investigate this group in Israel in terms of perceptions and views about 
the legal profession and the judiciary. The relatively high number of participants, the 
participation of 12 out of the 14 law schools in Israel and the fact that both college and 
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university law students participated makes the findings of this survey unique in the Israeli 
context. The Law Student Survey revealed a picture of Israeli law students that is 
generally similar to that of Israeli lawyers, but in some aspects is more diverse. The 
majority of survey participants were college (not university) law students (52%); there 
was a higher proportion of non-Jews (12%) and Sephardic Jews (34%) than amongst the 
lawyers; and participants included relatively new immigrants from Ethiopia (1%) and the 
USSR (7.7% by father’s country of birth, 3.4% by self-definition).  
Table 29 compares the main findings of each of the three demographic studies in this 
research, covering judges, lawyers and law students. It highlights some of the key 
differences and similarities between the three major populations that are critical to an 
understanding of judicial diversity in Israel. It shows that other than legal education, 
extra-legal education and Jewish ethnicity, there is a remarkable consistency on all other 
variables between the judiciary, the legal profession and current law students in Israel. 
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Table 29. Key background characteristics of Israeli judges, lawyers and students 
(comparative look on the findings of this thesis) 
  
                                                 
999 This section only refers to employment as lawyers and not to internship. 
1000 For lawyers and law students this includes those who selected “religious” or “orthodox”, but note that 
there was a category of “traditional” that also suggests religious observance to an extent. 
1001 6% appear religious; 9% with religious background 
1002 For judges, the analysis was done based on external factors; the figures displayed here are a joint 
calculation of certain categories and less certain (e.g. Ashkenazi and “appears Ashkenazi”). For lawyers 
and law students this was based on self-definition. Analysis of ethnicity by parents and own country of 
birth was reviewed in chapters 7 and 8. 
1003 For lawyers and law students this category included “other” and “irrelevant”. For judges, it referred to 
Jewish judges whose ethnicity could not be determined. 
Variable Categories Israeli  
Judges 
Study 
Israeli 
Lawyer 
Survey 
Israeli  
Law Student 
Survey 
Legal education 
(in Israel) 
LL.B. in university 90% 46% 47% 
LL.B. in college 10% 52% 52% 
 
Extra legal 
education 
Non-legal academic 
degrees 17% 45% 36% 
 
Employment999 
Public 21% 18% 
n/a Private 48% 81% 
Both 31% n/a 
 
Family ties in 
the profession  
Reported ties to the 
judiciary 4.5% 3% 1.8% 
Reported ties to the 
profession n/a 31% 21% 
 
Gender  Women 52% 35% 53% 
 
Religion / 
nationality 
Jews 91.7% 91% 88% 
Non-Jews 8.3% 9% 12% 
 
Religiosity1000 Religious or Orthodox 
 
15%1001 
 
16% 16.1% 
 
Jewish 
ethnicity1002 
Ashkenazi 64.1% 44.5% 35% 
Sephardic 15.6% 22% 34% 
Mixed n/a 14.1% 17% 
Immigrants from 
former 
USSR/Ethiopia 
0% 3.1% 4% 
Unknown / other1003 20.3% 16.4% 10% 
289 
 
Attitudes to judicial diversity and the courts system 
The two other aims of the Lawyer and Student Surveys were to explore the attitudes of 
Israeli lawyers and law students to judicial diversity in Israel, and to examine motivations 
and barriers to considering a judicial career. As Figure 81 shows, Israeli lawyers and 
law students tend to feel that background characteristics of judges affect their decision-
making, but they also tend to agree that judges are objective, professional and neutral. 
This suggests that lawyers and law students may not see diversity as unconnected to 
professionalism (‘merit’).  
Figure 81. Lawyer and law student general views about judges and decision-
making 
 
27%
21%
46%
19%
16%
40%
Judges are detached form daily life
Background characteristics of judges have no
bearing on their decision-making
Judges are objective, professional and neutral
decision-makers
Survey participants who agree
Students Lawyers
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Figure 82 shows that Israeli law students were more likely than Israeli lawyers to agree 
that the judicial system in Israel is liberal, secular and has a clear political orientation.  
However, lawyers and law students had similar levels of scepticism about the extent to 
which the judiciary was balanced and fair, and had similar levels of trust in the courts 
system. Whilst existing polls and studies in Israel often ask the public about the image of 
the courts and its trustworthiness, this was the first time Israeli lawyers and law students 
have been asked specifically about these issues.  
Figure 82. Lawyer and law student views about the Israeli judiciary 
42%
34%
24%
46%
45%
39%
37%
32%
57%
59%
Trust the courts system to a large extent
Israeli judicial system is balanced and fair
Israeli judicial system has clear political
orientation
Israeli judicial system is secular
Israel judicial system is liberal
Survey participants who agree
Students Lawyers
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In terms of their views about the current state of diversity in the Israeli judiciary, the legal 
profession and legal education, both lawyers and law students agreed that legal education 
and the legal profession are diverse. But only a small minority of both lawyers and law 
students believe the judiciary is diverse (Figure 83).  
Figure 83. Lawyer and law student views about the current state of diversity in law 
 
When asked specifically about judicial diversity policies, very substantial majorities of 
both Israeli lawyers and law students in the surveys felt that diversity is an important 
component in the courts’ legitimacy; that the judiciary should represent a variety of 
sectors that make up Israeli society and that something should be done about judicial 
diversity in Israel.  Such a clear message from a representative sample of the current and 
future pool for judicial appointments in Israel should not be overlooked by decision-
makers, the judiciary or the Bar.  
16%
62%
60%
15%
50%
61%
The population of judges is diverse and
reflects Israeli society
the population of lawyers in Israel is
diverse and reflects Israeli society
The population of law students in Israel
is diverse and reflects Israeli society
Survey participants who agree
Law Students Lawyers
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Figure 84. Lawyer and law student views about judicial diversity in Israel 
 
Interest in becoming a judge 
Israeli lawyers and law students were also able for the first time to express their views 
about applying for a judicial position in the future and the reasons why they would either 
consider or not consider a judicial career. Their answers provide the first insights on 
judicial career plans for current and future members of the pool for judicial appointments 
in Israel.  A majority of both lawyers and law students said they would or might consider 
applying of a judicial post in future, which should be seen as beneficial to the judiciary. 
Figure 85. Lawyer and student intentions to apply to the judiciary  
 
28%
34% 33%
5%
31%
44%
20%
4%
Yes Maybe No Irrelevant
Would you consider applying for a judicial position in the 
future?
Lawyers Law Students
74%
76%
48%
66%
83%
85%
48%
76%
Diversity is an important component in 
courts’ legitimacy
Israeli judges should represent a variety of
sectors (women, Sephardic Jews, Arabs,
etc.)
The judiciary would become more diverse
over time
Should something be done about judicial
diversity in Israel?
Survey participants who agree
Students Lawyers
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While age (i.e. being too old to apply), unattractive wages and working conditions were 
the most common reasons for lawyers to not be interested in applying for a judicial post, 
law students’ reluctance was based mostly on a general lack of interest in a judicial post. 
A more in-depth analysis revealed a series of factors that were strongly correlated to 
considering a judicial career. In brief, lawyers who are younger, less experienced, have 
worked in the public sector, identify with the state of Israel, are generally satisfied with 
the legal profession, the courts and the professional level of judges, and think they have 
a good chance of being appointed were those most likely to consider a judicial career. 
Older law students who expected to stay in the legal profession, had high levels of trust 
in the courts, earned a below average salary and attended a college were more likely to 
consider a judicial career. 
Some of the statements of survey participants on this issue indicated a lack of confidence 
in the judicial selection and nomination system and the perception of it as biased and 
unfair:  
“I have no connections. The queue to get called for an interview is very 
long and it's only aimed at those who have connections and 
recommendations from judges”1004 
“Political considerations and nepotism heavily influence the selection 
of judges…. [We] should act to create mechanisms that can help 
promote judicial diversity”1005 
“It’s a setup”1006 
This may be an indication of the ‘domino effect’ in the lack of diversity at work in Israel; 
that is, the discrediting of the appointments process caused by a lack of judicial 
diversity1007.  
Moreover, lawyers who had applied for a judicial position in the past described concerns 
from their first-hand experience: 
“This is a nepotistic system that does not look only on skills but also 
and mainly on connections. I applied for a judicial position in the past 
and I saw the candidates who overcame me. They were not better than 
I was, but they had connections that I did not have”. 1008F1008 
                                                 
1004 Respondent 1060771 (Lawyer Survey) 
1005 Respondent 1028297 (Lawyer Survey) 
1006 Respondent 1060349 (Lawyer Survey) 
1007 Thomas (n5) 103 
1008 Respondent 1060422 (Lawyer Survey) 
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Clearly, there is an underlying interest in applying for a judicial position amongst most 
lawyers and law students, and the surveys revealed some of their motivations (desire to 
change the system, belief that they had the aptitude for it and ideological reasons). 
However, the judiciary and the Judicial Nominations Committee would benefit from 
considering the statements of lawyers and students in this study who view the nominations 
system as problematic and biased, even if they are based on stereotypes rather than facts. 
Those statements reflect a common, negative public perception of the judicial selection 
mechanism in Israel1009. But coming from Israeli lawyers and students who are familiar 
with the legal system and form part of the current and future pool for judicial 
appointments, they raise important concerns about the way the judicial selection process 
is perceived among potential eligible candidates for the judiciary. Despite the differences 
in sample sizes and response rates between the Lawyer and Student surveys, and 
specifically the concerns regarding response and coverage errors in the Lawyer Survey, 
the similarities between the demographics, trends and attitudes of Lawyer and Student 
respondents, suggest that the composition of the Lawyer survey participants may have 
not been heavily affected by the low response rate. 
9.3 How the findings fit within existing knowledge on judicial diversity 
The findings of this research enhance the understanding of the state of judicial diversity 
in Israel, and in some cases, they contribute to the knowledge of judicial diversity 
worldwide. In some cases, they reiterate the common justifications for greater judicial 
diversity, and they correlate with the existing literature about the positioning of women 
and ethnic minorities in the judiciary. Unique to the Israel judiciary are the findings 
regarding Jewish ethnicity (which have not been systematically examined before), and 
the findings regarding the attitudes and intentions of Israeli lawyers and law students. 
This study’s analysis of the current composition of the Israeli judiciary makes an 
important contribution to the knowledge of judicial diversity in Israel, mainly because it 
is the first thorough examination of the judiciary as a whole. However, the findings also 
have significance beyond Israel, as they reinforce the findings of a number of other studies 
conducted in other jurisdictions. Especially prominent are this study’s findings regarding 
the representation and progression of women and ethnic minorities in the various ranks 
of the judiciary, which provide further support for the “prestige theory” of judicial 
                                                 
1009 For the impression amongst members of the public, politicians and journalists that the judges 
appointed to the Supreme Court during the 1990s were selected from one group of friends, see Mautner, 
“Appointment of Judges in a multi-culturalist society” (n1) 426-7 (and references in footnote 5). 
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diversity: that women and ethnic minorities are most likely to attain judicial office in less 
prestigious courts. Regarding women, the prestige theory is borne out in Israel, but only 
to some extent. While women are over-represented in lower courts and under-represented 
in senior judicial positions, women have been able to attain some influential senior roles 
in the Israeli judiciary, including the President of the Supreme Court, and Presidents and 
Vice-Presidents of other courts. The prestige effect also seems to apply to Sephardic Jews 
in the judiciary, in line with the pattern seen for minorities in other judicial systems. The 
high concentration of women judges in family courts and juvenile courts in Israel also 
provides a further example of the “caring role effect” in the study of judicial diversity.  
 
The findings of this study also affirm some of the main theoretical premises of the existing 
literature on judicial diversity, and specifically the justifications for greater diversity. The 
survey findings on lawyer and law student attitudes lend weight to the democratic 
argument for judicial diversity, in which judicial diversity is “part of the delivery of 
justice that is increasingly vital for the courts’ legitimacy in a diverse society’1010. In 
addition to the fact that 60% of lawyers and 70% of law students in the surveys agreed 
that “the composition of the judiciary should reflect the society in which it operates”, 74% 
of lawyers and 83% of law students agreed that “diversity is an important component in 
the courts’ legitimacy”. In addition, lawyers and law students who agreed that diversity 
is an important component in the courts’ legitimacy were also highly more likely to think 
that something should be done about judicial diversity in Israel.  This provides some 
evidence that (amongst these two groups at least) diversity and legitimacy are seen as 
strongly linked. 
Furthermore, the survey results reinforce the perception of fairness argument that “…a 
diverse judiciary signals the public acknowledgement of historically excluded 
communities and sends an invaluable message of inclusion”1011. Lawyers who did not 
feel that the Israeli judiciary was “balanced and fair” were highly more likely to support 
action for judicial diversity (77% compared with 66% of all lawyers supporting action for 
diversity), and vice versa. Similarly, Israeli law students who do not view the judicial 
system as fair are significantly more likely to think that something should be done about 
judicial diversity.  
                                                 
1010 Thomas (n5) 6; Hale (n128) 1-2 (emphasis added). 
1011 Chen (n 132) 1116-1117.  
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Considering the possible effects of diversity (or its lack thereof), one of the most 
important findings of the surveys was the correlation between lawyers and law students’ 
level of trust in Israeli courts and their stand on judicial diversity. The public’s trust in 
state institutions (and the judiciary in particular) is vital in any democracy. Lack of trust 
might be reflected in a decline in political participation and a sense of belonging to the 
state on the part citizens, and it may undermine the government’s legitimacy1012. Judicial 
diversity has been found to promote public confidence in the courts. Israel has seen a 
steady decline in public confidence in its courts. The CBS 2015 Social Survey found that 
only 58% of the public trust the judicial system to any extent1013. Specifically, 60% of 
Jews and 50% of Arabs trust the courts. Amongst Jews, the rate of confidence in the 
justice system falls as the level of religiosity increases (e.g. only 22% of Orthodox Jews 
trust the courts). Moreover, Jews from the former USSR and from Ethiopia trust the 
judicial system in lower rates than the general Jewish public (53% and 43% accordingly). 
In other words, minority sectors, either ethnic or religious, as well as immigrants, tend to 
trust the judiciary less than the general public. These are also precisely some of the sectors 
that were found to be under-represented in the judiciary in this study1014. In addition, 29% 
of the population think that Israeli courts do not treat all citizens equally1015. Although it 
is hard to link the figures about the decline in public trust directly to the lack of judicial 
diversity, these figures reflect a worrying trend that is worthy of further investigation.  
Despite the inherent differences between the general public and the populations of legal 
practitioners and law students, the survey results found a link between judicial diversity 
and the level of trust in courts amongst these members of the pool for judicial 
appointments. Overall, lawyers and law students trust the courts in significantly higher 
proportions than the public: 82% of lawyers and 87% of students trust the courts to a large 
or some extent. And a highly significant correlation was found between the level of trust 
in courts and lawyers’ and law students’ standing on judicial diversity. For example, 
lawyers who thought the judiciary was diverse also trusted the courts to a large extent, 
while lawyers who strongly disagreed that the judiciary was diverse were highly more 
likely to trust the courts only to a small extent or not at all. In addition, the greater the 
                                                 
1012 Hadar (n94); Barak-Erez (n45) 123. 
1013 In comparison, 82% trust the IDF, 60% trust the State Comptroller, 53% trust the police. CBS 
“Selected Data from the 2015 Social Survey” (n80). 
1014 It would be interesting to see a comparison between various Jewish ethnic groups, but the CBS did 
not publish data on other groups. 
1015 CBS “Selected Data from the 2015 Social Survey: Public Opinion (of Aged 20 and Over) on the 
Police and Court Services in Israel” (19.9.2016) 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201619291  
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trust in courts, the less convinced lawyers and law students were that something should 
be done about judicial diversity in Israel. Conversely, as trust in courts decreased, the 
percentage of lawyers and law students feeling that something should be done about 
judicial diversity increased1016. These findings are important not just in the Israeli context, 
but can be regarded as reinforcing the existing literature about the possible effects of 
judicial diversity on trust in courts, this time in relation specifically to lawyer and law 
students. 
Interestingly, the decline in public trust in the courts has occurred parallel to an increase 
in judicial diversity of courts in recent years, as shown in this thesis. However, it might 
be that the public views on the judiciary, including its composition and diversity, are not 
necessarily derived from facts on the composition of courts, but rather rely on beliefs, 
opinions and sometimes myths. In other words, perhaps because no data on judicial 
diversity are available to the public, the courts are perceived as less diverse than they are 
in reality, and this perception might have an effect on the level of trust in courts. This 
study addressed lawyers and law students, not the general public, but may nevertheless 
suggest that it is important to publish and update the data about judicial diversity in Israel, 
in order to provide the public with solid data and thus perhaps increase the level of public 
trust. Additionally, the survey findings in this respect reinforce the need to conduct further 
studies to investigate the public views in Israel regarding judicial diversity, and how they 
possibly link with trust in the judiciary. 
9.4 Is there a liberal paradox at the heart of judicial diversity? 
The Israeli judicial system is heavily influenced by the doctrines of Anglo-American law; 
one of the most important of these is political liberalism1017. Israeli scholars who study 
the history of the Israeli legal system have focused on the evolution of liberalism in the 
courts1018. In the early years of the state, the liberal tradition of the Supreme Court was 
opposed to the general culture of Israel, which was collectivist and emphasized the state 
and not the individuals. However, from the 1980s judicial liberalism was not opposed to 
                                                 
1016 Only 70.2% of law students who trusted the courts “to a large extent” think that something should be 
done about judicial diversity, compared with 83.7% of those who trust courts “to a small extent”. 
1017 Mautner, ‘The Supreme Court- 3 periods’ (n981) 587. The Anglification that shaped Israel’s law 
embeds liberalism, says Mautner. 
1018 Zaltzberger and Oz-Zaltzberger (n44); Amal Jamal, “Liberal Zionism": Enlightened Jurisprudence 
and the Challenge of Multiculturalism in Israel” (2004) 4 State and Society 789-823; Sapir, “Between 
Liberalism and Multiculturalism” (n360) 311-340 
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the mainstream culture1019. During the 1980s and the 1990s, following major political 
changes in Israel, the liberal elite in Israel expressed strong concerns that the values of 
liberalism, humanism, enlightenment and modernism would be defeated by religiousness 
and theocracy. In the forefront of the struggle to hold off “anti-democratic” powers was 
the Supreme Court, which has become a pivotal arena for the political and cultural activity 
of liberals. The Court itself cooperated with this trend through its judicial activism, moral 
reasoning and positioning as a central political player in Israel1020. As a result the Supreme 
Court has become affiliated with the liberal, former-hegemonic sectors of Israel, and not 
with the new, “multi-culturalist” (or multi-layered) society that emerged following the 
political upheavals of 1977.  
However, despite its strong liberal ethos, the common view among the senior judiciary 
and legal scholars was that judicial diversity was not an issue worth dealing with. Part of 
the argument was that the judiciary should not be representative of society because it is 
not an elected body but rather a professional institution and its judges should only be 
assessed on the grounds of merit. Others argued that diversity would occur naturally over 
time and should not be actively embedded in the judicial nominations system, as this 
would jeopardize the independence of the judiciary. Another common view was that there 
was actually no problem with judicial diversity in Israel. The Zamir Committee reflected 
this view: 
“In many countries, the composition of the judiciary fails to reflect the 
composition of society, as it mainly relied on professional (rather than social) 
considerations. In Israel, it seems that the composition of judges reflects the 
Israeli society no less, and perhaps even more, than in many other countries. 
Still, the extent to which the Israeli judiciary is reflective of society should be 
improved”. 1021 
 
The Israeli case, in which liberals object to the idea of judicial diversity in an attempt to 
stop non-liberal groups from endangering the judiciary’s independence and liberal legacy, 
is not entirely unique. The rise of multiculturalism has posed several challenges to liberal 
thinkers. One of them was “how should liberal states treat non-liberal cultural 
groups?”1022 This has some relevance to liberal jurists in Israel when challenged about 
the lack of judicial diversity. The result was that the Israeli judiciary objected to the idea 
                                                 
1019 Mautner (n981); Jamal (ibid), however, claims that this liberalism was Zionist and excluded groups 
that did not promote the Zionist ethos. 
1020 Mautner (n.981). 
1021 Zamir report (n.336) para 29. 
1022 Mautner, ‘From "Honor" to "Dignity’ (n.180) 
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of proactively promoting judicial diversity. Thus, although it was argued that liberal 
decision-makers are more likely to appoint women and ethnic minorities to the judiciary 
because they are more aware of issues of fairness, equality and diversity1023, in Israel this 
was not the case. A paradoxical situation developed, in which the liberal idea of diversity 
became a concept the judiciary and the liberal elite rejected. 
 
However, this study’s findings regarding both the state of judicial diversity in Israel and 
the views of lawyers and law students on judicial diversity should be of interest to those 
concerned with the liberal tradition of the Israeli judiciary. Of course, the common 
justification for diversity (e.g. the democratic argument), and the unique circumstances 
and composition of Israeli society present strong arguments in favour of endorsement of 
judicial diversity as a liberal idea. However, the findings of this study provide additional 
solid support to “resolving” the liberal paradox, that is: to make judicial diversity an 
accepted concept not only amongst those who want to challenge the courts but also for 
those who support the courts and wish to strengthen their legitimacy and improve their 
public perception. For example, the findings of this research about the under-
representation of specific groups in the judiciary, as well as the prestige effect that 
influences the progression of women and ethnic minorities in the Israeli judiciary, suggest 
that claims of an under-representative judiciary are not just baseless allegations but rather 
the reality for Israeli courts today. Similarly, the consistent fall in public trust in the 
judiciary should concern all those who value the vital role played by the judiciary in 
Israeli democracy and public life. But they are even more concerning given this study’s 
findings on the correlation between the level of trust in courts and perceptions about 
diversity amongst members of the legal profession and legal education.  
Another finding from this research that adds an important aspect to the “liberal paradox” 
is the factors that were strongly linked with lawyers’ and law students’ position on action 
for judicial diversity. The survey did not look for participants’ political views; however, 
it did ask about ethnicity, religious observance and identification with the state. The cross-
analysis of these factors with lawyers’ and law students’ views on judicial diversity 
reveals that lawyers and law students of specific backgrounds (e.g. Sephardic or Arabs, 
religious and Orthodox and those who are less likely to identify with the state of Israel) 
are the strongest supporters of action to increase judicial diversity. This resembles the 
liberal paradox in the attitudes of politicians and policy-makers towards judicial diversity; 
                                                 
1023 Hurwitz and Lanier (n108). 
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as discussed earlier, it is mainly Knesset members with right wing and religious views 
that have been more active and vocal about the need to increase diversity in the judiciary. 
The findings of this thesis refute the claim that there is no problem with diversity in the 
Israeli judiciary. In addition, it clearly shows that the majority of lawyers and law students 
think the judiciary is not diverse enough and support actions for greater diversity in Israel. 
It has exposed some of the mistrust in the judicial selection procedure that exists not only 
in the public but also in the pool from which future judges in Israel will be selected. The 
reality of judicial diversity in Israel (revealed by this empirical study), as well as the firm 
and unequivocal stand of Israeli lawyers and law students on the importance of judicial 
diversity, should highlight the importance of judicial diversity and encourage Israeli 
liberals and the judicial system to acknowledge this issue. Other countries introduced 
policies to increase judicial diversity and there is no evidence to suggest that these policies 
or the growing diversity on the bench have harmed the liberal, professional or 
independent character of the judiciary. Similarly, given the findings of this study, it is 
suggested that those who wish to ensure a strong, independent and professional judiciary 
in Israel would realise that diversity is an inseparable part of these characteristics, and 
that a diverse bench is likely to contribute to strengthening the liberal ethos of the Israeli 
judiciary. 
9.5 Policy implications  
This section explores what policy implications may flow from the findings of this 
research. It deals with proposals for policy changes to the Judicial Nominations 
Committee and other bodies, and tries to balance the need to revise the judicial 
nomination procedure to increase diversity with the desire to maintain stability and 
agreement between the liberal and the conservative sides of the political and public 
spectrum.   
The findings of this research highlight the need to promote, deepen and widen the judicial 
diversity debate, and consider actions to increase judicial diversity. What should be done 
to increase judicial diversity successfully? Cases from other jurisdictions suggest that 
judicial diversity may be addressed by a combination of factors, namely political action, 
appointment criteria, nomination committees and professional associations (e.g. the Bar, 
the Law Society etc.)1024. Earlier chapters reviewed the factors that systematically affect 
                                                 
1024 The Judicial Diversity Taskforce in the UK is an example of such joint efforts to increase judicial 
diversity (for its latest report see: “Improving Judicial Diversity- Progress towards the Delivery Of the 
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judicial diversity, most notably the judicial selection procedure, the nature of the judicial 
profession, the courts system and the pool from which judicial candidates are drawn1025. 
This study’s new findings have implications for most of these factors and have relevance 
for the bodies that are able to promote judicial diversity in Israel, including the 
Nominations Committee, the judiciary, the Israeli Bar and the academic institutions that 
teach law in Israel.  
In Israel suggestions to set aside seats in the Supreme Court for judges from certain 
sectors (e.g., women, Arabs, Sephardic) have been repeatedly heard, yet the operation of 
a “designated seats” policy has remained vague, and the process of nominating judges has 
not been transparent for many years. The legal system has continuously opposed attempts 
to revise the selection procedure. The Zamir Committee dismissed the representativeness 
idea and claimed there was no evidence of under-representation of specific groups in the 
Israeli judiciary, apart from Arabs and new immigrants. This study has contributed a 
significant body of evidence and new knowledge to this diversity debate. In addition to 
the evidence regarding the reality of judicial diversity today, this study suggests several 
paths to increase judicial diversity and to improve the way judicial diversity is thought of 
and dealt with in Israel that would have the support of the legal profession and future 
lawyers. 
The study’s two surveys provide clear evidence of what Israeli lawyers and law students 
think should be done to increase judicial diversity in Israel. A majority of both Israeli 
lawyers and law students feel that diversity considerations should be a part of the judicial 
nominations process and that the Israeli Bar should play an active role in identifying 
eligible candidates for judicial office from under-represented groups. 
                                                 
‘Report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity 2010’ (Final Annual Report (2014) Produced by the 
Judicial Diversity Taskforce)” (June 2015). 
1025 In some cases, demographic influences will also systematically affect judicial diversity. Wald (n103). 
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Figure 86. Lawyer and student views on what should be done to increase judicial 
diversity in Israel 
 
How should diversity be considered or implemented in the nominations procedure? The 
experience of other jurisdictions shows that in order to successfully increase judicial 
diversity, a genuine commitment to this target must be made by all parties involved in the 
selection and appointment procedure. Moreover, one of the JAC’s statutory duties is “to 
have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for judicial 
selection”1026. Therefore in Israel it is necessary that the committee would publish a 
‘diversity statement’ that expresses its commitment to achieving greater judicial diversity, 
as well as its strategy to increase diversity1027. Such statement is important for two main 
reasons: it anchors the commitment of the entire committee (i.e. representatives of all 
branches of government and the bar) to promote diversity, and may allay fears of 
improper intervention or over-influence by some members of the committee. Second, in 
a conflicted and multi-cultural society like Israel, such statement is likely to send a strong 
message of inclusion that would be especially important to communities and sectors that 
are under-represented in the judiciary.  
In addition to a diversity statement, which has a clear declarative value, in order to 
increase the diversity on the bench de facto, some targets need to be set. The option of 
quotas, as seen in figure 86, was the least supported diversity policy by survey 
                                                 
1026 The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
1027 Compare: the JAC Diversity Strategy (https://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/diversity-strategy). 
26%
53%
56%
71%
34%
45%
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Set specific quotas for judges from under-
represented sectors
An openly public discussion should be
maintained to influence the nomination
procedure
The Israeli Bar should proactively locate
eligible candidates from under-represented
sectors
Judicial diversity should be considered in the
judicial nominations procedure
Students (N=976) Lawyers (N=269)
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participants. While quotas set very clear goals they do raise concerns and claims about 
inflexibility and possible threats to judicial selection on merit1028and in Israel they are 
likely to provoke strong opposition from the legal system, and perhaps to be misused by 
politicians. Scholars have shown that in order to promote minority representation in the 
judiciary, a certain ‘tipping point’ should be reached1029. It is hard to determine what 
qualifies as a tipping point, but the literature suggested a 10%-15% rate of minority 
representation in order to reach that ‘point’1030. However, while this may be a helpful 
target to ‘quantify’ the representation or progression of Arabs, Sephardic Jews and other 
minorities in the Israeli judiciary, what is the case for women judges who account for 
more than 52% of the judiciary? In light of this study’s findings and the operation of the 
prestige theory regarding women judges, It is clear the targets need to be set for specific 
courts and positions where women are under-represented, e.g. the supreme court, 
president of courts, etc.  
Judicial selection procedure 
Over the years, there have been numerous suggestions to revise the judicial nominations 
procedure. Some proposals were motivated by a concern over the judiciary’s dominance 
in the nomination process.  This prompted suggestions to add Knesset members to the 
Judicial Nominations Committee or to entrust the selection procedure exclusively to the 
Knesset1031; others suggested a Knesset hearing for every judicial candidate1032. But there 
has been strong opposition to any change in the method of judicial appointment for fear 
of damaging the independence and professionalism of the judiciary1033. The author of this 
thesis has suggested elsewhere that, in light of the tensions between the three branches 
regarding the judicial selection process, it may be better to leave the current structure of 
the committee in place1034 and instead to establish an advisory panel to support the 
committee. Such a panel would be responsible for studying and monitoring the state of 
diversity in the judiciary, the legal profession and legal education in Israel1035. Ideally, it 
                                                 
1028 Malleson, Kate. "Gender Quotas for the Judiciary in England and Wales." Ulrike Schultz; Gisela 
Shaw (comps.), Gender and Judging. Oxford/Portland: Hart Publishing (2013): 461-500, 484 
1029 McCall, Madhavi. "Structuring Gender's Impact: Judicial Voting Across Criminal Justice 
Cases." American Politics Research 36, no. 2 (2008): 264-296. 
1030 ibid 
1031 Aviad Bakshi, Changing The Method Of Judicial Selection In Israel (The Institute for Zionist 
Strategies 2011) 
1032 See chapter 2 on reform proposals. 
1033 Some of these bodies were reviewed earlier, e.g. Israel Democracy Institute. 
1034 That is, to allow for representation of the judicial system, the government, the Knesset and the Bar in 
the Committee 
1035 Levy Ariel (n.175) 
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would consist of representatives of the Bar, the judiciary, the Ministry of Justice and 
academics. It should aim for cooperation (rather than confrontation) between the branches 
and prefer a model in which reforms are promoted by consensus, transparency and mutual 
flow of information. An important element of any such change is that the discourse about 
judicial diversity be evidence-based, not impressionistic and anecdotal, and decisions 
should be substantiated by reliable data. 
In addition, based on this study’s findings, there are specific sectors and matters that the 
Nominations Committee and the proposed new advisory panel should focus on in order 
to target diversity effectively1036. For example, this study shows that a large 
representation of women in the judiciary does not guarantee their promotion to higher 
courts or to senior positions, nor does it necessarily result in the advancement of women 
from minority groups (e.g. Arab women) in the judiciary. Therefore, the focus of any 
policy in relation to women in the judiciary should be on the senior judiciary and higher 
courts, as well as the allocation of eligible female candidates from under-represented 
groups1037. A good example of a targeted approach to gender diversity in the judiciary 
would be to investigate the regression in the number of women as District Court 
Presidents from 2010 (68%) to 2015 (17%) and 2016 (0%). This may suggest that there 
is no explicit gender-equality policy that regulates the number of women in senior 
positions and they are rather subject to external factors such as retirement, promotion, etc. 
But only a detailed study would answer this and point to whether any policy change was 
needed. 
Two other groups, recent Jewish immigrants from the former USSR and Ethiopia, have 
been identified by a member of the Nominations Committee has as in need of policy 
action to address their under-representation in the judiciary1038. This study affirmed the 
true extent of their non-existence in the judiciary. The Committee could find ways to 
focus policy actions on this population, especially in light of the low rates of trust in the 
courts amongst these groups. Another sector in need of a diversity policy is Israeli Arabs. 
However, based on this study’s findings, to do that effectively, the Committee would need 
to focus specifically on Muslim and Druze applicants for judicial office, given that the 
                                                 
1036 Compare: Paterson and Paterson’s recommendations, in light of the experience from other 
jurisdictions that managed to “disable” the prestige effect for women and minorities by using political 
power and leadership (n.5) 63; Thomas, Understanding Judicial Diversity (n.105) for a summary of 
strategies that have been used successfully to increase judicial diversity in other jurisdictions.  
1037 The appointment of two female Ethiopian Jewish judges in September 2016 is an example of such 
step. 
1038 See previous comments on MK Ilatov. 
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majority of Arab judges in Israel today are Christian. The next round of appointments to 
the Supreme Court presents an opportunity to demonstrate awareness on this issue, as the 
only Arab (Christian) justice is expected to retire in 2017, and there is a valued and 
experienced Muslim candidate to fill his place1039. 
Finally, the study clearly demonstrates that an important matter for the Nominations 
Committee to take into account is the perception of the judicial selection procedure 
amongst current and future members of the pool for future judicial appointments. The 
conduct of the Committee in previous years (characterised by secrecy and a lack of 
transparency) has raised concerns about the process being biased, unfair and posing 
barriers for greater diversity. The views expressed by lawyers and students in this research 
provide important feedback to Israeli policy-makers involved in the judicial selection 
procedure and demonstrate the importance for the Committee to find ways to ensure that 
the process is perceived as legitimate and fair, and that it is not a barrier but rather an 
incentive for judicial diversity. Greater transparency would be an important step towards 
changing the image of the nominations procedure, and this could be assisted by the 
protocols and decisions of the Committee being published and made publicly accessible 
recently, as well as a clear declaration about diversity and its importance in the 
Committee’s work (which has not happened yet). 
Judicial system data 
A crucial, immediate need is for greater transparency of the data that the judiciary 
collects and publishes on judicial diversity. This is essential for transforming the judicial 
diversity debate into a fact-based debate not and anecdote-based debate. Obviously, this 
would require releasing data about judges and the judiciary. The inclusion of CVs on the 
judiciary’s webpage is noteworthy, and provides invaluable data about Israeli judges 
today, but it does not provide all the data that is essential for a comprehensive examination 
of judicial diversity in Israel. In addition, when certain information is found to be essential 
to studying diversity but is not systematically collected (e.g., Jewish ethnicity), this 
should provide the grounds for re-evaluating the scope and variety of diversity-related 
characteristics that the judiciary monitors. Finally, in light of the findings of this study, 
and based on the experience of other jurisdictions, it is recommended that the judiciary 
                                                 
1039Kahled Kaboub, a Muslim District Court judge, is reported to be the preferred candidate of the Bar 
(Tova Tzimuki, “The Next Supremes’ Yedioth Ahronoth (7.10.2016); Yasmin Gueta, “Judges in 
Jerusalem: Soon there will be four more’ TheMarker (21.10.2016) 
http://www.themarker.com/markerweek/1.3100022. 
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re-examine its policy of not cooperating with academic research and consider a new 
policy of research cooperation to investigate the state of judicial diversity and the factors 
that may be affecting it1040. 
The meetings and deliberations of the Nominations Committee, its subcommittees that 
examine judicial candidates, and the processes of evaluating candidates are all 
confidential1041. The recent publication regarding a secret committee that screens 
candidates for promotion in the judicial system adds to the criticism over lack of 
transparency. But in the past few years, the shroud of secrecy surrounding the judicial 
system and judges has begun to lift. Some Israeli scholars have started examining the 
external factors that may affect the judicial decision-making process, and journalists and 
members of the legal profession have forced the judiciary and the MoJ to reveal family 
and other ties between presiding judges and members of the profession. And with the 
establishment of the Ombudsmen for Judges, the decision has now been made to upload 
the Nominations Committee decisions and protocols to the public website1042. Yet, there 
is still much to be done to enhance transparency in this context. Firstly, the process of 
selecting and appointing judges should be as clear and transparent to the public (and to 
potential applicants) as possible. This includes the operation of all committees, sub-
committees and panels that are involved in shortlisting, interviewing, recommendation 
drafting and appointment of judges. While intra-organizational consultation processes are 
legitimate and essential, the operation of a secret advisory panel, detached from the 
official selection procedure and far from the public eye and the Nominations committee, 
harms the image of the judicial selection process and might deter potential applicants. 
Such mechanism must be known to the public (unlike, for example, the names of failed 
applicants which can remain confidential).  
Second, it is essential to make the process of applying for judicial positions at all levels 
accessible and ‘user-friendly’. Currently, the judiciary’s website only publishes tenders 
for positions of interns, legal assistants and other non-judicial positions. The section on 
                                                 
1040 This could potentially be done in collaboration with the Israeli Courts Research Division (established 
in 2010) that has published several reports and performs quantitative investigation of various topics, 
including the workload in Israeli courts, conviction and acquittal rates in Israel. 
(http://elyon1.court.gov.il/heb/Research%20Division/Research%20-%20Eng.htm). However, no research 
or reports have been published regarding the composition of the judiciary or any other matter relating to 
judicial diversity. 
1041 Klein and Koppel (n303) 19. 
1042 These protocols do not refer to the evaluation of judicial candidates, but rather provide the end 
decision regarding appointments and other matters discussed in the Committee's meeting (e.g. setting 
limitations to appointment of family members of sitting judges). 
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the website regarding the appointment of judges in Israel only details the eligibility 
criteria set by law for various judicial positions, and provides links to application 
forms1043. Therefore, it is recommended that a designated website of the Nominations 
Committee is established, which will contain a ‘diversity statement’ (as mentioned) and 
a commitment to an equal selection process, a clear explanation of the application process 
(including the sub-committee, the training course, etc.) and updated information about 
judicial vacancies at all levels. The JAC website serves as a good example, as it contains 
detailed information regarding current and forthcoming vacancies; it clearly sets the 
eligibility criteria, job requirements and working conditions; it provides a succinct 
explanation about the selection and appointment process, and, as mentioned, it declares 
its commitment to diversity. Studies in the US found that in order to ensure a diverse 
applicant pool, it is essential to welcome candidates to apply and ensure that judicial 
vacancies are widely advertised1044. These are definitely areas in which the current 
selection and appointment mechanism in Israel needs to improve, in order to attract 
quality candidates from diverse backgrounds. In addition, and for similar reasons, it is 
essential to publish data about judicial diversity, including data on judicial candidates, 
success rates in the judicial candidates' course, etc.1045. This is critical to understanding 
the state of judicial diversity in Israel, including the understanding of barriers and other 
challenges in the judicial selection process. Similarly, data that shows the progression and 
representation of certain sectors (e.g. Christian Arabs, women) might serve as an 
incentive for potential applicants. 
Of course, lack of updated data on diversity is not unique to the judiciary: the Bar, 
academic institutions and other official bodies either do not collect or do not publish 
information about diversity in Israel. The lack of publicly-available data about a range of 
judicial diversity-related variables should be addressed, as such data are key to any 
informed discussion about judicial diversity in Israel. 
                                                 
1043 https://www.gov.il/he/Departments/General/judges_nominations  
1044 Torres-Spelliscy, Ciara, Monique Chase, and Emma Greenman. "Improving Judicial Diversity." 
Brennan Centre for Justice (2010) 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Improving_Judicial_Diversity_2010.pdf . The 
authors suggested that appointment commissions should act like proactive recruiters or head-hunters, in 
order to attract diverse judicial applicants. 
1045 Compare: the JAC website publishes several reports and statistics about diversity, including statistics 
about judicial applicants, reports of the Judicial Diversity Taskforce, etc. 
(https://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/judicial-diversity-forum) 
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The Bar 
The Bar is deeply involved in the selection and appointment of almost all judges in Israel, 
including in specialised courts, labour courts as well as the main courts system. In 
addition, it is in charge of the qualification process of thousands of interns each year, and 
the on-going supervision of almost 60,000 Israeli lawyers. It is a pivotal link between 
legal education, the profession and the judiciary, and many of its members have frequent 
interfaces with judges. Its interest in judicial diversity should, therefore, be inherent. It 
was recently reported that the Bar prefers a Muslim candidate to the Supreme Court over 
a Christian candidate, because there are thousands of Muslim Bar members and nearly 2 
million Muslim citizens in Israel. It also elected the first ever Arab Bar representative to 
sit in the Judicial Nominations Committee. Perceptions like these suggest that the Bar is 
aware of the diversity consideration but does not necessarily apply it coherently.  
The Bar cooperated with this study to some extent by distributing the survey to its 
newsletter recipients, but was not willing to provide any data on its members’ 
demographics (and it is unclear whether such information is actually collected and 
analysed systematically). Given its central role in the appointment of judges and in 
qualifying and monitoring the next generation of potential judges, it is clear that any 
attempt to increase judicial diversity should include a rethinking within the Bar. One step 
could be for the Israeli Bar to adopt a “Judicial Diversity Initiative”, similar to that of the 
American Bar Association1046 or the English Law Society1047. Such an initiative would 
promote diversity in the Nominations Committee, as well as in the Bar (e.g. by identifying 
eligible applicants from minority groups and increasing awareness amongst lawyers). In 
addition, the Bar should take into account the views and perceptions of this study’s survey 
participants on the legal profession, legal education and the issue of judicial diversity. 
These findings should encourage the Bar to systematically collect, analyse and publish 
data regarding diversity amongst Bar members in Israel, and perhaps (like the Law 
Society in England) conduct internal surveys about diversity similar to the Lawyers 
Survey conducted here. As was prominent in the Lawyer Survey, the lack of existing data 
on the demographics of Israeli lawyers posed difficulties to assessing the possible effects 
of the low response rate, the coverage bias, etc., in this study. This highlights the 
importance of maintaining a publically available, regularly updated database about 
diversity in the legal profession in Israel. 
                                                 
1046 Thomas (n5) 79 
1047 http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/practice-management/Diversity-inclusion/ 
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Finally, the Bar could play a significant role in encouraging eligible lawyers to consider 
a judicial career and initiate activities to raise awareness about judicial diversity and the 
possibility of a judicial career, especially in under-represented sectors. 
Academic institutions 
Even though legal education in Israel has changed significantly in the past two decades 
with the opening of ten new law schools and a massive increase in the number of law 
students, it has been unclear how (or if) the increase in the number of law students 
diversified the population of law students (and future lawyers). Almost all law schools in 
Israel agreed to participate in this study by distributing the Law Student Survey to their 
students. However, none of the faculties provided data about the demographic 
composition of its student cohort, and it is unclear whether in fact such information exists. 
The CBS and the Council for Higher Education only provide data on a limited number of 
variables (e.g. gender, Arabs) and this is compound data covering all law schools. 
Therefore, the first recommendation to Israeli law schools would be to analyse and 
publish data about the diversity of their student cohorts on a yearly basis. This would 
enable researchers to understand whether a lack of diversity occurs already in legal 
education, or if the law student population is diverse but there are barriers that reduce 
diversity in the transition from legal education to the legal profession. Another important 
contribution of data regarding diversity would be to the debate on the “flooding” of the 
legal profession and the calls to reduce the number of law schools (especially to close 
colleges). An openly available database of law student populations would allow for an 
examination of the differences between the various institutions (e.g. based on location 
and state-funded compared with private colleges). If colleges are more diverse than 
universities (a trend that was found in this study regarding intra-Jewish ethnicity), this 
could serve as a strong argument against closing colleges1048. 
9.6 Future research 
The findings of the different studies in this thesis have highlighted several areas where 
further research into judicial diversity in Israel is needed:  
                                                 
1048 In response to the Bar’s attempt to reduce the number of lawyers by issuing stricter qualification 
exams, extending the length of the required internship, etc., some academics and activists claimed this 
was a professional guild’s effort to maintain its elitist character. In his television report, Shalmor (n477) 
interviews Prof. Yuval Elbashan, of Ono Academic College, who claimed that the recent decision of the 
MoJ to extend the internship duration to two years would prevent law students with disadvantaged 
backgrounds from entering the legal profession. 
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• consistent and publicly available database on judicial diversity in Israel;  
• expansion of the judicial diversity research to courts and judges that were not 
covered in this study (namely, military courts, religious courts and the 
Enforcement and Collection Authority); and 
• further examination of the “pool” for future judicial appointments. 
There are several caveats that stem from the exploratory nature of this research and the 
fact that it did not have an existing body of research or datasets to rely on. In order to 
explore the state of judicial diversity this study had to establish a database without access 
to official records or previous reports and of course with no direct access to judges. Thus, 
some of the findings, mainly regarding ethnicity and religiousness, are based on the 
interpretation of judges’ CVs and/or inferential examination of what judges included in 
their public profiles, external resources, etc. This raises concerns about the subjectivity 
of the analysis and the relatively high number of cases that could not be categorised with 
certainty regarding ethnicity and religion. The best methodology would be to obtain data 
directly from the judges or from the courts system records. This was not possible at the 
time of this study, but the first priority of future research would be to obtain the 
collaboration of the courts system, or to convince it to publish data regarding specific 
variables. Should the courts system be willing to cooperate with research, direct access to 
judges would enable both a systematic review of the courts system’s records on current 
and retired judges and the ability to obtain additional or missing data. 
Furthermore, the methods chapter explained the reasons why this research focused on the 
General Courts system and did not included the Specialised Courts, which differ from the 
main courts system in size, composition, appointment criteria and procedures, court 
procedures and jurisdiction (as well as the availability of data on its judges). However, 
understanding judicial diversity in Israel would be assisted by a more expansive definition 
of the judiciary that included these other courts in any future diversity analysis. This 
would also include the Enforcement and Collection Authority, which was not included in 
this study because it is separate from the courts system, consists only of registrars and 
maintains a different selection and appointment procedure1049. However, its registrars are 
part of the pool for candidates to judicial office in the General Courts system. Registrars’ 
CVs are published on the Authority’s website, so a study similar to this one could be 
                                                 
1049 Appendix 1 
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conducted with registrars, but any comparison between this authority and the general 
courts system would need to be done carefully given the differences between them. 
Another important group that cannot be currently investigated due to a lack of access to 
the judicial system’s records are applicants for judicial positions in Israel who have 
submitted information as part of their application process1050. Access to this population 
and to the records of their application would provide invaluable information as to the 
demographic and other characteristics of judicial applicants in Israel. Clearly, judicial 
applicants are the most immediate pool for judicial appointments, and this group’s 
characteristics and composition are a key factor directly affecting judicial diversity. Of 
course, examination of the records of judicial applicants would require anonymity and a 
strict privacy policy. It is unclear, however, how willing the judicial system would be to 
share such data given the secrecy surrounding the classification, examination and 
selection of judicial candidates. 
Another population that could potentially help to better understand judicial diversity in 
Israel is retired judges. At least in theory, this group of judges is not likely to be bound 
by the same restrictions that prohibit acting judges from answering academic survey 
questions. They are also likely to have views on the system in general and more 
specifically about diversity in the judiciary1051. However, a sampling frame that would 
list these judges, let alone ways of contacting them, was not available, and therefore, this 
approach problematic at present1052.  
Finally, future research could further assess the pool from which the future Israeli judges 
are likely to be appointed. The surveys in this study focused on law students and lawyers. 
This was done to enable a broad perspective of the pool, from the initial point (law 
students who are making their first steps in the legal arena) to the immediate pool 
consisting of qualified lawyers of varying experience levels. Moreover, another 
population to research would be legal interns in Israel. Interns are those who successfully 
completed their law degree and find a place for an internship, but have not taken the Bar 
exam and are therefore not qualified lawyers. This is an important group situated at a 
point of time in their career between students and lawyers. Exploring their demographics, 
                                                 
1050 Thomas, Appointment of Deputy District Judges (n.110) 21, explains how identifying who applies for 
judicial positions is the first key factor affecting diversity. 
1051 There are several examples of interviews, books and lectures by retired judges, for instance: Lahav, 
Chief Justice Simon Agranat (n.453); Lewitzky Your Honour- Aharon Barak (n.453);  
Yitzhak Olshen, Collection of Articles in Law (Schocken 1978) 
1052 The webpage has recently added a section for retired judges’ CVs, but it is still under construction.  
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career plans and perceptions would enrich our understanding of judicial diversity in Israel 
and possibly identify barriers that affect the transition from legal education to the legal 
profession. Currently, the most practical way to approach Israeli legal interns is through 
the Bar (which is responsible for registering and monitoring interns)1053.  
 
Judicial diversity has been an increasingly important policy-making issue in many 
western countries. Its importance stems from several factors, the leading being the 
growing power of the courts in public life (judicialization of politics) and correspondently 
the increased public interest in the composition of courts and judicial decision-making. 
The links between judicial diversity and the legitimacy of courts and perception of the 
courts as fair have also contributed to scholarly and public interest in diversity. 
Specifically in Israel, the interest in the background characteristics of judges and the 
extent to which the judiciary reflects the diversity of the Israeli society has grown 
substantially in the past two decades. The complex multicultural nature of Israeli society, 
the growing power of courts and especially the transformation of the Israeli Supreme 
Court into a key political player have all given rise to criticisms about the lack of diversity 
on the bench. However, the public debate has so far been dominated by anecdotal 
evidence and unsubstantiated beliefs about judicial diversity. The importance of this 
thesis is that it represents the first thorough empirical investigation of judicial diversity 
in Israel and covers three aspects: the judiciary (including all judges in the General Courts 
system), the legal profession and legal education in Israel. This thesis has demonstrated 
that much of what people have believed about judicial diversity in Israel has been based 
more on myth than reality. But it has also revealed how Israel highlights a particular 
dichotomy for those who feel that judicial diversity has an underlying liberal dimension. 
It found that Israeli lawyers and law students strongly support action for judicial diversity 
in Israel and believe the Israeli judiciary should reflect a variety of sectors in society but 
currently fails to do so. Thus, this thesis has strengthened the understanding of judicial 
diversity in Israel, highlighted the elements that policymakers in Israel need to focus on 
if they wish to increase judicial diversity and provided the database, knowledge and 
foundation for any future examination of judicial diversity in Israel. 
  
                                                 
1053 Using legal databases like Nevo is also feasible but it would need to be a complementary measure as 
it is unclear how many interns are registered on these databases and what is their daily exposure to them. 
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Appendix 1: Appointment structure for all judges in all courts in Israel 
Type of court Governing legislation Appointing 
official 
Selection/nomination body- composition 
All General Courts Basic Law: the 
Judicature (1984);  
 
The Courts Law 
[consolidated version] 
(1984) 
President of 
Israel 
Judicial Nominations Committee (9)  
1. Minister of Justice 
2. Supreme Court President (Chief Justice) 
3. 2 Supreme Court justices 
4. Another minister 
5. 2 Members of the Knesset (MK) 
6. 2 Bar representatives 
Labour Courts Labor Court Act, 1969 President of 
Israel 
Judicial Nominations Committee (9)  
1. Minister of Justice 
2. Supreme court president (Chief Justice) 
3. 2 Supreme Court justices 
4. Another minister1 
5. 2 Members of the Knesset 
6. 2 Bar representatives 
Military Courts2 Military Justice Law, 
1955 
President of 
Israel  
Military Judges Selection Committee 
1. Minister of Defence 
2. Minister of Justice 
3. Chief Justice 
4. Supreme Court justice 
                                                 
1 When appointing labour judges, the additional minister in the committee would be the Minister of Economy and Industry 
2 This only refers to military judges that are jurists, rather than military judges (side judges) that have no legal background and are appointed separately. 
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5. IDF Chief of Staff 
6. President of IDF Court of Appeal 
7. Judge of IDF court of appeal 
8. IDF Head of Personnel 
9. Bar Rep 
Religious 
Courts3 
Druze Courts  
(3 courts) 
The Druze Religious 
Courts Law, 1962 
President of 
Israel 
(9 members) 
1. Chairman of the Council 
2. Chair of the Appeal Court 
3. 2 khadi’Med’heb 
4. Minister of Justice 
5. Another minister4 
6. 2 Druze MK’s5 
7. Bar representative 
Muslim Courts 
(Sharia courts) 
(9 courts) 
The Qadi Law, 1961 (9 members) 
1. President of the Sharia Appeal Court 
2. Khadi 
3. Minister of Justice 
4. Another minister 
5. 3 MK’s (of which at least 2 Muslims) 
6. 2 Bar representatives (at least 1 Muslim) 
                                                 
3 In Israel, two parallel legal systems have jurisdiction over issues relating to family law: the religious courts (consisting of courts for all recognised religious communities in Israel) 
and the civil courts (including family courts). See: Family Courts Law 5797-1995. Religious courts have exclusive jurisdiction over matters of marriage and divorce of married 
couples of the same religious group, and family courts have jurisdiction on all other matters regarding family law. 
4 Alternatively, a Druze Vice Minister. 
5 The law stipulates alternatives in case there are no two Druze MK’s. 
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Christian 
(Ecclesiastical) 
Courts6 
Article 54 of the King's 
Order-in-Council7 
There is no legislative stipulation about appointment of Christian 
Court judges. De facto, the Churches appoint religious judges 
independently and there is no government committee involved in the 
selection process8. 
Rabbinical courts 
(13 courts)9 
Rabbinical Courts 
(Marriage and Divorce) 
Law, 5713 – 1953 
 
The Rabbinical Judges 
Act, 1955 
Rabbinical Judges Appointment Committee (11 members):  
1. the two Chief Rabbis in Israel,  
2. two Great Rabbinical Court judges ,  
3. two Ministers (including the Minister of Justice)  
4. two Knesset Members, 
5.  two Bar reps 
6. a female rabbinical pleader 
Enforcement and Collection 
Authority10 
Execution Law, 1967 Minister of 
Justice 
1. District Court judge (currently a retired judge)(President of 
Committee) 
2. Director of Enforcement and Collection Authority 
3. Supervisor of Registrars 
4. Public representative with legal background (currently: a 
retired judge) 
5. Bar representative 
                                                 
6 There are separate courts for each of the ten recognised Christian denominations (e.g. Greek-orthodox) Kayan- Feminist Organisation Ecclesiastical Courts in Israel: a Gender-
Responsive Analysis (2012). However, not all Christian communities are recognized for this purpose, e.g. Protestants. Shimon Shetreet, On Adjudication: Justice on Trial (Yediot 
Achronot, 2004) 121. 
7 The courts of the various Christian communities still operate under the King’s Order-in-Council and were not regulated in Knesset legislation, as were other courts for religious 
groups (Shetreet). 
8 As confirmed to the author by the Ministry of Justice’s Public Inquiries department. Pers.comm: email correspondence 9.11.2016. For the problems caused by the lack of regulation 
and state supervision over the Christian courts, see “Ecclesiastical Courts in Israel: a gender-responsive analysis” (n6) 3 
9 As of 2015, the rabbinical courts are no longer subject to the Ministry of Justice but are subordinated to the Ministry of Religious Services.  
10 Criteria for appointing registrars is “an Israeli citizen eligible to be appointed as a Magistrate’s Court judge”. 
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Appendix 2: English translation of survey questionnaire for 
Israeli lawyers 
Survey Questionnaire for Israeli Lawyers 
‘Diversity in the Israeli Judiciary and the Legal Profession’ 
Dear colleague, 
This survey is part of a study about diversity in the Israeli judiciary. The issue of judicial 
diversity is constantly on the public agenda, and claims about lack of representation of 
various groups in the Israeli judiciary are often heard. Yet there is little evidence about the 
diversity of the judiciary, and even less regarding diversity in the legal profession and legal 
education – the two crucial populations that form the potential pool for judicial appointments 
(at present and in the future).  
This questionnaire is designed to understand the demographics of law students and legal 
practitioners in Israel today; and to understand their views and perceptions about judicial 
diversity. By completing this survey, you would enhance our understanding of the ‘pool’ 
of legal professionals from which the future judges of Israel are likely to be selected.   
You would also be contributing to an important study that is the first of its kind in Israel.  
Your participation and cooperation are therefore highly important and very much 
appreciated.  
Most of the questions in this survey are multiple-choice questions. Please choose the option 
that is most suitable to your views, perceptions or circumstances. There are no ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ answers. Unless otherwise stated, you should tick only one of the options for each 
question. The survey is interactive in the sense that follow-up questions appear in accordance 
with answers to preceding questions, and therefore it is important not to skip questions and 
answer the entire survey if possible. 
Participation in this study is entirely anonymous, and any information you provide will 
remain anonymous and not be shared with other organisations.  
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study! 
 
 
* The author is a member of the Israeli Bar Association and a qualified solicitor of England 
and Wales. This study is part of a doctoral dissertation being undertaken at the UCL Judicial 
Institute, Faculty of Laws, University College London, and is supported by the UCL Faculty 
of Laws and several other organisations.  
 
*** 
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Questions Regarding Legal education And the Legal Profession 
Q1: Was your LL.B. obtained in Israel? 
o Yes 
o No 
o n/a 
 
Q2: [IF ‘NO’ TO Q0]  
If your LL.B. was gained in a country other than Israel, please specify the name of the 
country in which you gained it [SELECT FROM a DROP-DOWN LIST] [DIRECTED 
TO Q5] 
 
Q3: [IF ‘YES’ TO Q0] 
If your LL.B. was obtained in Israel, in what type of an academic institution was it?  
o University 
o Academic college 
o Other 
o n/a  
 
Q4: Please indicate the name of the academic institution in Israel from which you 
obtained your LL.B.: 
o IDC Herzliya 
o Ono academic college 
o Netanya academic college 
o College of Management 
o Sha’arei Mishpat college 
o Centre of law and business (Ramat Gan) 
o Peres academic centre 
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o Carmel academic centre 
o Zefat academic college 
o Sapir college 
o Haifa University 
o Bar-Ilan University 
o Tel Aviv university 
o Hebrew University 
o Other; please specify:______________ 
 
Q5: Did you study for your LL.B. in a combined program for laws and another non-
legal degree?  
o Yes [DIRECT TO Q6] 
o No  
 
Q6: If you studied in a combined program, what was the other degree you took in 
addition to your LL.B.?  
o Accounting 
o Business management / MBA 
o Economics 
o Education 
o International relations 
o Political science 
o Psychology 
o Social work 
o Other fields in Humanities 
o Other fields in Social sciences 
o Other (please specify): ______________ 
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Q7: Do you have an academic (non-legal) degree that was obtained independently of 
your legal studies? 
o Yes  
o No 
o No, but I am currently studying for a non-legal degree 
  
Q8: [IF ‘YES’ OR ‘NO, BUT’ TO Q0] 
If you have a non-legal degree or you are currently studying for one, please indicate in 
which field: 
o Accounting 
o Business management / MBA 
o Economics 
o Education 
o International relations 
o Political science 
o Psychology 
o Social work 
o Other fields in Humanities 
o Other fields in Social sciences 
o Other (please specify): ______________ 
 
Q9: Do you have an LL.M.? 
o Yes 
o No 
o No but I am currently studying for an LL.M. 
Q10: Do you have a PhD in Laws? 
o Yes 
o No 
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o No, but I am currently studying for a PhD in Laws 
Q11: Do you have any other non-legal professional certificate and/or qualification? 
(e.g. teaching certificate, accountant) 
o Yes; please specify _______________________________________ 
o No 
Q12: Are you qualified to practice law in any country other than Israel (e.g. admission 
to the NY Bar)? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
Q13: What was the duration of your internship? (This question refers to the duration 
of the compulsory internship period and not any pre-internship schemes, etc.) 
o One year 
o Two years 
o Other  
 
Q14: In which sector did you undertake your internship? 
o The private sector 
o The public sector 
o Both 
o n/a 
Q15: In which of the following offices/posts did you intern? 
o Private law firm 
o The courts system 
o State attorney 
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o IDF 
o Another public sector position 
o Other 
 
Q16: In what year were you admitted to the Israeli bar?  [SELECT FROM A DROP-
DOWN LIST] 
 
Q17: Are you currently working as a lawyer? 
o Yes 
o No [DIRECTED TO Q19] 
 
Q18: How many years have you been working in the legal profession for (in Israel 
and/or generally)? 
o Less than 5 years 
o Between 5 and 10 years 
o Between 10 and 15 years 
o More than 15 years 
o I am qualified but do not practise  
 
Q19: In which sector are you currently working as a lawyer? 
o Private sector 
o The court system 
o State attorney 
o IDF 
o NGO 
o Other branch of the public sector 
o Other; please specify: ________________ 
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Q20: Have you ever worked or are you currently working as a lawyer in the public 
sector? 
o Yes 
o No [DIRECTED TO Q22] 
 
Q21: Have you ever worked or are you currently working as a lawyer in the court 
system?  
o Yes 
o No 
 
Q22: Have you taught law in an academic institution in Israel (after being admitted to 
the Israeli Bar)? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
Q23: Are you self-employed or a salaried lawyer? 
o Self-employed 
o Employed 
o N/a 
 
Q24: In which legal position are you currently working? 
o Associate 
o Partner 
o Head of department 
o Senior partner 
o Co-founder 
o Legal assistant 
o Legal counsel/ in-house 
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o Self-employed 
o Other 
o n/a 
 
Q25: In which geographic area in Israel are you currently working? (Please note this 
refers to your work place and not residence district) 
o Haifa 
o North 
o South 
o Tel-Aviv area 
o Jerusalem area 
o Centre 
 
Q26: Have you ever worked as a lawyer outside Israel? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
Q27: How would you define your area(s) of professional specialism? (Tick all that 
apply) 
o Criminal law 
o Constitutional law 
o Administrative law 
o Family law 
o Labour law 
o Real estate (land law) 
o Tax law 
o Traffic law 
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o Litigation 
o Company law 
o Tort law 
o Banking law 
o Insurance law 
o N/a 
o Other; please specify: _________ 
 
Q28: Why did you choose to work in the legal profession? Please tick all that apply. 
o Expected income; 
o Social status and prestige;  
o Intellectual interest 
o Ideals and beliefs (e.g. law as an important tool for social change) 
o Followed Family members or other important figures who work in the profession 
o I thought I would have an aptitude in it 
o By chance 
o Other reason; please specify: __________________________________________ 
 
Q29: Does anyone in your immediate family (i.e. parent(s), sibling(s), spouse/partner) 
work in the legal field? 
o Yes 
o No [DIRECTED TO Q31] 
 
Q30: Are or were any of your family members judges in the Israeli judicial system? 
o Yes 
o No 
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Q31: Do you expect to be working in the legal profession in 5 years’ time? 
o Yes 
o Probably 
o No [DIRECTED TO Q32] 
 
Q32: If you do not expect to be working in the legal profession in 5 years’ time, please 
indicate why:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q33: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Don't 
know 
I am satisfied with the 
legal profession in 
general 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
I am satisfied with my 
wage and benefits  
o  o  o  o  o  o  
I am satisfied with my 
prospects of 
promotion 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
I consider the legal 
profession as my 
vocation 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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I am satisfied with the 
professional level of 
my colleagues 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
I am satisfied with the 
efficiency of the 
courts system 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
I am satisfied with the 
professional level of 
the judges I have met 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
Q34: Would you consider applying to a judicial position in Israel during your legal 
career or in the future? 
o Yes 
o No 
o Maybe 
o Irrelevant 
 
Q35: If you applied for a judicial position, what do you think would be your chances 
of success in being appointed? 
o Very high 
o High 
o Moderate 
o Low 
o Very low 
o Don’t know 
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Q36: If you would consider applying for a judicial position in the future, please 
indicate why: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Q37: If you do not intend to apply for a judicial position in the future, please indicate 
why: 
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Views and Perceptions Regarding Judicial Decision-Making, the Judiciary and Judges 
(In Israel and Generally) 
Q38: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Don't 
know 
Judges are professional, 
objective and neutral 
decision-makers 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The background 
characteristics of judges 
(e.g. age, gender, 
ethnicity, religion etc.) 
have no bearing on their 
decision-making. 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The background 
characteristics of the 
parties in a given case 
(e.g. age, gender, 
ethnicity, religion etc.) 
have no bearing on 
judicial decision-making. 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Judges sit in an ‘ivory 
tower’ and are detached 
from everyday life 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The Israeli legal system is 
characterized by a liberal 
approach 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The Israeli legal system is 
characterized by 
secularism 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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The Israeli legal system is 
characterized by a clear 
political orientation 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Israel's legal system is 
balanced and fair o  o  o  o  o  o  
The composition of the 
Israeli judiciary reflects 
the composition of the 
Israeli society 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The composition of the 
Israeli judiciary reflects 
the composition of the 
legal professionals in 
Israel 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q39: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Don't 
know 
Diversity in the judiciary 
is an important 
component in the 
legitimacy of courts 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The composition of the 
judiciary should reflect 
the composition of the 
society in which it 
operates. 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Judges’ professional 
conduct is the only 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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relevant factor to ensure 
public trust in courts. 
It is important that a 
variety of sectors of 
Israeli society (e.g. 
women, Sephardic Jews, 
Arabs etc.) are 
represented in the 
judiciary 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The judiciary will 
become increasingly 
diverse over time 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Q40: For each of the following groups, please indicate the extent to which you agree 
they are diverse and reflective of the Israeli society:  
 
Strongl
y agree 
Agre
e 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagre
e 
Disagre
e 
Strongl
y 
disagre
e 
Don'
t 
kno
w 
The 
population 
of law 
students in 
Israel (in 
universities 
and colleges 
alike) is 
diverse and 
reflective of 
the Israeli 
society 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The 
population 
of legal 
professional
s in Israel is 
diverse and 
reflective of 
the Israeli 
society 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The 
population 
of sitting 
judges in 
Israel is 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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diverse and 
reflective of 
the Israeli 
society 
The 
population 
of senior 
judges in 
Israel (e.g. 
presidents 
of courts, 
supreme 
court 
justices 
etc.) is 
diverse and 
reflective of 
the Israeli 
society 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The 
population 
of senior 
legal 
practitioner
s in Israel 
(e.g. 
partners in 
law firms, 
heads of 
departments 
in the State 
Attorney’s 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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office) is 
diverse and 
reflective of 
the Israeli 
society 
The 
population 
of 
outstanding 
law 
students in 
Israel (e.g. 
on the 
dean’s list) 
is diverse 
and 
reflective of 
the Israeli 
society 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Q41: For each of the following groups please indicate the extent to which you think 
they are represented amongst Israeli law students (e.g. to what extent are women 
represented amongst law students, etc.): 
 
 
Q42: For each of the following groups please indicate the extent to which you think 
they are represented amongst Israeli lawyers: (e.g. to what extent are women 
represented amongst Israeli lawyers, etc.) 
 Under-
represented 
among Israeli 
lawyers 
Over 
represented 
among Israeli 
lawyers 
Adequately 
represented 
among Israeli 
lawyers 
Don’t 
know 
Women o  o  o  o  
 Under-
represented 
among Israeli 
law students 
Over represented 
among Israeli 
law students 
Adequately 
represented 
among Israeli law 
students 
Don’t 
know 
Women 
o  o  o  o  
Muslim Arabs 
o  o  o  o  
Christian Arabs 
o  o  o  o  
Druze  
o  o  o  o  
Religious Jews 
o  o  o  o  
Ashkenazi Jews 
o  o  o  o  
Sephardic Jews 
o  o  o  o  
New immigrants 
(‘Olim’) o  o  o  o  
Other (please 
specify): 
_____________ 
o  o  o  o  
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Muslim Arabs o  o  o  o  
Christian Arabs o  o  o  o  
Druze  o  o  o  o  
Religious Jews o  o  o  o  
Ashkenazi Jews o  o  o  o  
Sephardic Jews o  o  o  o  
New immigrants 
(‘Olim’) 
o  o  o  o  
Other (please 
specify): 
_____________ 
o  o  o  o  
 
Q43: For each of the following groups please indicate the extent to which you think 
they are represented amongst Israeli judges (e.g. to what extent are women 
represented amongst Israeli judges, etc.) 
 Under-
represented 
among Israeli 
judges 
Over 
represented 
among Israeli 
judges 
Adequately 
represented 
among Israeli 
judges 
Don’t 
know 
Women 
o  o  o  o  
Muslim Arabs 
o  o  o  o  
Christian Arabs 
o  o  o  o  
Druze  
o  o  o  o  
Religious Jews 
o  o  o  o  
Ashkenazi Jews 
o  o  o  o  
Sephardic Jews 
o  o  o  o  
New immigrants 
(‘Olim’) o  o  o  o  
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Q44: Do you think anything should be done about judicial diversity in Israel? 
o Yes [DIRECTED TO Q45] 
o No [DIRECTED TO Q46] 
 
Q45: If you answered ‘yes’ to the previous question, what should be done, in your 
view, to address judicial diversity in Israel (tick all that is applicable)? 
o Judicial diversity should be considered in the judicial appointments process 
o Special quotas for judges from under-represented groups/backgrounds should be set.  
o The Israeli Bar Association should proactively locate eligible candidates for justiceship 
among lawyers and especially lawyers from minority groups. 
o There should be an open public discussion on the matter, which would influence the 
nominations procedure.  
o Other; please specify: ___________________  
 
Q46: If you answered ‘no’ to the previous question, please indicate why in your view 
nothing should be done regarding judicial diversity in Israel (tick all that is 
applicable): 
o Judicial diversity will improve over time and does not require any action or intervention 
o There is no problem with judicial diversity in Israel 
o Any attempt to ‘diversify’ the judiciary could undermine the legitimacy of the judicial 
system and public trust in judges.  
o Increasing judicial diversity might harm the professionalism of judges 
o Other; please specify: ______________________________________ 
  
Other (please 
specify): 
_____________ 
o  o  o  o  
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Questions Regarding Nationality, Society and Population Groups in Israel 
Q47: To what extent do you define yourself as Israeli? 
o Completely 
o To some extent 
o To a small extent 
o Not at all 
 
Q48: To what extent do you identify with the state of Israel and its institutions?    
o Completely 
o To some extent 
o To a little extent 
o Not at all 
Q49: To what extent do you trust the following institutions/bodies in Israel? 
 
To a large 
extent 
To some 
extent 
To a small 
extent 
Not at 
all 
Don’t 
know 
The court 
system  o  o  o  o  o  
The police 
o  o  o  o  o  
The state 
advocacy o  o  o  o  o  
The army (IDF) 
o  o  o  o  o  
The media 
o  o  o  o  o  
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Q50: Please rate on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 5 describes the most important component 
and 1 the least important) how important the following factors are in the way you 
define yourself (e.g. if gender is the most important component in your self-definition, 
it should be rated 5 etc.) 
 5 – most 
important 
4 3 2 
1 – least 
important 
My religion (e.g. ‘I am Jewish’, ‘I am 
Muslim’ etc.) o  o  o  o  o  
My nationality (e.g. ‘I’m Israeli’, ‘I am 
Arab’ etc.) o  o  o  o  o  
My ideological or political views (e.g. I am 
Zionist, I am a feminist) o  o  o  o  o  
My ethnicity (e.g., I am Ashkenazi; I am 
Bedouin etc.) o  o  o  o  o  
My gender 
o  o  o  o  o  
Other; please specify 
o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q51: Please indicate how influential you believe each factor is on one’s likelihood of 
success and integration in the Israel society: 
 
Very 
Influential 
Influential 
Not So 
Influential 
Not 
Influential At 
All 
Don’t 
Know 
Age 
o  o  o  o  o  
Gender 
o  o  o  o  o  
Ethnic origin 
o  o  o  o  o  
Nationality and 
religion o  o  o  o  o  
Place of residence 
(e.g. periphery) o  o  o  o  o  
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Personal 
connections, 
acquaintances  
o  o  o  o  o  
Appearance and 
looks o  o  o  o  o  
Education 
o  o  o  o  o  
Skills and abilities 
o  o  o  o  o  
Income and social 
status o  o  o  o  o  
Profession and 
qualifications o  o  o  o  o  
Luck/ fate 
o  o  o  o  o  
 
 
Q52: In your view, which of the following population groups (if any) is most worthy of 
affirmative action? 
o Women 
o Sephardic Jews 
o People with disabilities (physical, mental, etc.) 
o Arabs 
o New immigrants 
o Orthodox and religious Jews 
o LGBT 
o None of the groups 
o Other; please specify: ______ 
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Q53: Have you ever felt you have been discriminated against and/or treated 
differently, during your studies and/or your work, on grounds of the following 
characteristics? 
 
 
  
 During your 
studies 
In the 
workplace 
In 
court 
Nationality 
o  o  o  
Religion and/or religiosity 
o  o  o  
Ethnic origin and/or ‘Eda’ 
o  o  o  
Gender 
o  o  o  
Sexual orientation 
o  o  o  
Disability 
o  o  o  
Age  
o  o  o  
Other background characteristic; please 
specify: ____________ o  o  o  
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Background characteristics 
Q54: what is your Age group? 
o 18-24 
o 25-34 
o 35-44 
o 45-54 
o 55-64 
o Other; please specify: ________  
 
Q55: Gender 
o Female 
o Male 
o Other 
 
Q56: Country of birth 
o Israel 
o Other [DIRECT TO Q57] 
 
Q57: if you were not born in Israel, please specify your country of birth [SELECT 
FROM a DROP-DOWN LIST] 
 
Q58: If you were not born in Israel – how long have lived in Israel? 
o Less than a year 
o Between 1 and 5 years 
o 5-10 years 
o 10-15 years 
o More than 15 years 
o n/a 
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Q59: Please state your Father’s country of birth [SELECT FROM a DROP-DOWN LIST] 
 
Q60: Please state your Mother’s country of birth: [SELECT FROM a DROP-DOWN 
LIST] 
 
Q61: How do you define yourself? 
o Jewish 
o Muslim 
o Christian 
o Druze 
o Samaritan 
o Without religion affiliation 
o Mixed/other; please specify: ____________________ 
 
[IF TICKED ‘JEWISH’ OR ‘MIXED/OTHER’ OR ‘NO RELIGION’ IN Q61] 
Q62: how would you define your intra-Jewish ethnic origin (‘Eda’)? 
o Sephardic/ Mizrahi 
o Ashkenazi 
o Ethiopian 
o Russian/ former USSR 
o Mixed 
o Irrelevant 
o Other; please specify: __________________  
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Q63: [IF TICKED ALL OTHER OPTIONS OTHER THAN ‘JEWISH’ IN Q61 or 
TICKED ‘N/A’ IN Q62] 
How would you define yourself in terms of affiliation to any of the following 
national/religious groups?  
o Arab 
o Druze 
o Bedouin 
o Armenian 
o Circassian 
o Samaritans  
o Irrelevant 
o Other; please specify: _________________ 
 
Q64: Which of the following best describes your level of religious observance? 
o Very religious (e.g. for Jews: Orthodox/ Haredi) 
o Religious 
o Observant (‘Massorti’) 
o Secular 
o Atheist 
o Other; please specify: ____________________ 
 
Q65: How would you describe your personal status? 
o Single (never married) 
o Co-habiting  
o Married 
o Separated 
o Divorced 
o Widowed 
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o Other; please specify: ________________________ 
 
Q66: Please indicate the type of locality you live in: 
o City/town 
o Village 
o ‘Moshav’ 
o Kibbutz 
o Local council 
o Development town 
o Other; please specify: ___________________ 
 
Q67: In which of the following geographical districts in Israel do you reside?  
o Jerusalem 
o Northern 
o Haifa 
o Central 
o Tel-Aviv 
o Southern 
 
Q68: Have you served in the IDF? 
o Yes 
o No 
o No, but I served in ‘National Service’ scheme (‘Sherut Le’umi’) 
 
Q69: The monthly average income in Israel in 2013 was ~ 9,200 NIS (gross). How 
would you define your income level compared to the average?  
o Well below the average 
o Below the average 
o More or less as the average  
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o Above the average 
o well above the average 
o I do not work 
 
*** 
[COMPLETE / END] 
Thank you for taking part in this survey! 
For any queries or comments regarding the survey or this study, please contact: 
yael.ariel.09@ucl.ac.uk 
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Appendix 3: English translation of survey questionnaire for 
Israeli law students  
Survey questionnaire for Law Students in Israel 
Diversity in the Israeli Judiciary and the Legal Profession 
Dear Law Student, 
This survey is part of a study about diversity in the Israeli judiciary. The issue of judicial 
diversity is constantly on the public agenda, and claims of under-representation of various 
groups and sectors in the Israeli judiciary are often heard. Yet there is little evidence about 
the composition of the judicial system, and even less regarding lawyers and law students – 
the two crucial populations that form the potential pool for future judicial appointments (at 
present and in the future).  
This questionnaire is designed to understand the demographics of law students and legal 
practitioners in Israel today; and to understand their views and perceptions about judicial 
diversity.  
By completing this survey, you would enhance our understanding of the ‘pool’ of legal 
professionals from which the future judges of Israel are likely to be selected.  You would 
also be contributing to an important study that is the first of its kind in Israel.  
Your participation and cooperation are therefore highly important and very much 
appreciated.  
Most of the questions in this survey are multiple-choice questions. Please choose the option 
that is most suitable to your views, perceptions or circumstances. There are no right’ or 
‘wrong’ answers. Unless otherwise stated, you should tick only one of the options for each 
question.  
Participation in this study is entirely anonymous, and any information you provide will 
remain anonymous and not shared with other organisations. 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study! 
 
 
* The author is a member of the Israeli Bar Association and a qualified solicitor of England and Wales. This 
study is part of a doctoral dissertation being undertaken at the UCL Judicial Institute, Faculty of Laws, 
University College London, and is supported by the UCL Faculty of Laws and several other organisations.  
 
*** 
  
371 
 
Questions regarding Legal Education and the Legal Profession 
 
Q1: What degree are you currently studying for? 
o LL.B. 
o LL.M. 
o PhD (in laws) / JD 
o Other; please specify: ______________________ 
 
Q2: What year of your degree are you in?  
o First 
o Second 
o Third 
o Fourth 
o Other 
 
Q3: In which type of academic institution are you taking this degree? 
o University  
o Academic College 
o Other  
 
Q4: Please indicate the name of the institution you are currently studying at: 
o Bar-Ilan University 
o Haifa university 
o Tel-Aviv university 
o Hebrew university 
o Zefat academic college 
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o College of Management 
o Carmel academic centre 
o Peres academic centre 
o IDC Herzliya 
o Centre of Law and Business (Ramat Gan) 
o Ono academic college 
o Netanya academic college 
o Sapir college 
o Sha’arei Mishpat college 
o Other; please specify: ______________ 
 
Q5: Are you currently studying for another (non-legal) degree as well? (In a combined 
program with law or a different scheme) 
o Yes [DIRECT TO Q6] 
o No [DIRECT to Q0] 
 
Q6: [IF ‘YES’ TO Q0]  If you answered ‘yes’ to the previous question, what is the non-
legal degree you are currently studying for in addition to your legal degree?  
o Accounting 
o Business management / MBA 
o Economics 
o Education 
o International relations 
o Political science 
o Psychology 
o Social work 
o Other fields in Humanities 
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o Other fields in Social sciences 
o Other (please specify): ______________ 
 
 
Q7: Do you already have an academic (non-legal) degree? 
o Yes [DIRECT TO Q8] 
o No [DIRECT TO Q9] 
 
Q8: [IF ‘YES’ TO Q0] If you already have a non-legal degree, please indicate in which 
field (tick all that apply): 
o Accounting 
o Business management / MBA 
o Economics 
o Education 
o International relations 
o Political science 
o Psychology 
o Social work 
o Other fields in Humanities 
o Other fields in Social sciences 
o Other (please specify): ______________ 
 
Q9: Do you have any other non-legal professional certificate and/or qualification? 
(e.g. teaching certificate, accountant) 
o no 
o Yes; please specify _______________________________________ 
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Q10: [IF ANSWERED ‘LLM’, ‘PhD’, OR ‘OTHER’ TO Q0] for graduate or 
postgraduate law students: do you already have an LL.B.?  
o Yes 
o No [DIRECT TO Q12] 
 
Q11: [IF ‘YES’ TO Q0] If so, was your LL.B. gained in an Israeli academic 
institution? 
o Yes 
o No [DIRECT TO Q13] 
 
Q12: [IF ‘YES’ TO Q0] If your LL.B. was gained in an Israeli academic institution, 
please indicate whether this was a: 
o University 
o College 
o other 
o n/a 
 
Q13: [IF ANSWERED ‘LL.M.’, ‘PhD’, OR ‘OTHER’ TO Q0] for graduate or 
postgraduate law students: Have you successfully passed the Israeli Bar exams and 
qualified as a lawyer in Israel? 
o Yes 
o No 
o n/a 
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Q14: Are you qualified to practice law in a country other than Israel?  
o Yes 
o No 
 
Q15: Why did you choose to study law (tick all that apply)? 
o Expected income 
o Social status and prestige 
o Intellectual interest 
o Ideals and beliefs (e.g. law as a tool for social change) 
o Followed family members or other important figures who studied laws 
o By chance 
o I thought I would have an aptitude for it 
o Other reason (please specify): ______________________________________ 
 
Q16: Do you intend to take an internship in Israel once you complete your studies?  
o Yes [DIRECT TO Q17] 
o No  
o n/a 
o I am already a qualified lawyer in Israel and am not required to take an internship. 
 
Q17: [IF ‘YES’ TO Q0] Where do you intend or hope to undertake your internship? 
o The private sector 
o The Public sector (State Advocacy, government offices, etc.) 
o The Court system 
o NGO’s 
o I haven’t decided yet 
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o I do not intend to take an internship 
o n/a 
o Other (please specify):___________ 
 
Q18: Once you complete your internship period, do you intend to take the Israeli Bar 
exams? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
Q19: [IF ‘YES’ TO Q0 AND TO Q0] Do you intend to work as a lawyer in Israel after 
completing your internship and successfully passing the Bar exams? 
o Yes 
o No 
o n/a 
 
Q20: Are you currently working or have you worked as a lawyer (in Israel or 
elsewhere)? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
Q21: Have you ever worked or are you currently working in a legal position in Israel 
or elsewhere? (E.g. pre-internship, student legal work, etc.) 
o Yes 
o No 
o n/a 
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Q22: [IF ‘YES’ TO Q0] If you have worked in a legal position, please indicate if this 
work is/was in the: 
o Private sector 
o Public sector 
o Both (if you worked in more than one place) 
o n/a 
 
Q23: Does anyone of your immediate family (i.e. parent, sibling, spouse/partner) work 
in the legal field?  
o Yes 
o No [DIRECT TO Q25] 
 
Q24: [IF ‘YES’ TO Q0] Are or were any of these family members judges in the Israeli 
judicial system? 
o Yes 
o No 
 
Q25: Do you expect to be practicing in the legal profession 5 years from now? 
o Yes 
o Probably  
o No ; If you answered No please indicate why in the box below: 
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Q26: Would you consider applying for a judicial position in the future or at some 
stage in your legal career? 
o No 
o Yes 
o Maybe 
o N/a 
 
Q27: [IF ‘NO’ TO Q0] If you do not intend to apply for a judicial position, please 
indicate why: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q28: [IF ‘YES’ OR ‘MAYBE’ TO Q0] If you would or might consider applying for a 
judicial position in the future, please indicate why: 
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Views and Perceptions Regarding Judicial Decision-Making, the Judiciary and Judges 
(in Israel and generally) 
Q29: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Don't 
know 
Judges are professional, 
objective and neutral 
decision-makers 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The background 
characteristics of judges 
(e.g. age, gender, 
ethnicity, religion etc.) 
have no bearing on their 
decision-making. 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The background 
characteristics of the 
parties in a given case 
(e.g. age, gender, 
ethnicity, religion etc.) 
have no bearing on 
judicial decision-making. 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Judges sit in an ‘ivory 
tower’ and are detached 
from everyday life 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The Israeli legal system is 
characterized by a liberal 
approach 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The Israeli legal system is 
characterized by 
secularism 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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The Israeli legal system is 
characterized by a clear 
political orientation 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Israel's legal system is 
balanced and fair o  o  o  o  o  o  
The composition of the 
Israeli judiciary reflects 
the composition of Israeli 
society 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The composition of the 
Israeli judiciary reflects 
the composition of the 
legal professionals in 
Israel 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q30: To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 
 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Don't 
know 
Diversity in the judiciary 
is an important element 
in the legitimacy of 
courts 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The composition of the 
judiciary should reflect 
the composition of the 
society in which it 
operates. 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
Judges’ professional 
conduct is the only 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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relevant factor to ensure 
public trust in courts. 
It is important that a 
variety of sectors in 
Israeli society (e.g. 
women, Sephardic Jews, 
Arabs etc.) are 
represented in the 
judiciary 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The judiciary will 
become increasingly 
diverse over time 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Q31: For each of the following groups, please indicate the extent to which you agree 
they are diverse and reflective of the Israeli society:  
 Strongl
y agree 
Agre
e 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagre
e 
Disagre
e 
Strongl
y 
disagre
e 
Don'
t 
kno
w 
The 
population 
of law 
students in 
Israel (in 
universities 
and colleges 
alike) is 
diverse and 
reflective of 
the Israeli 
society 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The 
population 
of legal 
professional
s in Israel is 
diverse and 
reflective of 
the Israeli 
society 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The 
population 
of sitting 
judges in 
Israel is 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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diverse and 
reflective of 
the Israeli 
society 
The 
population 
of senior 
judges in 
Israel (e.g. 
presidents 
of courts, 
supreme 
court 
justices 
etc.) is 
diverse and 
reflective of 
the Israeli 
society 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
The 
population 
of senior 
legal 
practitioner
s in Israel 
(e.g. 
partners in 
law firms, 
heads of 
departments 
in the State 
Attorney’s 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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office) is 
diverse and 
reflective of 
the Israeli 
society 
The 
population 
of 
outstanding 
law 
students in 
Israel (e.g. 
on the 
dean’s list) 
is diverse 
and 
reflective of 
the Israeli 
society 
o  o  o  o  o  o  
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Q32: For each of the following groups please indicate the extent to which you think 
they are represented amongst Israeli law students (e.g. to what extent are women 
represented amongst law students, etc.): 
 
Q33: For each of the following groups please indicate the extent to which you think 
they are represented amongst Israeli lawyers: (e.g. to what extent are women 
represented amongst Israeli lawyers, etc.) 
 Under-
represented 
among Israeli 
lawyers 
Over 
represented 
among Israeli 
lawyers 
Adequately 
represented 
among Israeli 
lawyers 
Don’t 
know 
Women o  o  o  o  
Muslim Arabs o  o  o  o  
 Under-
represented 
among Israeli 
law students 
Over represented 
among Israeli 
law students 
Adequately 
represented 
among Israeli law 
students 
Don’t 
know 
Women 
o  o  o  o  
Muslim Arabs 
o  o  o  o  
Christian Arabs 
o  o  o  o  
Druze  
o  o  o  o  
Religious Jews 
o  o  o  o  
Ashkenazi Jews 
o  o  o  o  
Sephardic Jews 
o  o  o  o  
New immigrants 
(‘Olim’) o  o  o  o  
Other (please 
specify): 
_____________ 
o  o  o  o  
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Christian Arabs o  o  o  o  
Druze  o  o  o  o  
Religious Jews o  o  o  o  
Ashkenazi Jews o  o  o  o  
Sephardic Jews o  o  o  o  
New immigrants 
(‘Olim’) 
o  o  o  o  
Other (please 
specify): 
_____________ 
o  o  o  o  
 
Q34: For each of the following groups please indicate the extent to which you think 
they are represented amongst Israeli judges (e.g. to what extent are women 
represented amongst Israeli judges, etc.) 
 Under-
represented 
among Israeli 
judges 
Over 
represented 
among Israeli 
judges 
Adequately 
represented 
among Israeli 
judges 
Don’t 
know 
Women 
o  o  o  o  
Muslim Arabs 
o  o  o  o  
Christian Arabs 
o  o  o  o  
Druze  
o  o  o  o  
Religious Jews 
o  o  o  o  
Ashkenazi Jews 
o  o  o  o  
Sephardic Jews 
o  o  o  o  
New immigrants 
(‘Olim’) o  o  o  o  
Other (please 
specify): 
_____________ 
o  o  o  o  
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Q35: Do you think anything should be done about judicial diversity in Israel? 
o Yes [DIRECT TO Q36] 
o No [DIRECT TO Q37] 
 
Q36: If you answered ‘yes’ to the previous question, what should be done in your view 
to address judicial diversity in Israel (tick any options that reflect your view)? 
o Judicial diversity should be considered in the judicial appointments process 
o Special quotas for judges from under-represented groups/backgrounds should be set.  
o The Israeli Bar Association should proactively locate eligible candidates for judicial 
posts among lawyers and especially lawyers from minority groups. 
o There should be an open public discussion on the matter, which would influence the 
nominations procedure.  
o Other; please specify: ___________________ 
 
Q37: If you answered ‘no’ to the previous question, please indicate why in your view 
nothing should be done regarding judicial diversity in Israel (tick any that reflect your 
view): 
o Judicial diversity will improve over time and does not require any action or intervention 
o There is no problem with judicial diversity in Israel 
o Any attempt to ‘diversify’ the judiciary could undermine the legitimacy of the judicial 
system and public trust in judges.  
o Increasing judicial diversity might harm the professionalism of judges 
o Other; please specify: ______________________________________ 
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Questions Regarding Nationality, Society and Population Groups in Israel 
Q38: To what extent do you define yourself as Israeli? 
o Completely 
o To some extent 
o To a small extent 
o Not at all 
 
Q39: To what extent do you identify with the state of Israel and its institutions?    
o Completely 
o To some extent 
o To a little extent 
o Not at all 
 
Q40: To what extent do you trust the following institutions/bodies in Israel? 
 
 
To a large 
extent 
To some 
extent 
To a small 
extent 
Not at 
all 
Don’t 
know 
The court system  
o  o  o  o  o  
The police 
o  o  o  o  o  
The State 
Advocacy o  o  o  o  o  
The army (IDF) 
o  o  o  o  o  
The media 
o  o  o  o  o  
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Q41: Please rate on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 5 describes the most important component 
and 1 the least important) how important the following factors are in the way you 
define yourself (e.g. if gender is the most important component in your self-definition, 
it should be rated 5, etc.) 
 5 – most 
important 
4 3 2 
1 – least 
important 
My religion (e.g. ‘I am Jewish’, ‘I am 
Muslim’ etc.) o  o  o  o  o  
My nationality (e.g. ‘I’m Israeli’, ‘I am 
Arab’ etc.) o  o  o  o  o  
My ideological or political views (e.g. I am 
Zionist, I am a feminist) o  o  o  o  o  
My ethnicity (e.g., I am Ashkenazi, I am 
Bedouin etc.) o  o  o  o  o  
My gender 
o  o  o  o  o  
Other; please specify 
o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q42: Please indicate how influential you believe each factor is on one’s likelihood of 
success and integration in the Israel society: 
 
Very 
Influential 
Influential 
Not So 
Influential 
Not 
Influential At 
All 
Don’t 
Know 
Age 
o  o  o  o  o  
Gender 
o  o  o  o  o  
Ethnic origin 
o  o  o  o  o  
Nationality and 
religion o  o  o  o  o  
Place of residence 
(e.g. periphery) o  o  o  o  o  
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Personal 
connections, 
acquaintances  
o  o  o  o  o  
Appearance and 
looks o  o  o  o  o  
Education 
o  o  o  o  o  
Skills and abilities 
o  o  o  o  o  
Income and social 
status o  o  o  o  o  
Profession and 
qualifications o  o  o  o  o  
Luck/ fate 
o  o  o  o  o  
 
Q43: in your view which of the following population groups (if any) is most worthy of 
affirmative action? 
o Women 
o Sephardic Jews 
o Disabled (physically/mentally) 
o Arabs 
o New immigrants 
o Orthodox and/or religious Jews 
o LGBT 
o None of these groups 
o Other; please specify______________________ 
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Q44: Have you ever felt you have been discriminated against and/or treated 
differently during your studies and/or your work, on grounds of the following 
characteristics? 
 
 
 
 
  
 During your 
studies 
In the 
workplace 
Nationality 
o  o  
Religion and/or religiosity 
o  o  
Ethnic origin and/or ‘Eda’ 
o  o  
Gender 
o  o  
Sexual orientation 
o  o  
Disability 
o  o  
Age  
o  o  
Other background characteristic; please 
specify: ____________ o  o  
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Background characteristics 
Q45: What is your Age group? 
o 18-24 
o 25-34 
o 35-44 
o 45-54 
o 55-64 
o Other  
 
Q46: Gender 
o Male 
o Female 
o other 
 
Q47: Country of birth 
o Israel [DIRECT TO Q50] 
o Other [DIRECT TO Q48] 
 
Q48: If you were not born in Israel, please specify your country of birth [SELECT 
FROM a DROP-DOWN LIST] 
Q49: If you were not born in Israel – how long have you lived in Israel? 
o Less than a year 
o Between 1 and 5 years 
o 5-10 years 
o 10-15 years 
o More than 15 years 
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o n/a  
 
Q50: Please state your Father’s country of birth [SELECT FROM a DROP-DOWN LIST] 
Q51: Please state Mother’s country of birth [SELECT FROM a DROP-DOWN LIST] 
Q52: How do you define yourself? 
o Jewish 
o Muslim 
o Christian 
o Druze 
o Samaritan 
o Without religion affiliation 
o Mixed/other; please specify: ____________________ 
 
Q53: [IF TICKED ‘JEWISH’ OR ‘MIXED/OTHER’ OR ‘NO RELIGION’ IN Q0] 
How would you define your intra-Jewish ethnic origin (‘Eda’)? 
o Sephardic/ Mizrahi 
o Ashkenazi 
o Ethiopian 
o Russian/ former USSR 
o Mixed 
o Irrelevant 
o Other; please specify: __________________  
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Q54: [IF TICKED ALL OTHER OPTIONS RATHER THAN ‘JEWISH’ IN Q0 or 
TICKED ‘N/A’ IN Q0] 
How would you define yourself in terms of affiliation to any of the following 
national/religious groups?  
o Arab 
o Druze 
o Bedouin 
o Armenian 
o Circassian 
o Samaritans  
o irrelevant 
o other; please specify: _________________ 
 
Q55: Which of the following best describes your level of religious observance? 
o Very religious (e.g. for Jews: Orthodox/ Haredi) 
o Religious 
o Observant (‘Massorti’) 
o Secular 
o Atheist 
o Other; please specify: ____________________ 
 
Q56: How would you describe your personal status? 
o Single (never married) 
o Co-habiting  
o Married 
o Separated 
o Divorced 
o Widowed 
395 
 
o Other; please specify: ________________________ 
 
Q57: Please indicate the type of locality you live in: 
o City/town 
o Village 
o ‘Moshav’ 
o Kibbutz 
o Local council 
o Development town 
o Other; please specify: ___________________ 
 
Q58: In which of the following geographical districts in Israel do you reside?  
o Jerusalem 
o Northern 
o Haifa 
o Central 
o Tel-Aviv 
o Southern 
 
Q59: Have you served in the IDF? 
o Yes 
o No 
o No, but I served in ‘National Service’ scheme (‘Sherut Le’umi’) 
o I am studying in the academic reserve scheme (‘Atuda’) and expected to be drafted 
to the army upon completion of my degree.  
Q60: The monthly average income for employees in Israel in 2013 was 9,200 NIS 
(gross). How would you define your income level compared with the average?  
o Well below the average 
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o Below the average 
o More or less as the average  
o Above the average 
o Well above the average 
o I do not work 
 
*** 
[COMPLETE / END] 
Thank you for taking part in this survey! 
For any queries or comments regarding the survey or this study, please contact: 
yael.ariel.09@ucl.ac.uk 
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Appendix 4: Invitation to lawyers to take the survey, as it 
appeared in the Israeli Bar newsletter (first image) and in 
the electronic notice board (second image) both on the Bar 
website 
 
398 
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Appendix 5: Initial request to Deans of Israeli Law Schools 
and Faculties to collaborate with this study (sent by email 
during May 2014) 
 
To: 
Professor [FULL NAME]  
Dean of Faculty of Laws/ Law School  
[INSERT INSTITUTION NAME] 
 
Dear madam/sir, 
 
My name is Yael Levy-Ariel and I am a doctoral student at the UCL Judicial Institute in 
the Faculty of Laws of University College London. I have previously graduated with an 
LL.B. and a BA (Communication and Journalism) from the Hebrew University, and 
have also been awarded an LL.M. from the UCL Faculty of Laws. I am a qualified 
Israeli lawyer and a solicitor of England and wales. 
 
My current research deals with judicial diversity in Israel.  It examines the background 
characteristics of sitting judges in Israel and the possible relationship between the 
demographic profile of Israeli judges and the demographic profiles of Israeli lawyers 
and law students, which comprise the 'pool' for potential judicial appointments. 
 
I am writing to seek your cooperation with my empirical-legal study in which I aim to 
distribute on online survey to Israeli law students in all relevant academic institutions. I 
do not require any funding or support, only technical assistance in sending a link to the 
online survey to your students. Once the data collection and analysis are completed, I 
would be happy to share my findings and conclusions with you. 
 
I strongly believe that if I gain the cooperation of various academic institutions 
(universities and colleges alike), the findings of this study will be valuable not only for 
my research, but also for anyone who values the importance of legal education and the 
legal profession in Israel. Specifically, distributing the survey in [INSERT 
INSTITUTION NAME] is highly important because of the composition of your 
students and because of [INSERT RELEVANT FIGURES, E.G. IF THIS IS A WELL-
ESTABLISHED INSTITUTION, ANY GRADUATES IN THE JUDICIARY, ETC.]. 
In addition, in the future some of your law graduates are likely to become eligible 
candidates for a judicial post, therefore my interest in this population is clear. 
 
For your information, I have included an abstract of my research, detailing the purposes 
of the survey as well as its content and scope. I would be happy to send you the full 
questionnaire should you wish to see it. Please note that this letter and the attached 
abstract are currently being sent to all law faculties and schools in Israel.  
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It is important to note that the survey was developed for academic purposes only, and it 
will be distributed and completed anonymously. Also this study is not intended to 
criticise the judiciary, the Israeli Bar Association or any legal academic institutions in 
Israel. Rather, the aim of my research is to understand the extent to which the Israeli 
judiciary is diverse and the possible links between judicial diversity (or its lack thereof) 
and the characteristics of Israeli lawyers and law students. 
 
My research is funded by the UCL Faculty of Laws and is also supported by the British 
Friends of the Hebrew University, the Anglo-Israel Association and the Anglo-Jewish 
Association. 
 
I would be happy to send you any additional information you may require, including the 
questionnaires, my CV, etc. If you wish to speak over the phone, please let me know of 
the best way to get in touch.  
 
I would like to thank you for your time and I hope you will agree to participate in this 
research. 
 
Yael Levy Ariel (Adv.) 
 
 
 
 
Yael Levy Ariel* 
PhD Candidate 
Judicial Institute, Faculty of Laws 
University College London 
  
yael.ariel.09@ucl.ac.uk 
___ 
* Solicitor (England and Wales); Attorney (Israel) 
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Appendix 6: Invitation to Israeli law students to participate in 
the survey (sent by email during July-August 2014 through 
the Deans of Law Schools and/or staff members) 
 
[SUGGESTED SUBJECT LINE: "WHO ARE THE FUTURE JUDGES OF 
ISRAEL?"]11 
 
Dear students in the law faculty/school at [INSERT NAME OF INSTITUTION] 
 
I am writing to ask you to participate in the attached survey about Israeli law students. I 
am a research student at the UCL Faculty of Laws, and my study examines the 
background characteristics and perceptions of law students, lawyers and judges in 
Israel. Your faculty/school [OPTION: INSERT DEAN'S NAME IF APPLICABLE] has 
approved of the sending of this request to you to participate in my survey. Completing 
this survey should take only a few minutes of your time, and it is completely 
anonymous. 
 
To take the survey please click on the link below: 
https://opinio.ucl.ac.uk/s?s=31934 
 
I would be very grateful if you could take part in this survey. Your cooperation will be 
extremely valuable and will contribute to the success of this study. 
 
For additional details or queries regarding this study, please contact:  
yael.ariel.09@ucl.ac.uk 
 
 
  
                                                 
11 The author suggested using this subject line in the email sent to students through their departments. 
However, the faculties themselves made the final decision of the wording of the subject matter and any 
other information that deans decided to include. 
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Appendix 7: Statistical analysis appendix – chapter 6 
This appendix sets out the statistical analyses conducted as part of chapter 6 (Judges’ 
analysis). It does not cover every single statistical analysis that was carried out for the 
purpose of this study, as these are numerous. Instead, it focuses on the findings that arose 
from statistically significant cross analyses between variables, and elaborates on the 
important results displayed in chapter 6 (including results displayed in tables and figures 
in the chapter). 
The results of the significance tests (chi-square) and the outputs of the statistical package 
in which the analysis was conducted (SPSS) are displayed below by order of appearance 
in chapter 6. Each output table displays the actual count, the expected count, and the 
adjusted Pearson residuals (or ‘PR’), which indicate which cells in the table caused the 
‘lack of fit’, i.e. contributed to the significant chi-square result. Furthermore, where 
appropriate, an independent sample t-test was performed to compare the means of two 
independent groups in order to determine whether there is statistical evidence that the 
associated population means are significantly different (for example, comparing the mean 
age of male and female judges, comparing the length of professional experience prior to 
first judicial appointment for Jews and Arabs, etc.).
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1. Gender 
a. Cross analysis of gender and type of court 
 
 
Type of court 
Tot
al 
Magistra
tes  
Distri
ct  
Supre
me 
Court 
Juven
ile  
Traff
ic 
Fam
ily 
Labou
r- 
Natio
nal 
Labou
r- 
Regio
nal 
Courts 
managem
ent 
Gend
er 
Male Count 163 103 12 5 13 24 3 22 2 347 
Expect
ed 
Count 
164.2 86.6 8.1 8.1 13.4 30.6 3.4 31.6 1.0 
347
.0 
Adjust
ed 
Residu
al 
-.2 2.8 1.9 -1.5 -.2 -1.7 -.3 -2.5 1.5  
Fem
ale 
Count 180 78 5 12 15 40 4 44 0 378 
Expect
ed 
Count 
178.8 94.4 8.9 8.9 14.6 33.4 3.6 34.4 1.0 
378
.0 
Adjust
ed 
Residu
al 
.2 -2.8 -1.9 1.5 .2 1.7 .3 2.5 -1.5  
Total Count 343 181 17 17 28 64 7 66 2 725 
Expect
ed 
Count 
343.0 
181.
0 
17.0 17.0 28.0 64.0 7.0 66.0 2.0 
725
.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asym
p. 
Sig. 
(2-
sided
) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
22.395a 8 .004 
Likelihood Ratio 23.498 8 .003 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
6.528 1 .011 
N of Valid Cases 725   
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b. Gender and position in court (seniority) 
 
 
Position in court 
Total Registrar 
Senior 
registrar Judge 
Senior 
judge 
Vice 
president President 
Gender Male Count 13 17 234 23 49 11 347 
Expected 
Count 
17.2 18.2 242.7 23.9 34.9 10.1 347.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.4 -.4 -1.4 -.3 3.5 .4  
Female Count 23 21 273 27 24 10 378 
Expected 
Count 
18.8 19.8 264.3 26.1 38.1 10.9 378.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.4 .4 1.4 .3 -3.5 -.4  
Total Count 36 38 507 50 73 21 725 
Expected 
Count 
36.0 38.0 507.0 50.0 73.0 21.0 725.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.828a 5 .017 
Likelihood Ratio 14.019 5 .015 
Linear-by-Linear Association 8.057 1 .005 
N of Valid Cases 725   
 
 
2. Religion 
a. Religious group with type of court (non-significant)  
 
 
Religious group 
Total Jewish Muslim Christian Druze 
other non-
Jewish 
Type of 
court 
Magistrates Count 307 6 24 3 3 343 
Expected 
Count 
314.6 6.2 18.5 2.4 1.4 343.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.1 -.1 1.8 .6 1.8  
District  Count 171 3 6 1 0 181 
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Expected 
Count 
166.0 3.2 9.7 1.2 .7 181.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.6 -.2 -1.4 -.3 -1.0  
Supreme Court Count 16 0 1 0 0 17 
Expected 
Count 
15.6 .3 .9 .1 .1 17.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.4 -.6 .1 -.3 -.3  
Juvenile Count 15 1 1 0 0 17 
Expected 
Count 
15.6 .3 .9 .1 .1 17.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.5 1.3 .1 -.3 -.3  
Traffic Count 25 0 3 0 0 28 
Expected 
Count 
25.7 .5 1.5 .2 .1 28.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.5 -.7 1.3 -.4 -.3  
Family Count 61 2 1 0 0 64 
Expected 
Count 
58.7 1.1 3.4 .4 .3 64.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.1 .8 -1.4 -.7 -.5  
Labour- National Count 6 0 1 0 0 7 
Expected 
Count 
6.4 .1 .4 .0 .0 7.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.6 -.4 1.0 -.2 -.2  
Labour- Regional Count 62 1 2 1 0 66 
Expected 
Count 
60.5 1.2 3.6 .5 .3 66.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.7 -.2 -.9 .8 -.5  
Courts 
management 
Count 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Expected 
Count 
1.8 .0 .1 .0 .0 2.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.4 -.2 -.3 -.1 -.1  
Total Count 665 13 39 5 3 725 
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Expected 
Count 
665.0 13.0 39.0 5.0 3.0 725.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.084a 32 .986 
Likelihood Ratio 19.579 32 .958 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.265 1 .132 
N of Valid Cases 725   
 
 
b. Binary religious category (Jewish/ non-Jewish) with type of court (non-
significant) 
 
 
Religion (binary) 
Total Jewish Arab 
Type of court Magistrates  Count 307 36 343 
Expected Count 314.6 28.4 343.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.1 2.1  
District  Count 171 10 181 
Expected Count 166.0 15.0 181.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.6 -1.6  
Supreme Court Count 16 1 17 
Expected Count 15.6 1.4 17.0 
Adjusted Residual .4 -.4  
Juvenile Count 15 2 17 
Expected Count 15.6 1.4 17.0 
Adjusted Residual -.5 .5  
Traffic Count 25 3 28 
Expected Count 25.7 2.3 28.0 
Adjusted Residual -.5 .5  
Family Count 61 3 64 
Expected Count 58.7 5.3 64.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.1 -1.1  
Labour- National Count 6 1 7 
Expected Count 6.4 .6 7.0 
Adjusted Residual -.6 .6  
Labour- Regional Count 62 4 66 
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Expected Count 60.5 5.5 66.0 
Adjusted Residual .7 -.7  
Courts management Count 2 0 2 
Expected Count 1.8 .2 2.0 
Adjusted Residual .4 -.4  
Total Count 665 60 725 
Expected Count 665.0 60.0 725.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.677a 8 .572 
Likelihood Ratio 7.041 8 .532 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.556 1 .212 
N of Valid Cases 725   
 
c. Religious group with position in court (seniority) 
 
 
Religious group 
Total Jewish Muslim Christian Druze 
other non-
Jewish 
Position in 
court 
Registrar Count 33 0 3 0 0 36 
Expected 
Count 
33.0 .6 1.9 .2 .1 36.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.0 -.8 .8 -.5 -.4  
Senior 
registrar 
Count 33 1 4 0 0 38 
Expected 
Count 
34.9 .7 2.0 .3 .2 38.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.1 .4 1.4 -.5 -.4  
Judge Count 467 11 24 3 2 507 
Expected 
Count 
465.0 9.1 27.3 3.5 2.1 507.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.6 1.2 -1.2 -.5 -.1  
Senior judge Count 45 0 4 1 0 50 
Expected 
Count 
45.9 .9 2.7 .3 .2 50.0 
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Adjusted 
Residual 
-.5 -1.0 .9 1.2 -.5  
Vice 
president 
Count 67 1 3 1 1 73 
Expected 
Count 
67.0 1.3 3.9 .5 .3 73.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.0 -.3 -.5 .7 1.3  
President Count 20 0 1 0 0 21 
Expected 
Count 
19.3 .4 1.1 .1 .1 21.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.6 -.6 -.1 -.4 -.3  
Total Count 665 13 39 5 3 725 
Expected 
Count 
665.0 13.0 39.0 5.0 3.0 725.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.091a 20 .944 
Likelihood Ratio 12.537 20 .896 
Linear-by-Linear Association .010 1 .920 
N of Valid Cases 725   
 
 
d. Binary religious category with position in court 
 
 
Religion binary 
Total Jewish Arab 
Position in court Registrar Count 33 3 36 
Expected Count 33.0 3.0 36.0 
Adjusted Residual .0 .0  
Senior registrar Count 33 5 38 
Expected Count 34.9 3.1 38.0 
Adjusted Residual -1.1 1.1  
Judge Count 467 40 507 
Expected Count 465.0 42.0 507.0 
Adjusted Residual .6 -.6  
Senior judge Count 45 5 50 
Expected Count 45.9 4.1 50.0 
Adjusted Residual -.5 .5  
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Vice president Count 67 6 73 
Expected Count 67.0 6.0 73.0 
Adjusted Residual .0 .0  
President Count 20 1 21 
Expected Count 19.3 1.7 21.0 
Adjusted Residual .6 -.6  
Total Count 665 60 725 
Expected Count 665.0 60.0 725.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.831a 5 .872 
Likelihood Ratio 1.712 5 .887 
Linear-by-Linear Association .266 1 .606 
N of Valid Cases 725   
 
 
e. Religious group (binary) with location of court 
 
 
Religion binary 
Total Jewish Arab 
District of court Jerusalem Count 112 6 118 
Expected Count 108.2 9.8 118.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.4 -1.4  
TLV Count 193 3 196 
Expected Count 179.8 16.2 196.0 
Adjusted Residual 4.0 -4.0  
Merkaz 
(central) 
Count 127 1 128 
Expected Count 117.4 10.6 128.0 
Adjusted Residual 3.4 -3.4  
Haifa Count 106 24 130 
Expected Count 119.2 10.8 130.0 
Adjusted Residual -4.7 4.7  
North Count 43 24 67 
Expected Count 61.5 5.5 67.0 
Adjusted Residual -8.6 8.6  
South Count 84 2 86 
Expected Count 78.9 7.1 86.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.1 -2.1  
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Total Count 665 60 725 
Expected Count 665.0 60.0 725.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 111.548a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 92.967 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 22.199 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 725   
 
 
f. Religious group with district of courts 
 
 
Religious group 
Total Jewish Muslim Christian Druze 
other non-
Jewish 
District of 
court 
Jerusalem Count 112 2 4 0 0 118 
Expected 
Count 
108.2 2.1 6.3 .8 .5 118.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.4 -.1 -1.0 -1.0 -.8  
TLV Count 193 2 1 0 0 196 
Expected 
Count 
179.8 3.5 10.5 1.4 .8 196.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
4.0 -1.0 -3.5 -1.4 -1.1  
Merkaz 
(central) 
Count 127 0 1 0 0 128 
Expected 
Count 
117.4 2.3 6.9 .9 .5 128.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
3.4 -1.7 -2.5 -1.0 -.8  
Haifa Count 106 1 19 3 1 130 
Expected 
Count 
119.2 2.3 7.0 .9 .5 130.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-4.7 -1.0 5.2 2.5 .7  
North Count 43 6 14 2 2 67 
Expected 
Count 
61.5 1.2 3.6 .5 .3 67.0 
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Adjusted 
Residual 
-8.6 4.6 5.9 2.4 3.4  
South Count 84 2 0 0 0 86 
Expected 
Count 
78.9 1.5 4.6 .6 .4 86.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.1 .4 -2.4 -.8 -.6  
Total Count 665 13 39 5 3 725 
Expected 
Count 
665.0 13.0 39.0 5.0 3.0 725.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 128.996a 20 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 112.025 20 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 21.696 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 725   
 
 
 
g. Religious group and military service 
 
 
Did the judge serve in the military? 
Total 
Yes (including 
national service) 
No (including 
unknown) 999.00 
Religious 
group 
Jewish Count 628 36 1 665 
Expected 
Count 
584.3 79.8 .9 665.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
18.0 -18.2 .3  
Muslim Count 1 12 0 13 
Expected 
Count 
11.4 1.6 .0 13.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-8.9 9.0 -.1  
Christian Count 3 36 0 39 
Expected 
Count 
34.3 4.7 .1 39.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-15.8 15.9 -.2  
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Druze Count 5 0 0 5 
Expected 
Count 
4.4 .6 .0 5.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.8 -.8 -.1  
other non-
Jewish 
Count 0 3 0 3 
Expected 
Count 
2.6 .4 .0 3.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-4.7 4.7 -.1  
Total Count 637 87 1 725 
Expected 
Count 
637.0 87.0 1.0 725.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 367.591a 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 223.880 8 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association .019 1 .889 
N of Valid Cases 725   
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3. Jewish ethnicity 
a. Binary Jewish ethnic group with position in court 
 
 
Jewish ethnicity 
Total Ashkenazi Sephardic 
Jewish but ethnicity 
unknown 
Position in 
court 
Registrar Count 17 5 11 33 
Expected 
Count 
21.1 5.2 6.7 33.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.5 -.1 1.9  
Senior 
registrar 
Count 14 6 13 33 
Expected 
Count 
21.1 5.2 6.7 33.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.7 .4 2.8  
Judge Count 307 67 93 467 
Expected 
Count 
299.2 73.0 94.8 467.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.4 -1.4 -.4  
Senior judge Count 25 11 9 45 
Expected 
Count 
28.8 7.0 9.1 45.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.2 1.7 -.1  
Vice 
president 
Count 47 12 8 67 
Expected 
Count 
42.9 10.5 13.6 67.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.1 .5 -1.8  
President Count 16 3 1 20 
Expected 
Count 
12.8 3.1 4.1 20.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.5 -.1 -1.7  
Total Count 426 104 135 665 
Expected 
Count 
426.0 104.0 135.0 665.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
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 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 21.551a 10 .018 
Likelihood Ratio 21.231 10 .020 
Linear-by-Linear Association 10.158 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 665   
 
b. Jewish group (broad definition) with position in court 
 
 
Jewish ethnicity (broad) 
Total Ashkenazi 
appears 
Ashkenazi Sephardic 
appears 
Sephardic USSR 
not 
clear 
Position 
in court 
Registrar Count 3 14 2 3 0 11 33 
Expected 
Count 
8.5 12.5 2.0 3.2 .1 6.7 33.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.3 .6 .0 -.1 -.4 1.9  
Senior 
registrar 
Count 6 7 2 4 1 13 33 
Expected 
Count 
8.5 12.5 2.0 3.2 .1 6.7 33.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.0 -2.0 .0 .5 2.3 2.8  
Judge Count 119 186 28 39 2 93 467 
Expected 
Count 
120.8 176.3 28.1 44.9 2.1 94.8 467.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.3 1.7 .0 -1.7 -.1 -.4  
Senior 
judge 
Count 14 11 3 8 0 9 45 
Expected 
Count 
11.6 17.0 2.7 4.3 .2 9.1 45.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.8 -1.9 .2 1.9 -.5 -.1  
Vice 
president 
Count 23 24 3 9 0 8 67 
Expected 
Count 
17.3 25.3 4.0 6.4 .3 13.6 67.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.7 -.3 -.6 1.1 -.6 -1.8  
President Count 7 9 2 1 0 1 20 
Expected 
Count 
5.2 7.5 1.2 1.9 .1 4.1 20.0 
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Adjusted 
Residual 
.9 .7 .8 -.7 -.3 -1.7  
Total Count 172 251 40 64 3 135 665 
Expected 
Count 
172.0 251.0 40.0 64.0 3.0 135.0 665.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 38.270a 25 .044 
Likelihood Ratio 36.993 25 .058 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
13.276 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 665   
 
 
c. Jewish ethnic group with type of court 
 
 
Jewish ethnicity 
Total Ashkenazi Sephardic 
Jewish but ethnicity 
unknown 
Type of 
court 
Magistrates  Count 178 57 72 307 
Expected 
Count 
196.7 48.0 62.3 307.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.0 1.9 1.9  
District  Count 122 20 29 171 
Expected 
Count 
109.5 26.7 34.7 171.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.3 -1.6 -1.3  
Supreme Court Count 13 2 1 16 
Expected 
Count 
10.2 2.5 3.2 16.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.5 -.3 -1.4  
Juvenile  Count 11 0 4 15 
Expected 
Count 
9.6 2.3 3.0 15.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.8 -1.7 .6  
Traffic Count 20 2 3 25 
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Expected 
Count 
16.0 3.9 5.1 25.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.7 -1.1 -1.1  
Family Count 33 16 12 61 
Expected 
Count 
39.1 9.5 12.4 61.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.7 2.4 -.1  
Labour- National Count 5 1 0 6 
Expected 
Count 
3.8 .9 1.2 6.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.0 .1 -1.2  
Labour- Regional Count 42 6 14 62 
Expected 
Count 
39.7 9.7 12.6 62.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.6 -1.4 .5  
Courts 
management 
Count 2 0 0 2 
Expected 
Count 
1.3 .3 .4 2.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.1 -.6 -.7  
Total Count 426 104 135 665 
Expected 
Count 
426.0 104.0 135.0 665.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.751a 16 .044 
Likelihood Ratio 31.302 16 .012 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.224 1 .269 
N of Valid Cases 665   
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d. Jewish ethnic group (broad) with type of court 
 
 
Jewish ethnicity (broad) 
Total Ashkenazi 
appears 
Ashkenazi Sephardic 
appears 
Sephardic 
USSR 
post 
1990 
not 
clear 
Type 
of 
court 
Magistrates  Count 58 116 20 36 3 74 307 
Expected 
Count 
79.4 114.5 18.5 28.6 1.8 64.2 307.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.8 .2 .5 2.0 1.2 1.9  
District  Count 62 60 11 9 0 29 171 
Expected 
Count 
44.2 63.8 10.3 15.9 1.0 35.7 171.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
3.6 -.7 .3 -2.1 -1.2 -1.5  
Supreme 
Court 
Count 13 0 2 0 0 1 16 
Expected 
Count 
4.1 6.0 1.0 1.5 .1 3.3 16.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
5.1 -3.1 1.1 -1.3 -.3 -1.5  
Juvenile  Count 2 8 0 1 0 4 15 
Expected 
Count 
3.9 5.6 .9 1.4 .1 3.1 15.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.1 1.3 -1.0 -.4 -.3 .6  
Traffic Count 7 12 0 2 1 3 25 
Expected 
Count 
6.5 9.3 1.5 2.3 .2 5.2 25.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.2 1.1 -1.3 -.2 2.2 -1.1  
Family Count 14 19 4 11 0 13 61 
Expected 
Count 
15.8 22.7 3.7 5.7 .4 12.8 61.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.5 -1.0 .2 2.5 -.6 .1  
Labour- 
National 
Count 1 4 1 0 0 0 6 
Expected 
Count 
1.6 2.2 .4 .6 .0 1.3 6.0 
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Adjusted 
Residual 
-.5 1.5 1.1 -.8 -.2 -1.3  
Labour- 
Regional 
Count 14 28 2 3 0 15 62 
Expected 
Count 
16.0 23.1 3.7 5.8 .4 13.0 62.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.6 1.3 -1.0 -1.3 -.6 .7  
Courts 
management 
Count 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Expected 
Count 
.5 .7 .1 .2 .0 .4 2.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.8 .4 -.4 -.5 -.1 -.7  
Total Count 172 248 40 62 4 139 665 
Expected 
Count 
172.0 248.0 40.0 62.0 4.0 139.0 665.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 79.620a 40 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 83.684 40 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association .860 1 .354 
N of Valid Cases 665   
 
 
e. Jewish ethnic group (binary) with district of court 
 
 
Jewish ethnicity 
Total Ashkenazi Sephardic 
Jewish but ethnicity 
unknown 
District of 
court 
Jerusalem Count 84 17 11 112 
Expected Count 71.7 17.5 22.7 112.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.6 -.1 -3.0  
TLV Count 112 33 48 193 
Expected Count 123.6 30.2 39.2 193.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.1 .7 1.9  
Merkaz Count 86 12 29 127 
Expected Count 81.4 19.9 25.8 127.0 
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Adjusted 
Residual 
1.0 -2.1 .8  
Haifa Count 73 14 19 106 
Expected Count 67.9 16.6 21.5 106.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.1 -.8 -.7  
North Count 28 6 9 43 
Expected Count 27.5 6.7 8.7 43.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.1 -.3 .1  
South Count 43 22 19 84 
Expected Count 53.8 13.1 17.1 84.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.6 2.8 .6  
Total Count 426 104 135 665 
Expected Count 426.0 104.0 135.0 665.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.834a 10 .006 
Likelihood Ratio 25.721 10 .004 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.058 1 .080 
N of Valid Cases 665   
 
 
4. Gender with ethnicity and religion combined 
 
 
Ethnic/ religious group 
Total not Jewish Ashkenazi Sephardic UUSR unknown 
Gender Male Count 43 186 64 2 52 347 
Expected Count 28.7 202.5 49.8 1.4 64.6 347.0 
Adjusted Residual 3.9 -2.5 3.0 .7 -2.4  
Female Count 17 237 40 1 83 378 
Expected Count 31.3 220.5 54.2 1.6 70.4 378.0 
Adjusted Residual -3.9 2.5 -3.0 -.7 2.4  
Total Count 60 423 104 3 135 725 
Expected Count 60.0 423.0 104.0 3.0 135.0 725.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 29.134a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 29.598 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.895 1 .027 
N of Valid Cases 725   
 
5. Gender with religious group 
 
 
Religious group 
Total Jewish Muslim Christian Druze other non-Jewish 
Gender Male Count 304 12 24 5 2 347 
Expected Count 318.3 6.2 18.7 2.4 1.4 347.0 
Adjusted Residual -3.9 3.2 1.8 2.3 .7  
Female Count 361 1 15 0 1 378 
Expected Count 346.7 6.8 20.3 2.6 1.6 378.0 
Adjusted Residual 3.9 -3.2 -1.8 -2.3 -.7  
Total Count 665 13 39 5 3 725 
Expected Count 665.0 13.0 39.0 5.0 3.0 725.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.315a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 23.904 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 11.595 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 725   
 
6. Age  
a. General frequencies 
 
One-Sample Statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Age 530 50.3509 8.29019 .36010 
 
Age   
N Valid 530 
Missing 195 
Mean 50.3509 
Median 48.0000 
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Mode 44.00 
Std. Deviation 8.29019 
 
 
b. Age with gender 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Gender Statistic 
Bootstrapa 
 
Bias Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Upper 
Age Male N 342     
Mean 52.3977 .0031 .4296 51.5814 53.2363 
Std. Deviation 8.22483 -.01080 .22333 7.77809 8.65941 
Std. Error Mean .44475     
Female N 188     
Mean 46.6277 -.0083 .5162 45.6069 47.6374 
Std. Deviation 7.03313 -.05908 .44079 6.14822 7.85139 
Std. Error Mean .51294     
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Age Equal 
variances 
assumed 
19.211 .000 8.123 528 .000 5.77000 .71031 4.37461 7.16539 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  8.499 438.077 .000 5.77000 .67890 4.43569 7.10432 
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c. Age with nationality (Jews vs non-Jews) 
 
Age   
Jewish/Non-Jewish Statistic 
Bootstrapa 
Bias Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Jewish Mean 50.5405 .0037 .3696 49.7925 51.2785 
N 481 0 0 481 481 
Std. Deviation 8.27666 -.01165 .20354 7.88611 8.65465 
Non-Jewish Mean 48.4898 .0675 1.1472 46.3475 50.9178 
N 49 0 0 49 49 
Std. Deviation 8.27678 -.07987 .69546 6.81608 9.43600 
Total Mean 50.3509 .0096 .3490 49.6571 51.0471 
N 530 0 0 530 530 
Std. Deviation 8.29019 -.00893 .19330 7.91083 8.65602 
 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Jewish/Non-Jewish Statistic 
Bootstrapa 
 
Bias Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
 Lower Upper 
Age Jewish N 478     
Mean 50.5523 .0096 .3810 49.8181 51.2615 
Std. Deviation 8.29086 -.00904 .19761 7.88354 8.66205 
Std. Error Mean .37922     
Non-Jewish N 52     
Mean 48.5000 .0215 1.1490 46.3462 50.8457 
Std. Deviation 8.13007 -.10837 .69088 6.59304 9.33664 
Std. Error Mean 1.12744     
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
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Age Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.312 .577 1.698 528 .090 2.05230 1.20841 -.32158 4.42619 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  1.725 63.106 .089 2.05230 1.18950 -.32466 4.42926 
 
d. Age at the time of first judicial appointment 
Statistics 
How old was the judge when first 
appointed?   
N Valid 531 
Missing 194 
Mean 41.0207 
Median 40.0000 
Std. Deviation 6.04118 
Range 34.00 
Minimum 28.00 
Maximum 62.00 
 
Statistics 
How old was the judge when first appointed?   
 Statistic 
Bootstrapb 
Bias Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
N Valid 531 0 0 531 531 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 41.0207 .0012 .2591 40.4954 41.5103 
Median 40.0000 -.0620 .3198 39.0000 40.0000 
Mode 39.00     
Std. Deviation 6.04118 -.00905 .20790 5.62630 6.45314 
b. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 bootstrap samples 
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e. Cross analysis of age at appointment and nationality/religion 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Religion Statistic 
Bootstrapa 
 
Bias 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 Lower Upper 
How old was the judge when 
first appointed? 
Jewish N 478     
Mean 41.3849 -.0053 .2629 40.8556 41.9098 
Std. 
Deviation 
6.06069 
-
.01688 
.20674 5.62406 6.44235 
Std. Error 
Mean 
.27721     
Arab N 53     
Mean 37.7358 .0102 .6630 36.4528 39.0184 
Std. 
Deviation 
4.77635 
-
.11773 
.77638 3.27827 6.20031 
Std. Error 
Mean 
.65608     
a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 stratified bootstrap samples 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
How old 
was the 
judge 
when first 
appointed? 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
6.493 .011 4.238 529 .000 3.64909 .86094 1.95780 5.34038 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  5.123 71.974 .000 3.64909 .71224 2.22925 5.06893 
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7. Type of academic institution 
a. With position in court 
 
Crosstab 
 
Position in court 
Total Registrar 
Senior 
registrar Judge 
Senior 
judge 
Vice 
president President 
Type of 
academic 
institution 
University Count 28 26 433 48 67 18 620 
Expected 
Count 
30.6 33.2 435.8 43.1 60.2 17.1 620.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.5 -4.1 -.8 2.4 2.9 .7  
College Count 6 11 52 0 0 1 70 
Expected 
Count 
3.4 3.8 49.2 4.9 6.8 1.9 70.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.5 4.1 .8 -2.4 -2.9 -.7  
Total Count 34 37 485 48 67 19 690 
Expected 
Count 
34.0 37.0 485.0 48.0 67.0 19.0 690.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 31.325a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 38.000 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
17.198 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 690   
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b. With Jewish ethnicity 
 
 
 
Jewish ethnicity (broad) 
Total 
non-
Jew
s 
Ashkena
zi 
appears 
Ashkena
zi 
Sephardi
c 
appears 
Sephardi
c 
USS
R 
post 
1990 
not 
clear 
Type of 
academi
c 
institutio
n 
Universit
y 
Count 52 156 219 32 49 3 109 620 
Expecte
d Count 
50.3 143.8 214.8 33.2 53.0 3.6 
121.
3 
620.
0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.8 3.7 1.1 -.7 -1.8 -1.0 -3.9  
College Count 4 4 20 5 10 1 26 70 
Expecte
d Count 
5.7 16.2 24.2 3.8 6.0 .4 13.7 70.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.8 -3.7 -1.1 .7 1.8 1.0 3.9  
Total Count 56 160 239 37 59 4 135 690 
Expecte
d Count 
56.0 160.0 239.0 37.0 59.0 4.0 
135.
0 
690.
0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 28.367a 6 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 29.462 6 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
24.451 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 690   
 
c. With type of court 
 
 
Type of court 
Tot
al 
Magistra
tes  
Distr
ict  
Supre
me 
Court 
Juven
ile  
Traf
fic 
Fam
ily 
Labo
ur- 
Natio
nal 
Labou
r- 
Regio
nal 
Courts 
manage
ment 
Count 289 175 16 13 19 50 6 51 1 620 
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Type 
of 
acade
mic 
instituti
on 
Univer
sity 
Expect
ed 
Count 
292.9 
158.
1 
14.4 13.5 22.5 55.7 6.3 54.8 1.8 
620
.0 
Adjust
ed 
Resid
ual 
-1.0 4.9 1.4 -.4 -2.3 -2.5 -.4 -1.7 -1.9  
Colleg
e 
Count 37 1 0 2 6 12 1 10 1 70 
Expect
ed 
Count 
33.1 17.9 1.6 1.5 2.5 6.3 .7 6.2 .2 
70.
0 
Adjust
ed 
Resid
ual 
1.0 -4.9 -1.4 .4 2.3 2.5 .4 1.7 1.9  
Total Count 326 176 16 15 25 62 7 61 2 690 
Expect
ed 
Count 
326.0 
176.
0 
16.0 15.0 25.0 62.0 7.0 61.0 2.0 
690
.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 37.463a 8 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 46.801 8 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
9.919 1 .002 
N of Valid Cases 690   
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8. Legal practice experience (length of professional experience prior to 
judicial appointment) 
a. General- frequencies 
Statistics 
Number of years of practice before first appointment   
 Statistic 
Bootstrapb 
Bias Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
N Valid 711 0 0 711 711 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 13.0956 .0078 .1954 12.7286 13.4979 
Median 12.0000 .1110 .3175 12.0000 13.0000 
Mode 12.00     
Std. Deviation 5.40963 -.00897 .17307 5.05013 5.76878 
b. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 stratified bootstrap 
samples 
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b. Gender and years of practice: 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Gender 
Statisti
c 
Bootstrapa 
 
Bias 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 Lower Upper 
Number of years of practice 
before first appointment 
Male N 344     
Mean 13.421
5 
.0020 .3016 
12.822
4 
14.039
9 
Std. Deviation 5.7336
1 
-.00716 .26701 
5.2005
7 
6.2556
3 
Std. Error 
Mean 
.30914     
Femal
e 
N 367     
Mean 12.790
2 
-.0095 .2666 
12.266
5 
13.313
4 
Std. Deviation 5.0761
5 
-.01753 .20340 
4.6863
4 
5.4732
1 
Std. Error 
Mean 
.26497     
a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 stratified bootstrap samples 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. 
Error 
Differenc
e 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Number of 
years of 
practice 
before first 
appointme
nt 
Equal 
variance
s 
assume
d 
2.37
1 
.124 
1.55
7 
709 .120 .63132 .40556 
-
.16492 
1.4275
6 
Equal 
variance
s not 
assume
d 
  
1.55
1 
685.42
0 
.121 .63132 .40716 
-
.16810 
1.4307
4 
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c. Nationality and years of practice: 
 
Group Statistics 
 
Religion 
Statisti
c 
Bootstrapa 
 
Bias 
Std. 
Error 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
 Lower Upper 
Number of years of 
practice before first 
appointment 
Jewish N 651     
Mean 13.182
8 
.0046 .2129 
12.774
2 
13.595
9 
Std. 
Deviation 
5.5093
3 
.00253 .17485 
5.1806
5 
5.8676
1 
Std. Error 
Mean 
.21593     
Arab N 60     
Mean 12.150
0 
-.0049 .5389 
11.100
0 
13.250
0 
Std. 
Deviation 
4.0955
7 
-.04835 .38100 
3.2888
7 
4.7793
8 
Std. Error 
Mean 
.52874     
a. Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 1000 stratified bootstrap samples 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. 
Error 
Differenc
e 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
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Number of 
years of 
practice 
before first 
appointme
nt 
Equal 
variance
s 
assume
d 
6.45
7 
.011 
1.41
6 
709 .157 1.03280 .72934 
-
.39913 
2.4647
2 
Equal 
variance
s not 
assume
d 
  1.80
8 
80.119 .074 1.03280 .57113 
-
.10376 
2.1693
5 
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d. Cross analysis of the type of courts with range of years of experience prior to 
first judicial appointment 
 
 
Type of court 
Tot
al 
Magistra
tes  
Distr
ict  
Supre
me 
Court 
Juven
ile  
Traf
fic 
Fam
ily 
Labo
ur- 
Natio
nal 
Labou
r- 
Regio
nal 
Courts 
manage
ment 
Years 
prior to 
judicial 
appointm
ent 
up 
to 5 
yea
rs 
Count 6 3 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 13 
Expect
ed 
Count 
6.2 3.2 .3 .3 .5 1.2 .1 1.1 .0 
13.
0 
Adjust
ed 
Residu
al 
-.1 -.1 -.6 -.6 2.1 -1.1 -.4 -.1 5.1  
6 to 
10 
yea
rs 
Count 115 55 4 3 6 20 5 34 0 242 
Expect
ed 
Count 
115.0 59.9 5.8 5.8 9.5 21.8 2.4 21.1 .7 
242
.0 
Adjust
ed 
Residu
al 
.0 -.9 -.9 -1.4 -1.4 -.5 2.1 3.6 -1.0  
11 
to 
15 
yea
rs 
Count 127 61 6 7 11 20 2 16 0 250 
Expect
ed 
Count 
118.8 61.9 6.0 6.0 9.8 22.5 2.5 21.8 .7 
250
.0 
Adjust
ed 
Residu
al 
1.3 -.2 .0 .5 .5 -.7 -.4 -1.6 -1.0  
16 
to 
20 
yea
rs 
Count 63 34 3 3 7 17 0 10 1 138 
Expect
ed 
Count 
65.6 34.2 3.3 3.3 5.4 12.4 1.4 12.0 .4 
138
.0 
Adjust
ed 
Residu
al 
-.5 .0 -.2 -.2 .8 1.5 -1.3 -.7 1.1  
Count 26 21 4 4 2 6 0 1 0 64 
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21 
to 
30 
yea
rs 
Expect
ed 
Count 
30.4 15.8 1.5 1.5 2.5 5.8 .6 5.6 .2 
64.
0 
Adjust
ed 
Residu
al 
-1.2 1.6 2.1 2.1 -.4 .1 -.8 -2.1 -.4  
mor
e 
tha
n 
30 
yea
rs 
Count 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
Expect
ed 
Count 
1.9 1.0 .1 .1 .2 .4 .0 .3 .0 4.0 
Adjust
ed 
Residu
al 
-.9 1.2 -.3 -.3 -.4 1.1 -.2 -.6 -.1  
Total Count 338 176 17 17 28 64 7 62 2 711 
Expect
ed 
Count 
338.0 
176.
0 
17.0 17.0 28.0 64.0 7.0 62.0 2.0 
711
.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 73.633a 40 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 54.456 40 .063 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.506 1 .113 
N of Valid Cases 711   
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Appendix 8: statistical appendix- chapter 7 
This appendix sets out the statistical analyses conducted as part of chapter 7 (Lawyer 
Survey). It does not cover every singly statistical analysis that was carried out for the 
purpose of this study, as these are numerous. Instead, it focuses on the findings that arose 
from statistically significant cross analyses between variables, and elaborates on the 
important results displayed in chapter 7. 
The results of the significance tests (chi-square) and the outputs of the statistical package 
in which the analysis was conducted are displayed below by order of appearance in 
chapter 7. Each output table displays the actual count, the expected count, and the adjusted 
Pearson residuals, which indicate which cells in the table caused the ‘lack of fit’, i.e. 
contributed to the significant chi-square result. 
Commonly used abbreviations: 
PR= Pearson residuals 
Extent of agreement with various statements: 
 SA = strongly agree (1) 
 A=agree (2) 
 NAND= neither agree nor disagree (3) 
 D= disagree (4) 
 SD= strongly disagree (5) 
 DK= don't know (6) 
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Analysis in PART 1:  Demographics of lawyers 
1. Cross-examination self-defined Jewish ethnicity and type of academic institution 
 
 
Jewish Ethnicity 
Total 
othe
r 
Ashkenaz
i 
Ethiopia
n 
irrelevan
t 
mixe
d 
Sephardi
c 
forme
r 
USS
R 
Type of 
academi
c 
institutio
n 
universit
y 
Count 3 97 0 26 25 35 5 191 
Expecte
d Count 
3.9 84.6 .6 28.0 26.9 41.4 5.6 
191.
0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.7 2.7 -1.1 -.6 -.6 -1.7 -.4  
other Count 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Expecte
d Count 
.0 .4 .0 .1 .1 .2 .0 1.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.1 1.1 -.1 -.4 -.4 -.5 -.2  
irrelevan
t 
Count 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Expecte
d Count 
.0 .9 .0 .3 .3 .4 .1 2.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
4.8 -1.3 -.1 1.4 -.6 -.7 -.2  
college Count 3 53 1 23 23 39 5 147 
Expecte
d Count 
3.0 65.1 .4 21.6 20.7 31.9 4.3 
147.
0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.0 -2.7 1.2 .4 .7 1.9 .4  
Total Count 7 151 1 50 48 74 10 341 
Expecte
d Count 
7.0 151.0 1.0 50.0 48.0 74.0 10.0 
341.
0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 36.013a 18 .007 
Likelihood Ratio 19.843 18 .342 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.108 1 .013 
N of Valid Cases 341   
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Analysis in PART 2: Lawyers’ experiences and attitudes to the state, the judiciary 
and judicial diversity 
1. Link between perception of diversity in the Israeli judiciary and the level of 
trust in courts 
1.1 level of trust in courts and "the Israeli judiciary reflects the Israeli society" 
 
 
Level of trust in courts 
Total 
to a 
large 
extent 
to 
some 
extent 
to a 
small 
extent 
not 
at all 
don't 
know 
The Israeli judiciary reflects 
the Israeli society 
1 Count 4 3 0 0 0 7 
Expected 
Count 
2.9 2.8 1.0 .3 .0 7.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.8 .2 -1.1 -.5 -.2  
2 Count 34 12 3 2 0 51 
Expected 
Count 
21.2 20.1 7.4 1.9 .3 51.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
3.9 -2.5 -1.9 .1 -.6  
3 Count 30 23 5 1 0 59 
Expected 
Count 
24.6 23.3 8.6 2.2 .3 59.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.6 -.1 -1.5 -.9 -.6  
4 Count 66 73 20 4 2 165 
Expected 
Count 
68.7 65.1 24.1 6.2 .9 165.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.6 1.7 -1.2 -1.2 1.6  
5 Count 14 28 26 7 0 75 
Expected 
Count 
31.2 29.6 10.9 2.8 .4 75.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-4.5 -.4 5.5 2.8 -.7  
6 Count 6 7 0 0 0 13 
Expected 
Count 
5.4 5.1 1.9 .5 .1 13.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.3 1.1 -1.5 -.7 -.3  
Total Count 154 146 54 14 2 370 
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Expected 
Count 
154.0 146.0 54.0 14.0 2.0 370.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 63.305a 20 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 63.123 20 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 24.600 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 370   
. 
 
1.2  level of trust in courts with stand on the statement "the population of Israeli judges 
is diverse and reflects Israeli society" 
Crosstab 
 
The population of judges is diverse 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Level of trust in 
courts 
To a large 
extent 
Count 3 32 45 58 10 7 155 
Expected Count 2.1 20.9 41.8 65.6 19.6 5.0 155.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.8 3.4 .8 -1.6 -3.0 1.2  
to some extent Count 2 14 42 72 12 4 146 
Expected Count 2.0 19.7 39.4 61.8 18.5 4.7 146.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.0 -1.8 .6 2.2 -2.1 -.4  
to a small extent Count 0 3 11 21 20 0 55 
Expected Count .7 7.4 14.8 23.3 7.0 1.8 55.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.9 -1.9 -1.3 -.7 5.7 -1.5  
not at all Count 0 1 2 5 5 0 13 
Expected Count .2 1.8 3.5 5.5 1.6 .4 13.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.4 -.6 -1.0 -.3 2.8 -.7  
don't know Count 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Expected Count .0 .3 .5 .8 .3 .1 2.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.2 -.6 -.9 .2 -.5 3.7  
Total Count 5 50 100 157 47 12 371 
Expected Count 5.0 50.0 100.0 157.0 47.0 12.0 371.0 
 
 
438 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 41.809a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 46.264 9 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association .274 1 .601 
N of Valid Cases 490   
 
 
2. Cross analyses of various factors with stand on action for judicial diversity 
a. Action for judicial diversity and gender (non-significant but note differences 
between men and women) 
 
 
 
Gender 
Total other male female 
Action for judicial diversity Yes Count 1 155 88 244 
Expected Count .7 160.0 83.3 244.0 
Adjusted Residual .7 -1.2 1.1  
No Count 0 83 36 119 
Expected Count .3 78.0 40.7 119.0 
Adjusted Residual -.7 1.2 -1.1  
Total Count 1 238 124 363 
Expected Count 1.0 238.0 124.0 363.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.752a 2 .417 
Likelihood Ratio 2.070 2 .355 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.015 1 .314 
N of Valid Cases 363   
 
 
b. Action for judicial diversity and level of religious observance (non-significant 
but note the 'traditional' category') 
 
 
 
Level of religious observance 
Total other atheist religious 
very 
religious secular 
traditional 
(massorti) 
Yes Count 5 22 36 9 120 48 240 
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Action for 
judicial 
diversity 
Expected 
Count 
4.0 26.9 30.9 8.1 128.4 41.7 240.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.8 -1.7 1.7 .6 -1.9 1.9  
No Count 1 18 10 3 71 14 117 
Expected 
Count 
2.0 13.1 15.1 3.9 62.6 20.3 117.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.8 1.7 -1.7 -.6 1.9 -1.9  
Total Count 6 40 46 12 191 62 357 
Expected 
Count 
6.0 40.0 46.0 12.0 191.0 62.0 357.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.893a 5 .054 
Likelihood Ratio 11.218 5 .047 
Linear-by-Linear Association .268 1 .605 
N of Valid Cases 357   
. 
 
c. Action for judicial diversity and type of academic institution (non-significant but 
note the support in action amongst college students) 
 
 
 
Type of academic institution 
Total university other irrelevant college 
Action for judicial diversity Yes Count 130 1 2 129 262 
Expected Count 141.7 .7 2.0 117.6 262.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.5 .7 .0 2.5  
No Count 81 0 1 46 128 
Expected Count 69.3 .3 1.0 57.4 128.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.5 -.7 .0 -2.5  
Total Count 211 1 3 175 390 
Expected Count 211.0 1.0 3.0 175.0 390.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.845a 3 .077 
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Likelihood Ratio 7.210 3 .065 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.282 1 .012 
N of Valid Cases 390   
 
 
d. Action for judicial diversity and self-defined Jewish ethnicity 
 
 
 
Jewish ethnicity 
Total other Ashkenazi Ethiopian irrelevant mixed Sephardic 
Former 
USSR 
Action 
for 
judicial 
diversity 
Yes Count 3 85 1 35 35 61 9 229 
Expected 
Count 
4.7 102.5 .7 33.3 31.3 49.9 6.7 229.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.3 -4.0 .7 .6 1.2 3.1 1.6  
No Count 4 69 0 15 12 14 1 115 
Expected 
Count 
2.3 51.5 .3 16.7 15.7 25.1 3.3 115.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.3 4.0 -.7 -.6 -1.2 -3.1 -1.6  
Total Count 7 154 1 50 47 75 10 344 
Expected 
Count 
7.0 154.0 1.0 50.0 47.0 75.0 10.0 344.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.619a 6 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 23.805 6 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 21.722 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 344   
a. 5 cells (35.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .33. 
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e. Link between action for judicial diversity in Israel and military service 
 
 
Military service 
Total yes no no but national service 
Action for judicial diversity Yes Count 206 15 17 238 
Expected Count 212.5 12.8 12.8 238.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.4 1.1 2.1  
No Count 110 4 2 116 
Expected Count 103.5 6.2 6.2 116.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.4 -1.1 -2.1  
Total Count 316 19 19 354 
Expected Count 316.0 19.0 19.0 354.0 
  
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.048a 2 .049 
Likelihood Ratio 7.046 2 .030 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.013 1 .014 
N of Valid Cases 354   
. 
f. Link between action for judicial diversity and definition as Israeli  
 
 
Self-definition as Israeli 
Total 
not at 
all 
to a small 
extent 
to some 
extent absolutely 
Action for judicial 
diversity 
Yes Count 2 3 17 223 245 
Expected Count 1.3 2.7 12.0 229.1 245.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.0 .4 2.6 -2.7  
No Count 0 1 1 122 124 
Expected Count .7 1.3 6.0 115.9 124.0 
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Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.0 -.4 -2.6 2.7  
Total Count 2 4 18 345 369 
Expected Count 2.0 4.0 18.0 345.0 369.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.970a 3 .047 
Likelihood Ratio 10.633 3 .014 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.459 1 .019 
N of Valid Cases 369   
. 
 
g. link between action for judicial diversity and satisfaction with the professional 
level of judges 
 
 
 
Satisfaction with the professional level of judges 
Total 
           
1 
           
2 
           
3 
           
4 
           
5 
           
6 
Action for judicial 
diversity 
Yes Count 15 83 64 69 26 10 267 
Expected 
Count 
20.4 80.4 73.2 62.6 21.8 8.6 267.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.1 .6 -2.2 1.6 1.6 .9  
No Count 16 39 47 26 7 3 138 
Expected 
Count 
10.6 41.6 37.8 32.4 11.2 4.4 138.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.1 -.6 2.2 -1.6 -1.6 -.9  
Total Count 31 122 111 95 33 13 405 
Expected 
Count 
31.0 122.0 111.0 95.0 33.0 13.0 405.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.896a 5 .024 
Likelihood Ratio 12.872 5 .025 
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Linear-by-Linear Association 5.678 1 .017 
N of Valid Cases 405   
 
 
h. Efficiency of courts 
 
 
Satisfaction with the efficiency of courts 
Total 
           
1 
           
2 
           
3 
           
4 
           
5 
           
6 
Action for judicial 
diversity 
Yes Count 4 24 63 98 69 11 269 
Expected 
Count 
4.0 28.5 73.5 92.8 61.6 8.6 269.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.0 -1.5 -2.5 1.2 1.8 1.4  
No Count 2 19 48 42 24 2 137 
Expected 
Count 
2.0 14.5 37.5 47.2 31.4 4.4 137.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.0 1.5 2.5 -1.2 -1.8 -1.4  
Total Count 6 43 111 140 93 13 406 
Expected 
Count 
6.0 43.0 111.0 140.0 93.0 13.0 406.0 
  
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 12.036a 5 .034 
Likelihood Ratio 12.203 5 .032 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.704 1 .002 
N of Valid Cases 406   
. 
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i. Trust in courts 
 
Crosstab 
 
Level of trust in courts 
Total 
to a large 
extent 
to some 
extent 
to a small 
extent 
not at 
all 
don't 
know 
Action for judicial 
diversity 
Yes Count 82 105 46 10 2 245 
Expected 
Count 
102.2 96.9 36.5 8.0 1.3 245.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-4.5 1.8 2.9 1.3 1.0  
No Count 72 41 9 2 0 124 
Expected 
Count 
51.8 49.1 18.5 4.0 .7 124.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
4.5 -1.8 -2.9 -1.3 -1.0  
Total Count 154 146 55 12 2 369 
Expected 
Count 
154.0 146.0 55.0 12.0 2.0 369.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 23.811a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 25.078 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 21.873 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 369   
. 
j. Attitudes towards the importance of judicial diversity  
Judicial diversity is an important component in the courts' legitimacy 
 
 
Judicial diversity is part of legitimacy 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Action for judicial diversity Yes Count 102 129 24 11 2 0 268 
Expected Count 77.2 123.4 35.0 23.1 7.9 1.3 268.0 
Adjusted Residual 5.7 1.2 -3.4 -4.5 -3.7 -2.0  
No Count 15 58 29 24 10 2 138 
Expected Count 39.8 63.6 18.0 11.9 4.1 .7 138.0 
Adjusted Residual -5.7 -1.2 3.4 4.5 3.7 2.0  
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Total Count 117 187 53 35 12 2 406 
Expected Count 117.0 187.0 53.0 35.0 12.0 2.0 406.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 69.815a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 71.875 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 69.015 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 406   
. 
Judges’ professionalism is the only relevant factor (non-significant) 
 
 
Judges’ professional conduct is the only relevant factor 
to ensure public trust 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Action for judicial 
diversity 
Yes Count 68 94 44 51 11 268 
Expected 
Count 
75.3 94.4 42.2 48.8 7.3 268.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.7 -.1 .5 .6 2.4  
No Count 46 49 20 23 0 138 
Expected 
Count 
38.7 48.6 21.8 25.2 3.7 138.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.7 .1 -.5 -.6 -2.4  
Total Count 114 143 64 74 11 406 
Expected 
Count 
114.0 143.0 64.0 74.0 11.0 406.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.218a 4 .084 
Likelihood Ratio 11.645 4 .020 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.039 1 .025 
N of Valid Cases 406   
. 
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Judges are objective and professional decision-makers 
 
 
Judges are objective, neutral decision-
makers 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Action for judicial 
diversity 
Yes Count 15 95 68 66 25 269 
Expected Count 23.2 101.4 62.3 63.6 18.6 269.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.1 -1.4 1.4 .6 2.7  
No Count 20 58 26 30 3 137 
Expected Count 11.8 51.6 31.7 32.4 9.4 137.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
3.1 1.4 -1.4 -.6 -2.7  
Total Count 35 153 94 96 28 406 
Expected Count 35.0 153.0 94.0 96.0 28.0 406.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.224a 4 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 19.078 4 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 13.216 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 406   
. 
 
Judges’ background characteristics have no bearing on their decision-making 
 
 
Background characteristics of judges are irrelevant to 
decision-making 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Action for judicial 
diversity 
Yes Count 13 29 49 117 58 2 268 
Expected 
Count 
15.2 38.9 48.2 115.5 48.2 2.0 268.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.0 -3.0 .2 .3 2.7 .0  
No Count 10 30 24 58 15 1 138 
Expected 
Count 
7.8 20.1 24.8 59.5 24.8 1.0 138.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.0 3.0 -.2 -.3 -2.7 .0  
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Total Count 23 59 73 175 73 3 406 
Expected 
Count 
23.0 59.0 73.0 175.0 73.0 3.0 406.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
14.371a 5 .013 
Likelihood Ratio 14.451 5 .013 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
10.755 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 406   
. 
Background characteristics of parties have no bearing on judicial decision-making 
 
 
Background Characteristics of Parties have no bearing on 
judicial decision-making 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Action for 
judicial diversity 
Yes Count 13 44 58 104 46 2 267 
Expected 
Count 
16.5 55.4 59.3 97.6 35.6 2.6 267.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.5 -2.9 -.3 1.4 3.2 -.7  
No Count 12 40 32 44 8 2 138 
Expected 
Count 
8.5 28.6 30.7 50.4 18.4 1.4 138.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.5 2.9 .3 -1.4 -3.2 .7  
Total Count 25 84 90 148 54 4 405 
Expected 
Count 
25.0 84.0 90.0 148.0 54.0 4.0 405.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.718a 5 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 20.631 5 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 15.685 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 405   
. 
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Judges sit in an ivory tower detached from daily life 
 
 
Judges sit in an ivory tower 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Action for judicial diversity Yes Count 20 68 79 87 14 268 
Expected Count 14.6 59.6 76.1 91.3 26.5 268.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.5 2.1 .7 -1.0 -4.4  
No Count 2 22 36 51 26 137 
Expected Count 7.4 30.4 38.9 46.7 13.5 137.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.5 -2.1 -.7 1.0 4.4  
Total Count 22 90 115 138 40 405 
Expected Count 22.0 90.0 115.0 138.0 40.0 405.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 27.849a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 28.242 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 22.939 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 405   
. 
k. Attitudes on the diversity of the Israeli judiciary 
The judiciary should reflect the Israeli society 
 
 
The composition of the judiciary should reflect the 
society 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Action for judicial 
diversity 
Yes Count 93 105 39 28 3 268 
Expected 
Count 
66.8 96.6 45.0 44.3 15.2 268.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
6.4 1.8 -1.7 -4.6 -5.5  
No Count 8 41 29 39 20 137 
Expected 
Count 
34.2 49.4 23.0 22.7 7.8 137.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-6.4 -1.8 1.7 4.6 5.5  
Total Count 101 146 68 67 23 405 
Expected 
Count 
101.0 146.0 68.0 67.0 23.0 405.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 81.595a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 87.345 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 80.164 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 405   
 
The Israeli judiciary reflects the composition of the Israeli society 
 
 
The composition of the Israeli judiciary reflects 
Israeli society 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Action for judicial 
diversity 
Yes Count 1 28 36 130 68 5 268 
Expected 
Count 
4.7 41.3 42.7 118.7 52.0 8.7 268.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.0 -3.9 -1.9 2.4 4.3 -2.2  
No Count 6 34 28 48 10 8 134 
Expected 
Count 
2.3 20.7 21.3 59.3 26.0 4.3 134.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
3.0 3.9 1.9 -2.4 -4.3 2.2  
Total Count 7 62 64 178 78 13 402 
Expected 
Count 
7.0 62.0 64.0 178.0 78.0 13.0 402.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 47.341a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 48.341 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 26.402 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 402   
. 
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The Israeli judiciary reflects the population of Israeli lawyers 
 
 
The composition of the Israeli judiciary reflects the 
composition of the legal profession 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Action for 
judicial diversity 
Yes Count 7 43 60 102 44 12 268 
Expected 
Count 
7.3 51.7 64.3 90.9 37.1 16.6 268.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.2 -2.3 -1.1 2.5 2.1 -2.0  
No Count 4 35 37 35 12 13 136 
Expected 
Count 
3.7 26.3 32.7 46.1 18.9 8.4 136.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.2 2.3 1.1 -2.5 -2.1 2.0  
Total Count 11 78 97 137 56 25 404 
Expected 
Count 
11.0 78.0 97.0 137.0 56.0 25.0 404.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.855a 5 .005 
Likelihood Ratio 16.922 5 .005 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.186 1 .074 
N of Valid Cases 404   
. 
 Israeli judicial system is characterised by secularism 
 
 
The judiciary is secular 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Action for judicial diversity Yes Count 30 105 86 38 5 4 268 
Expected Count 20.5 101.9 92.6 39.7 7.9 5.3 268.0 
Adjusted Residual 3.7 .7 -1.5 -.5 -1.8 -1.0  
No Count 1 49 54 22 7 4 137 
Expected Count 10.5 52.1 47.4 20.3 4.1 2.7 137.0 
Adjusted Residual -3.7 -.7 1.5 .5 1.8 1.0  
Total Count 31 154 140 60 12 8 405 
Expected Count 31.0 154.0 140.0 60.0 12.0 8.0 405.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 19.025a 5 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 23.866 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 11.675 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 405   
. 
 
Israeli judicial system has a clear political orientation 
 
 
The judiciary has a political orientation 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Action for judicial diversity Yes Count 32 48 84 77 27 1 269 
Expected Count 23.2 39.8 82.8 80.2 41.1 2.0 269.0 
Adjusted Residual 3.3 2.4 .3 -.7 -4.1 -1.2  
No Count 3 12 41 44 35 2 137 
Expected Count 11.8 20.2 42.2 40.8 20.9 1.0 137.0 
Adjusted Residual -3.3 -2.4 -.3 .7 4.1 1.2  
Total Count 35 60 125 121 62 3 406 
Expected Count 35.0 60.0 125.0 121.0 62.0 3.0 406.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 31.164a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 33.056 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 28.930 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 406   
. 
Israeli judicial system is balanced and fair 
 
 
The Israeli judicial system is balanced and 
fair 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Action for judicial 
diversity 
Yes Count 8 63 103 65 29 1 269 
Expected Count 13.9 76.2 97.4 59.0 21.9 .7 269.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.8 -3.1 1.2 1.5 2.7 .7  
No Count 13 52 44 24 4 0 137 
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Expected Count 7.1 38.8 49.6 30.0 11.1 .3 137.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.8 3.1 -1.2 -1.5 -2.7 -.7  
Total Count 21 115 147 89 33 1 406 
Expected Count 21.0 115.0 147.0 89.0 33.0 1.0 406.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.414a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 25.288 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 22.331 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 406   
 
The state of judicial diversity will improve over time 
 
 
The judiciary will diversify over time 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Action for judicial 
diversity 
Yes Count 30 82 81 44 8 21 266 
Expected Count 
29.0 99.0 77.2 31.0 7.9 21.8 266.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.3 -3.7 .9 4.3 .0 -.3  
No Count 14 68 36 3 4 12 137 
Expected Count 
15.0 51.0 39.8 16.0 4.1 11.2 137.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.3 3.7 -.9 -4.3 .0 .3  
Total Count 44 150 117 47 12 33 403 
Expected Count 
44.0 150.0 117.0 47.0 12.0 33.0 403.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 25.284a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 29.683 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.215 1 .040 
N of Valid Cases 403   
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l. Cross analysis of stand on fairness of Israeli courts and whether the Israeli 
judiciary should reflect the composition of society 
 
 
The Israeli judiciary reflects the Israeli 
society 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 
The Israeli judiciary is balanced 
and fair 
1 Count 3 6 4 6 2 2 23 
Expected 
Count 
.4 3.5 3.7 10.1 4.5 .7 23.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
4.0 1.5 .2 -1.8 -1.3 1.6  
2 Count 3 28 26 48 10 5 120 
Expected 
Count 
2.3 18.3 19.4 52.9 23.4 3.7 120.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.6 2.9 1.9 -1.1 -3.7 .8  
3 Count 2 25 30 73 17 5 152 
Expected 
Count 
2.9 23.2 24.6 67.0 29.7 4.7 152.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.7 .5 1.5 1.2 -3.2 .2  
4 Count 0 5 7 49 28 0 89 
Expected 
Count 
1.7 13.6 14.4 39.2 17.4 2.8 89.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.5 -2.8 -2.4 2.4 3.2 -1.9  
5 Count 0 0 1 8 25 1 35 
Expected 
Count 
.7 5.3 5.7 15.4 6.8 1.1 35.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.9 -2.6 -2.2 -2.6 8.1 -.1  
6 Count 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Expected 
Count 
.0 .2 .2 .4 .2 .0 1.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.1 -.4 -.4 1.1 -.5 -.2  
Total Count 8 64 68 185 82 13 420 
Expected 
Count 
8.0 64.0 68.0 185.0 82.0 13.0 420.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 131.547a 25 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 119.888 25 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 54.401 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 420   
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m. Cross analysis between position regarding affirmative action and support in 
action for judicial diversity 
 
 
Affirmative Action 
Tota
l 
Missin
g 
oth
er 
people 
with 
disabiliti
es 
none
 of 
the 
grou
ps 
Orhodo
x 
and/or 
religiou
s jews 
ephardS
ic jews 
omW
en 
Oli
m 
rabA
s 
LGB
T 
Action 
for 
judicia
l 
diversi
ty 
Ye
s 
Count 32 11 70 34 10 34 24 22 29 5 271 
Expect
ed 
Count 
32.5 
13.
3 
74.9 40.4 8.6 23.2 24.5 
22.
5 
26.5 4.6 
271.
0 
Adjuste
d 
Residu
al 
-.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.9 .8 4.0 -.2 -.2 .9 .3  
No Count 17 9 43 27 3 1 13 12 11 2 138 
Expect
ed 
Count 
16.5 6.7 38.1 20.6 4.4 11.8 12.5 
11.
5 
13.5 2.4 
138.
0 
Adjuste
d 
Residu
al 
.2 1.1 1.1 1.9 -.8 -4.0 .2 .2 -.9 -.3  
Total Count 49 20 113 61 13 35 37 34 40 7 409 
Expect
ed 
Count 
49.0 
20.
0 
113.0 61.0 13.0 35.0 37.0 
34.
0 
40.0 7.0 
409.
0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 21.557a 9 .010 
Likelihood Ratio 27.587 9 .001 
N of Valid Cases 409   
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n. Stand on action for judicial diversity and previous experiences of discrimination 
On the grounds of religion (at work) 
 
 
Q53Discrimination.Religion.Work 
Total No Yes 
Action for judicial diversity Yes Count 251 20 271 
Expected Count 256.4 14.6 271.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.5 2.5  
No Count 136 2 138 
Expected Count 130.6 7.4 138.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.5 -2.5  
Total Count 387 22 409 
Expected Count 387.0 22.0 409.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.319a 1 .012   
Continuity Correctionb 5.208 1 .022   
Likelihood Ratio 7.743 1 .005   
Fisher's Exact Test    .010 .007 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.304 1 .012   
N of Valid Cases 409     
 
On the grounds of ethnicity (at work) 
 
 
Q53Discrimination.Ethnicity.Work 
Total No Yes 
Action for judicial diversity Yes Count 241 30 271 
Expected Count 248.5 22.5 271.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.8 2.8  
No Count 134 4 138 
Expected Count 126.5 11.5 138.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.8 -2.8  
Total Count 375 34 409 
Expected Count 375.0 34.0 409.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.011a 1 .005   
Continuity Correctionb 6.974 1 .008   
Likelihood Ratio 9.417 1 .002   
Fisher's Exact Test    .004 .002 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.991 1 .005   
N of Valid Cases 409     
 
 
PART 3: Professional intentions of Israeli lawyers 
1. Cross-analysis of likelihood of being appointed to the judiciary with various 
factors 
a. Type of academic institution (non-significant but note university and 'very high') 
 
 
 
Type of academic institution 
Total university other irrelevant college 
Chances of being appointed to the 
judiciary 
moderate Count 68 0 0 65 133 
Expected Count 68.4 .3 1.3 63.0 133.0 
Adjusted Residual -.1 -.6 -1.4 .4  
high Count 81 0 2 71 154 
Expected Count 79.2 .3 1.5 73.0 154.0 
Adjusted Residual .4 -.7 .4 -.4  
very high Count 25 0 0 12 37 
Expected Count 19.0 .1 .4 17.5 37.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.0 -.3 -.6 -1.9  
don't know Count 40 0 3 47 90 
Expected Count 46.3 .2 .9 42.7 90.0 
Adjusted Residual -1.5 -.5 2.4 1.0  
low Count 32 1 0 28 61 
Expected Count 31.4 .1 .6 28.9 61.0 
Adjusted Residual .2 2.7 -.8 -.2  
very low Count 10 0 0 13 23 
Expected Count 11.8 .0 .2 10.9 23.0 
Adjusted Residual -.8 -.2 -.5 .9  
Total Count 256 1 5 236 498 
Expected Count 256.0 1.0 5.0 236.0 498.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 20.517a 15 .153 
Likelihood Ratio 18.302 15 .247 
Linear-by-Linear Association .290 1 .590 
N of Valid Cases 498   
. 
b. Satisfaction with the legal profession (non-significant but note those very 
satisfied and estimating their chances as 'high') 
 
 
Satisfaction with the legal profession 
Total 
strongly 
agree agree 
neither 
agree nor 
disagree disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
don't 
know 
Chances of 
being 
appointed to 
the judiciary 
moderate Count 23 71 29 10 6 1 140 
Expected 
Count 
30.8 69.3 21.8 11.7 4.6 1.6 140.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.9 .3 2.0 -.6 .8 -.6  
high Count 45 84 15 9 4 1 158 
Expected 
Count 
34.8 78.2 24.6 13.2 5.2 1.8 158.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.4 1.1 -2.5 -1.5 -.7 -.8  
very high Count 9 17 4 5 2 0 37 
Expected 
Count 
8.2 18.3 5.8 3.1 1.2 .4 37.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.4 -.5 -.8 1.2 .7 -.7  
don't 
know 
Count 19 49 15 7 1 2 93 
Expected 
Count 
20.5 46.0 14.5 7.8 3.1 1.1 93.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.4 .7 .2 -.3 -1.3 1.0  
low Count 14 25 11 7 3 1 61 
Expected 
Count 
13.4 30.2 9.5 5.1 2.0 .7 61.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.2 -1.4 .6 .9 .7 .4  
very low Count 3 8 6 5 1 1 24 
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Expected 
Count 
5.3 11.9 3.7 2.0 .8 .3 24.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.2 -1.6 1.3 2.3 .2 1.4  
Total Count 113 254 80 43 17 6 513 
Expected 
Count 
113.0 254.0 80.0 43.0 17.0 6.0 513.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 32.283a 25 .150 
Likelihood Ratio 31.477 25 .174 
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.188 1 .074 
N of Valid Cases 513   
. 
 
c. Age group 
 
 
 
Age group 
Total 
18 - 
24 
25- 
34 
35 - 
44 
45 - 
54 
55 - 
64 other 
Chances of being 
appointed to the judiciary 
moderate Count 0 33 34 26 5 4 102 
Expected 
Count 
.3 25.0 28.9 25.3 13.5 9.1 102.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.6 2.2 1.3 .2 -2.9 -2.1  
high Count 0 24 34 30 15 11 114 
Expected 
Count 
.3 28.0 32.3 28.3 15.1 10.1 114.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.7 -1.0 .4 .5 .0 .3  
very high Count 0 1 7 8 6 7 29 
Expected 
Count 
.1 7.1 8.2 7.2 3.8 2.6 29.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.3 -2.7 -.5 .4 1.2 3.0  
don't 
know 
Count 0 20 14 12 11 8 65 
Expected 
Count 
.2 15.9 18.4 16.1 8.6 5.8 65.0 
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Adjusted 
Residual 
-.5 1.3 -1.3 -1.3 1.0 1.1  
low Count 1 11 13 11 5 1 42 
Expected 
Count 
.1 10.3 11.9 10.4 5.5 3.7 42.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.8 .3 .4 .2 -.3 -1.6  
very low Count 0 2 3 5 7 2 19 
Expected 
Count 
.1 4.7 5.4 4.7 2.5 1.7 19.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.2 -1.5 -1.2 .2 3.1 .3  
Total Count 1 91 105 92 49 33 371 
Expected 
Count 
1.0 91.0 105.0 92.0 49.0 33.0 371.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 52.224a 25 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 50.144 25 .002 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.720 1 .017 
N of Valid Cases 371   
 
d. Seniority in the legal profession 
 
 
 
Years in the profession 
Total Missing 
10-15 
years 
5-10 
years 
more 
than 15 
years 
less 
than 5 
years 
Chances of being 
appointed to the 
judiciary 
moderate Count 5 19 37 35 45 141 
Expected 
Count 
10.1 19.6 28.3 42.4 40.8 141.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.9 -.2 2.2 -1.6 .9  
high Count 9 23 29 53 46 160 
Expected 
Count 
11.4 22.2 32.1 48.1 46.2 160.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.9 .2 -.7 1.0 -.1  
very high Count 1 7 2 23 5 38 
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Expected 
Count 
2.7 5.3 7.6 11.4 11.0 38.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.1 .8 -2.4 4.3 -2.2  
don't 
know 
Count 12 10 15 25 32 94 
Expected 
Count 
6.7 13.0 18.8 28.3 27.2 94.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.3 -1.0 -1.1 -.8 1.2  
low Count 7 6 19 12 17 61 
Expected 
Count 
4.3 8.5 12.2 18.3 17.6 61.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.4 -1.0 2.3 -1.9 -.2  
very low Count 3 7 2 8 5 25 
Expected 
Count 
1.8 3.5 5.0 7.5 7.2 25.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.0 2.1 -1.5 .2 -1.0  
Total Count 37 72 104 156 150 519 
Expected 
Count 
37.0 72.0 104.0 156.0 150.0 519.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 51.271a 20 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 50.410 20 .000 
N of Valid Cases 519   
. 
e. Level of trust in courts 
 
 
 
Level of trust in courts 
Total 
to a large 
extent 
to some 
extent 
to a small 
extent 
not at 
all 
don't 
know 
Chances of being 
appointed to the 
judiciary 
moderate Count 42 48 11 1 0 102 
Expected 
Count 
42.7 40.2 14.8 3.8 .5 102.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.2 1.9 -1.2 -1.7 -.9  
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high Count 56 39 15 4 0 114 
Expected 
Count 
47.7 44.9 16.5 4.3 .6 114.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.9 -1.4 -.5 -.2 -.9  
very high Count 16 6 4 3 1 30 
Expected 
Count 
12.5 11.8 4.3 1.1 .2 30.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.3 -2.3 -.2 1.9 2.2  
don't 
know 
Count 27 26 11 2 0 66 
Expected 
Count 
27.6 26.0 9.6 2.5 .4 66.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.2 .0 .6 -.3 -.7  
low Count 13 15 11 3 0 42 
Expected 
Count 
17.6 16.6 6.1 1.6 .2 42.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.5 -.5 2.3 1.2 -.5  
very low Count 2 13 2 1 1 19 
Expected 
Count 
7.9 7.5 2.8 .7 .1 19.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.8 2.7 -.5 .4 2.9  
Total Count 156 147 54 14 2 373 
Expected 
Count 
156.0 147.0 54.0 14.0 2.0 373.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 43.711a 20 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 38.592 20 .007 
Linear-by-Linear Association 10.243 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 373   
. 
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f. Income level 
 
 
Income level 
Total 
not 
working 
well 
above 
average 
well 
below 
average 
above 
average 
below 
average 
about 
the 
same as 
average 
Chances of 
being 
appointed 
to the 
judiciary 
moderate Count 0 22 5 40 9 23 99 
Expected 
Count 
1.9 28.1 4.1 38.5 9.9 16.5 99.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.6 -1.6 .5 .4 -.4 2.1  
high Count 0 41 3 43 6 14 107 
Expected 
Count 
2.1 30.3 4.5 41.6 10.7 17.8 107.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.7 2.7 -.8 .3 -1.8 -1.2  
very high Count 1 14 2 7 0 5 29 
Expected 
Count 
.6 8.2 1.2 11.3 2.9 4.8 29.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.6 2.5 .8 -1.7 -1.9 .1  
don't 
know 
Count 5 18 2 21 10 8 64 
Expected 
Count 
1.2 18.1 2.7 24.9 6.4 10.7 64.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
3.7 .0 -.5 -1.1 1.7 -1.0  
low Count 0 5 1 21 8 8 43 
Expected 
Count 
.8 12.2 1.8 16.7 4.3 7.2 43.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.0 -2.6 -.6 1.4 2.0 .4  
very low Count 1 2 2 8 3 2 18 
Expected 
Count 
.4 5.1 .8 7.0 1.8 3.0 18.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.1 -1.7 1.5 .5 1.0 -.6  
Total Count 7 102 15 140 36 60 360 
Expected 
Count 
7.0 102.0 15.0 140.0 36.0 60.0 360.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 55.876a 25 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 57.805 25 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association .039 1 .843 
N of Valid Cases 360   
. 
g. Previous experiences of discrimination 
On grounds of nationality (in courts) 
 
 
Discrimination nationality 
court 
Total No Yes 
Chances of being appointed to the 
judiciary 
moderate Count 138 3 141 
Expected Count 135.8 5.2 141.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.1 -1.1  
high Count 155 5 160 
Expected Count 154.1 5.9 160.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.4 -.4  
very high Count 34 4 38 
Expected Count 36.6 1.4 38.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.3 2.3  
don't 
know 
Count 90 4 94 
Expected Count 90.6 3.4 94.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.3 .3  
low Count 61 0 61 
Expected Count 58.8 2.2 61.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.6 -1.6  
very low Count 22 3 25 
Expected Count 24.1 .9 25.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.3 2.3  
Total Count 500 19 519 
Expected Count 500.0 19.0 519.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.490a 5 .019 
Likelihood Ratio 12.440 5 .029 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.290 1 .256 
N of Valid Cases 519   
. 
 
On grounds of religion (in courts) 
 
 
Discrimination religion court 
Total No Yes 
Chances of being 
appointed to the judiciary 
moderate Count 137 4 141 
Expected Count 136.4 4.6 141.0 
Adjusted Residual .3 -.3  
high Count 158 2 160 
Expected Count 154.8 5.2 160.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.7 -1.7  
very high Count 33 5 38 
Expected Count 36.8 1.2 38.0 
Adjusted Residual -3.6 3.6  
don't know Count 93 1 94 
Expected Count 90.9 3.1 94.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.3 -1.3  
low Count 60 1 61 
Expected Count 59.0 2.0 61.0 
Adjusted Residual .8 -.8  
very low Count 21 4 25 
Expected Count 24.2 .8 25.0 
Adjusted Residual -3.7 3.7  
Total Count 502 17 519 
Expected Count 502.0 17.0 519.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 28.614a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 18.927 5 .002 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.507 1 .113 
N of Valid Cases 519   
. 
 
On grounds of ethnicity (in courts) 
 
 
Discrimination ethnicity court 
Total No Yes 
Chances of being 
appointed to the judiciary 
moderate Count 132 9 141 
Expected Count 132.0 9.0 141.0 
Adjusted Residual .0 .0  
high Count 151 9 160 
Expected Count 149.8 10.2 160.0 
Adjusted Residual .5 -.5  
very high Count 33 5 38 
Expected Count 35.6 2.4 38.0 
Adjusted Residual -1.8 1.8  
don't know Count 91 3 94 
Expected Count 88.0 6.0 94.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.4 -1.4  
low Count 59 2 61 
Expected Count 57.1 3.9 61.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.0 -1.0  
very low Count 20 5 25 
Expected Count 23.4 1.6 25.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.9 2.9  
Total Count 486 33 519 
Expected Count 486.0 33.0 519.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.464a 5 .019 
Likelihood Ratio 10.696 5 .058 
Linear-by-Linear Association .285 1 .593 
N of Valid Cases 519   
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. 
h. Perception of success in Israeli society 
Education is the most important component in success 
 
 
Education 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Chances of being appointed to the 
judiciary 
moderate Count 42 51 2 1 0 96 
Expected Count 48.4 40.9 5.9 .5 .3 96.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.5 2.4 -1.9 .7 -.6  
high Count 62 42 7 0 1 112 
Expected Count 56.5 47.7 6.9 .6 .3 112.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.3 -1.3 .1 
-
1.0 
1.5  
very high Count 21 4 3 0 0 28 
Expected Count 14.1 11.9 1.7 .2 .1 28.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.7 -3.2 1.1 -.4 -.3  
don't 
know 
Count 37 24 2 0 0 63 
Expected Count 31.8 26.8 3.9 .4 .2 63.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.5 -.8 -1.1 -.7 -.5  
low Count 15 21 4 1 0 41 
Expected Count 20.7 17.5 2.5 .2 .1 41.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.9 1.2 1.0 1.7 -.4  
very low Count 4 11 4 0 0 19 
Expected Count 9.6 8.1 1.2 .1 .1 19.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.6 1.4 2.8 -.3 -.2  
Total Count 181 153 22 2 1 359 
Expected Count 181.0 153.0 22.0 2.0 1.0 359.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 39.580a 20 .006 
Likelihood Ratio 39.908 20 .005 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.691 1 .101 
N of Valid Cases 359   
. 
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Nationality and/or religion are the most important components in success 
 
 
Nationality and religion 
Total 1 2 3 4 5 
Chances of being appointed to the 
judiciary 
moderate Count 24 58 13 2 0 97 
Expected Count 25.1 51.8 17.2 2.2 .8 97.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.3 1.5 -1.3 -.1 
-
1.1 
 
high Count 26 71 12 1 2 112 
Expected Count 28.9 59.8 19.8 2.5 .9 112.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.8 2.6 -2.3 
-
1.2 
1.3  
very high Count 7 9 8 2 0 26 
Expected Count 6.7 13.9 4.6 .6 .2 26.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.1 -2.0 1.8 1.9 -.5  
don't 
know 
Count 20 26 15 1 1 63 
Expected Count 16.3 33.6 11.1 1.4 .5 63.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.2 -2.1 1.4 -.4 .7  
low Count 7 20 11 2 0 40 
Expected Count 10.3 21.3 7.1 .9 .3 40.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.3 -.5 1.7 1.2 -.6  
very low Count 8 6 4 0 0 18 
Expected Count 4.7 9.6 3.2 .4 .2 18.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.9 -1.7 .5 -.7 -.4  
Total Count 92 190 63 8 3 356 
Expected Count 92.0 190.0 63.0 8.0 3.0 356.0 
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2. Intentions to apply for a judicial position in the future: 
a. Age  
 
 
Age group 
Total 18 - 24 25- 34 35 - 44 45 - 54 55 - 64 Other 
Judicial career Maybe Count 0 37 38 37 11 3 126 
Expected Count .3 30.6 36.3 31.2 16.5 11.1 126.0 
Adjusted Residual -.7 1.6 .4 1.5 -1.8 -3.1  
Yes Count 1 33 45 24 6 0 109 
Expected Count .3 26.5 31.4 27.0 14.2 9.6 109.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.6 1.7 3.4 -.8 -2.8 -3.9  
No Count 0 18 23 25 27 24 117 
Expected Count .3 28.4 33.7 29.0 15.3 10.3 117.0 
Adjusted Residual -.7 -2.7 -2.6 -1.0 3.9 5.4  
Irrelevant Count 0 3 2 7 5 6 23 
Expected Count .1 5.6 6.6 5.7 3.0 2.0 23.0 
Adjusted Residual -.3 -1.3 -2.2 .6 1.3 3.0  
Total Count 1 91 108 93 49 33 375 
Expected Count 1.0 91.0 108.0 93.0 49.0 33.0 375.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 83.683a 15 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 89.197 15 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 41.983 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 375   
 
b. Seniority (years) in the profession 
 
 
Seniority in the profession 
Total 
10-15 
years 
5-10 
years 
more than 15 
years 
less than 5 
years 
Judicial 
career 
Maybe Count 25 46 46 54 171 
Expected 
Count 
26.2 36.3 55.8 52.7 171.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.3 2.2 -2.0 .3  
Yes Count 22 32 26 55 135 
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Expected 
Count 
20.7 28.7 44.1 41.6 135.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.4 .8 -3.9 2.9  
No Count 25 26 78 34 163 
Expected 
Count 
24.9 34.6 53.2 50.2 163.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.0 -2.0 5.1 -3.4  
Irrelevant Count 3 0 10 8 21 
Expected 
Count 
3.2 4.5 6.9 6.5 21.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.1 -2.4 1.5 .7  
Total Count 75 104 160 151 490 
Expected 
Count 
75.0 104.0 160.0 151.0 490.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 41.809a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 46.264 9 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association .274 1 .601 
N of Valid Cases 490   
. 
c. Jewish ethnicity 
 
 
Jewish ethnicity 
Total 
othe
r 
Ashkenaz
i 
Ethiopia
n 
irrelevan
t 
mixe
d 
Sephardi
c 
forme
r 
USSR 
Judicia
l 
career 
Maybe Count 1 49 0 18 24 27 4 123 
Expecte
d Count 
2.4 54.7 .3 17.7 17.3 27.0 3.5 
123.
0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.1 -1.3 -.7 .1 2.1 .0 .4  
Yes Count 3 45 1 11 14 25 4 103 
Expecte
d Count 
2.0 45.8 .3 14.8 14.5 22.6 2.9 
103.
0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.8 -.2 1.6 -1.3 -.2 .7 .8  
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No Count 0 56 0 18 10 24 2 110 
Expecte
d Count 
2.2 49.0 .3 15.8 15.5 24.2 3.1 
110.
0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.8 1.6 -.7 .7 -1.8 .0 -.8  
Irrelevan
t 
Count 3 8 0 4 2 2 0 19 
Expecte
d Count 
.4 8.5 .1 2.7 2.7 4.2 .5 19.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
4.5 -.2 -.2 .9 -.5 -1.2 -.8  
Total Count 7 158 1 51 50 78 10 355 
Expecte
d Count 
7.0 158.0 1.0 51.0 50.0 78.0 10.0 
355.
0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 35.360a 18 .009 
Likelihood Ratio 27.387 18 .072 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.737 1 .030 
N of Valid Cases 355   
. 
d. Previous experiences of discrimination - On the grounds of religion (at work) 
 
 
Discrimination Religion Work 
Total No Yes 
Judicial career Maybe Count 177 5 182 
Expected Count 174.5 7.5 182.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.2 -1.2  
Yes Count 139 10 149 
Expected Count 142.8 6.2 149.0 
Adjusted Residual -1.9 1.9  
No Count 169 4 173 
Expected Count 165.8 7.2 173.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.5 -1.5  
Irrelevant Count 24 3 27 
Expected Count 25.9 1.1 27.0 
Adjusted Residual -1.9 1.9  
Total Count 509 22 531 
Expected Count 509.0 22.0 531.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.129a 3 .043 
Likelihood Ratio 7.132 3 .068 
Linear-by-Linear Association .538 1 .463 
N of Valid Cases 531   
 
e. identification with the state 
 
 
Identification with Israel 
Total 
not at 
all 
to a small 
extent 
to some 
extent 
to a large 
extent 
Judicial 
career 
Maybe Count 0 2 29 93 124 
Expected Count 1.7 3.7 21.3 97.4 124.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.6 -1.1 2.3 -1.2  
Yes Count 0 2 10 98 110 
Expected Count 1.5 3.2 18.9 86.4 110.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.5 -.8 -2.7 3.2  
No Count 4 5 19 88 116 
Expected Count 1.6 3.4 19.9 91.1 116.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.4 1.0 -.3 -.9  
Irrelevant Count 1 2 6 14 23 
Expected Count .3 .7 3.9 18.1 23.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.3 1.7 1.2 -2.1  
Total Count 5 11 64 293 373 
Expected Count 5.0 11.0 64.0 293.0 373.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 23.928a 9 .004 
Likelihood Ratio 24.999 9 .003 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.072 1 .024 
N of Valid Cases 373   
. 
f. Satisfaction with the professional level of judges 
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Satisfaction with the professional level of judges 
Total 
           
1 
           
2 
           
3 
           
4 
           
5 
           
6 
Judicial 
career 
Maybe Count 10 49 64 42 10 5 180 
Expected Count 13.5 53.3 53.3 41.5 13.2 5.2 180.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.2 -.9 2.2 .1 -1.1 -.1  
Yes Count 22 63 35 24 3 1 148 
Expected Count 11.1 43.8 43.8 34.2 10.8 4.3 148.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
4.0 4.1 -1.9 -2.3 -2.9 -1.9  
No Count 7 37 46 48 21 8 167 
Expected Count 12.5 49.5 49.5 38.5 12.2 4.8 167.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.0 -2.6 -.7 2.1 3.2 1.8  
Irrelevant Count 0 5 9 6 4 1 25 
Expected Count 1.9 7.4 7.4 5.8 1.8 .7 25.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.5 -1.1 .7 .1 1.7 .3  
Total Count 39 154 154 120 38 15 520 
Expected Count 39.0 154.0 154.0 120.0 38.0 15.0 520.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 58.489a 15 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 59.421 15 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 10.004 1 .002 
N of Valid Cases 520   
 
g. Satisfaction with the efficiency of courts 
 
 
Satisfaction with the efficiency of courts 
Total 
           
1 
           
2 
           
3 
           
4 
           
5 
           
6 
Judicial 
career 
Maybe Count 2 14 59 68 32 5 180 
Expected Count 2.8 19.8 51.8 62.2 37.5 5.9 180.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.6 -1.7 1.5 1.1 -1.3 -.5  
Yes Count 6 32 46 44 17 2 147 
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Expected Count 2.3 16.2 42.3 50.8 30.6 4.8 147.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.9 4.9 .8 -1.4 -3.3 -1.5  
No Count 0 10 34 60 52 9 165 
Expected Count 2.5 18.2 47.5 57.0 34.4 5.4 165.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.9 -2.5 -2.8 .6 4.1 1.9  
Irrelevant Count 0 1 10 7 7 1 26 
Expected Count .4 2.9 7.5 9.0 5.4 .9 26.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.7 -1.2 1.1 -.8 .8 .2  
Total Count 8 57 149 179 108 17 518 
Expected Count 8.0 57.0 149.0 179.0 108.0 17.0 518.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 59.948a 15 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 59.237 15 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 10.092 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 518   
. 
h. Level of trust in courts 
 
 
Level of trust in courts 
Total 
to a large 
extent 
to some 
extent 
to a small 
extent 
not at 
all 
don't 
know 
Judicial 
career 
Maybe Count 45 62 15 2 1 125 
Expected 
Count 
52.1 49.4 18.2 4.6 .7 125.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.6 2.8 -1.0 -1.5 .5  
Yes Count 67 34 9 1 0 111 
Expected 
Count 
46.2 43.9 16.2 4.1 .6 111.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
4.8 -2.3 -2.3 -1.9 -.9  
No Count 35 48 26 8 1 118 
Expected 
Count 
49.1 46.6 17.2 4.4 .6 118.0 
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Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.2 .3 2.8 2.1 .6  
Irrelevant Count 10 5 5 3 0 23 
Expected 
Count 
9.6 9.1 3.4 .9 .1 23.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.2 -1.8 1.0 2.4 -.4  
Total Count 157 149 55 14 2 377 
Expected 
Count 
157.0 149.0 55.0 14.0 2.0 377.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 44.105a 12 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 43.078 12 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.333 1 .007 
N of Valid Cases 377   
. 
i. current work sector 
 
 
 
Current work sector 
Total other 
other- 
public 
sector 
courts 
system 
private 
firm 
NGO/Non-
profit 
state 
advocacy 
Judicial 
career 
Maybe Count 13 12 4 138 3 0 170 
Expected 
Count 
9.5 9.1 8.1 139.5 1.8 2.1 170.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.5 1.2 -1.8 -.4 1.2 -1.8  
Yes Count 6 7 17 100 0 6 136 
Expected 
Count 
7.6 7.3 6.4 111.6 1.4 1.7 136.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.7 -.1 5.0 -3.1 -1.4 3.9  
No Count 7 5 1 146 0 0 159 
Expected 
Count 
8.9 8.5 7.5 130.5 1.6 2.0 159.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.8 -1.5 -3.0 3.9 -1.6 -1.7  
Irrelevant Count 1 2 1 14 2 0 20 
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Expected 
Count 
1.1 1.1 .9 16.4 .2 .2 20.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.1 .9 .1 -1.4 4.1 -.5  
Total Count 27 26 23 398 5 6 485 
Expected 
Count 
27.0 26.0 23.0 398.0 5.0 6.0 485.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 68.569a 15 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 59.558 15 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.652 1 .103 
N of Valid Cases 485   
. 
 
j. Internship sector 
 
Internship sector 
Total irrelevant 
private 
sector 
public 
sector 
both 
sectors 
Judicial 
career 
Maybe Count 0 123 39 18 180 
Expected Count 1.0 110.2 46.5 22.2 180.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.3 2.4 -1.6 -1.2  
Yes Count 0 72 66 10 148 
Expected Count .8 90.6 38.3 18.3 148.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.1 -3.7 6.1 -2.4  
No Count 2 115 25 29 171 
Expected Count 1.0 104.7 44.2 21.1 171.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.3 2.0 -4.1 2.2  
Irrelevant Count 1 12 6 8 27 
Expected Count .2 16.5 7.0 3.3 27.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.2 -1.8 -.4 2.8  
Total Count 3 322 136 65 526 
Expected Count 3.0 322.0 136.0 65.0 526.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 58.985a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 55.017 9 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.804 1 .094 
N of Valid Cases 526   
 
 
k. previous work in the courts system 
 
 
Work experience in the courts system 
Total yes no 
Judicial career Maybe Count 7 30 37 
Expected Count 11.1 25.9 37.0 
Adjusted Residual -1.8 1.8  
Yes Count 26 30 56 
Expected Count 16.8 39.2 56.0 
Adjusted Residual 3.6 -3.6  
No Count 1 21 22 
Expected Count 6.6 15.4 22.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.9 2.9  
Irrelevant Count 3 5 8 
Expected Count 2.4 5.6 8.0 
Adjusted Residual .5 -.5  
Total Count 37 86 123 
Expected Count 37.0 86.0 123.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.337a 3 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 18.481 3 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association .005 1 .945 
N of Valid Cases 123   
. 
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l. Satisfaction with the legal profession 
 
 
Satisfaction with the legal profession 
Total 
strongly 
agree agree 
neither 
agree nor 
disagree disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
don't 
know 
Judicial 
career 
Maybe Count 29 96 36 17 2 1 181 
Expected 
Count 
40.8 89.1 28.3 14.9 5.9 2.1 181.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.6 1.3 1.9 .7 -2.0 -.9  
Yes Count 44 71 19 6 4 4 148 
Expected 
Count 
33.3 72.9 23.2 12.1 4.8 1.7 148.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.5 -.4 -1.1 -2.2 -.4 2.1  
No Count 37 80 23 18 11 0 169 
Expected 
Count 
38.1 83.2 26.4 13.9 5.5 1.9 169.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.2 -.6 -.9 1.4 2.9 -1.7  
Irrelevant Count 8 11 4 2 0 1 26 
Expected 
Count 
5.9 12.8 4.1 2.1 .8 .3 26.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.0 -.7 .0 -.1 -1.0 1.3  
Total Count 118 258 82 43 17 6 524 
Expected 
Count 
118.0 258.0 82.0 43.0 17.0 6.0 524.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 32.884a 15 .005 
Likelihood Ratio 34.394 15 .003 
Linear-by-Linear Association .012 1 .913 
N of Valid Cases 524   
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m. Chances of being appointed 
 
 
Chances of being appointed to the judiciary 
Total moderate high 
very 
high 
don't 
know low 
very 
low 
Judicial 
career 
Maybe Count 59 47 9 32 26 6 179 
Expected Count 48.6 55.5 12.8 32.3 21.2 8.7 179.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.2 -1.7 -1.4 -.1 1.4 -1.2  
Yes Count 50 56 10 14 13 3 146 
Expected Count 39.6 45.3 10.5 26.3 17.3 7.1 146.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.3 2.3 -.2 -3.1 -1.3 -1.9  
No Count 29 50 17 35 21 13 165 
Expected Count 44.8 51.2 11.8 29.7 19.5 8.0 165.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.3 -.2 1.9 1.3 .4 2.2  
Irrelevant Count 2 7 1 12 1 3 26 
Expected Count 7.1 8.1 1.9 4.7 3.1 1.3 26.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.3 -.5 -.7 3.8 -1.3 1.6  
Total Count 140 160 37 93 61 25 516 
Expected Count 140.0 160.0 37.0 93.0 61.0 25.0 516.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 52.469a 15 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 51.967 15 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 10.505 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 516   
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Appendix 9: statistical appendix- chapter 8 
This appendix sets out the statistical analyses conducted as part of chapter 8 (Student 
Survey). It does not cover every single statistical analysis that was carried out for the 
purpose of this study, as these are numerous. Instead, it focuses on the findings that arose 
from statistically significant cross analyses between variables, and elaborates on the 
important results displayed in chapter 8. 
The results of the significance tests (chi-square) and the outputs of the statistical package 
in which the analysis was conducted are displayed below by order of appearance in 
chapter 8. Each output table displays the actual count, the expected count, and the adjusted 
Pearson residuals, which indicate which cells in the table caused the ‘lack of fit’, i.e. 
contributed to the significant chi-square result. 
Commonly used abbreviations: 
PR= Pearson residuals 
Extent of agreement with various statements: 
 SA = strongly agree (1) 
 A=agree (2) 
 NAND= neither agree nor disagree (3) 
 D= disagree (4) 
 SD= strongly disagree (5) 
 DK= don't know (6) 
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Analysis in part 1 (demographics of Israeli law students) 
1. Cross analysis of type of academic institution with religious group by self-
definition 
 
 
Religious group 
Total 
Druz
e 
Jewis
h 
no 
religiou
s 
affiliatio
n 
Musli
m 
mixed/oth
er 
Christia
n 
Samarita
n 
Type of 
academi
c 
institutio
n 
college Count 9 478 28 26 2 12 1 556 
Expecte
d Count 
5.3 490.8 31.7 15.4 4.3 8.2 .5 556.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
2.3 -2.3 -.9 3.8 -1.6 1.9 1.0  
universit
y 
Count 2 541 38 6 6 4 0 597 
Expecte
d Count 
5.7 526.9 34.0 16.5 4.6 8.8 .5 597.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
-2.2 2.6 1.0 -3.8 .9 -2.3 -1.0  
other Count 0 4 0 0 1 1 0 6 
Expecte
d Count 
.1 5.3 .3 .2 .0 .1 .0 6.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
-.2 -1.6 -.6 -.4 4.4 3.1 -.1  
Total Count 11 1023 66 32 9 17 1 1159 
Expecte
d Count 
11.0 
1023.
0 
66.0 32.0 9.0 17.0 1.0 
1159.
0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 57.622a 12 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 38.828 12 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.584 1 .108 
N of Valid Cases 1159   
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2. Cross analysis of gender with religious groups (non-significant) 
 
 
Religious group 
Total 
Druz
e 
Jewis
h 
no 
religious 
affiliatio
n 
Musli
m 
mixed/othe
r 
Christia
n 
Samarita
n 
Gende
r 
Male Count 9 480 32 18 4 4 0 547 
Expecte
d Count 
5.2 482.2 31.0 15.5 4.2 8.5 .5 547.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.3 -.4 .3 .9 -.2 -2.1 -.9  
Femal
e 
Count 2 547 34 15 5 14 1 618 
Expecte
d Count 
5.8 544.8 35.0 17.5 4.8 9.5 .5 618.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.3 .4 -.3 -.9 .2 2.1 .9  
Total Count 11 1027 66 33 9 18 1 1165 
Expecte
d Count 
11.0 
1027.
0 
66.0 33.0 9.0 18.0 1.0 
1165.
0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.541a 6 .073 
Likelihood Ratio 12.578 6 .050 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.492 1 .114 
N of Valid Cases 1165   
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3. Cross analysis of type of academic institution with self-defined Jewish 
ethnicity 
 
 
Jewish Ethnicity 
Total Ashkenazi Ethiopian Irrelevant mixed Sephardic 
former 
USSR 
Type of 
Academic 
institution 
College Count 115 4 67 74 233 9 502 
Expected 
Count 
175.4 4.2 47.7 87.4 170.7 16.7 502.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-7.7 -.1 4.0 -2.2 8.0 -2.6  
university Count 261 5 35 115 135 27 578 
Expected 
Count 
201.9 4.8 54.9 100.7 196.6 19.2 578.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
7.5 .1 -4.1 2.3 -7.9 2.7  
other Count 3 0 1 0 1 0 5 
Expected 
Count 
1.7 .0 .5 .9 1.7 .2 5.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.2 -.2 .8 -1.0 -.7 -.4  
Total Count 379 9 103 189 369 36 1085 
Expected 
Count 
379.0 9.0 103.0 189.0 369.0 36.0 1085.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 108.797a 10 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 111.666 10 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
51.659 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1085   
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4. Cross analysis of type of academic institution with Intra-Jewish ethnicity by 
father's country of birth 
 
 
Eda by Father 
Total Sephardic Ashkenazi Ethiopian 
former 
USSR Israel 
 type of 
academic 
institution 
college Count 124 82 4 36 297 543 
Expected 
Count 
105.0 91.6 4.3 35.8 306.3 543.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.9 -1.5 -.2 .1 -1.1  
university Count 94 107 5 38 345 589 
Expected 
Count 
113.9 99.4 4.7 38.8 332.3 589.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.0 1.2 .2 -.2 1.5  
other Count 2 3 0 1 0 6 
Expected 
Count 
1.2 1.0 .0 .4 3.4 6.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.9 2.2 -.2 1.0 -2.8  
Total Count 220 192 9 75 642 1138 
Expected 
Count 
220.0 192.0 9.0 75.0 642.0 1138.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 18.211a 8 .020 
Likelihood Ratio 19.946 8 .011 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.625 1 .202 
N of Valid Cases 1138   
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Analyses in Part 2 (Law students’ experiences and attitudes) 
1. Cross analysis of religious group with self-definition as Israeli 
 
 
Religious group 
Total 
Druz
e 
Jewis
h 
no 
religiou
s 
affiliatio
n 
Musli
m 
mixed/oth
er 
Christia
n 
Samarita
n 
Definitio
n as 
'Israeli 
not at all Count 2 1 3 3 0 1 0 10 
Expecte
d Count 
.1 8.8 .6 .3 .1 .1 .0 10.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
6.2 -7.7 3.3 5.2 -.3 2.2 -.1  
to a 
small 
extent 
Count 0 7 6 10 1 1 0 25 
Expecte
d Count 
.2 22.0 1.4 .7 .2 .4 .0 25.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
-.5 -9.4 4.0 11.2 1.8 1.1 -.1  
to some 
extent 
Count 0 46 25 10 5 12 1 99 
Expecte
d Count 
.9 87.2 5.7 2.8 .8 1.5 .1 99.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
-1.0 -13.4 8.7 4.5 5.0 9.2 3.3  
absolutel
y 
Count 9 960 32 10 3 3 0 1017 
Expecte
d Count 
9.7 895.9 58.3 29.2 8.0 15.0 .9 
1017.
0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
-.7 18.2 -10.4 -10.6 -5.2 -9.2 -2.8  
Total Count 11 1014 66 33 9 17 1 1151 
Expecte
d Count 
11.0 
1014.
0 
66.0 33.0 9.0 17.0 1.0 
1151.
0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 491.177a 18 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 265.153 18 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 255.136 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1151   
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2. Cross analysis of religious group with extent of identification with the state 
 
 
Religious Group 
Total 
Druz
e 
Jewis
h 
no 
religiou
s 
affiliatio
n 
Musli
m 
mixed/oth
er 
Christia
n 
Samarita
n 
Identificatio
n with the 
State 
not 
at all 
Count 1 6 4 3 0 0 0 14 
Expecte
d Count 
.1 12.3 .8 .4 .1 .2 .0 14.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
2.4 -5.3 3.7 4.3 -.3 -.5 -.1  
to a 
small 
exten
t 
Count 1 31 17 11 2 1 0 63 
Expecte
d Count 
.6 55.5 3.7 1.8 .4 1.0 .1 63.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
.5 -9.8 7.4 7.3 2.4 .0 -.2  
to 
some 
exten
t 
Count 1 176 25 11 5 10 0 228 
Expecte
d Count 
2.2 200.8 13.3 6.3 1.6 3.6 .2 228.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
-.9 -5.7 3.7 2.1 3.0 3.8 -.5  
to a 
large 
exten
t 
Count 8 800 21 7 1 7 1 845 
Expecte
d Count 
8.1 744.3 49.2 23.5 5.9 13.2 .7 845.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
-.1 11.5 -8.1 -6.7 -3.9 -3.4 .6  
Total Count 11 1013 67 32 8 18 1 1150 
Expecte
d Count 
11.0 
1013.
0 
67.0 32.0 8.0 18.0 1.0 
1150.
0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
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 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 228.606a 18 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 162.311 18 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 97.564 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1150   
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3. Cross tab between view of the composition of Israeli judiciary and the 
perception of it as balanced and fair 
 
 
Q29Israel's legal system is balanced and 
fair 
Total SA A NAND D SD DK 
Q29The composition of the Israeli 
judiciary reflects the composition of 
Israeli society 
1 Count 17 10 10 6 1 0 44 
Expected 
Count 
1.9 14.4 15.0 9.7 2.6 .4 44.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
11.6 -1.5 -1.6 -1.4 -1.0 -.7  
2 Count 9 85 51 23 1 2 171 
Expected 
Count 
7.2 56.1 58.2 37.8 10.0 1.7 171.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.7 5.0 -1.2 -2.9 -3.1 .3  
3 Count 9 77 77 30 7 0 200 
Expected 
Count 
8.4 65.7 68.1 44.2 11.7 2.0 200.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.2 1.9 1.4 -2.6 -1.5 -1.5  
4 Count 11 171 181 122 14 4 503 
Expected 
Count 
21.2 165.1 171.2 111.1 29.5 4.9 503.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.9 .7 1.2 1.5 -3.7 -.5  
5 Count 8 65 111 102 52 1 339 
Expected 
Count 
14.3 111.3 115.4 74.9 19.9 3.3 339.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.0 -6.2 -.6 4.1 8.6 -1.5  
6 Count 2 29 23 11 3 6 74 
Expected 
Count 
3.1 24.3 25.2 16.3 4.3 .7 74.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.7 1.2 -.6 -1.5 -.7 6.4  
Total Count 56 437 453 294 78 13 1331 
Expected 
Count 
56.0 437.0 453.0 294.0 78.0 13.0 1331.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 314.308a 25 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 210.687 25 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 92.763 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1331   
 
 
4. Cross-analyses of Level of trust in courts and other factors: 
4.1 religious groups (non-significant but note Muslim group) 
 
 
Religious group 
Total 
Druz
e 
Jewis
h 
no 
religious 
affiliatio
n 
Musli
m 
mixed/othe
r 
Christia
n 
Samarita
n 
Level 
of 
trust 
in 
court
s 
to a 
large 
exten
t 
Count 6 407 27 4 2 6 1 453 
Expecte
d Count 
4.3 399.4 26.2 12.5 3.5 6.7 .4 453.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.1 1.4 .2 -3.1 -1.0 -.3 1.2  
to 
some 
exten
t 
Count 4 491 27 21 7 10 0 560 
Expecte
d Count 
5.3 493.7 32.4 15.5 4.4 8.2 .5 560.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.8 -.5 -1.4 2.0 1.8 .9 -1.0  
to 
small 
exten
t 
Count 1 103 11 7 0 1 0 123 
Expecte
d Count 
1.2 108.4 7.1 3.4 1.0 1.8 .1 123.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.2 -1.6 1.6 2.1 -1.0 -.6 -.3  
not at 
all 
Count 0 17 2 0 0 0 0 19 
Expecte
d Count 
.2 16.8 1.1 .5 .1 .3 .0 19.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.4 .2 .9 -.7 -.4 -.5 -.1  
don't 
know 
Count 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Expecte
d Count 
.0 2.6 .2 .1 .0 .0 .0 3.0 
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Adjusted 
Residual 
-.2 .6 -.4 -.3 -.2 -.2 -.1  
Total Count 11 1021 67 32 9 17 1 1158 
Expecte
d Count 
11.0 
1021.
0 
67.0 32.0 9.0 17.0 1.0 
1158.
0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 23.943a 24 .465 
Likelihood Ratio 27.194 24 .296 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.658 1 .198 
N of Valid Cases 1158   
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4.2 identification with the state 
 
 
Extent of Identification with the State 
Total 
not at 
all 
to a small 
extent 
to some 
extent 
to a large 
extent 
Level trust in 
courts 
to a large 
extent 
Count 2 9 65 383 459 
Expected 
Count 
5.4 25.7 89.9 338.0 459.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.9 -4.3 -3.7 6.1  
to some 
extent 
Count 5 32 138 395 570 
Expected 
Count 
6.8 31.9 111.6 419.8 570.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.9 .0 3.9 -3.3  
to small 
extent 
Count 7 18 27 76 128 
Expected 
Count 
1.5 7.2 25.1 94.3 128.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
4.7 4.4 .5 -3.9  
not at all Count 0 7 1 11 19 
Expected 
Count 
.2 1.1 3.7 14.0 19.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.5 6.0 -1.6 -1.6  
don’t know Count 0 0 0 4 4 
Expected 
Count 
.0 .2 .8 2.9 4.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.2 -.5 -1.0 1.2  
Total Count 14 66 231 869 1180 
Expected 
Count 
14.0 66.0 231.0 869.0 1180.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 111.387a 12 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 85.317 12 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 57.076 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1180   
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4.3 Definition as Israeli  
 
 
Extent of definition as Israeli 
Total 
not at 
all 
to a small 
extent 
to some 
extent absolutely 
Level of trust in 
courts 
to a large 
extent 
Count 1 5 27 425 458 
Expected 
Count 
3.9 10.1 38.1 405.9 458.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.9 -2.1 -2.4 3.6  
to some 
extent 
Count 3 12 59 497 571 
Expected 
Count 
4.8 12.6 47.5 506.1 571.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.2 -.2 2.4 -1.7  
to small 
extent 
Count 6 9 8 104 127 
Expected 
Count 
1.1 2.8 10.6 112.6 127.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
5.0 4.0 -.9 -2.5  
not at all Count 0 0 4 15 19 
Expected 
Count 
.2 .4 1.6 16.8 19.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.4 -.7 2.0 -1.3  
don't know Count 0 0 0 4 4 
Expected 
Count 
.0 .1 .3 3.5 4.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.2 -.3 -.6 .7  
Total Count 10 26 98 1045 1179 
Expected 
Count 
10.0 26.0 98.0 1045.0 1179.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 55.024a 12 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 39.948 12 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 21.305 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1179   
 
5. Cross analyses of various factors with stand on action for judicial diversity 
5.1 Religious group (overall non-significant but note high support in action for 
Muslim students) 
 
 
Religious group Total 
Druz
e Jewish 
no 
religious 
affiliatio
n 
Musli
m 
mixed/othe
r 
Christia
n 
Samarita
n  
Action 
for 
judicial 
diversit
y in 
Israel 
ye
s 
Count 9 762 49 29 7 14 1 871 
Expecte
d Count 
8.4 771.5 49.7 23.0 6.1 11.5 .8 871.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.4 -2.1 -.2 2.6 .7 1.5 .6  
no Count 2 246 16 1 1 1 0 267 
Expecte
d Count 
2.6 236.5 15.3 7.0 1.9 3.5 .2 267.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.4 2.1 .2 -2.6 -.7 -1.5 -.6  
Total Count 11 1008 65 30 8 15 1 1138 
Expecte
d Count 11.0 1008.0 65.0 30.0 8.0 15.0 1.0 
1138.
0 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp
. Sig. 
(2-
sided) 
Pearson 
Chi-Square 
10.685a 6 .099 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
14.550 6 .024 
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Linear-by-
Linear 
Association 
6.793 1 .009 
N of Valid 
Cases 
1138   
 
5.2 Gender 
 
 
Gender 
Total Male Female 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 385 498 883 
Expected Count 413.6 469.4 883.0 
Adjusted Residual -4.0 4.0  
no Count 156 116 272 
Expected Count 127.4 144.6 272.0 
Adjusted Residual 4.0 -4.0  
Total Count 541 614 1155 
Expected Count 541.0 614.0 1155.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.793a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 15.245 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 15.787 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 15.779 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 1155     
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5.3 Jewish ethnicity 
 
 
Jewish Ethnicity 
Total Ashkenazi Ethiopian irrelevant mixed Sephardic 
former 
USSR 
Action for 
judicial 
diversity in 
Israel 
yes Count 243 8 72 143 316 24 806 
Expected 
Count 
282.8 6.8 74.9 142.1 271.4 28.0 806.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-5.9 .9 -.7 .2 6.7 -1.5  
no Count 131 1 27 45 43 13 260 
Expected 
Count 
91.2 2.2 24.1 45.9 87.6 9.0 260.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
5.9 -.9 .7 -.2 -6.7 1.5  
Total Count 374 9 99 188 359 37 1066 
Expected 
Count 
374.0 9.0 99.0 188.0 359.0 37.0 1066.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson 
Chi-Square 
56.581a 5 .000 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
59.658 5 .000 
Linear-by-
Linear 
Association 
38.999 1 .000 
N of Valid 
Cases 
1066   
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5.4 Religiosity 
 
 
Religiosity 
Total other atheist religious 
very 
religious secular 
traditional 
(massorti) 
Action for 
judicial 
diversity in 
Israel 
yes Count 17 78 130 15 365 257 862 
Expected 
Count 
19.1 84.0 124.5 15.3 395.5 223.7 862.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.0 -1.4 1.1 -.1 -4.3 5.3  
no Count 8 32 33 5 153 36 267 
Expected 
Count 
5.9 26.0 38.5 4.7 122.5 69.3 267.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.0 1.4 -1.1 .1 4.3 -5.3  
Total Count 25 110 163 20 518 293 1129 
Expected 
Count 
25.0 110.0 163.0 20.0 518.0 293.0 1129.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-
Square 
34.730a 5 .000 
Likelihood 
Ratio 
37.332 5 .000 
Linear-by-
Linear 
Association 
6.127 1 .013 
N of Valid 
Cases 
1129   
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5.5 Identification with the state 
 
 
Identification with the State 
Total 
not at 
all 
to a small 
extent 
to some 
extent 
to a large 
extent 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 12 54 180 635 881 
Expected 
Count 
9.9 47.3 171.8 652.0 881.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.4 2.0 1.4 -2.7  
no Count 1 8 45 219 273 
Expected 
Count 
3.1 14.7 53.2 202.0 273.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.4 -2.0 -1.4 2.7  
Total Count 13 62 225 854 1154 
Expected 
Count 
13.0 62.0 225.0 854.0 1154.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.338a 3 .025 
Likelihood Ratio 10.408 3 .015 
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.296 1 .002 
N of Valid Cases 1154   
a. 1 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 3.08. 
 
5.6 Type of academic institution 
 
 
Academic Institution 
Total college university other 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 516 457 5 978 
Expected Count 489.8 482.9 5.3 978.0 
Adjusted Residual 3.5 -3.4 -.3  
no Count 125 175 2 302 
Expected Count 151.2 149.1 1.7 302.0 
Adjusted Residual -3.5 3.4 .3  
Total Count 641 632 7 1280 
Expected Count 641.0 632.0 7.0 1280.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.935a 2 .003 
Likelihood Ratio 11.981 2 .003 
Linear-by-Linear Association 11.729 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 1280   
 
5.7 previous experiences of discrimination (displaying only significant chi-sq.) 
On grounds of gender (studies/work) 
 
 
Q44Discrimination.Gender.Studies 
Total 0 1 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 916 67 983 
Expected Count 926.6 56.4 983.0 
Adjusted Residual -3.0 3.0  
no Count 299 7 306 
Expected Count 288.4 17.6 306.0 
Adjusted Residual 3.0 -3.0  
Total Count 1215 74 1289 
Expected Count 1215.0 74.0 1289.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.843a 1 .003   
Continuity Correctionb 8.026 1 .005   
Likelihood Ratio 10.622 1 .001   
Fisher's Exact Test    .002 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 8.836 1 .003   
N of Valid Cases 1289     
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Q44Discrimination.Gender.Work 
Total 0 1 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 857 126 983 
Expected Count 870.1 112.9 983.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.7 2.7  
no Count 284 22 306 
Expected Count 270.9 35.1 306.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.7 -2.7  
Total Count 1141 148 1289 
Expected Count 1141.0 148.0 1289.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.274a 1 .007   
Continuity Correctionb 6.730 1 .009   
Likelihood Ratio 7.969 1 .005   
Fisher's Exact Test    .007 .004 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.268 1 .007   
N of Valid Cases 1289     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 35.13. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
On the ground of ethnicity (studies/work) 
 
 
Q44Discrimination.Ethnicity.Studie
s 
Total 0 1 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 893 90 983 
Expected Count 909.8 73.2 983.0 
Adjusted Residual -4.2 4.2  
no Count 300 6 306 
Expected Count 283.2 22.8 306.0 
Adjusted Residual 4.2 -4.2  
Total Count 1193 96 1289 
Expected Count 1193.0 96.0 1289.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
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 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.525a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 16.497 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 22.439 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 17.512 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 1289     
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22.79. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
On ground of religion (studies/work) 
 
 
Q44Discrimination.Religion.Studie
s 
Total 0 1 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 914 69 983 
Expected Count 924.3 58.7 983.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.8 2.8  
no Count 298 8 306 
Expected Count 287.7 18.3 306.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.8 -2.8  
Total Count 1212 77 1289 
Expected Count 1212.0 77.0 1289.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.062a 1 .005   
Continuity Correctionb 7.296 1 .007   
Likelihood Ratio 9.518 1 .002   
Fisher's Exact Test    .003 .002 
Linear-by-Linear Association 8.055 1 .005   
N of Valid Cases 1289     
 
 
 
 
Q44Discrimination.Religion.Work 
Total 0 1 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 917 66 983 
Expected Count 925.0 58.0 983.0 
505 
 
Adjusted Residual -2.2 2.2  
no Count 296 10 306 
Expected Count 288.0 18.0 306.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.2 -2.2  
Total Count 1213 76 1289 
Expected Count 1213.0 76.0 1289.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.995a 1 .025   
Continuity Correctionb 4.393 1 .036   
Likelihood Ratio 5.642 1 .018   
Fisher's Exact Test    .026 .014 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.991 1 .025   
N of Valid Cases 1289     
 
On grounds of nationality (work/studies) 
 
 
discrimination nationality studies 
Total no yes 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 908 75 983 
Expected Count 918.9 64.1 983.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.9 2.9  
no Count 297 9 306 
Expected Count 286.1 19.9 306.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.9 -2.9  
Total Count 1205 84 1289 
Expected Count 1205.0 84.0 1289.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.420a 1 .004   
Continuity Correctionb 7.668 1 .006   
Likelihood Ratio 9.877 1 .002   
Fisher's Exact Test    .003 .002 
Linear-by-Linear Association 8.414 1 .004   
N of Valid Cases 1289     
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discrimination nationality work 
Total .00 1.00 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 930 53 983 
Expected Count 938.0 45.0 983.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.5 2.5  
no Count 300 6 306 
Expected Count 292.0 14.0 306.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.5 -2.5  
Total Count 1230 59 1289 
Expected Count 1230.0 59.0 1289.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 6.289a 1 .012   
Continuity Correctionb 5.528 1 .019   
Likelihood Ratio 7.473 1 .006   
Fisher's Exact Test    .011 .006 
Linear-by-Linear Association 6.284 1 .012   
N of Valid Cases 1289     
 
507 
 
 
5.8 Level of trust in courts 
 
 
Extent of trust in Israeli courts 
Total 
to a large 
extent 
to some 
extent 
to small 
extent 
not at 
all 
don't 
know 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 318 446 104 16 1 885 
Expected 
Count 
345.8 428.8 94.4 12.9 3.0 885.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.9 2.4 2.1 1.8 -2.4  
no Count 136 117 20 1 3 277 
Expected 
Count 
108.2 134.2 29.6 4.1 1.0 277.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
3.9 -2.4 -2.1 -1.8 2.4  
Total Count 454 563 124 17 4 1162 
Expected 
Count 
454.0 563.0 124.0 17.0 4.0 1162.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 25.101a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 24.922 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 12.498 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1162   
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5.9 Position regarding affirmative action in Israel: 
 
 
Groups worthy of affirmative action 
Total  
oth
er 
people 
with 
disabiliti
es) 
none 
of 
the 
grou
ps 
orthod
ox and 
religio
us 
Jews 
Sephar
dic 
Jews 
wom
en 
new 
immigra
nts 
Ara
bs 
LG
BT 
Action 
for 
judicia
l 
divers
ity in 
Israel 
ye
s 
Count 116 44 274 70 29 89 129 61 135 36 983 
Expect
ed 
Count 
119
.0 
49.
6 
270.7 86.9 25.9 74.7 
125.
8 
67.9 
124.
3 
38.1 
983.
0 
Adjust
ed 
Residu
al 
-.6 
-
1.7 
.5 -3.9 1.3 3.5 .6 -1.8 2.1 -.7  
no Count 40 21 81 44 5 9 36 28 28 14 306 
Expect
ed 
Count 
37.
0 
15.
4 
84.3 27.1 8.1 23.3 39.2 21.1 38.7 11.9 
306.
0 
Adjust
ed 
Residu
al 
.6 1.7 -.5 3.9 -1.3 -3.5 -.6 1.8 -2.1 .7  
Total Count 156 65 355 114 34 98 165 89 163 50 1289 
Expect
ed 
Count 
156
.0 
65.
0 
355.0 
114.
0 
34.0 98.0 
165.
0 
89.0 
163.
0 
50.0 
1289
.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 37.661a 9 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 38.807 9 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1289   
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5.10 attitudes towards the Israeli judiciary 
Judges are professional and objective 
 
 
Judges are professional, objective and neutral 
decision-makers 
Total SA A NAND D SD DK 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 41 316 274 290 55 3 979 
Expected 
Count 
45.7 349.2 262.3 265.3 50.3 6.1 979.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.5 -4.5 1.7 3.6 1.4 -2.6  
no Count 19 142 70 58 11 5 305 
Expected 
Count 
14.3 108.8 81.7 82.7 15.7 1.9 305.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.5 4.5 -1.7 -3.6 -1.4 2.6  
Total Count 60 458 344 348 66 8 1284 
Expected 
Count 
60.0 458.0 344.0 348.0 66.0 8.0 1284.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 35.683a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 34.570 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 18.203 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1284   
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The importance of background characteristics of judges 
 
 
The background characteristics of judges (e.g. age, gender, 
ethnicity, religion etc.) have no bearing on the decisions they 
reach. 
Total SA A NAND D SD DK 
Action for 
judicial 
diversity in 
Israel 
yes Count 44 103 132 474 219 7 979 
Expected 
Count 
45.1 109.3 141.4 478.4 198.7 6.1 979.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.3 -1.3 -1.8 -.6 3.3 .7  
no Count 15 40 53 152 41 1 302 
Expected 
Count 
13.9 33.7 43.6 147.6 61.3 1.9 302.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.3 1.3 1.8 .6 -3.3 -.7  
Total Count 59 143 185 626 260 8 1281 
Expected 
Count 
59.0 143.0 185.0 626.0 260.0 8.0 1281.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.800a 5 .017 
Likelihood Ratio 14.530 5 .013 
Linear-by-Linear Association 8.429 1 .004 
N of Valid Cases 1281   
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Judicial diversity is important to legitimacy of courts 
 
 
Judicial diversity is an important component in the 
legitimacy of courts 
Total SA A NAND D SD DK 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 426 445 66 27 2 6 972 
Expected 
Count 
363.6 446.0 92.2 54.1 9.1 6.9 972.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
8.5 -.1 -5.9 -7.8 -4.9 -.7  
no Count 51 140 55 44 10 3 303 
Expected 
Count 
113.4 139.0 28.8 16.9 2.9 2.1 303.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-8.5 .1 5.9 7.8 4.9 .7  
Total Count 477 585 121 71 12 9 1275 
Expected 
Count 
477.0 585.0 121.0 71.0 12.0 9.0 1275.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 157.591a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 146.749 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 138.791 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1275   
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The composition of the Israeli judiciary reflects the composition of society 
 
 
The composition of the Israeli judiciary reflects the 
composition of Israeli society 
Total SA A NAND D SD DK 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 26 106 134 394 278 42 980 
Expected 
Count 
32.8 126.0 150.5 372.8 246.7 51.2 980.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.5 -3.9 -3.0 2.9 4.7 -2.7  
no Count 17 59 63 94 45 25 303 
Expected 
Count 
10.2 39.0 46.5 115.2 76.3 15.8 303.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.5 3.9 3.0 -2.9 -4.7 2.7  
Total Count 43 165 197 488 323 67 1283 
Expected 
Count 
43.0 165.0 197.0 488.0 323.0 67.0 1283.0 
The Israeli judiciary should reflect a variety of sectors 
 
 
It is important that a variety of sectors of Israeli society (e.g. 
women, Sephardic Jews, Arabs etc.) are represented in the 
judiciary 
Total SA A NAND D SD DK 
Action for 
judicial 
diversity in 
Israel 
yes Count 503 388 54 16 8 1 970 
Expected 
Count 
428.6 398.1 83.1 42.7 16.0 1.5 970.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
9.9 -1.3 -6.9 -8.6 -4.1 -.9  
no Count 59 134 55 40 13 1 302 
Expected 
Count 
133.4 123.9 25.9 13.3 5.0 .5 302.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-9.9 1.3 6.9 8.6 4.1 .9  
Total Count 562 522 109 56 21 2 1272 
Expected 
Count 
562.0 522.0 109.0 56.0 21.0 2.0 1272.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 186.479a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 173.365 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 174.775 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1272   
 
Israeli judiciary has a political orientation 
 
 
The Israeli legal system is characterized by a clear 
political orientation 
Total SA A NAND D SD DK 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 105 237 332 219 58 30 981 
Expected 
Count 
87.9 222.3 331.6 233.8 74.1 31.3 981.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
3.9 2.3 .1 -2.3 -4.0 -.5  
no Count 10 54 102 87 39 11 303 
Expected 
Count 
27.1 68.7 102.4 72.2 22.9 9.7 303.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.9 -2.3 -.1 2.3 4.0 .5  
Total Count 115 291 434 306 97 41 1284 
Expected 
Count 
115.0 291.0 434.0 306.0 97.0 41.0 1284.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 37.312a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 38.946 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 30.646 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1284   
 
 
514 
 
Israeli judiciary is balanced and fair 
 
 
Israel's legal system is balanced and 
fair 
Total SA A NAND D SD DK 
Action for judicial diversity in 
Israel 
yes Count 30 282 336 251 66 8 973 
Expected Count 41.3 323.3 327.9 214.8 56.6 9.2 973.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.7 -5.8 1.1 5.8 2.7 -.8  
no Count 24 141 93 30 8 4 300 
Expected Count 12.7 99.7 101.1 66.2 17.4 2.8 300.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
3.7 5.8 -1.1 -5.8 -2.7 .8  
Total Count 54 423 429 281 74 12 1273 
Expected Count 54.0 423.0 429.0 281.0 74.0 12.0 1273.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 69.559a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 72.063 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 55.986 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1273   
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The composition of the Israeli judiciary reflects that of the legal profession 
 
 
The composition of the Israeli judiciary reflects the 
composition of legal professionals in Israel 
Total SA A NAND D SD DK 
Action for 
judicial diversity 
in Israel 
yes Count 15 145 218 306 126 170 980 
Expected 
Count 
19.1 152.2 227.2 287.7 116.3 177.5 980.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.0 -1.3 -1.4 2.7 2.0 -1.3  
no Count 10 54 79 70 26 62 301 
Expected 
Count 
5.9 46.8 69.8 88.3 35.7 54.5 301.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
2.0 1.3 1.4 -2.7 -2.0 1.3  
Total Count 25 199 297 376 152 232 1281 
Expected 
Count 
25.0 199.0 297.0 376.0 152.0 232.0 1281.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 16.623a 5 .005 
Likelihood Ratio 16.582 5 .005 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.218 1 .136 
N of Valid Cases 1281   
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The judiciary will diversify over time 
 
 
The judiciary will become increasingly diverse 
over time 
Total SA A NAND D SD DK 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 127 337 237 131 16 120 968 
Expected 
Count 
121.3 357.0 239.5 117.5 13.7 119.0 968.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.1 -2.7 -.4 2.7 1.3 .2  
no Count 32 131 77 23 2 36 301 
Expected 
Count 
37.7 111.0 74.5 36.5 4.3 37.0 301.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.1 2.7 .4 -2.7 -1.3 -.2  
Total Count 159 468 314 154 18 156 1269 
Expected 
Count 
159.0 468.0 314.0 154.0 18.0 156.0 1269.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 14.152a 5 .015 
Likelihood Ratio 15.008 5 .010 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.783 1 .182 
N of Valid Cases 1269   
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The judiciary should reflect society 
 
 
The composition of the judiciary needs to reflect the 
composition of the society in which it operates. 
Total SA A NAND D SD DK 
Action for 
judicial diversity 
in Israel 
yes Count 374 389 139 52 10 3 967 
Expected 
Count 
311.4 370.8 159.9 96.7 25.1 3.0 967.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
8.8 2.5 -3.7 -9.8 -6.3 -.1  
no Count 35 98 71 75 23 1 303 
Expected 
Count 
97.6 116.2 50.1 30.3 7.9 1.0 303.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-8.8 -2.5 3.7 9.8 6.3 .1  
Total Count 409 487 210 127 33 4 1270 
Expected 
Count 
409.0 487.0 210.0 127.0 33.0 4.0 1270.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 192.676a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 181.972 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 179.124 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1270   
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Judges sit in an ivory tower detached from daily life 
 
 
Q29Judges sit in an ‘ivory tower’ and are detached 
from everyday life 
Total SA A NAND D SD DK 
Action for judicial 
diversity in Israel 
yes Count 39 159 317 340 112 12 979 
Expected 
Count 
35.9 151.8 293.8 356.3 125.9 15.3 979.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.1 1.3 3.3 -2.2 -2.7 -1.7  
no Count 8 40 68 127 53 8 304 
Expected 
Count 
11.1 47.2 91.2 110.7 39.1 4.7 304.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.1 -1.3 -3.3 2.2 2.7 1.7  
Total Count 47 199 385 467 165 20 1283 
Expected 
Count 
47.0 199.0 385.0 467.0 165.0 20.0 1283.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.914a 5 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 22.716 5 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 17.343 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1283   
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Analyses in part 3: intentions of Israeli students (regarding the legal profession 
and the judiciary) 
1. Factors associated with a desire for a judicial career 
a. Nationality/religion (non-significant but note PR for Muslim group) 
 
 
Religious group 
Total 
Druz
e 
Jewis
h 
no 
religiou
s 
affiliatio
n 
Musli
m 
mixed/oth
er 
Christia
n 
Samarita
n 
Judicial 
Career 
(with 
undecide
d) 
No Count 2 209 18 3 1 5 0 238 
Expecte
d Count 
2.3 208.9 14.2 7.0 1.7 3.6 .2 238.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
-.2 .0 1.2 -1.7 -.6 .8 -.5  
Mayb
e 
Count 5 460 28 14 5 4 0 516 
Expecte
d Count 
5.1 452.9 30.9 15.2 3.7 7.8 .5 516.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
.0 1.3 -.7 -.4 .9 -1.9 -.9  
Yes Count 4 314 21 16 2 8 1 366 
Expecte
d Count 
3.6 321.2 21.9 10.8 2.6 5.6 .3 366.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
.3 -1.4 -.2 2.0 -.5 1.3 1.4  
Total Count 11 983 67 33 8 17 1 1120 
Expecte
d Count 
11.0 983.0 67.0 33.0 8.0 17.0 1.0 
1120.
0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.027a 12 .367 
Likelihood Ratio 13.685 12 .321 
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.709 1 .191 
N of Valid Cases 1120   
 
 
b. Gender (non-significant but note PR for male) 
 
 
Gender 
Total Male Female 
Judicial Career (with 
undecided) 
No Count 127 112 239 
Expected Count 110.7 128.3 239.0 
Adjusted Residual 2.4 -2.4  
Maybe Count 231 296 527 
Expected Count 244.1 282.9 527.0 
Adjusted Residual -1.6 1.6  
Yes Count 171 205 376 
Expected Count 174.2 201.8 376.0 
Adjusted Residual -.4 .4  
Total Count 529 613 1142 
Expected Count 529.0 613.0 1142.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.886a 2 .053 
Likelihood Ratio 5.874 2 .053 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.543 1 .111 
N of Valid Cases 1142   
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c. Age group 
 
 
Age Group 
Total 
18 - 
24 
25- 
34 
35 - 
44 
45 - 
54 
55 - 
64 other 
Judicial Career (with 
undecided) 
No Count 45 127 31 25 9 3 240 
Expected 
Count 
64.0 126.3 28.7 15.5 4.6 .8 240.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.1 .1 .5 2.8 2.3 2.7  
Maybe Count 155 279 56 32 5 0 527 
Expected 
Count 
140.5 277.3 63.1 34.1 10.1 1.8 527.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
1.9 .2 -1.3 -.5 -2.2 -1.9  
Yes Count 105 196 50 17 8 1 377 
Expected 
Count 
100.5 198.4 45.1 24.4 7.3 1.3 377.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.6 -.3 .9 -1.9 .3 -.3  
Total Count 305 602 137 74 22 4 1144 
Expected 
Count 
305.0 602.0 137.0 74.0 22.0 4.0 1144.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 31.350a 10 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 30.619 10 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 10.863 1 .001 
N of Valid Cases 1144   
522 
 
 
d. Planned internship sector 
 
 
Internship. Place 
Total  
othe
r 
do not 
intend to 
take an 
internshi
p 
privat
e 
sector 
courts 
syste
m 
NGO
s 
publi
c 
secto
r 
haven'
t 
decide
d yet 
n/
a 
Judicial 
Career 
(with 
undecide
d) 
No Count 80 4 3 138 11 12 61 56 0 365 
Expecte
d Count 
51.0 5.1 .8 113.7 22.9 7.0 94.4 68.6 
1.
5 
365.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
4.9 -.5 2.6 3.1 -2.9 2.2 -4.5 -1.9 
-
1.
4 
 
Mayb
e 
Count 97 9 1 253 29 13 211 178 3 794 
Expecte
d Count 
111.
0 
11.1 1.8 247.3 49.7 15.2 
205.
4 
149.2 
3.
2 
794.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
-1.9 -.8 -.8 .6 -4.1 -.8 .6 3.6 -.2  
Yes Count 64 11 0 146 68 8 174 90 4 565 
Expecte
d Count 
79.0 7.9 1.3 176.0 35.4 10.8 
146.
2 
106.2 
2.
3 
565.0 
Adjuste
d 
Residua
l 
-2.2 1.4 -1.4 -3.3 6.9 -1.1 3.3 -2.1 
1.
4 
 
Total Count 241 24 4 537 108 33 446 324 7 1724 
Expecte
d Count 
241.
0 
24.0 4.0 537.0 108.0 33.0 
446.
0 
324.0 
7.
0 
1724.
0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 120.402a 16 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 115.950 16 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1724   
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e. Expectation to stay in the legal profession in 5 years 
 
 
expect_to_work_in_profession_in5years 
Total yes probably no 
Judicial Career (with 
undecided) 
No Count 129 132 103 364 
Expected Count 171.1 147.0 45.9 364.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-5.0 -1.8 10.2  
Maybe Count 310 381 95 786 
Expected Count 369.4 317.5 99.1 786.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-5.8 6.3 -.6  
Yes Count 366 179 18 563 
Expected Count 264.6 227.4 71.0 563.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
10.5 -5.1 -8.2  
Total Count 805 692 216 1713 
Expected Count 805.0 692.0 216.0 1713.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 194.075a 4 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 189.816 4 .000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 148.799 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1713   
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f. Level of trust in courts 
 
 
Level of trust in courts 
Total 
to a large 
extent 
to some 
extent 
to small 
extent 
not at 
all 
don't 
know 
Judicial Career 
(with undecided) 
No Count 73 122 37 7 2 241 
Expected 
Count 
94.8 115.4 26.1 3.8 .8 241.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.2 1.0 2.5 1.9 1.4  
Maybe Count 207 267 45 9 1 529 
Expected 
Count 
208.1 253.4 57.3 8.3 1.8 529.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.1 1.6 -2.4 .3 -.9  
Yes Count 170 159 42 2 1 374 
Expected 
Count 
147.1 179.2 40.5 5.9 1.3 374.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
3.0 -2.5 .3 -2.0 -.3  
Total Count 450 548 124 18 4 1144 
Expected 
Count 
450.0 548.0 124.0 18.0 4.0 1144.0 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.571a 8 .001 
Likelihood Ratio 26.573 8 .001 
Linear-by-Linear Association 16.390 1 .000 
N of Valid Cases 1144   
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g. Perception of the Israeli judiciary as balanced and fair 
 
 
Israel's legal system is balanced and 
fair 
Total SA A NAND D SD DK 
Judicial Career (with 
undecided) 
No Count 11 73 92 72 19 2 269 
Expected Count 10.9 87.8 92.6 58.9 15.8 2.9 269.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.0 -2.2 -.1 2.2 .9 -.6  
Maybe Count 13 192 223 120 29 9 586 
Expected Count 23.8 191.2 201.8 128.4 34.4 6.4 586.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.1 .1 2.5 -1.1 -1.3 1.4  
Yes Count 28 152 125 88 27 3 423 
Expected Count 17.2 138.0 145.6 92.7 24.8 4.6 423.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
3.2 1.8 -2.6 -.7 .6 -.9  
Total Count 52 417 440 280 75 14 1278 
Expected Count 52.0 417.0 440.0 280.0 75.0 14.0 1278.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 28.052a 10 .002 
Likelihood Ratio 27.961 10 .002 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.416 1 .006 
N of Valid Cases 1278   
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h. Income level 
 
 
Income level (compared with average) 
Total 
not 
working 
well 
above 
the 
average 
well 
below 
the 
average 
above 
the 
average 
below 
the 
average 
about 
the same 
as 
average 
Judicial 
Career (with 
undecided) 
No Count 31 20 72 35 47 27 232 
Expected 
Count 
28.5 11.3 91.1 23.9 55.3 22.0 232.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.6 3.0 -2.9 2.7 -1.4 1.3  
Maybe Count 66 19 219 40 124 44 512 
Expected 
Count 
62.8 25.0 201.0 52.7 122.0 48.5 512.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.6 -1.7 2.2 -2.5 .3 -.9  
Yes Count 39 15 144 39 93 34 364 
Expected 
Count 
44.7 17.7 142.9 37.5 86.7 34.5 364.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-1.1 -.8 .1 .3 .9 -.1  
Total Count 136 54 435 114 264 105 1108 
Expected 
Count 
136.0 54.0 435.0 114.0 264.0 105.0 1108.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 26.850a 10 .003 
Likelihood Ratio 25.648 10 .004 
Linear-by-Linear Association .770 1 .380 
N of Valid Cases 1108   
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i. Previous experiences of discrimination 
 
 
discrimination nationality work 
Total No Yes 
Judicial Career (with 
undecided) 
No Count 356 9 365 
Expected Count 352.9 12.1 365.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.0 -1.0  
Maybe Count 774 20 794 
Expected Count 767.7 26.3 794.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.7 -1.7  
Yes Count 537 28 565 
Expected Count 546.3 18.7 565.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.7 2.7  
Total Count 1667 57 1724 
Expected Count 1667.0 57.0 1724.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.155a 2 .028 
Likelihood Ratio 6.742 2 .034 
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.290 1 .021 
N of Valid Cases 1724   
 
 
 
 
Q44Discrimination.age.work 
Total No Yes 
Judicial Career (with 
undecided) 
No Count 348 17 365 
Expected Count 340.4 24.6 365.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.8 -1.8  
Maybe Count 746 48 794 
Expected Count 740.6 53.4 794.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.0 -1.0  
Yes Count 514 51 565 
Expected Count 527.0 38.0 565.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.7 2.7  
Total Count 1608 116 1724 
Expected Count 1608.0 116.0 1724.0 
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Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.839a 2 .020 
Likelihood Ratio 7.711 2 .021 
Linear-by-Linear Association 7.411 1 .006 
N of Valid Cases 1724   
 
j. Self-definition as Israeli 
 
 
Nationality Self Identity 
Total 
not at 
all 
to a small 
extent 
to some 
extent absolutely 
Judicial Career (with 
undecided) 
No Count 2 10 16 210 238 
Expected 
Count 
2.1 5.4 20.5 210.0 238.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.1 2.2 -1.2 .0  
Maybe Count 5 5 41 475 526 
Expected 
Count 
4.6 12.0 45.3 464.0 526.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
.2 -2.8 -.9 2.0  
Yes Count 3 11 41 318 373 
Expected 
Count 
3.3 8.5 32.1 329.0 373.0 
Adjusted 
Residual 
-.2 1.0 2.0 -2.2  
Total Count 10 26 98 1003 1137 
Expected 
Count 
10.0 26.0 98.0 1003.0 1137.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.172a 6 .040 
Likelihood Ratio 13.420 6 .037 
Linear-by-Linear Association .539 1 .463 
N of Valid Cases 1137   
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k. Type of academic institution 
 
 
Academic Institution 
Total college university other 
Judicial Career (with 
undecided) 
No Count 198 163 3 364 
Expected Count 189.3 172.7 1.9 364.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.0 -1.2 .9  
Maybe Count 386 399 6 791 
Expected Count 411.4 375.4 4.2 791.0 
Adjusted Residual -2.5 2.3 1.2  
Yes Count 306 250 0 556 
Expected Count 289.2 263.9 2.9 556.0 
Adjusted Residual 1.7 -1.4 -2.1  
Total Count 890 812 9 1711 
Expected Count 890.0 812.0 9.0 1711.0 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10.061a 4 .039 
Likelihood Ratio 12.798 4 .012 
Linear-by-Linear Association .630 1 .427 
N of Valid Cases 1711   
 
 
 
